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Abstract
Beginning with a definition of "race" as a system of 
discourse about human difference sustained by its symbolic 
articulations, I approach "race" as analogous to the social 
disciplines that Foucault describes as constructing the 
modern subject. Bringing together certain speculations of 
Lacan, Fanon, and Morrison, I suggest that this racial 
discipline facilitates a racial "mirror stage" through 
which "blackness" and "whiteness" are projected as distinct 
and unified conceptions of identity. My readings of 
representative texts examine how such racial identity 
patterns are both seductive as resolutions of self-discord 
and destructive in tension with the multiple, 
interpersonal, and historical determinations of the self. 
The anxieties of psychic and bodily disintegration 
represented in these texts simultaneously inscribe this 
tension and, because they are evoked in overtly racialized 
contexts, suggest the uses and effects of "race" in U.S. 
culture. These implications of "race" are quite different 
for whites and blacks, but it is precisely the study of 
texts by white and black writers together, as a literature 
of social racialization, rather than as literatures by 
"whites" and "blacks," that reveals the discursivity of 
"race" and its role in the construction and destruction of 
the self.
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Thus, chapter 2 reads Stein's representation of 
"black," fragmented subjectivity in Melanc tha as a 
racialized re-presentation of the social disciplines that 
circumscribed Stein's own identity and precipitated her 
anxieties of disintegration, while also noting how Stein's 
compositional approach dramatically illustrates "race" as a 
discursive system. Chapter 3 shows how Ellison's Invisible 
Man evokes the "white" mirror stage, its production of 
disciplinary models of "black" identity, and the 
disintegration of the "black" self-experience that results. 
Chapter 4 compares the blackface device employed in 
Berryman's Dream Sonas to the function of historical 
minstrelsy, suggesting how Berryman simultaneously 
acknowledges the internal "blackness" that structures 
normative "white" identity, yet manipulates a carnivalized 
"blackness" to allay the moral and organizational anxieties 
of “whiteness." Chapter 5 suggests additional historical 
and theoretical directions for this racially politicized 
psychoanalytic criticism, applying Kohutian self psychology 
to the felt disintegration of the African-American self 
that, in Morrison's Beloved. is the legacy of slavery's 
intrapsychic and intrafamilial disruptions.
Chapter One 
Introduction: Identity, Race, Fragmentation
In going underground, I whipped it all except the mind, 
the mind. And the mind that has conceived a plan of 
living must never lose sight of the chaos against which 
that pattern was conceived. That goes for societies as 
well as for individuals. (Invisible Man 567)
Near the end of Part Two of his Autobiography. in the 
midst of a rare admission of incapacity, Benjamin Franklin 
uses an intriguing parable to illustrate his personal 
surrender to "faulty character" (82). After outlining his 
"bold and arduous project of arriving at moral perfection" 
(75), with its thirteen categories of "virtue," its step-by- 
step regimen for making virtue habitual, and its reduction 
of both moral identity and daily life to a set of visual 
grids, Franklin admits that the category he labeled "Order" 
was his persistent tripping stone. To illustrate his 
frustrated resignation to disorder, Franklin tells the story 
of a man who, given the unendurable difficulty of perfecting 
an ax, decides to accept the instrument in its flawed state. 
The frank self-ironization of this anecdote is undercut by 
an irony Franklin evidently misses--the fact that his bid to 
perfectly organize and order his identity is derailed 
precisely by the inability to obtain perfect "Order"--but 
what makes the parable most telling, given its location in 
this archetypical document of the shaping of "American 
identity," is its almost unconscious yoking of the struggle 
for self order with a certain semiotics of color.
The anecdote, as Franklin relates it, involves a man so 
obsessed with making the "face" of his new ax "bright" that 
he is willing to take on the arduous task of turning the 
wheel himself while the smith attempts to "grind it bright." 
Like Franklin in his struggle to order his life, the poor 
fellow eventually tires of the futile task. "No, says the 
Smith, Turn on, turn on; we shall have it bright by and by; 
as yet 'tis only speckled. Yes, says the Man; but--I think 
I like a speckled Ax best" (82, Franklin's emphasis) . As 
Franklin notes, quickly restoring his own upper hand, this 
is probably emblematic of other seekers after virtue who, 
lacking a systematic and structured approach like his own, 
"have given up the Struggle, and concluded that a speckled 
Ax was best" (82) . Still, he admits, in that one category-- 
"Order"--he himself was "incorrigible"--speckled, as it 
were.
As is indicated by the preoccupation with order itself 
and by the careful structuring, regimentation, and gridwork 
of "virtue," this episode in The Autobioar achy is not 
merely concerned with moral and ethical perfection, though 
that is the overt content. Franklin's entire approach to 
the pursuit of virtue, rather, reveals an effort to 
categorize, define, structure, and bring into a state of 
complete and final order both everyday life (his scheme 
includes a grid for the activities of each day, every day 
the same) and iden*~ ity itself. Having developed a
comprehensive schema of "character" and its component 
categories, and specifications of what constitutes proper 
behavior in each category, Franklin embarks on a program of 
complete definition and control of his own identity--his own 
"self." The brief admission of failure, of course, is what 
is intriguing in a text that was destined to become the 
gospel of the pre-eminent myth of "American identity": the 
self-made, self-reliant, autonomous, independent 
individual.1 Here, from the father of American
individualism, is the confession that his most conspicuous 
attempt to put his "self" in order was utterly frustrated by 
disorder. What I am most interested in, however, is 
Franklin's selection of a metaphor of light and dark to 
illustrate his thwarted struggle to bring subjective 
coherence out of incoherence: the effort to brighten the ax 
is a struggle to secure brightness and clarity from darkness 
and chaos. Franklin's italicized moral, a speckled Ax was 
best. refers then not only to the distasteful flecks of 
color which remain on the face of the ax, not only to the 
dirty "little black spots" which signify moral failures and 
speckle the would-be clean slate of Franklin's daily 
examination grids (78) , but also to the order of his 
identity itself. The effort to create an orderly, coherent, 
and structured self is figured here as a struggle to remove 
dark "speckles" of discoloration from a shiny, clean 
surface.
I open with the "speckled Ax" not because this book will 
be extensively concerned with Benjamin Franklin, or with the 
American ideal, so prevalent during the nineteenth century 
and so dependent on the Franklin archetype for its 
inspiration, of self-reliant individualism and self-made 
success. Nor do I intend a detailed analysis of the models 
of society and identity Franklin is working with--the extent 
of his essentialism and his attitude toward social context 
and historical process, for example. Rather, I open with 
the ax anecdote because it is suggestive of many of the 
concerns of the study at hand and because Franklin's 
Autobiography seems to be the document which initiates many 
of those concerns for a cultural tradition of which I will 
study only the most recent epoch. Foremost among those 
concerns are the ideal of individualism itself and the 
development of race and racism in the United States, ideas 
which, as theorists of race, culture, and identity have 
begun only recently to realize, are inextricably linked in 
a complex and vicious circle of codependence. That the 
moment in which Franklin posits his most audacious 
conception of the perfectly ordered, defined, and controlled 
subject is also the moment in which he begins to think in 
terms of eradicating "little black spots" (78), is 
illustrative of the entire history of the relationship of 
subjectivity and race in America which this book takes as 
its central theme. Franklin's "Art of Virtue," which is
really an art of self-ordering, and his parable of the ax, 
which is really a parable of the self, stand as the preface 
to a history of which this book will study only the most 
recent chapters. The making of "subjectivity" in America, 
the forging of both an "American identity" and the "American 
culture" which determines it, has been a process of constant 
wheel turning, constant grinding, constant effort to make 
the face of the ax bright and pure; always, the struggle has 
foundered on the ineradicable speckling of the ax. This 
book is about the presence, the meaning, and the denial of 
those speckles, and the realization, suppressed by Franklin 
even as he suggests it, that, perhaps, "a speckled Ax is 
best."
Of course, Franklin's story refers neither to racially 
typed human beings nor to the concept of race itself. 
Nevertheless, the "little black spots" of which the perfect 
self must be cleansed are immensely suggestive of what Toni 
Morrison has recently analyzed as the necessary presence of 
darkness in opposition to which white subjectivity is 
continually staged and restaged. In her brief but crucial 
new rationale for American literary criticism, Playing in 
the Dark. Morrison argues that the pre-eminent concern of 
literature in the United States has always been "the 
architecture of a new white man" (14-15) . Though she 
focuses on other texts and on the wide discursive field she 
calls "Africanism" as the darkness in opposition to which
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the new, white, male American identity was forged, the 
characteristics she attributes to this dominant idea of 
American selfhood are in fact those of Franklin, the 
archetypical new American white man: freedom, independence, 
individualism, autonomy, authority, power (Morrison, Playing 
38-45). As Morrison details, most vividly by referring to 
the experience of the Scottish-American frontiersman William 
Dunbar, the identity of this new white man was established 
in contradistinction to a dark-skinned savage "other" that 
was positioned "out there."2 That savage other was 
eventually elaborated most fully as the Negro slave and the 
entire complex of terms, images, metaphors, and stereotypes 
that soon congealed around the black man in America: an
entire discursive field that Morrison terms "Africanism."3 
The initial instance of this vast network of racial 
discourse, according to Morrison, is the "repressed 
darkness" onto which "artists--and the society that bred 
them--transferred internal conflicts" (38-39). The anecdote 
with which Franklin illustrates the tale of his own struggle 
with disorder is an exemplar of just this process, including 
as it does the sense of both repression and darkness (the ax 
must be "bright," the speckles must be ground out) .4 It 
would seem to be no accident, then, that such an image 
appears in connection with what may have been the first 
formalized "architecture of the new white man" in American 
literature.
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If this segment of the Autobiography is not the first 
such blueprint for American manhood, it is surely the one 
most obsessed with order and structure, a fact that 
increases its relevance to the particularly Foucauldian 
analysis of subjectivity and race which I intend. T h e  
rather remarkable attempt to reduce identity to an ordered 
set of procedures and categories (one of which is concerned 
with enforcing "order" itself), the related attempt to 
reduce identity to an objectified visual or spatial 
presentation (grids on a page), the internalization of the 
codes of virtuous behavior--all seem to exemplify Michel 
Foucault's assumptions about the nature of the Western world 
which was emerging at this time. Franklin's methods exhibit 
both the increasing obsession with order and the increasing 
concern with "subjectification" through means of 
objectification that Foucault links to the Enlightenment and 
the end of the eighteenth century.5 Briefly, this was the 
historical moment that saw the emergence of what Foucault 
would call the "modern subject"--the individual: 
systematized according to a fixed set of categories, 
constantly examined and evaluated against a code of 
normativity, and constituted by the written record of 
itself.
Using Foucault's genealogy of the modern subject as part 
of its groundwork, the present study will concern itself 
with the anxiety about disorder that surfaces in Franklin's
account--almost against his will--and with its complex 
relation to the "ordering" of life, to the creation of 
"subjectivity, " and to the development of race and racism in 
America. By examining twentieth-century literary texts that 
persistently link the anxiety of psychic disorder to issues 
of racist practice and racial identity--often within 
contexts of near or outright psychopathology--we can trace 
in this century the effects of the kind of obsession with 
order and subjectification of which Franklin's "Art of 
Virtue" represents only one of the first instances. When we 
examine literary representations of both race and identity, 
and especially racial identity, in the light of these 
issues, we can begin to see where we are today as a 
racialized society, why we are here, and where we might be 
able to go both socially and culturally by taking a full 
accounting of how we got here.
Specifically, I want to examine why and how, as Morrison 
asserts, race "functions as a metaphor so necessary to the 
construction of Americanness" (47), why and how "Africanism" 
itself, as she also suggests, had and has the effect of 
"ego-reinforcement" for white subjects (8) . Even more 
specifically, I will use the peculiar and increasing 
prevalence in the twentieth century of a particular 
manifestation of this anxiety about disorder--literary 
metaphors of psychic and bodily disintegration--as the 
problematic through which I engage such questions of self
formation and race. The central question of this study will 
be: what is the role of the U.S. concept of race in the 
fragmentation of subjectivities, both white and nonwhite? 
For example, what cultural dynamics are in play when race, 
or "blackness," to use our culture's most common 
codification of racial difference, becomes a crucial aspect 
of the psychic fragmentation depicted by what we call 
"white" writers? Following Morrison, we might ask what 
"white" writers are trying to accomplish when they write 
about race, when they deploy "Africanism." It is with such 
concerns in mind that this study will try to open up new 
perspectives on the art of Gertrude Stein and John Berryman, 
both of whom deploy a distinctive "Africanist" presence in 
their work. Significantly, as I discuss in chapters 2 and 
4, both also depict characters who are tragically unable to 
piece together a disintegrating sense of identity. At the 
same time, we need to ask why "self-disintegration, " 
especially (but not only) since the advent of postmodernism, 
is such an apt metaphor for the psychological experiences of 
members of social minorities, like African Americans, that 
are marginalized by racial definitions. Why have writers 
from backgrounds as divergent as those of Frantz Fanon, 
Salman Rushdie, Gloria Anzaldua, and Toni Morrison found the 
language and themes of psychic and physical disintegration 
useful for describing their historically very different 
experiences of racial oppression? By analyzing the
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disintegration motif in novels by Ralph Ellison and by 
Morrison herself in chapters 3 and 5, respectively, the 
present study seeks to understand such fragmentation 
precisely in relationship to and, in specific ways, as a 
result of the kinds of psychologically motivated racial 
definitions deployed by Stein and Berryman. As we shall 
see, psychic disorder, the persistent speckling of the "ax," 
continued to be a preoccupation of U.S. literature into and 
throughout the twentieth century. My concern is with how 
that disorder relates to the fact that citizens of the 
United States, like no other people in history and no other 
people on earth, from Philadelphia in 1787 to Gettysburg in 
1863 to Birmingham in 1963 to Los Angeles in 1993, have had 
one consistent and obsessive ax to grind: the presence of 
race in our society.
Some critical premises: transgressing boundaries
The extent to which Benjamin Franklin's ideal of an 
ordered and autonomous subject, implicit throughout the 
Autobiography. continues to function as one of the central 
assumptions, guiding myths, and accepted "truths" of U.S. 
society is a direct measure of the political urgency of this 
book. Taking my impulse from Fredric Jameson's insistence 
on the general priority of "political interpretation," 
combined with what Henry Louis Gates Jr. has called the 
tendency of a "new black aesthetic movement" to read "the
social aspects of literature, the larger dynamics of 
subjection and incorporation through which the subject is 
produced" (Gates, "Criticism" 3 09), I want to begin by 
politicizing the strategies of order, isolation, and self- 
sufficiency that Franklin idealizes in his construction of 
a self.6 One of the fundamental political messages of this 
inquiry, then, is that Franklin's ontological assumptions 
are rooted in a wider epistemology of order that has 
potentially falsifying, potentially pernicious consequences 
for the many aspects of human culture to which it has been 
applied. The ideals of individualistic order and autonomy 
became standards in U.S. society (and, as Foucault would 
argue, in Western society as a whole) for organizing ideas 
about everything from human identities to cultural 
identities to economic entities to physical and biological 
quantities to nations and states to literary artefacts 
themselves. Indeed, the critical formalism of twentieth 
century "well wrought urn-ers," with its emphasis on the 
perfectly crafted and autonomous text, bears an almost 
geneaological resemblance to Franklin's formalized outline 
of the well-crafted (and self-crafted) moral and economic 
"subject"--the "well wrought earner." The common thread is 
the impulse to draw boundaries, to create categories, to 
define and divide isolated entities--be they human or 
discursive (urns can be the conceptual containers of 
psychic, as well as written matter). It is this conceptual
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mode, and its implications for human lives and human 
interaction, on which this book will focus its oppositional 
politics. Such boundary fixation, I will argue, be it to 
delimit persons, texts, nations, races, cultures, or 
academic disciplines, precludes or inhibits those kinds of 
bonding, interaction, and community which are most human-- 
and most democratic.
My contention is that this philosophy that divides and 
isolates is an aspect of what Foucault calls the 
"objectivizing" of the sciences and the "dividing practices" 
of the various social institutions that manage human life, 
the first two of his three primary "modes of objectification 
which transform human beings into subjects" ("Power" 208). 
The "dividing practices," in particular, are methods of 
defining and categorizing human beings, processes through 
which "the subject is either divided inside himself or 
divided from others. This process objectivizes him. 
Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, 
the criminals and the 'good boys'" ("Power" 208) . 
Franklin's self-conception, which reduces him to an ethical 
subject made up of thirteen categories and an economic 
subject capable of absolute self-dependence, both divides 
him within and partitions him from others. Indeed, it is 
the attachment of the "speckling" metaphor to such modes of 
subject production that suggests we conceptualize "race" as
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another, and, in the U.S., particularly pervasive "mode of 
objectification" that divides and categorizes.7
My concern with the problematic ramifications of thinking 
that rigidifies categories and boundaries, then, determines 
the basic philosophical and critical stance of this study. 
To the extent that the aforementioned principles of order 
and autonomy have been normalized and idealized in our 
society, this book must define itself as oppositional and, 
in the sense outlined by Frank Lentricchia, "radical": aimed 
at questioning both the assumed normalcy of society and its 
methods of sustaining that assumption, its methods of 
"normalization."8 As Edward Said and, more comprehensively, 
Jim Merod have pointed out, however, there is radical 
criticism and there is radical criticism. The skeptical 
quotation marks Said places around the term "left" in his 
essay "Reflections on American 'Left' Literary Criticism" 
ironize both post-structuralist "textual" criticisms and 
Marxist analyses that, despite pretenses of subversion, do 
little to engage with the society in which they are situated 
and even less to question its basic assumptions. The former 
too easily lapse into new formalisms (the "urn" they deal 
with is an expanded one, but an "urn" nonetheless) , and both 
tend to foster the continued isolation of intellectuals 
within a cult of specialized expertise that operates around 
entirely traditional models of authority. This is a problem 
I recognize, as does Merod, with many ostensibly
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oppositional intellectuals, including Foucault himself. It
is on precisely such grounds that Merod questions the social
relevance of both Foucauldian analysis and Jameson's brand
of academic Marxism:
Both Jameson and Foucault accept the authoritative role 
of the professional intellectual without finding any need 
to specify how, precisely, that authority supports or can 
be brought into relation with the victims of power each 
wants to champion... The threat to Jameson's avowed 
Marxist ambition is his own substitution of verbal 
dexterity for the thankless job of building class 
consciousness: of arousing among students an awareness of 
the dominance of capital formation and its ability to 
direct or merely to pervert intellectual clarity and 
political reality. (149-50)
Without entering the debate that Merod examines about how
various progressive social critiques are undermined and
immobilized by their own degrees of institutional
complicity, I would simply add my voice to Merod's in
arguing that a "politically responsible" criticism is
possible--one that maintains a vigilant attention to the
"politics" of context, community, and, most importantly for
the present study, personality (specifically, in this case,
psychology).9
In other words, my own formula for effective critical 
radicalism, derived from both Said and Merod, is based 
precisely on a willingness to transgress the arbitrary
boundaries that literary critics often place around
themselves, the texts they work with, and the academy 
itself. Politicization demands contextualization, a 
critical precept that begins for me with two guiding
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attitudes. First, a politically responsible criticism must
maintain an awareness of the cultural contexts of the
discourse undergoing analysis and the material social
consequences of all discourse. As Said puts it in trying to
formulate a critical significance beyond mere "appreciative
technical reading methods," critical consciousness
should begin its meaningful cognitive activity in 
attempting to account for, and rationally to discover and 
know, the force of statements in texts, that is, as doing 
something more or less effective, with consequences that 
criticism should make it its business to
reveal... Criticism cannot assume that its province is
merely the text, not even the great literary text. It 
must see itself, with other discourse,inhabiting a much 
contested cultural space, in which what has counted in 
the continuity and transmission of knowledge has been the 
signifier, as an event that has left lasting traces upon 
the human subject.10 (World 224-25)
Said's sensitivity to context and his wariness of arbitrary
boundaries here are appropriate: he is not merely expanding
the "urn" of the literary object, nor even breaking it open;
he is denying that the urn ever existed in the first place--
or at least pointing out its provisional status, its
constructedness. Moreover, this refusal of boundaries
renders neither a larger "playground" for critical sport,
nor a bottomless and ruleless interpretive activity, but a
"political" imperative: the creation, transmission, and
utilization of texts is always political, always entails
gain and loss in specifically human terms. As Foucault
would add, such creation and transmission of words is always
done for some reason and for some purpose, and it is that
utility which can be most revealing; the Foucauldian critic
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is more interested in determining the uses to which 
discourse is put--the effectivity referred to by Said--than 
in pursuing the significations of authorial intention or 
reader perception. Most importantly, Said directs critical 
attention not merely to the elucidation of abstract and 
hidden political "content" which inheres in the text (cf. 
Jameson), but to the area of "effect" most relevant to my 
inquiry: that is, to the potential and, to him, more
significant, effects of the text on the human subject. It 
is this attention not only to the political aspects of the 
text, but also to the psychological aspects of its politics, 
that informs my own approach.
The second important sense of context for a criticism 
that hopes to avoid intellectual isolation and, using 
Merod's formulation, to bring critical authority into 
relation with "victims of power," is the critic's context: 
who is our audience? what communities are we a part of? 
how does our location in an academic institution affect our 
work? Critical work, if it is to have any sway in the 
transformation of social structures, must have both a 
pedagogical and a wider, more public agenda. Challenging 
students to think critically about how various powerful 
influences shape thought patterns, identities, and consensus 
is a logical first step, as Merod suggests in the passage on 
Jameson I cited above. Far too little criticism, it is 
worth noting, is of direct application to how students--
particularly undergraduates--conceptualize the world, 
themselves, and their social responsibilities.11 In a 
broader sense, though, expanding the critic's context means 
making the habits of critical thinking, of questioning 
received knowledge, accessible to a society that extends 
beyond the classroom and the university. Such accessibility 
involves rethinking critical authority itself in ways that 
are often difficult for intellectuals who are paid, and 
frequently privileged, precisely because of their status as 
expert authorities. Again, as Merod makes very clear,
fulfilling this wider community role is a matter of crossing 
the arbitrary boundaries--motivated by attitudes of
authority, order, knowledge and self-interest--that separate 
students and teachers, academics and nonacademics, critics 
and physicists. As he notes, "The effort of criticism is 
always, if it is committed to public welfare, a public act" 
(Merod 187) .12
This has implications for the substance, the style, and 
the forums we choose for critical discourse, but I think the 
most generalizable use of a public criticism is the
establishment of a certain skeptical approach to "knowledge" 
itself. I have in mind a mentality of skepticism that would 
enable critics, students, and the general public to 
interrogate every posture of knowledge--assumption, 
stereotype, belief, cultural/media representation, social 
"consensus," received "truth," history, scientific fact--
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with some form of the question, "How do you/I/we know?"13 
What are the contexts in which such "truths" were formed and 
what are their consequences in the real human communities 
which they affect? Teaching such a questioning mentality to 
students, especially as it applies to assumptions about 
human identity, and making one's own criticism an example of 
it for both students and the citizenry of which academics 
themselves are members, may be the most basic task of the 
political critic and of the responsible humanist.
In the following pages, as I outline my own approach to 
the convergence of race and identity in twentieth-century 
literature, I will draw theoretical support from several 
cultural analysts who I think share the transgressive, 
context-conscious, and truth-questioning mindset I have 
described. Foucault has used a Nietzschean genealogical 
method to study the historical processes by which various 
types of human "subjects" were produced and to show how the 
"truths" we revere emerge at specific historical moments 
from specific historical circumstances, a methodology I 
adapt to the study of the racial subject and our accepted 
racial paradigms. Said, as already mentioned, has commented 
extensively on the need to pursue criticism outside of 
traditional limitations, and his thorough analysis of how 
one particular type of racialism evolved and functioned-- 
Orientalism--provides a close and instructive parallel to 
the U.S. versions of racialism that interest me here. So
too, bell hooks has formulated her critiques of raced and 
gendered patterns of thinking with particular attention to 
how subjects are formed, defined, isolated, and constrained. 
Moreover, her efforts to forge a criticism of both popular 
culture and literary "art," using principles attentive to 
both politics and aesthetics, and engaging the intellectual 
community while remaining accessible to a wider public 
audience, make her a model of the politically responsible 
critic I described above. Each of these cultural theorists 
challenges us to question accepted chronological, social, 
and interpersonal boundaries when we approach human beings 
and human culture. Just as importantly, they call us to 
think about human beings when we think about human culture, 
and that is the real political imperative of both their work 
and mine. Like hooks, I am "most excited by writing and 
reading cultural criticism that is linked with a concern for 
transforming oppressive structures of domination" (hooks 
12) .
Politicizing identity
For both hooks and Foucault, as for many cultural 
theorists since Frantz Fanon's groundbreaking psychocultural 
critique of the postcolonial situation, it is clear that the 
focal point for such transformative criticisms must be the 
question of personal identity or subjectivity.14 In his 
late essay, "Why Study Power: The Question of the Subject,"
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Foucault pointed out that one of the defining impulses of
struggles against oppression is precisely such a questioning
of "the status of the individual":
on the one hand, they assert the right to be different 
and they underline everything which makes individuals 
truly individual. On the other hand, they attack 
everything which separates the individual, breaks his 
links with others, splits up community life, forces the 
individual back on himself and ties him to his own 
identity in a constraining way. These struggles are not 
exactly for or against the "individual," but rather they 
are struggles against the "government of 
individualization." ("Power" 211-12)
Foucault is referring here to various other "struggles"
against power, but the concerns he expresses are exactly
parallel to those that hooks identifies for African
Americans. Although she notes that the theoretical distance
of some postmodern approaches makes them somewhat
problematic for the struggle against racism, hooks is
nevertheless interested in making postmodern critiques of
"essentialism" a part of the "identity politics" she views
as central to black liberation. Specifically, she is
interested in formulating a liberated, "radical black
subjectivity" and making it a valid self paradigm for
African Americans, a sense of self which must be fought for
against a "pervasive politic of white supremacy" (26) which
seeks to maintain pre-existing, stereotypical patterns of
black identity, hooks sees a basic challenge to racism in
reformulating such outmoded notions of identity. We have 
too long had imposed upon us from both the outside and 
the inside a narrow, constricting notion of blackness. 
Postmodern critiques of essentialism which challenge 
notions of universality and static over-determined
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identity within mass culture and mass consciousness can 
open up new possibilities for the construction of self 
and the assertion of agency. (28)
The radicalized identity politics hooks is interested in
pursuing demands the recognition of the multiple and diverse
aspects of identity, a multiplicity and diversity that are
exigencies of the self's emergence from a historical,
experiential process. Only by repressing that historicity
can stereotypical and one-dimensional notions of black
identity be sustained. For hooks, "radical black
subjectivity" is actively resistant to such notions, be they
enforced by white culture or the black community itself.
The radicalized identity she posits--historical, diverse,
nonessentialized, complex--is committed to the exploration
of marginal spaces "where we can best become whatever we
want to be" (20) ,15
Indeed, the significance of such a complication of
identity politics to liberatory racial struggle was
anticipated, prior to the emergence of postmodern
theorizations of the decentered subject, in the thought of
writers like Ellison, whose fictional meditation on racial
identity politics I will examine in chapter 3, Fanon, whose
theorization of racial "narcissism" appeared the same year
(1952) as Ellison's novel, and Albert Memmi, whose language
of colonization hooks often applies to the constriction of
African American identity. Like Memmi, hooks is insisting
that a crucial step in the effort by colonized subjects to
decolonize themselves is, beyond the seizure of political 
power, to "cease defining [themselves] through the 
categories of the colonizers" (Memmi 152). Similarly, a 
central theme in Ellison's critical observations and 
autobiographical remarks is the assertion of his own 
eloquent version of "radical subjectivity"--self-experience 
viewed as a "sensitively focused process of opposites," a 
"delicately poised unity of divergencies"--against the 
cultural imposition of one-dimensional definitions of 
identity (Shadow 26) . For Memmi, too, conceptualizing 
freedom for colonized peoples like African Americans (the 
American edition of The Colonizer and the Colonized was 
dedicated to "the American Negro, also colonized") focuses 
not only on the eradication of the colonial system, but also 
on recovering all the "dimensions" of a nonessential, 
historically dynamic, "whole" self (153). And Fanon, as 
Homi Bhabha puts it, stresses the necessary "hybrid 
identity" of "the liberatory people who initiate the 
productive instability of revolutionary cultural change" in 
the postcolonial moment (Culture 38).
Foucault's analysis of "subjectification" provides a 
specific framework for understanding the "colonization" of 
subjectivity that concerns these writers. Such
"colonization," I argue, can often be read as a process of 
subjectification, a process, that is, in which defined and 
ordered "subjects" are produced through the application of
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models of unified identity that are both individualizing,
like Franklin's, and racially essentializing, like those
that concern hooks. Foucault has suggested that both ethnic
and feminist struggles against oppression are, like Fanon's
version of postcolonial liberation, above all struggles for
new formulations of subjectivity, new types of
individuality, against this "government of
individualization" that attempts to tie the individual to a
particular, externally defined identity and to thereby
"submit him to others":
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday 
life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his 
own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and 
which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of 
power which makes individuals subjects. ("Power" 212)
For Foucault, then, the focal point of the operations of
power--and the point of application for oppression--is the
category of subjectivity. Hence, his insistent interest was
not power itself but the creation of "a history of the
different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are
made subjects" (208) . We might say that the crucial
question is, for both Foucault and hooks, "How are the
potentially unlimited identities of human beings made into
certain types of finite and constrained subiects?" That is,
how (and why) do plural, contradictory, and indefinable
potentialities of self experience get reduced to ordered,
defined identities? How do hyperstructured and
hypermoralized psychic models (like Franklin's, for example)
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come to dominate our culture's attitudes toward identity? 
How and why do experientially plural psyches become 
"blacks," "women," "criminals," "sexual deviants"? Just as 
importantly, how and why do plural psyches become "whites," 
"men," "normal individuals"?
By applying Foucault's theorizations of the "modes of 
objectification" to literary texts which depict characters 
struggling with repressive, limited notions of identity, I 
hope to reveal the relations of such subj ectif ication of 
human beings to the kinds of psychic fragmentation evoked in 
the literature of the U.S. experience of racialization. 
Most of all, by doing so I hope to show the urgency of 
hooks' agenda for rethinking, for "decolonizing" (hooks 28), 
the frameworks of subjectivity by which we conceptualize 
ourselves as individuals; for creating the spaces "where we 
can best become whatever we want to be" (hooks 20) . Such an 
agenda was explicitly shared by Foucault, who, in a 
statement that comes as close as anything he ever wrote to 
formulating the political significance of his work, 
observed,
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, 
but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to 
build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of 
political "double bind," which is the simultaneous 
individualization and totalization of modern power 
structures.
The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, 
social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try 
to liberate the individual from the state, and from the 
state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the 
state and the type of individualization which is linked 
to the state. We have to promote new forms of
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subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of 
individuality which has been imposed on us for several 
centuries. ("Power" 216, emphasis mine)
The following studies of Stein, Ellison, Berryman and
Morrison will make use of a Foucauldian vocabulary and
approach to explore the horrors of the "government of
individualization" in our society, while keeping the more
radical and liberatory possibilities of human identity that
Foucault alludes to here always in mind. Learning how modes
of subjectification, particularly racial subjectification,
have divided us from each other and within ourselves can be
a step toward challenging how racism functions in the United
States only if its ultimate goal is to overturn such modes,
reestablish the forms of internal and interpersonal bonding
they inhibit, and promote an entirely different way of
imagining who I/you/we are.
Let me begin to make this reassessment of subjectivity
more specific than the idea of a radicalized or hybridized
cultural identity suggests, both by clarifying the terms I
will apply to identity and by placing them within an
explicitly psychological framework. I will use the terms
"psyche" and "subjectivity" more or less interchangeably for
the totality of possible psychic experience (memories,
emotions, thoughts, aptitudes, sensory experiences, desires,
etc.) that might potentially contribute to any person's
"sense of self." Correlatively, I will use "self" to refer
to whatever self-conception of personal identity prevails
for a person at a given time. Following certain bodies of 
psychoanalytic thought, this "self" might be conceptualized 
as a "container" for some limited, but flexible, portion of 
the wider psychic content mentioned above. In the post- 
Jungian depth psychology of Andrew Samuels, for example, the 
self is a temporarily structured sense of personality which 
changes interminably based on the interactions of a fluid 
infinitude of psychic components (drives, complexes, part- 
selves, self-objects, sectors, etc.), a conglomeration of 
psychic potentialities that Samuels terms the "plural 
psyche" (2-12) . Even more useful to my analysis will be the 
post-Freudian self psychology of Heinz Kohut, in which, 
similarly, the self is "the center of the psychological 
universe" (Restoration xv) , an experiential focal point 
flexibly structured by the psyche's various ambitions, 
aptitudes, ideals, identifications and, most crucially, 
ongoing interactions with environmental "self-objects."
While the term "subject" has passed into common critical 
usage as part of a Lacanian parlance for this self-function 
or "I," it will function as one of the central ideas in my 
discussion in a more Foucauldian sense, connoting a certain 
type of self: one which has been objectified and thereby 
delimited or defined according to some set of external 
constraints. Often this subject is formulated as some 
specific type of "identity"--the externally imposed notions 
of "black identity" critiqued by hooks, "masculine
identity," "criminal identity," and so on. As Foucault 
argues, however, the most powerful effect of such 
"identities" is there tendency to become "internalized" and 
thus to function as the self-monitored self-conceptions of 
the psyches they subjectify.16 We might say that Benjamin 
Franklin, for example, is engaged in transforming his own 
subjectivity, with all its potentiality for contradiction 
and change, into a particular subject by defining its 
components and objectifying it on paper. The "Art of 
Virtue" is a formula for the self-government of a sort of 
Kantian ethical subject, in the sense suggested by 
Foucault's observation that "Kant introduces one more way in 
our tradition whereby the self is not merely given but is 
constituted in relationship to itself as subject" ("Ethics" 
371-72).
While I rely on a Foucauldian approach to the subject as 
a framework for discussing what is done to the "plural 
psyche" in racialized societies, then, it is by means of a 
complementary psychoanalytic perspective that I attempt an 
understanding of what happens to the self in a racialized 
context. I will use several recent psychological
approaches, which loosely overlap with one another and, in 
some instances, with Foucault's study of subjectification, 
to provide both a background of clinical discourse on 
psychic problems like the ones which interest me here and a 
set of more specific models for what hooks, Ellison, and
Fanon variously allude to as a hybrid subjectivity. Indeed, 
these writers share a common interest in psychologizing the 
study of racism. Ellison, who once worked in the office of 
the psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan (a critical early 
voice in pushing ego psychology toward a more interpersonal 
paradigm), articulated the need to address the psychology of 
race in his 1948 essay "Harlem is Nowhere," which deals with 
the psychiatric needs of black Harlemites suffering from 
"personality damage" (Shadow 301) . Fanon, himself a 
psychiatrist, insisted that "only a psychoanalytical 
interpretation" could "lay bare the anomalies of affect" 
associated with the "complexes" of what he called racial 
"narcissism" (10) . And hooks pushes the problematization of 
identity in precisely this direction when she calls for more 
literature that "addresses the psychological impact" of the 
holocausts of racism and slavery in this country--a 
direction, as she notes, that Toni Morrison has already been 
pursuing in her fiction (216). The psychological damage 
caused by racism and the need for what hooks calls "self- 
recovery" of the "colonized" indeed demand the "racial 
politicization of mental health," as hooks puts it (220). 
Psychoanalysis and mental health, she argues, are "a central 
revolutionary frontier for black folks" (218) . My readings 
of twentieth century representations of both "Africanism" 
and the black experience are intended as a critical gesture, 
from my own necessarily "white" cultural position, toward
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"the production of a body of work on psychoanalysis and 
black experience" for which she calls (226) .
My own "racially politicized" version of psychoanalytic 
criticism will proceed from a model of subjectivity I derive 
from various structuralist, poststructuralist, 
existentialist, psychoanalytic, object relations, and depth 
psychology approaches to identity, though it is perhaps more 
accurate to say that I will be employing several different, 
though correlative, models according to their explanatory 
value in different situations. I am particularly interested 
in theories of identity that have redefined both romanticist 
notions of the autonomous subject and the Freudian 
"drive/structure" or "ego" models in the direction of a 
subjectivity that is destabilized, open-ended, multiple, 
environmentally constituted (culturally, linguistically, and 
historically), and, finally, intersubjective. The
philosophy of my approach is aligned with the "anti-ego" and 
"anti-oedipal" position taken up by Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, though I have synthesized my own conception of an 
"ego-less" self from other psychological frameworks. 
Samuels' conception of a "plural psyche" provided a critical 
starting point, suggesting how the traditional Freudian 
structure of psychic agencies might be superseded by a 
broader definition of the "psyche" as a radically plural and 
fluid totality of psychological processes and phenomena. 
The plural psyche consists, according to the various
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schemata that Samuels finds to be compatible, of conflicts, 
complexes, attitudes, functions, self-objects, part-selves, 
roles, sectors, and developmental phases. Discrete portions 
of this psychic makeup, he suggests, are "in a state of 
competition between themselves," and "[p]ersonality, at any 
one moment, is the outcome of such competition" (2) . 
According to this conception, the psyche has no fixed 
structure (i.e., there is no "subject" or "ego"), yet is. 
structured and centered by its contents--and their 
interactions--at any given moment (hence, there is a 
"self").
The model Samuels develops is admirable for its pluralism 
and its destigmatization of psychic multiplicity and 
contradiction. It is also infused, however, with a modified 
Jungian conception of the "synchronous" and innate 
components of subjectivity (archetypes, gods, permanent 
features), elements which are extremely problematic for a 
concept of the self that emphasizes historical specificity 
and cultural context as determining factors in the 
construction of identity. Hence my model of identity will 
be centered on theories that have sought explanations for 
the multiplicitous and indefinite nature of the self more 
exclusively in the social and cultural contexts that 
constitute it. The post-Freudian linguistic psychoanalysis 
of Jacques Lacan, for example, articulates the importance of 
social and linguistic "others" in the formation of the
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(Lacanian) "subject." Similarly, the post-Freudian "self 
psychology" of Heinz Kohut focuses on the "self" not as an 
agency (like the "ego") of a Freudian "mental apparatus" but 
as an irreducible "center" of experience that is 
fundamentally dependent on social and cultural "self- 
objects" (Restoration xv).
Lacan's model of a linguistically structured unconscious, 
the potentially self-alienating plurality and 
differentiality of which is kept at bay by a fiction of ego 
unity, was one of my first keys for understanding the 
sources of self-difference and internal "otherness" and 
multiplicity. For Lacan, the unconscious is manifested as 
a language-based "Other" whose "presence" is constantly 
"fading" down a multidirectional chain of differential 
linguistic signification, resulting in the perpetual 
instability of the fiction of "unified" identity--the 
Lacanian subject--whose roots extend into the depths of that 
very unconscious (Ecrits 299).17 Indeed, because of its 
dependence on the signifier, the constitution of personality 
in the Lacanian system bears a certain resemblance to 
Samuels's conception of identity as determined by the 
interaction and competition between discrete elements which 
reside within the psyche: for Lacan, "the signifier [and the 
subject dependent on it] is constituted only from a 
synchronic and enumerable collection of elements in which 
each is sustained only by the principle of its opposition to
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each of the others" (Ecrits 304). Finally, Lacan's posing 
of this "linguistic" structure is broad enough to 
incorporate an entire spectrum of the subject's language- 
based connections with its ostensibly external environment, 
making his model adaptable to conceptions of identity as 
culturally based, intersubjective or interpersonal, and 
derived from interaction with parental figures.18
Perhaps the most useful of recent psychological 
approaches that focus on the radical contextuality of the 
self and on identity as process, rather than on the 
coherence and autonomy of the traditional "subject," is the 
self psychology of Heinz Kohut. Self psychology provides 
what I view as a more realistic framework for healthy 
subjectivity and a more realistic approach to fragmented 
self-experiences than traditional ego-based conceptions. 
Kohut, in addition to formulating a reassessment of the 
Freudian emphasis on "drive" and "structural" 
interpretations, exhibits a consistent optimism about 
psychic experience that would lead him to eschew both 
Samuels's rhetoric of conflict and domination among the 
various part selves and Lacan's irrecoverably disintegrated 
and alienated subjectivity. According to Kohut's object- 
relations-based schema, the self is a fluid and evolving 
construct determined by the interaction between various 
portions of the psyche, usually figured as self-images or 
part-selves which can be, as for Samuels, internalized
images of other people (the salient example is the parental 
"selfobject"), societal or cultural identity constructs, and 
various developmental versions of the self. Indeed, 
Kohutian subjectivity, a fragmented yet unified 
agglomeration of coexistent versions of the self whose 
interactions shape the overall sense of identity, is one of 
the models Samuels incorporates in the plural psyche, though 
one that has little place for either inborn or static 
versions of the self.19 Kohut, similarly, would probably 
dismiss Samuels's Jungian idea of "conflict" between these 
fragments in favor of his postulation of a potential healthy 
and working balance or equilibrium among the various 
historically determined part selves, an equilibrium that 
entails full recognition of all the phases within as healthy 
and as fully "self."
As with Lacan, moreover, the self for Kohut is multiple 
and destabilized because it is fundamentally based on 
external elements of its experience, a sort of internal 
otherness evoked by the concept of the "linguistic Other" 
for Lacan and by the importance of the "self-object" for 
Kohut, who defines the latter as an object or image 
(developmentally, the parents) experienced as external to, 
yet incompletely separated from, the self. Indeed, the 
important contribution of object-relations-based 
psychoanalysts like Kohut is, as Henry Sussman puts it, "the 
reinscription of the constitutive role of the object (or the
other) in the primal scene of psychoanalysis" (50).20 As 
this may already be seen to imply, the Kohutian self is 
defined not merely as a discrete entity which interacts with 
"others," but as a fundamentally intersubjective experience. 
Like Lacan, Kohut is less interested in the idea of a 
unified, essential, or structured identity than he is in a 
self-in-process that is multiple and mutable because it is 
an intersubjective or relational process.21 Samuels, in 
fact, praises Kohut for envisioning identity, and the 
psychoanalytic process itself, as enmeshed in a fabric of 
relationship. Perhaps no theorist, however, has more 
usefully outlined the intersubjective aspects of the plural 
self than Jessica Benjamin, particularly insomuch as she 
asks us to consider the explicitly political implications of 
neglecting them. For Benjamin, an analysis of the social 
structures of (particularly sexist) domination and
oppression is predicated on the conceptual move from an 
intrapsychic apparatus to an interpsychic matrix: "Whereas 
the intrapsychic perspective conceives of the person as a 
discrete unit with a complex internal structure,
intersubjective theory describes capacities that emerge in 
the interaction between self and others" (20).
Kohut and Lacan are particularly useful for the study at 
hand because both have traced the psychopathology of 
disintegrative personalities and their typical
symptomologies (as exhibited in dreams, imagery, enactments,
delusions, and anxieties), to the overly rigid fictions of 
ego unity that displace the relational features of the self. 
It is precisely such experiences of self-fragmentation, a 
feature of narcissistic personality disorder Kohut termed 
"disintegration anxiety," brought on by social codes of 
normative behavior and identity, that are most symptomatic 
of the representations created at the intersection of race 
and identity, which I study in the following chapters. 
Using Benjamin's work as a crucial precedent for how 
depoliticized psychologies like both the theoretical 
formulations of Lacan and the clinical observations of Kohut 
might be deployed within a racially politicized 
psychoanalytic criticism, I will, like her, explore how 
cultural and social modes of domination might be linked to 
our insufficiently intersubj ective conceptualizations of the 
self.
In summarizing a "liberatory" reformulation of 
subjectivity, I should note that, though I posit a self that 
is fluid and multiple because it is fundamentally 
constituted by otherness, this does not imply the utter 
dispersal of the self that often marks poststructural or 
postmodern approaches. As Henry Sussman has noted, the 
kinds of redefinition of the self which I have been 
describing problematize the unity and consistency of the 
self's structure, but they need not imply its complete 
disintegration (152-53). Indeed, disintegrative
personalities should direct us to a questioning of the 
constricting models of singular and integrated selfhood that 
produced them, not to a pessimistic assumption that such 
fragmentation is a universal principle of the human 
experience. As Sussman points out, the terminology and 
concepts of contemporary critical theory's critique of 
presence and identity can be "readily interjected into 
descriptions by object-relations theorists of the clinical 
conditions facing them" (153), but I have deliberately 
avoided reference to the postmodern critique in the above 
discussion, primarily because I want to preserve 
considerable validity for the term "self" and maintain a 
conception of it that holds diversity and unity in balance. 
For Samuels, this "singular" sense of self is merely the 
temporarily dominant part-self or self-image, the 
impermanent point of an extended triangle which contains the 
many other possible versions of and parts of identity. 
According to this model, the self has a structure in the 
sense of a temporary, "ad hoc hierarchy," one of many, and 
changeable over time, as opposed to a "preconceived 
hierarchy" (subject) which mandates a permanent structure 
and identity (13). As Samuels admits, this model of self 
structure is derived from the fact that, regardless of what 
postmodern theory might tell us about identity, all of us 
need and experience a "sense of self, " a structure in the 
psyche, of some kind (14). Sussman articulates a parallel
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response to the postmodern decentering of the subject when
he argues, in preparation for his literary applications of
Kohut and other object-relations theorists, that
With all the qualifications regarding unity, identity, 
certainty, and essence that can be applied to it the 
notion of the self hovers about us, as, if nothing else, 
a perspectual framework, in a state of constant revision, 
through which we apprehend and articulate the world.
(152)
It is in a similar vein, and in a similar response to 
postmodernism, that Ihab Hassan has posited what he calls 
"virtual subjectivity" (12). Speculating that "identity" 
may at the very least cohere around an ongoing unique 
"style," Hassan suggests that our mere tendency to believe 
in an "identity" is enough to hold together its diverse 
elements: "Such an identity need not presume unity or
coherence; nor does ego integrity preclude the linguistic 
qualities of the self" (12) .22 Expanding our notion of 
"identity" so that it can include all our diverse elements 
was precisely Kohut's clinical approach to psychological 
health.23
Like Kohut, the psychophilosophers Deleuze and Guattari 
posit the possibility of a psychoanalytic field in which the 
traditional Freudian discourse of the "absolute primacy of 
the value system correlated to the model of unconscious and 
conscious" (Kohut, Restoration 176) has been replaced by a 
discourse of reestablishing contacts and relationships 
between different, including previously stigmatized, sectors 
of the self. Though Deleuze and Guattari do not refer to
Kohut (they are more interested in an earlier critic of the
autonomous ego, R.D. Laing), their respective approaches
share a distaste for Freud's pseudomoral (Deleuze and
Guattari characterize it as fascistic) superstructure of
virtue, normalcy, and valuation, and the contrivances
through which such social codes are applied to psychic
experience: the ego, the drives, the Oedipal configurations,
and the analyst's role as "interpreter." For Kohut, as for
Deleuze and Guattari, the purpose of analysis would not be
to determine and interpret the corrupt and guilt-ridden
elements of the isolated ego's history and unconscious in
order to effect a cure, but to facilitate the salutary
acceptance of the psyche's inherent multiplicity and
intersubjectivity. For Kohut, the analyst's role is
therapeutic and facilitative, not educative and
interpretive, and the goal of psychoanalysis is the
enrichment of emotional life through the functional
organization and acceptance of multiple psychic
manifestations rather than an exorcism of stigmatized
portions of the psychic makeup.24 Like self psychology,
the "schizoanalysis" outlined by Deleuze and Guattari
suggests that overcoming the tyranny of the ego will allow
a reassemblage of the plural psyche:
...it is certain that neither men nor women are clearly 
defined personalities, but rather vibrations, flows, 
schizzes, and "knots."...The task of schizoanalysis is 
that of tirelessly taking apart egos and their 
presuppositions; liberating the prepersonal singularities 
they enclose and repress... establishing always further
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and more sharply the schizzes and breaks well below 
conditions of identity; and assembling the desiring- 
machines that countersect everyone and group everyone 
with others. For everyone is a little group and must 
live as such. (Deleuze and Guattari 3 62)
For both Kohut and Deleuze and Guattari, the psychic
miseries of modern times have much to do with the artificial
imposition of the concept of the "clearly defined
personality"--the autonomous ego--on psychic experiences
that are constantly changing, multiply determined, and
profoundly interpersonal.
These theorists are trying to liberate us, then, from
exactly the kind of overly structured, overly moralized
approach to identity so effectively illustrated, and
idealized, by the literary Benjamin Franklin with whom I
began. But they have also provided a specific and, in
Kohut's case at least, a clinical model of the kind of
"radical subjectivity" called for as an imperative of racial
empowerment by bell hooks: de-essentialized, desire-based,
contextual, historical, multiple, interpersonal. By
returning to Foucault, I want to now develop an argument for
the direct relationship between the Franklinian moment of
conservative and repressive identity management, on the one
hand, and the need for our contemporary moment of liberatory
reformulation of identity as a means to confront the
violence of race, on the other. I am suggesting that the
speckles of disorder and moral failure which subtly slip
into Franklin's conceptualization of the virtuous self are
illustrative of what "race" is, where it comes from, and 
what it is used for. As Franklin's anecdote suggests, it 
requires an agonizing and grinding effort of removal to 
shore up the boundaries and definitions of such a 
concretized individuality against the seeping, relentless, 
anxiety-producing presence of disorder, multiplicity, and 
otherness within. History, however, as Toni Morrison has 
argued, provided a powerful tool to help secure those 
boundaries, and that tool was the concept of "race." It is 
to the functioning and nature of that tool, and to 
hypotheses about its relation to both tentatively secured 
identities like Franklin's and violently discomposed 
identities like those to be found in twentieth-century 
representations of race, that I now want to turn my 
attention.
"Race" as discursive discipline
The plural psyche model of identity which I have sketched 
presents the "individual" as a hybrid and relational entity 
that would, for obvious reasons, escape rigid definition and 
thwart effective categorization, control, and management. 
It is easy to imagine, for example, even without 
sociological analysis, the difficulties involved in 
governmental management of a population that cannot be 
easily typed and enumerated according to race, gender, 
class, citizenship, ethnicity, health and so on. Or to
imagine the problems involved in corporate management of a 
consumer-base (or a labor-base) that cannot be divided and 
targeted according to distinctive income-levels, tastes, 
tendencies, aptitudes, attitudes, and, again, races. 
Indeed, Foucault has commented extensively on the ways in 
which the evolution of the modern, manageable subject was 
concomitant with the evolution of the modern state and 
modern capitalism. As such, Foucault's historical studies 
provide a conceptual framework for the ways in which the 
plural psyche might be restricted, defined, and subjectified 
(in both the sense of being "made subject to," and made into 
a "subject") by what he referred to generally as the 
"disciplinarity" of society and, later, as the "government 
of individualization." As Foucault detailed in Madness and 
Civilization. Discipline and Punish, and The History of 
Sexuality, it is in the interests of state power and order, 
and their procurement of public and personal welfare, to 
have a populace made up of subjects who are clearly and 
concretely identified as specific types of personalities 
with particular--and documented--sets of characteristics. 
Foucault variously referred to this superimposed personality 
structure--fabricated and nonessential, yet brutally real in 
its effects--as the "subject," "individuality," or "soul." 
It is further in the interests of power, Foucault surmised, 
to have this identificatory process of "subjectification" 
carried out by the individuals themselves. To cite my
earlier example, the consolidation of capitalism and the 
organization of the state and its power are facilitated by 
the creation of subject-citizens--well-wrought earners--like 
Franklin who have a clearly defined set of traits, 
characteristics, and identity categories--so defined that 
they can be outlined on paper--and who have so internalized 
the codes of virtue and normalcy around which those 
categories are organized that they can carry out the 
"government" of their identities themselves (including, as 
in Franklin's case, careful self-examination to ensure 
normativity and eradicate improper behavior).25 Indeed, my 
juxtaposition of the plural psyche with such "disciplinary 
technologies" which imprison it within a moral individual is 
not entirely whimsical: Foucault credits none other than
Deleuze and Guattari for preceding him in the study of such 
"modes of subjection" (Discipline 309, n.2).
In what follows, I want to suggest that "race" can be 
treated as one of the disciplinary categories of identity, 
one which was critical to the establishment of the 
ostensibly "American," but implicitly "white-male- 
capitalist -individualist, " subject which came to prominence 
in U.S. culture in the years following, and partly as a 
result of, Franklin's mythologization of the type. Although 
"race" emerges in Franklin's framing of his own identity 
only subtextually (his daily self-examination does not 
include the question, "Did I avoid acting like an African
today?"), and although the concept of "race" is a marginal 
and troubled one in Foucault's discussions of the 
disciplines of subjectification, "race" can be productively 
viewed as functioning in the U.S. "government of 
individualization" much like the categories of personality 
that Foucault does engage: criminality, sanity, sanctity, 
sexuality, hygiene, productivity.26 Each of these
categories served as a disciplinary mode for the development 
of a given type of "subject" or "individuality," an- entity 
to which could be ascribed distinct characteristics, and 
allowed the distribution of the affected populace along a 
continuum of normalcy/deviancy. In the same way as the 
penal system, for example, "fabricated" the idea of 
"delinquency" and attached a "delinquent subject"--a 
"biographical unity" with a defined essence, character, set 
of traits, and life history--to what before had been only a 
human being accused of a crime, we might say that the 
American system of chattel slavery fabricated the concept of 
"race" and developed a "racial subject" which could be 
attached to the generally darker skinned human beings it was 
victimizing.27 Like the delinquent, the essence of the 
racial (i.e., nonwhite) subject was its abnormality or 
deviance from an established norm (whiteness) , and, like 
delinquency, "race" converted the complex, historically 
specific psyche into a "biographical unity" and a "type of 
anomaly" to which could be attached a whole bundle of
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essential traits: "instincts, drives, tendencies, character" 
(Discipline 252-55) .
"Race," then, might be said to create a certain type of 
essentialized, unified and permanent identity, like 
Foucault's "subject" or "soul" (criminal, sinful, insane, 
perverted, etc.) which could be carefully managed and 
manipulated by defining its relationship to the "norm" and 
its distinctive and static characteristics. Aside from the 
very telling fact that each of the categories Foucault 
analyzes in this way overlaps significantly with some 
specific aspect of the traditional U.S. racial stereotype, 
several intriguing similarities support such a comparison, 
similarities that also begin to suggest a broader definition 
of what "race" actually is--and what it isn't.28 The 
"black personality" is, as Foucault says of the "soul," 
"noncorporal" and nonessential, yet considerably more real 
than illusionary: "On the contrary, it exists; it has a
reality; it is produced permanently around, on, within the 
body by the functioning of a power that is exercised" on 
those who are punished, supervised or "colonized" 
(Discipline 29). "Blackness," I would argue, like 
delinquency, was fabricated precisely as "a point of 
application of the power to punish" (Discipline 255), or in 
this case, enslave. And just as the delinquent "soul" was 
not born criminal and subject to punishment, but rather was 
born out of "methods of punishment, supervision, and
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constraint" (Discipline 29), the "black" individual was not
born in "blackness" and hence subject to enslavement, as the
racial mythology later argued, but rather was a product
itself of an economic system that needed cheap labor.
"Blackness," like "delinquency," is a "reality reference,"
a construct of discourse and history. This "soul" is
the element in which are articulated the effects of a 
certain type of power and the reference of a certain type 
of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations 
give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and 
knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this 
power. On this reality reference, various concepts have 
been constructed and domains of analysis carved out; 
psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.
(Discipline 29)
By viewing racialized identity as one particularly useful 
type of "soul" or "personality," through which a complex 
self is turned into an object and a subject, we can begin to 
understand the elaboration of a whole body of knowledge-- 
both folk knowledge and scientific knowledge--around a 
concept that has no innate basis in reality. More 
importantly for the study at hand, we can analyze the 
psychological consequences of having a racialized society in 
terms of the plural psyche that is imprisoned within a 
unitary, essentializing "personality" type like "blackness," 
and the superstructure of morality that such typing entails- 
-in terms, that is, of the "government of 
individualization." We can see how the "black soul," like 
the criminal delinquent, the moral soul, and the sexual 
pervert before it, is only a creation and an effect of
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political power; and how it therefore functions, like them, 
as "the prison of the body" (Discipline 30).
This formulation is commensurate with several recent 
theoretical approaches to the origin and nature of "race." 
For the balance of this study, I will treat "race" as a 
discursive, symbolic, and historical construct with no 
coherent biological or essential substrate which emerged 
during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
as a function of the increasing commodification, 
individualization, and moralization of the human subject.29 
While it is not my purpose here to create a comprehensive 
historical theory of "race," nor to evaluate the attempts of 
others to do so, I do want to elaborate briefly on two of 
the fundamental points I have drawn from such theories to 
establish a working definition of "race" that will 
facilitate my readings in U.S. literature. In addition to 
treating "race" as a category analogous to the categories of 
subjectification discussed by Foucault, my definition will 
be underpinned by two basic assumptions. I contend, 
following historical investigations like Thomas Gossett's 
and Stephen Jay Gould's, that neither "race," nor any of its 
signified categories like "black," "white, " "Caucasian, " 
etc., has any supportable genetic, physiognomical, or other 
biological basis or scientific validity, despite arduous 
attempts to establish such a material reference for the 
concepts. Secondly, this complete lack of empirical
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grounding enables "race" to function as an arbitrary, 
flexible, self-contained, and circular signifying or 
discursive structure: an elaborate network of signifiers, 
metaphors and linguistically based assumptions with an 
endless intrareferentiality.
Gossett's searching history of "race" in America supports 
the argument that the concept itself and its supporting 
theory did not even emerge and begin to solidify until well 
into the colonial period, probably not until after the 
institution of slavery had been 1) attacked as inhumane, and 
2) formally codified (1660-1680). Moreover, Gossett 
suggests that the theories of separate human races and the 
innate inferiority of some of those races did not gain 
scientific or general consensual credibility in the U.S. 
until the nineteenth century.30 It was the nineteenth 
century, then, that saw a massive biological, 
anthropological and sociological effort to establish 
validity for the doctrines of "race" difference and white 
superiority. As both Gould and Gossett have documented, 
neither evidence nor even satisfactory criteria for either 
of these were ever found. More than anything else, 
Gossett's history gives us the almost incredible story of a 
colossal effort to pin a linguistic chimera to the bedrock 
of fact--or, to cite the individual instance and borrow a 
term from Foucault, to pin a "soul" to flesh. All the 
"scientists" and theorists Gossett describes were trying to
explain and define something that literally did not exist 
(or rather, that only literally existed): the presence of 
three or five or eight or a dozen different "races." No 
grounds for defining these "races," or even for properly 
numbering them, could be made to hold water: efforts to
establish different human groups on the bases of 
geographical origin, climactic influence, skin color, crania 
form, hair type, language use, cultural style, nationality, 
and psychological character have all been attempted with 
equal futility. Always such attempts have foundered on the 
inability to draw any but arbitrary lines between groups and 
on the unmanageable diversity within any proposed group.31
Paradoxically, the inability to ground "race" in 
"reality" facilitated, rather than impeded, its ability to 
function as a "reality reference," its role as "the element 
in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of 
power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge" and 
as the machinery by which the "knowledge extends and 
reinforces the effects of this power" (Discipline 29). As 
Gossett argues, "The fact that race has no precise meaning 
has made it a powerful tool for the most diverse purposes" 
(118), allowing its exclusionary and identificatory force to 
be deployed politically, rather than empirically or 
scientifically. Indeed, the most stunning aspect of 
Gossett's study is the fact that the failure to find any 
scientific basis for "race" never really mattered (83): it
was nevertheless sustained and "supported" by other theories 
and concepts, utilized to prove still other theories and 
explain social phenomena, and extended throughout an 
enormous corpus of intellectual and popular discourse and 
knowledge, precisely as if it actually referred to something 
concrete. In short, "race" developed and (still) functions 
solely as a set of discursively transmitted assumptions and 
agreements, a linguistic structure in which any one term, 
from "black" to "white" to "nigger, " has meaning only in 
reference to, and is literally supported by, the rest of the 
structure. Said's encyclopedic treatment of the particular 
version of racism he calls "orientalism" elucidates--and 
perhaps initiates--such a discursive definition of "race," 
though the discursive paradigm has also recently gained 
considerable legitimacy among theorists of "race" in general 
and African-American theorists of American racism in 
particular.32 Henry Louis Gates Jr., most notably, 
observing that biological categories of race have "long been 
recognized to be a fiction," has argued that, when we speak 
of "the white race" or "the black race, " we speak "in 
metaphors" (Gates, "Writing" 4).
Said, drawing his notion of discursive formations from 
Foucault, approaches an entire body of writings, scholarly 
and popular, and assumptions (definitions, metaphors, 
idioms, stereotypes), scientific and folkloric, as a 
discursive field that is not merely about the "orient" but
is in fact constitutive of it. While Said refers explicitly 
to the "orient" and to "Orientalism" (the study and 
definition of the former, but also a type of racism) as 
existing discursively, the critical difference or "race" 
they create is also fundamentally a discursive structure. 
Indeed, Said later pointed out that European writers had 
discursively constituted not only a "geographical entity 
called the Orient" and a field of study devoted to it-- 
"Orientalism"--but also "subject races" that emerged in the 
writings of Orientalists at the end of the nineteenth 
century (World 222) . It is certainly significant for my 
conceptualization of "race" that Said defines "Oriental 
races" as a later product of an entire discursive discipline 
of "Orientalism," and not vice versa--"race," he argues, was 
produced historically and discursively as a function of the 
needs of European power (imperialist, cultural, and 
economic).
Moreover, the extension of this line of analysis into 
another category which Said does not discuss in detail is 
critical to my argument. This category is, of course, the 
"racial subject" itself, which I want to treat not only as 
a discursive structure but as an entity fabricated by the 
"disciplinary technologies" of racism and attached to human 
beings to provide a point of application for these same 
disciplines. As Said observes, one of the important uses of 
the "Orientalist" discipline was the power to make
statements about "the Oriental mentality," but I also want 
to extend this idea in the direction of his comment that 
"The parallel between Foucault's carceral system and 
Orientalism is striking" (World 223, 222) . The penal
discipline, for Foucault, produced the "criminal soul" and 
the law-abiding subject. The Orientalist discipline, for 
Said, produced the "Oriental" subject and the 
"European/Occidental" subject. In the same way, I will 
approach American white/black racism as a discipline 
constitutive of racial (black/white) difference and, more 
importantly, of a thoroughly racialized "soul" for everyone: 
a racial prison not only for the body, but for the psyche 
itself. Ralph Ellison's acute observations of the U.S. 
racial scene provide a succinct summary of "race" as a 
discursive structure. "Perhaps the most insidious and least 
understood segregation is that of the word," he noted in 
1953. "For if the word has the potency to revive and make 
us free, it has also the power to blind, imprison and 
destroy" (Shadow 24).
Indeed, the U.S. racial discourse Ellison here intends-- 
"by this I mean the word in all its complex formulations, 
from the proverb to the novel and stage play" (Shadow 24) - - 
might also be most usefully elaborated through comparison to 
the "discursive field" of "Orientalism. 1,33 The semantic 
network of "Orientalism" is a self-referential and 
"internally consistent" discursive structure. This
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structure is the source of whatever meaning any one of its
terms (or texts) might have, making it a closed "system of
ideas" or "system of representations" on whigh the "real"
has little influence:
the Orient was a word which later accrued to it a wide 
field of meanings, associations, and connotations, and 
. ..these did not necessarily refer to the real Orient but 
to the field surrounding the word. (Orientalism 2 03)
Said's emphasis on the always repeated idioms, thoughts,
imagery, "representative figures," and "tropes" that are the
basis of the "orientalist" discursive structure34--that are
the basis, in fact, of a ridiculously broad and homogenized
"race"--highlights the parallels between "Orientalism" and
recent formulations of the black/white "race" difference in
America, beginning with Gates' insightful definition of
"race" as metaphorical: "Race has become a trope of
ultimate, irreducible differences" between groups ("Writing"
5) . Not only is the word "race" itself a metaphor for
supposed difference, but any of its proposed categories is
built out of a hidden structure of metaphors, figures, and
tropes--all frozen into self-evident truths through
linguistic circulation and constant reproduction. I began
this essay with reference to just such a metaphorical system
of "race": Toni Morrison's "Africanism," a term she uses to
refer not to the characteristics or culture of any
particular group of African people nor to the "study" of
Africa per se, but to the "denotative and connotative
blackness that African peoples have come to signify, as well
as the entire range of views, assumptions, readings, and 
misreadings that accompany Eurocentric learning about these 
people" (6-7) . A crucial distinction must be made here 
between the possible existence of any real "black" community 
in America, which it is not Morrison's purpose either to 
deny or to define, and the discursively, and mainly 
literarily, created "black race" she is discussing. 
"Sometimes allegorical, sometimes metaphorical" (Morrison 
17) , Africanism suggests the linguistic production of a new 
"race" which could be attached to the victims of American 
slavery and its descendants: a "trope" of blackness (7). 
Aldon Lynn Nielsen has elaborated in slightly greater detail 
a similarly based description of the American white/nonwhite 
racial distinction in terms of a "discursive structure 
within culture" (3), a "self-contained sphere of ideation" 
(5) revolving around a set of "frozen metaphors" about 
"race." Like Morrison's "Africanism," the "blackness" 
Nielsen refers to is a "structure of meanings, composed 
entirely out of language, which, like the elements of the 
phonetic system, have significance only in relationship to 
one another" (6) .
Treating "race"--and specifically, "blackness" and 
"black" identity--as a discursive system like Said's 
"Orientalism" is absolutely fundamental to my "racially 
politicized psychoanalytic criticism" for a number of 
related reasons. The first is implicit throughout Said's
entire study and explicit in the remarks made by both 
Morrison and Nielsen as they outline their own versions of 
such a discursive structure: talking about the linguistic 
generation of "race difference" and its subset "races" is a 
means of focusing attention not on the supposed referents of 
such a signifying system but on its producers. In studying 
"race" as a discourse and a "discipline"--as a discursive 
discipline--we do not dismiss it as a fiction but insist on 
its importance as a social and psychological reality 
utilized by some human beings and inflicted on others for a 
purpose. That, as Morrison and Nielsen argue, makes the 
real object of study "whiteness," and my own inquiry, like 
theirs, involves an investigation of the manipulation of the 
racial discourse, the deployment of Africanism, by those who 
are able to designate themselves as "white." What interests 
does "whiteness" have in the literary, scientific, and 
linguistic creation of "blackness"? "What Africanism became 
for, and how it functioned in, the literary imagination is 
of paramount interest because it may be possible to 
discover, through a close look at literary 'blackness,' the 
nature--even the cause--of literary 'whiteness'" (Morrison, 
Playing 9).
My second motivation for studying "race" as a discursive 
discipline involves my interest in transforming oppressive 
social structures. While valid cases might be made, and 
have been made, for affirming "blackness" in the sense of a
"black" community with a shared cultural heritage, a shared 
"black" ethnicity, and/or a shared geopolitical history, the 
privileging of such "positive" black-authored re-versions of 
"blackness" to the exclusion of the study of the "white" 
discourse of "race" and "racism" is counterproductive on at 
least two levels. First, such definitions of "blackness" 
share the same tendencies toward separatism and essentialism 
that were the basis of the "race" system, leaving the 
"manichean allegory" that structures violence in place (even 
if reversed), rather than denaturalized. Focusing on the 
shared cultural experience of being "black" without 
attending to the fiction of "race" that historically 
produced the former category can lead to overlooking the 
diversity within any formulation of "blackness" and to an 
unintended reinscription of a "black" essence onto its 
spurious biological signifier.35 Talking about the 
positive aspects of ethnic culture is productive, that is, 
but not if it is merely a way of avoiding discussion of a 
history of "race" and racism, or, worse yet, ignoring the 
practice of "race" and racism today. Discussions of 
experienced "blackness," ethnicity, and the value of a 
multiracial culture must not be, as bell hooks puts it, 
"neatly divorced from a recognition of racism, of the 
continuing domination of blacks by whites, and...of the 
continued suffering and pain in black life" (52) .
Ultimately, then, I am interested in studying the
discursive discipline of "race" in its function as a "white"
political strategy, a study that facilitates the crucial
task of "interrogating whiteness" (hooks 54). Denying the
essentiality of "race, " however, is not to deny the
possibility of a lived experience of "blackness"--another
potential object of study, literary and otherwise--any more
than my theorization of the linguistic and deterritorialized
"self" precludes the possibility of a lived experience of
"selfness." On the contrary, though my interest here is in
the tragic psychological effects produced by the spurious
racialization of society which I have sketched, there is an
identifiable, experiential "African-American culture,"
albeit one that is necessarily provisional, historically
produced, nonessential, and contradictory. I believe that
Ralph Ellison had such a lived "African Americanness" in
mind when he commented that
It is not skin color which makes the Negro American but 
cultural heritage as shaped by the American experience, 
the social and political predicament; a sharing of that 
"concord of sensibilities" which the group expressed 
through historical circumstance. (Shadow 131)
As Ellison's definition implies, such a "cultural heritage"
acknowledges, rather than denies, the way it has been shaped
by a "political predicament" that includes "race" and
racism. More recently, Hazel Carby has summarized the
distinction I am making with remarkable precision:
Though we can delineate the racialized structuring of 
society in terms of which there is an Afro-American
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culture that has been racialized and defined as 
black...neither its rhetoric nor its boundaries are 
strictly of "race." Afro-American culture is not 
completely autonomous...[and] it is always subject to the 
influence and power of the dominant culture. (43)
Taken together with the fact that the dominant culture is
also always subject to the influence and subversion of the
marginalized culture, this definition directs us to a
recognition that any culture is the "terrain of struggle
between groups" (Carby 43) . Like identities, we should
approach cultures as intertextual, plural and provisional,
never as essential, autonomous and timeless. It is my
project to join Carby in insisting that, "instead of
searching for cultural purity"--black, white, American, or
whatever--"we acknowledge cultural complexity" (42).
Neither "American culture" nor any particular subculture
belongs to any particular melanin-content based grouping;
together, all of us make cultures.
To put this another way, "race" does not inhere in the
difference between distinct cultures or groups--it is itself
the establishment and hierarchization of that difference.
As such, it conceals the complexity of the cultures it
differentiates and, in the individual instance, of
identities, and idealizes purity on all fronts--the concept
of "race" is dependent on the establishment of pure
difference. Defining "race" as a trope of difference--
really an elaborate network of tropes of difference--should
turn our attention from determining the accuracy or
authenticity of the overall trope, or of any of the 
component tropes, to an analysis of these "purity" effects. 
As I have been suggesting, analyzing "race" as a cultural 
practice puts the focus on the more politically engaged and 
socially useful questions of what it is being used for, and 
by whom. According to Foucault, the function of the entire 
culture of discipline was precisely this: to manage
multiplicity by reducing it to a set of definable unities, 
and to hierarchize those unities evaluatively: "Generally
speaking, it might be said that the disciplines are 
techniques for assuring the ordering of human 
multiplicities... the disciplines characterize, classify, 
specialize; they distribute along a scale, around a norm, 
hierarchize individuals in relation to one another" 
(Discipline 218, 223) . Foucault does not analyze the
racialization of society as a discipline, but he does hint 
occasionally at their similarity in function, particularly 
as a technique for forging a cultural illusion of purity out 
of a reality of disorder and multiplicity. In his essay on 
Nietzschean genealogy, for example, he alludes to the 
fictions about "German" identity to which the Germans were 
forced to resort in defending the idea of a pure German 
"race" against the anxieties of a felt complexity. Such 
fictions, Foucault comments, were simply the ideas by which 
they tried to "master the racial disorder from which they 
had formed themselves" as a pure "race" ("Nietzsche" 81).
The genealogist's task is to disintegrate such fictions of 
unity and purity by unearthing the complexity and disorder 
at their point of origin--the multiplicity which they are 
meant to cover up. This example is particularly relevant to 
my own purposes because Foucault is speaking of "race" here 
specifically as a category of identity or "soul," and he 
immediately translates his point about a national culture 
into a point about the individual: "Where the soul pretends 
unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity, the 
genealogist sets out to study the beginning--numberless 
beginnings, whose faint traces and hints of color are 
readily seen by a historical eye" ("Nietzsche" 81).
Fragmentation and the racial mirror stage
As I have suggested, in turning a genealogical eye on the 
central myth of the white American individualist--the self- 
made Ben Franklin--we find precisely the "faint traces and 
hints of color" that mark the unspoken entrance of a 
category of "race" into the project of fabricating a 
"coherent identity" or "unified soul." Franklin provides 
for us a convenient illustration of the genealogical moment 
at which a culture of "race" and a psychology of unified 
individuality emerge symbiotically. In other words, 
defining "race" as a discursive discipline and focusing on 
what it is being used for encourages us to explore the 
psychology of "race" because, as both Morrison and Nielsen
insist, what is most urgently at stake in the production of 
the racial signifying system is the concretization of a 
"white subject"--by way of describing and reifying a "black 
subject" whose qualities can be removed from, separated 
from, and opposed to the "white." The "dark speckles" on 
Franklin's diagram of his own soul might be considered to be 
a formative instance of the elaborate significatory system 
attached to dark-skinned Americans, an instance of the 
repressed darkness onto which "artists--and the society that 
bred them--transferred internal conflicts" (Playing 38). 
That process of psychological projection, of "othering," 
enabled the concretization of what Morrison calls the "new 
white man" in America, an identity construct that included 
all of the Franklinian traits--autonomy, authority, 
isolation, independence, freedom, individualism, economic 
vigor--and quickly became synonymous with "American 
identity" in general. As Morrison argues, that construct of 
white subjectivity was, from the very beginning and 
throughout its history of literary representations, staged 
against a backdrop of darkness, disorder, and contradiction 
that became discursively elaborated as the network of 
metaphors, images, stereotypes and idioms associated with 
darker-skinned Americans: the extended trope of difference 
she calls "Africanism." The unified white ego, that is, was 
ever structured in opposition to the "ego-reinforcing 
presence of an Africanist population" (45)--onto which could
be transferred, and distanced from the self, the internal 
disorder the ego denies: "It was this Africanism, deployed 
as rawness and savagery, that provided the staging ground 
and arena for the elaboration of the quintessential American 
identity....This population is convenient in every way, not 
the least of which is self-definition. This new white male 
can now persuade himself that savagery is 'out there'" 
(Playing 44-45) . "Race" is a tool for ego construction, for 
imaginatively banishing the disorder and multiplicity within 
to a locus safely outside the bounds of the self.
Nielsen has helpfully described this cultural process, 
the self-constitution of "whiteness" through a discursive 
creation of "blackness," in explicitly psychological terms, 
as a sort of Lacanian "racial mirror stage." For Lacan, the 
"mirror stage" is that point when the developing subject, 
cognizant for the first time of its own image reflected in 
a mirror or in the shape of other human beings, initiates an 
illusion of unity and autonomy. Ego formation, based on the 
bodily unity of this reflected image, occurs as a 
suppression of the fragmented, multiplicitous, and 
undifferentiated psychic experience of infancy (Lacan, 
Ecrits 1-7). Nielsen suggests that the "white" subject in 
America was constituted through a similar process: "The
language of white thought has had to create the boundaries 
of its existence and to determine what will not be allowed 
inside. The white subject has spoken to itself, and in so
speaking has created its own racial consciousness" (5) . The
point is, of course, that this process of ego-formation,
which can be considered as occuring in both individual
psychic and collective cultural instances, is carried out
not only in discursive, but also largely in negative, terms.
As Nielsen puts it, "The ability to constitute a structure
of whiteness assumes, more often than not, the form of the
constitution of antiwhiteness, the creation of some bad,
other thing out of the mass of humanity" (5) . For Foucault,
the disciplinary creation of madmen, criminals, and perverts
had little to do with discovering truths about humanity gone
wrong and everything to do with defining, securing, and
managing normalcy. Said has made exactly this connection in
discussing the literary creation of the "white subject" in
another context:
If we believe that Kipling's jingoistic White Man was 
simply an aberration, then we cannot see the extent to 
which the White Man was merely one expression of a 
science--like that of penal discipline--whose goal was to 
understand and to confine non-Whites in their status as 
non-Whites, in order to make the notion of Whiteness 
clearer, purer, and stronger.
(World 224, emphasis mine) 
The constitution of the "white" subject is not only, as 
Nielsen observes, "a literary project" (10), but also a 
disciplinary one.
The theorizations of "race" I have outlined, then, 
provide a framework for analyzing two distinct types of 
"individual": "black" and "white." Specifically, they
provide means for understanding how "race" functions as a
particular category of "personality" in the "government of 
individualization" which characterizes our culture. "Race" 
works to reify and secure well-managed subjective structures 
for those who are self-authorized and self-constituted by 
identifying its negative terms as "other," on the one hand, 
and by providing an externally imposed and coercive 
subjective structure for those who are so identified, on the 
other. For the latter, "blackness" becomes a binding sheath 
of identity behind which the real person cannot be seen--the 
"narrow, constricting notion of blackness" referred to by 
hooks (28), but also the discursive "veil" described by 
Nielsen. Because of this "veil" of discursive agreements 
about the "black" other, its "white" creators "cannot 
clearly see who or what is within" (Nielsen 2), a variant 
description of the operation of Africanism that will be most 
resonant when I turn my attention to the experience of 
"black" (non)identity as one of "invisibility" in chapter 3. 
This "black subject" or "black soul," then, so similar in 
derivation and function to the Foucauldian "subject" of 
discipline, represents the "black object not as itself but 
in its status as fictive signifier of the nonwhite" (Nielsen
10) :
That is to say quite simply that we are unlikely to find 
many actual black people who correspond at all closely to 
that image system known popularly as the stex'eotype. In 
this sense Felix Guattari is quite right to assert as "an 
example of a structure functioning as a subject...the 
fact that the black community in the United States 
represents an identification imposed by the white 
order." (Nielsen 6)
64
This is subjectivity imprisoned within a structure: more
precisely, within the "black subject" as discursive
structure. Such a subject, such a "soul," imposed in every
crack of society where the racial discipline reaches, leaves
the plural, contradictory, historically produced psyche I
have described violently unified, dehistoricized, and
essentialized beyond recognition. Hortense J. Spillers,
using perhaps the most influential literary deployment of
Africanism of all time as her example, describes how the
"telos of African persons in the United States" has been
precisely this conversion from real person into "the negro,"
...as Tom becomes in Stowe's text the negro--this 
existence of a him/her in a subject-position that unfolds 
according to a transparent, self-evidentiary motif. In 
other words, to rob the subject of its dynamic character, 
to captivate it in a fictionalized scheme whose outcome 
is already inscribed by a higher, different, other, 
power, freezes it in the ahistorical. (29)
"The negro," in Spillers' politicized sense, is the prison
of the African American plural psyche, and though that
imprisonment is a forceful and effective one, its
maintenance is ever tenuous, ever productive of psychic
stresses and anxieties of the most chronic variety. It is
to the form of these resistances that I now wish to turn my
attention.
To a very large extent, the focus of my succeeding 
chapters will be on the literary response, in the twentieth 
century, to the articulation of Africanism of which Harriet 
Beecher Stowe's depiction of "blackness" is perhaps the
signal moment. Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man is certainly- 
responding, for example, in his fruitless, boomeranging 
search for an authentic identity, to the discursive 
structuring of the "negro subject." His search is futile 
precisely because the discursive racialization of U.S. 
society is so complete and the veil is so impenetrable: no 
matter what identity he authors for himself, no person on 
the other side of the veil--the "white" side of the veil- 
wili ever see him, will ever see anything but the veil of 
assumptions about "blackness." Intriguingly, the anxieties 
and the imagery by which the Invisible Man evokes his 
psychic experience within this "prison" are reminiscent of 
the key feature of Franklin's psychic discomfort: they
register an encroaching sense of a disordered identity. The 
Invisible Man's persistent anxiety is not merely one of 
invisibility but of the dissonance and contradiction among 
the multiple voices within his head: "If only all the
contradictory voices shouting inside my head would calm down 
and sing a song in unison" (253). His quest for identity 
forces him to grasp at the concreteness of traditional 
"black" roles, like that offered to him by "the 
Brotherhood," because, as he intones, "How else could I save 
myself from disintegration?" (345). This anxiety of self­
disintegration, so typical of ,the literature of the racial 
experience that I will comment on in the chapters to follow, 
is a direct result, I argue, of the disciplinary conversion
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of plural psyches into unified subjects. Moreover, the 
disciplinary enforcement of the racial "structure as 
subject" has effects on the "white" subject that are the 
tell-tale reflection of its effects on the "black" subject, 
a phenomenon covertly suggested by Franklin's Autobiography 
and deeply inscribed in the poetry of John Berryman, as I 
argue in chapter 4.
Berryman's poetry instances one of the primary thematics 
of modernity: it chronicles the complexity--even the
multiplicity and alienation--of experience and identity, in 
opposition to the autonomy and power of the traditional 
Enlightenment and Romantic subject position. The 
representations of this type of experience that concern me 
here, however, emphasize the point at which the modern mode 
of experiencing environmental and psychic reality, always 
disconcerting, crosses over into the realm of outright 
psychic crisis, precipitating a psychopathology of 
alienation and disintegration that is shared by numerous 
literary personalities.36 They are characterized by a 
perceived inability to connect authentically with other 
people; a sense of internal confusion and contradiction; a 
disconcerting awareness of multiple aspects of identity 
that, if chronic enough, borders on a fear of having no 
identity at all; a sense of identity fragmentation that, if 
chronic enough, merges with neurotic visions of bodily
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disintegration and mutilation. As Berryman's Henry so 
glibly puts it, "things are going to pieces" (Song 137).
Such psychopathologies, I argue, result not directly from 
the complexity of experience but from the massive disparity 
between internalized ideals of unified identity, like the 
disciplinarily produced ones I have been describing, and 
that complexity--the contradictory and multiplicitous 
emissions, if you will, of the plural psyche. I would 
formulate the following initial diagnosis for victims of 
race-based anxieties of self-disintegration, like the 
Invisible Man: they have so internalized the ideal of a
unified racial identity that they are terrorized by their 
own lived experience of multiplicity and internal 
dissonance. Moreover, this diagnosis is the beginning of an 
explanation for a phenomenon my literary investigations-- 
particularly my comparison of Berryman and Morrison--will 
engage: the fact that the codes of "black" and "white"
identity have similar disintegrative effects for both the 
denigrated "black" victims of the racial system and its 
privileged "white" perpetrators. The imposition of a 
unified "white" subject structure requires the suppression 
of daily "disorder" for the individualistic Franklin, just 
as surely as the imposition of the "nigger with rhythm" 
persona demands that a plethora of dissonant internal voices 
be shouted down for the Invisible Man. What Morrison calls 
the "effect of racist inflection on the subject" (Playing
68
11) can be as psychically disturbing as the effect of "race" 
on its inflected objects.
The psychocultural diagnosis I am suggesting takes on 
particular resonance within the psychoanalytic context that 
has framed my discussion of "race" and fragmentation. If we 
follow Nielsen's conception of a racial mirror stage--both 
cultural and personal --through which an illusory "white" ego 
structure was concretized out of its primordial racial 
disorder by defining the disorder as "non-white" and other, 
we can think of the importance of the disintegration motif 
of "racialized" literature in terms of the Lacanian mirror 
stage and its consequences. The mirror stage is not merely 
a discrete moment in infantile development but also has a 
certain metaphorical valence for ongoing processes of 
identity formation and, indeed, initiates "the assumption of 
the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with 
its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development" 
(Lacan, Ecrits 4). The primordial "I" of the mirror stage, 
in Lacan's formulation, is the "phantasy" of power, 
totality, and coherence by which the individual emerges from 
"primordial Discord" (4) , inaugurating a "succession of 
phantasies" of unity that eventuates in the "subject." This 
fiction of unity, however, is ever subject to the 
encroachment of the multiplicities of psychic experience 
which it only tenuously masks. In cases of psychopathology, 
that encroachment can erupt as "a certain level of
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aggressive disintegration in the individual" and even as
horrific visions of bodily disintegration and mutilation
(4) . As Anthony Wilden has remarked, perhaps the most
interesting aspect of Lacan's enigmatic theory of the mirror
stage is that it suggests a dramatic explanation for the
widespread literary motif of emotional and physical
disintegration:
...Lacan regards the stade du miroir...as at the origin 
of the phantasy or dream of the corps morcele. The image 
of the "body in bits and pieces," or as put together like 
a mismatched jigsaw puzzle, is one of the most common 
phenomena in our normal dreams and phantasies, and also 
in certain forms of schizophrenia and of course in the 
LSD "trip, " to say nothing of literature, from 
Romanticism to existentialism. For Lacan, the paranoid 
twist of the moi [at the mirror stage] is directly 
related to the peculiar twists we give to our own body 
image. (174)
The prominence of the corps morcele at the intersection of
"race" and identity in the writing of Berryman and Morrison,
as well as in other artistic evocations of the experience of
racial oppression, is perhaps the most provocative evidence
for the idea, first introduced by Fanon in Black Skin. White
Masks. that one of the "mirror stages" that contribute to
identity formation in a racialized society must, inevitably,
be a racial mirror stage. Indeed, it is the paranoid
constitution of the "white" subject, suggested by both
Morrison and Nielsen and so vividly illustrated by Franklin
at the outset of our literature, that precipitates the
twisted legacy of emotional fragmentation and dismemberment
images we are about to sample.
The violent eruption of what Kohut called "disintegration 
anxiety" and its associated visions of bodily fragmentation 
at the intersection of "race" and identity is not 
inexplicable, nor is it an aberration of a few obscure texts 
or the postmodern moment. As Toni Morrison has observed, 
the vast canon of U.S. literature can be read as a legacy to 
this country's efforts to quell its internal discord--both 
as individuals and as a "unified" culture--by creating a 
continuing, distanced Africanist presence and constituting 
in opposition to it a privileged "whiteness" made up of pure 
"white" subjects. The hierarchized dichotomy will not hold, 
however, without considerable propping up, a sustenance that 
involves the insistent violence of social subjection and 
separation, to be sure, but also the constant discursive 
reiteration of the "white" subject and the "black" subject. 
The literary project of subject formation that concerns 
Morrison is a function of that discursivity. And while that 
literature repeatedly records the "successful" architectures 
of the "white" subject, like Franklin's (even as it 
represses the moments of failure), it also records the 
twisted consequences of the racial mirror stage, of its 
assertion of hierarchy, and of its production of 
"whiteness."
As Morrison has insightfully observed, this hierarchy 
based on "white" and "black," this ideology of "whiteness" 
with which we have for so long combatted our psychological
and cultural doubts, was a concept distinctly original to
the first fifty years of our nation's history. Within such
a context, she urges, we can hardly miss the allegorical
significance of the most imposing symbol of "whiteness" in
U.S. literature: Melville's whale. Indeed, the symbology
Morrison finds in Mobv-Dick--a dismembered human being
obsessed with the force that has mutilated him--forms a
central motif in the twentieth century tradition of which
her own work is exemplary. That force, we are led to
understand, is not Nature or God or Fate or even social
violence: it is "whiteness;" it is "whiteness as ideology;"
it is the ideology of "race" itself. Ultimately, it is with
Morrison's own hypothesis about "race" and psychology always
in mind that I want to present the following readings of
texts that connect our persistent psychic traumas to the
nature of our life in a violently racialized society:
...if the white whale is the ideology of race, what Ahab 
has lost to it is personal dismemberment and family and 
society and his own place as a human in the world. The 
trauma of racism is. for the racist and the victim, the 
severe fragmentation of the self, and has always seemed 
to me a cause (not a symptom) of psychosis.
("Unspeakable" 15-16, emphasis mine)
Here, Morrison fuses into a single psychology of "race" the 
dynamic I have tried to illustrate by employing a series of 
psychoanalytic and genealogical paradigms. But whether we 
consider "race," finally, as a discipline, a discourse, an 
ideology, or a psychological category, studying how it 
originated and what it is used for is the most effective
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strategy we have as, Ahab-like, we seek to destroy it. Such 
study is the most effective strategy we have, that is, as we 
seek to undermine the dynamics of the racial mirror stage 
and subvert the disciplinary enforcement of its "white" and 
"black" personality constructs by radically reformulating 
the "government of individualization" in this country. What 
is at stake for such a racially politicized psychoanalytic 
criticism, finally, is nothing less than the continued 
dismemberment of our "selves" and our society.
Notes
1. For the importance of this particular cult of the 
individual to American culture, and Franklin's centrality to 
its origin and his inspiration of its nineteenth-century 
devotees, see Cawelti and Wyllie. As Cawelti argues, 
"Franklin was not the first self-made man, but certainly he 
was the archetypal self-made man for Americans" (9) , and the 
self-made man soon became "an archetype of American society" 
(12) .
2. See Playing in the Dark 39-47. Morrison cites Dunbar's 
diaries and the commentary Bernard Bailyn makes on them in 
Voyages to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on 
the Eve of the Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1986) .
3. Morrison uses "Africanism" as "a term for the denotative 
and connotative blackness that African peoples have come to 
signify, as well as the entire range of views, assumptions, 
readings, and misreadings that accompany Eurocentric 
learning about these people" (Playing 6-7).
4. One might note in passing that there is certainly no 
shortage of references to the more overtly racialized savage 
"other"/"out there" in Franklin's writing. In the 
Autobiography. see his horrified description of the drunken, 
"disorderly," "dark-coloured" and demonic Indians at 
Carlisle (112-13), including his meditation on God's plan to 
"extirpate these savages" to make room for civilization, and 
his later anecdote about governing "blacks," where he poses 
the very condition of "blackness" as the difference in 
opposition to which the use of power itself is possible 
(123) . Carla Mulford has analyzed Franklin's "Narrative of 
the Late Massacres" as a discourse which similarly, despite
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its overt sympathizing with Native Americans, reinforces 
Franklin's white bourgeois identity--specifically by posing 
Native Americans in the position of socially subordinated, 
politically and economically inactive "subject-receiver [sj 
of the beneficence" of moral, economically and politically 
active white gentlemen (Mulford 353).
5. This summation refers generally to a set of concerns 
delineated in The Order of Things (1966), Madness and 
Civilization (1961), Discipline and Punish (1975), and The 
History of Sexuality (1977): namely, the new ways in which 
human beings began to be studied and manipulated as 
"subjects" and the evolution of what Foucault calls "bio­
power, " a set of procedures for ordering and controlling 
virtually every aspect of human life in the name of both 
individual and state welfare. Franklin's exacting attempt 
at self-definition and self-control is symptomatic of an era 
that presided over the emergence of bio-power and the 
disciplinary technologies through which it functions. These 
technologies, as Foucault details them in the aforementioned 
studies, are devoted to ordering and systematizing human 
life, isolating and normalizing individuals, and ensuring 
the internalization of the principles of order, 
individuality, and normalcy. The "Art of Virtue" is an 
exemplary instance of such disciplinary technology at work. 
Foucault's description of the "examination" as one of these 
technologies provides a pointed comparison: "These small
techniques of notation, of registration, of constituting 
files, of arranging facts in columns and tables that are so 
familiar to us now, were of decisive importance in the 
epistemological 'thaw' of the sciences of the individual." 
See Discipline and Punish 19 0-91.
6. I would argue that all writing, including all statements 
about writing, has "political" ramifications. My conviction 
in this regard, though not my particular politicized 
approach, follows Jameson, who "conceives of the political 
perspective not as some supplementary method, not as an 
optional auxiliary to other interpretive methods current 
today...but rather as the absolute horizon of all reading 
and all interpretation.... [T]here is nothing that is not 
social and historical--indeed, . . . everything is 'in the last 
analysis' political" (17-20).
7. Moreover, Franklin's case is equally representative of 
the third "mode of objectification" mentioned by Foucault, 
the process of internalization of this very objectification- 
-"the way a human being turns him- or herself into a 
subject" ("Power" 208) . Both the dividing practices and the 
internalization of subjectification are extremely useful 
concepts for exploring the way in which racial subjects are 
produced and the psychopathologies such a process involves.
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8. Lentricchia distinguishes the conservative from the 
radical critic along the lines of a distinction made by 
Kenneth Burke: the conservative is at home in the normalcy 
of society and views "education as a function of society"; 
the radical feels alienated by the "unreasonableness" of 
society and views "society as a function of education." 
Like Lentricchia, my hope is that education, and criticism, 
can remake society along more "reasonable, " and more humane, 
lines. According to Burke's formulation, "To say that 
'society' should be a function of 'education' is to say, in 
effect, that the principles and directives of the prevailing 
society are radically askew (that the society has been 
despoiled of its reasonableness) and that education must 
serve to remake it accordingly" (332) .
9. See especially Chapters 5-7 of The Political 
Responsibility of the Critic for Merod's analyses of the 
relative social effectiveness of various "left" 
intellectuals, including Stanley Fish, Paul de Man, Jacques 
Derrida, Noam Chomsky, Jameson, Foucault and Said. The 
oppositionality of each of these writers is compromised to 
some extent, Merod argues, but he is quite discerning about 
finding the elements in the thought of each that are still 
of use to the politically engaged critic. Perhaps Merod's 
critique of Fish is most relevant to the issues of context 
and community I am about to discuss. The social value of 
Fish's "interpretive community," Merod points out, though it 
has liberating implications for the idea of textual meaning 
and interpretive interaction, tends to be liquidated by its 
dependence on a traditional and elitist model of authority 
and intellectual expertise, on the "priestly function of the 
authoritative interpreter" (109). Still, it is an expanded 
idea of community that is most central to Merod's own
conception of critical radicalism (see, for example, 116- 
17) .
10. Said takes as his point of departure for these remarks 
Foucault's problematization of the question "What is a 
text?" in The Archaeology of Knowledge.
11. Merod argues that in large measure the humanities
teacher's mission is to counteract the disabling forces that 
produce helplessness, apathy, and homogeneity in our 
society: "The teacher's job is to breed the kind of critical 
capacities that allow students to resist such disabling
forces," leading them to "the process of questioning
received assumptions and conventional practices, to 
challenge authority not by temporary (and mostly futile) 
rebellion but by working wherever they work in the long- 
drawn-out effort to create resistance to domination and 
cultural indoctrination" (128-29). Developing this critical 
mindset in students involves teaching them both how to
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question "truth" and consensus and how, as Lentricchia puts 
it, to "spot, confront and work against the political 
horrors of one's time" (12).
12. This line of thought also owes much to Said, who asks us 
"to consider that the audience for literacy is not a closed 
circle of three thousand professional critics but the 
community of human beings living in society." Addressing 
such an audience and making critical work socially relevant 
will thus entail "a crossing of borders and obstacles, a 
determined attempt to generalize exactly at those points 
where generalizations seem impossible to make." See Said 
("Opponents" 24) and Merod 193-95.
13. This may be an important qualification of Lentricchia's 
injunction to "work against the political horrors of one's 
time, " if for no other reason than that there may be 
disagreements about what constitute the "political horrors" 
of our time. Different students may find different problems 
to "confront, " but if we have fostered this stance of 
aggressive critical thinking, we are already on the road to 
a more informed, and more humane, society. As Merod 
comments, "The job of the radical critic is not so much to 
make [particular] realities known as to challenge the 
conceptual basis for maintaining such ignorance. The 
radical's job is to prepare intellectual access for anyone 
who wants to comprehend the actual conditions... that 
separate people from the democratic control of their 
environments" (188).
14. Fanon's theorization of the psychology of colonialist 
racism is articulated in Black Skin. White Masks (1952). 
For an insightful perspective on the significance of Fanon's 
ideas, see Homi K. Bhabha's "Interrogating Identity: The 
Postcolonial Prerogative," in Goldberg. As Bhabha notes, 
"In shifting the focus of cultural racism from the politics 
of nationalism to the politics of narcissism, Fanon opens up 
a margin of interrogation that causes a subversive slippage 
of identity and authority" (206).
15. See hooks 19-20 and 27-29. As hooks notes, referring to 
Linda Alcoff's discussion, the importance of this version of 
identity politics to black liberation struggle is similar to 
its importance within feminist theory, where a conception of 
the subject as nonessentialized and emergent from a 
historical experience has also been emphasized. In a 
prominent example outlined by Rachel Blau DuPlessis, 
Virginia Woolf began "reevaluating the canons of...proper 
subject" in "Professions for Women" by overturning narrow 
definitions of female identity like the "Angel in the House" 
and creating a self more true to the "contradictions of 
consciousness" (123). Blau DuPlessis traces this
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redefinition of the subject through the work of several 
later woman poets.
16. The terms of this discussion are at best slippery and, 
partly because of their simultaneous use in different 
theoretical frameworks, partly because of their cultural 
manipulation, can have meanings that diverge to the point of 
direct contradiction. The term "identity," for example, 
might refer to either a specific type of "subjectified" 
identity or to the more fluid, more individuated "hybrid" 
sense of self which is possible in the absence of any 
externally defined type. And as this description suggests, 
the term "individualize," which Foucault applies (very 
usefully, I think) to the definition and typing of a 
"subject," might also be recovered to speak of the true, 
untypeable individuality of the historically situated, 
socially determined self. The term "subject" is similarly 
vexed, especially since Foucault is using it here for a 
version of what, in another philosophical framework, would 
be called "object." Indeed, in Jessica Benjamin's adaptation 
of the subject/object dichotomy, the position of "subject" 
corresponds to the fullness of intersubjective experience 
possible for those who are not objectified by others. I 
will try to note the occasional shifts in such usages that 
facilitate my discussion, as when I take up Benjamin's 
empowering version of the "subject" in chapter 5.
17. My summary is based particularly on Lacan's essays "The 
mirror stage as formative of the function of the I," "The 
agency of the letter in the unconscious," "The subversion of 
the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian 
unconscious," and "The function and field of speech and 
language in psychoanalysis," all in Ecrits: A Selection. My 
reading of the Lacanian self is also indebted to Gallop's, 
Brivic's, and Bannet's instructive commentaries.
18. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, for example, argues that the 
Lacanian Other on which identity depends can be defined as 
"the discourse of the mother, father, culture and language 
itself" (191), while Sheldon Brivic notes that "Lacan 
maintains that the unconscious is generated by an interplay 
of the situations of personal relations, culture, and 
language and cannot have any inherent content" (62).
19. My description is indebted to Henry Sussman's succint 
and evocative summary of the Kohutian model: "In the 
universe of Kohutian psychoanalysis, the subject is a 
palimpsest, a stuck-together agglomeration of more and less 
recent versions of a draft in progress, the self. 
Psychological experience for Kohut is a slippage or 
'snapping in' and 'out' of these prose versions of the self 
in response to a variety of stressors" (65). Kohut's own
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most detailed formulations of his approach, difficult to 
encapsulate because they are conscientiously empirical and 
descriptive, are contained in The Analysis of the Self 
(1971) and The Restoration of the Self (1977).
20. Kohut himself was aware of many of the similarities 
between Lacan's ideas and his own. He acknowledged, for 
example, that the self-object concept, along with the ideas 
of mirroring and mirror transference, were paralleled by 
Lacan's conceptualization of the developmental "mirror 
stage" (Analysis 123-24, Restoration xx). Joseph H. Smith 
has also remarked on the connections between Lacan and 
Kohut, due perhaps to their mutual Freudian roots (Smith 49, 
66, 70, 110) . Sussman, meanwhile, has elucidated the
extensive and intriguing similarities between Kohut's ideas 
and those of Otto Kernberg, placing those similarities in 
the context of a post-Freudian object-relations emphasis 
that encompasses Lacan, Winnicott, Klein, and Sullivan, 
among others.
21. The Kohutian clinician, for example, does not treat a 
patient per se so much as he or she engages in an ongoing 
process of analyst/analysand empathic intersubjectivity, in 
which neither "self" is wholly distinct from the other. 
Jane Gallop has summarized the similar Lacanian critique: 
"Through his emphasis on the intersubjective dialogue of the 
analytic experience as well as his discovery that the ego 
itself is constituted in an intersubjective relation, Lacan 
has shifted the object of psychoanalysis from the individual 
person taken as a separate monad to the intersubjective 
dialectic" (117).
22. The mediation I am suggesting here is similar to the one 
discussed recently by Fabienne Worth, derived from Gramsci's 
theorization of a historical process which deposits an 
infinite number of traces within the developing self. The 
historical process is then erased from awareness, leaving an 
externally derived, but internally autonomous construct of 
identity. The process of reconstructing one's subjective 
position, creating an "inventory" of the historical traces, 
then, is a mediation "between a humanistic identity (in 
which the subject signifies the object) and a postmodernist 
identity (in which the subject is constructed by the 
signifying object)" (Worth 7).
23. Even in the decentered, infinitely multiplicitous, 
object-desiring consciousness theorized by Deleuze and 
Guattari there is room for a "peripheral totality, " a unity 
which exists along with all the fragments of the self, but 
does not "unify" them (42). While this description sounds 
much like the "perspectual unity" proposed by Sussman, at 
other places in The Anti-Oedipus this "subject" resembles
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Samuels' self-structure based on its own changing phases: 
"This subject itself is not at the center, which is occupied 
by the machine, but on the periphery, with no fixed 
identity, forever decentered, defined by the states through 
which it passes" (20) .
24. "[I]t is not the aim of analysis to confront the patient 
with a now supposedly fully uncovered drive so that he can 
learn to suppress it, to sublimate it, or to integrate it in 
other ways with his total personality. The deepest level to 
be reached is not the drive, but the threat to the 
organization of the self" (Kohut, Restoration 123).
25. These aspects of the "disciplinary" production of the 
"subject," and how they relate to Franklin's proclivities 
for self-examination and self-writing, are captured with 
particular succinctness in the following passage: "Thanks to 
the whole apparatus of writing that accompanied it, the 
examination opened up two correlative possibilities: first 
the constitution of the individual as a describable, 
analyzable object...in order to maintain him in his 
individual features, in his particular evolution, in his own 
aptitudes or abilities, under the gaze of a permanent corpus 
of knowledge; and, second, the constitution of a comparative 
system that made possible the measurement of overall 
phenomena, the description of groups, the characterization 
of collective facts, the calculation of the gaps between 
individuals, their distribution in a given 'population'" 
(Discipline 190).
26. As Homi Bhabha points out, Foucault tends to treat 
"race" as an anomaly on the historical scene, ignoring the 
impact it surely had in the intercultural deployment of 
colonial "bio-power": "Foucault's spatial notion of the 
conceptual contemporaneity of power-as-sexuality limits him 
from seeing the double and overdetermined structure of race 
and sexuality that has a long history in the peuplement 
(politics of settlement) of colonial societies" (Bhabha, 
Culture 248).
27. I refer specifically to Foucault's discussion of 
"delinquency" and its fabrication as a method of making an 
object and, hence, an "individual" and a "subject," of the 
offender (Discipline 251-256). The entire discussion of the 
structure and function of penality in the sections 
"Panopticism" and "Complete and austere institutions" is 
also relevant to my argument.
28. I refer to the traditional attribution of such qualities 
as criminality, immorality, lunacy, hypersexuality, 
dirtiness, and laziness to the "black" personality construct 
in America. The evolution of these stereotypical image
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structures, as David R. Roediger has detailed, took place in 
the context of a consolidation of "whiteness" in terms of 
the disciplines of the body and the workplace. See 
especially Roediger's discussion of the mid-nineteenth- 
century Irish-American working class, which defined itself 
as "white" by projecting the negative terms of precisely 
these disciplinary categories onto the "black" "other" (150- 
56) .
29. Important support for such a summation can be found in 
David Theo Goldberg's "Introduction" and "The Social 
Formation of Racist Discourse" in Goldberg, ed. , Anatomy of 
Racism, and his "Modernity, Race, and Morality"; Michael Omi 
and Howard Winant's "By the Rivers of Babylon: Race in the 
United States (Part One)"; Henry Louis Gates Jr.'s "Writing 
'Race' and the Difference it Makes"; and in Gossett.
30. Even the earliest formulations of anything that could be 
called "racial" distinctions among classes of human beings 
date back only to the middle of the eighteenth century. The 
taxonomical classifications of Linnaeus (1758) were perhaps 
the first attempt to formalize "race" scientifically, while 
the philosopher David Hume attempted to naturalize the 
theories of "race" differentiation and "Negro" inferiority 
in 1753: "I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general 
all the other species of men (for there are four or five 
different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites" 
(from "Of National Characters"; quoted in Gates, "Writing").
31. "The nineteenth century was a period of exhaustive and-- 
as it turned out--futile search for criteria to define and 
describe race difference" (Gossett 69) . See also Gossett 
62, 77, 82, 125, and 140. Chapters III and IV in Gossett
are particularly informative about the "scientific" and 
anthropological efforts to validate "race," as is chapter 2 
in Gould. See also Nancy Stepan, The Idea of Race in 
Science: Great Britain, 1800-1960 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon
Books, 1982) and "Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in 
Science" in Goldberg, ed.
32. David Theo Goldberg makes the argument for viewing 
racism as a "field of discourse" in his 1990 essay "The 
Social Formation of Racist Discourse," citing Said's 
Orientalism and Cornel West's Prophecy Deliverance! An Afro- 
American Revolutionary Christianity (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1982) as his antecedents. Both West and 
Said draw on Foucault for their basic definitions of what 
such a "discursive field" might be and how it might operate. 
Gates presented a convincing argument for the discursivity 
of "race" from a specifically African-American perspective 
in his important 1985 essay, "Writing 'Race' and the 
Difference it Makes." More relevant to the present inquiry
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are the literary applications that Aldon Lynn Nielsen and 
Toni Morrison have made of such a theorization of "race." 
Cf. Morrison's "Africanism," discussed above and below.
33. My use of Said's analysis of "Orientalism" as a model 
for an analysis of American "Africanism" gains considerable 
credence from the fact that, at certain points, 
"Orientalism" not only parallels but intersects with the 
discursive construction of "blackness" in America. Hortense 
J. Spillers, for example, has noted how Harriet Beecher 
Stowe quite deliberately and unselfconsciously conflated 
what it means to be "oriental" with what it means to be 
"African," hopelessly complicating the possibility of any 
distinctive meaning for either term but making the utility 
of both abundantly clear: whatever they signified could be 
starkly opposed to what they did not--Anglo-European 
whiteness (Spillers, "Changing" 26-27) .
34. "Underlying all the different units of Orientalist 
discourse--by which I mean simply the vocabulary employed 
whenever the Orient is spoken or written about--is a set of 
representative figures, or tropes" (Said, Orientalism 71). 
Elsewhere, Said stresses the "idiomatic" nature of 
"orientalism," of "orientalness," and of the "oriental" 
person: "For the Orient idioms became frequent, and these 
idioms took firm hold in European discourse. Beneath the 
idioms there was a layer of doctrine about the Orient; this 
doctrine was fashioned out of the experiences of many 
Europeans, all of them converging upon such essential 
aspects of the Orient as the Oriental character, Oriental 
despotism, Oriental sensuality, and the like" (203).
35. Three stories that surfaced in the news in late 1993 are 
suggestive of the pernicious extremes to which 
essentialism, even if based on "black" pride and ethnicity, 
can quickly escalate: the first involved an organized 
movement by members of the "black" community to ban "white" 
parents from adopting and raising "black" children; the 
second involved the ejection from a Kwanzaa celebration of 
a "white" mother who had brought her "white/black" children 
to the event, on the grounds that Kwanzaa was for "blacks" 
only; the third involved protests by "black" students 
against the teaching of African-American history by "white" 
university professors (see Pope). All three actions are 
based on the assumption that "black" and "white" people can 
be defined, not merely that certain features of behavior or 
culture can be experientially characterized as "black." 
Such definitions must be rooted in the original system of 
"race" and "racism," with all its concern for exclusion and 
its blindness to both intragroup and intrapersonal 
diversity.
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36. The self became an increasingly problematic, 
increasingly contested idea with the "end" of romanticism 
and the advent of modernism. I am thinking primarily of 
fiction, like that of James Joyce and Virginia Woolf, in 
which identity is represented as fluctuating, 
multiplicitous, intersubjective, and, perhaps most 
significantly, constituted by a surrounding cultural and 
material substrate. For Leopold Bloom and Stephen Dedalus, 
as Sheldon Brivic has commented, the self is not only 
materially based but takes the form of a continuous loop or 
spiral: identity is an ongoing process of perception moving 
outward to engulf the "Other" and self-consciousness moving 
inward to sense its (constantly renewed) self, a dynamic 
that Brivic connects to both Hegel and Lacan. For Joyce, as 
for Hegel and Lacan, identity was a "succession of phases" 
(Brivic 48) . Similarly, Woolf explored the tenuous, 
environmentally constituted nature of identity in novels 
like Mrs. Dallowav and The Waves, and in fact extended her 
exploration to its psychopathological implications with her 
creation of the character Rhoda, who cannot see her face in 
the mirror and laments, "I am broken into separate pieces; 
I am no longer one" (Waves 106) . For discussions of similar 
literary identities from a distinctly Kohutian perspective, 
see Sussman and Bouson. A broader discussion of this 
"modernist" self in literature can be found, for example, in 
Sypher.
Chapter Two 
Proper Conduct and Negro Sunshine: 
Disciplines of Self and Text in Stein's Melanctha
Approached from almost every angle, Gertrude Stein's 
Melanctha seems to reflect a fundamental concern with the 
clarification of identity. Within the text, characters 
struggle to quell internal discord by asserting, fixing, 
and coming to "know" the "real" selves inside them and 
inside other characters. As a representation, the text has 
been read as a mimetic icon of consciousness in process, as 
an artistically coherent depiction of the conflictual, 
repetitive, disordered elements of unfolding identity. As 
a text about Americans of African descent, Stein's story 
has been read as an attempt at psychological realism that 
seeks to define racial identities according to a crude 
schema of skin color and blood mix. Finally, the way 
Melanctha inscribes elements of Stein's own life suggests 
possible readings of the story as an artistic exorcism of 
demonized anxieties about Stein's own social and emotional 
identity.
These related concerns with clarifying identity share a 
significant common thread: each develops around issues of 
morality, conformity, and propriety. Individual identity 
is managed, in Melanctha. through the management of proper 
conduct: applying the rule of "the right way to do" (235) 
to the verbal or observable record of what has been done, 
determines who and what one "really" is. The rules of
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rectitude, however, are insistently referenced to codes of 
sexuality, race, and class, so that constructs of coherent 
identity are always built out of a compound of conformity 
and category. Hence, Melanctha's romantic interest, Dr. 
Jefferson Campbell, is preoccupied with outlining what 
living "regular" means for working class "colored people" 
(117) .
The tragic proportions of Melanctha's life, conversely, 
are a product of her inability to fit into any such 
socially defined role. Taken in this light, Stein's story 
reads as an explication of the violence of constricting the 
contradiction and complexity of the plural psyche within 
simplistic, superficial constructs of race, sexuality, and 
propriety. Melanctha is a character whose yearning, 
noncomformity, and discontent expose the inadequacy of the 
identity roles available within a society which manages 
individuality by managing conduct and conformity. What 
interests me particularly, however, is the exaggerated 
emphasis this concern places on both morality and race. 
Indeed, if one sets aside the stylistic and aesthetic 
innovations which have traditionally riveted the attention 
of Stein critics, these topical elements may be the two 
most dramatic features of Melanctha: the seemingly clumsy 
and contrived structure of race and color which governs the 
narrative commentary and the character descriptions; and 
the remarkably extended depiction of the interpersonal
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operations of what Michel Foucault would analyze as a 
"disciplinary society," obsessed with the normalization of 
behavior. I want to suggest that this intersection of 
themes is not incidental, but can be traced to the intimate 
relationship of "race" and morality alluded to in recent 
cultural analyses like David Theo Goldberg's study of the 
racial subtext of Enlightenment moral philosophy (Goldberg, 
"Modernity"), and David Roediger1s and Eric Lott's studies 
of the moral subtext of the nineteenth-century 
racialization of U.S. society (Roediger 95-97, 133-63; Lott 
67-71) .
Placing Melanctha in the context of that relationship 
between "race," morality, and identity, I think, can help 
us to understand why the racial code embedded in Melanctha 
has inspired such contradictory responses. Richard Wright 
pronounced the story a profoundly realistic rendering of 
African American life and speech, claiming that he had read 
Melanctha aloud to "a group of semi-literate Negro 
stockyard workers," who were delighted, understanding, and 
"enthralled."-*- James Weldon Johnson and Nella Larsen were 
also among the African American writers who praised the 
text for its humane and realistic depiction of African 
Americans (Brinnin 121). In contrast, other commentators 
have found the portrayal of "blacks" in Melanctha to be 
utterly generic, if not patently demeaning and racist. "I 
found nothing striking and informative about Negro life,"
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wrote the African American poet Claude McKay. "Melanctha, 
the mulatress, might have been a Jewess" (248) . And 
Richard Bridgman, correcting numerous instances of blind 
appreciation of the realism of the portrayals by white 
critics, has bluntly described Stein's treatment of 
"blacks" as condescending, false, and thoroughly 
stereotyped (Pieces 52, "Melanctha" 352). All too often, 
however, the potential political issues raised by Stein's 
language of race have been largely slighted or ignored in 
favor of analyses of more aesthetic or "universal" 
concerns: the text as an example of modernism, realism,
stylistic experimentation, romantic narrative, 
epistemological inquiry, or psychological analysis. Even 
explicitly politicized approaches to Melanctha. like those 
which have sought to elucidate the latent feminism of the 
narrative, have only cursorily engaged the racial discourse 
and imagery, when they engage it at all.2 Such critics, as 
Sonia Saldivar-Hull points out, in their efforts to 
establish Stein as a legitimate force within the received 
modernist canon, or to install her as one of the feminist 
matriarchs of an alternative canon, have sidestepped the 
upper-class, white supremacism that Melanctha might be seen 
to exhibit.
I want to redirect attention to this often ignored 
aspect of Melanctha by placing it in a context that 
complicates the strict dualism of this realism-or-racism
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debate. A reading of the elaborate system of racial 
discourse and imagery in the story certainly needs to take 
into account how that system insistently tries to pin the 
behavioral and psychological characteristics it is 
describing to racial identity, an effect that must at least 
be defined as racializing, if not implicitly racist. In 
this aspect, the narrative functions as an instance of what 
Toni Morrison calls "Africanism," a representation of 
"blackness" that underwrites both cultural and personal 
definitions of "white" (in this case Stein's) identity. 
But the potentially racist implications of this deployment 
of rhetoric and stereotypes is extensively complicated by 
two crucial aspects of Stein's creative method: first, the 
"realism" of an artistic mode that apparently drew at least 
some of this material from a genuinely African American 
cultural milieu; and, second, her self-conscious intention 
to represent not "real" "blacks," but the very discursive 
system, including its Africanism, in which her own identity 
was constructed. Taking such features of Stein's creative 
process into account does not mean dismissing either the 
psychological function the text might have had for her as 
Africanism or the contribution the text makes to the 
extension of such symbolic racialization, but it does mean 
positioning Melanctha as an irresolvably ambivalent 
statement about "race." Derived in part from the hugely 
influential cultural structure of the minstrel show, as I
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suggest below, Stein's discourse of "race" exhibits 
precisely the kind of complex mix of "contradictory racial 
impulses" that Eric Lott has recently attributed to that 
most popular of all nineteenth-century entertainments (Lott 
4). Stein's ventriloquization of "blackness," like the 
minstrel show's, cannot be categorized as "inauthentic" or 
"racist" in any simple way, both because some elements of 
her text derive from a cultural discourse that was already 
interracial in its own right and because her art was rooted 
in what Lott has called a "contradictory structure" of 
racial feeling in nineteenth-century U.S. society.
We can begin to read this political ambivalence 
precisely in Stein's representation of Melanctha's struggle 
against the "government" of racial and moral 
"individualization." In the first section of my argument, I 
assess this "intratextual" dimension of the text--the plot 
itself--as radical or liberatory in that it encourages 
readers to question the normalizing strategies, centered on 
codes of both "race" and conformity, that radiate through 
the social structure it represents. The dual emphasis on 
"race" and morality, indeed, in a text in which the 
characters struggle to "know" each other "truly" as 
intelligible subjects, suggests that "race" and morality 
might both be categories of identity within a larger 
project of disciplinary "government of individualization," 
using "discipline" especially in its sense of "making"
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individuals (Foucault, Discipline 170). Both the discourse 
about racial natures and the continuing surveillance, 
comparative assessment, and categorization of characters' 
sexual and/or moral "identities," in other words, depict 
the specific mechanisms through which discipline operates, 
an operation implicitly challenged by the trajectory of 
Melanctha's life. Insomuch as the story analyzes the 
disciplinary effects of the characters' discourse, then, it 
bears a certain progressive political effectivity.
If, by reading with the grain of the text, so to speak, 
we can see Stein critiquing a disciplinary society that 
deploys such codes of individualization, by reading against 
the grain of the text--reading the text as Africanist--we 
can also see the important ways that Stein herself is 
contradictorily enmeshed in such a disciplinary society, as 
both subject and agent of discipline. Thus, in the second 
segment of my reading, I suggest how Stein was using her 
writing during this early phase of her career to work out 
profound anxieties about her own sense of self. These 
anxieties are precipitated by the normalizing and 
individualizing strictures of "white," middle-class moral 
conformity, I argue, and are exorcized in Melanctha through 
a process of self-fortification that projects the psychic 
disorder Stein was feeling onto a thoroughly racialized 
other. If the extended thematization in the story of how 
disciplinary sexual and moral individuality are enforced at
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the microsocial level indicates what was "eating" Stein as 
she made her expatriacy permanent and began her artistic 
career, her method of encoding that concern nevertheless 
witnesses the reproduction of disciplinary tendencies in 
her own text.
It is this secondary dimension of Melanctha. then, that 
reads as an elaborate instance of the ego-reinforcing and 
chaos-exorcising Africanism to which Morrison has ascribed 
a key role in the structuring of "whiteness" and "white" 
identity. Drawing on a culturally established network of 
discursive agreements about "blackness," Stein was working 
out the disorder of her own identity--and most prevalently 
its sexual "disorder"--by projecting disorder, and 
sexuality itself, onto a racialized other. Melanctha. from 
this perspective, can be productively read as a metaphor 
for Stein's own psychological alienation during the first 
few years of the twentieth century--Melanctha's "blueness," 
but also her "blackness," providing a metaphor through 
which Stein externalized experiences of disorder, 
incoherence and moral i m p r o p r i e t y . 3  in its dimension as 
text. then, Melanctha provides a signal twentieth-century 
example of the racial mirror stage in which a culturally 
dominating "white" identity is established and reified 
through the cultural creation of a degraded "blackness." 
If we attend to the disciplinary effects of Stein ' s 
discourse, that is, Melanc tha carries a politically
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regressive and racially reactionary symbolic valence that 
distinctly problematizes the potential radicalism of the 
content.
In my concluding remarks, however, I want to present the 
text in a third, more contextualized or "extratextual" 
dimension, a reading that, by focusing on Stein's 
particular compositional technique, leaves these 
contradictory impulses in tension. As Carla Peterson's 
recent attempt to historicize the story suggests, the 
racial rhetoric in Melanctha is realistic to the extent 
that Stein drew at least part of it from elements of 
minstrelsy, "coon" songs, and blues music that she heard in 
the African American communities she lived near in 
Baltimore during the late 1890s.4 These forms, before we 
even consider the complexities of intention and desire 
Stein may have brought to them, were already radically 
interracial in usage and deeply conflicted in political 
inflection (compromised by their racist origins, yet 
subversively reappropriated).5 ultimately, however, it is 
by complicating the idea of "realism" itself that Stein 
most profoundly inflects her story with such conflicted 
elements of the symbolic order. In formulating Melanctha as 
a "realism of the composition," a "realism of the 
composition of [her] thoughts," rather than as a "realism" 
of objects, events, or characters, Stein problematizes the 
very distinctions between textual content, textual surface,
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and textual context on which a totalizing interpretation of 
the story might depend. In Stein's metarepresentational 
composition, the material surface of the surrounding 
discursive system itself is incorporated directly into the 
"realism" of the representation. Instead of representing 
"black" Americans, as I argue in my conclusion, the story 
literally represents how culture trains "whites" to think 
about "black" Americans. Or, more accurately, in addition 
to representing "blackness," the story represents how the 
representation of "blackness" takes place. Insomuch as the 
text thus thematizes what we might call the disciplinarity 
of culture1s racial discourse, it remains an irresolvably 
ambivalent statement about "race" that holds both 
liberatory and oppressive significations in tension.
The sense of proper conduct
The obsession with moral propriety in Melanctha might be 
read as a direct response to the emergent, oppressively 
disciplinary U.S. middle-class atmosphere in which Stein 
grew up. I am referring to what Lott has called, drawing 
on the work of historians like Roediger, Mary Ryan, and 
Paul Boyer, the emergence of a "rationalized society" with 
a "new moral order" of both bourgeois and working-class 
"respectability" between about 1830 and 1860 (Lott 148). 
The formation of a U.S. class hierarchy during this period, 
Lott observes, was accompanied and managed by the
development of a "culture of moral reform" and other "fresh 
repertoires of domination," including new social discourses 
of "criminality" and "race" (69-70). Moreover, the 
cultural production of "blackness" in nineteenth-century 
minstrelsy tended to both encode these social formations 
and to symbolically resolve the tensions and anxieties they 
created. ̂  it is in this context that I want to read 
Stein's later production of a related, though different 
version of "blackness," eventually treating Melanctha as a 
sort of racialized projection of "white" middle-class 
disciplinarity. I begin, however, by examining it as an 
illustration of what we might think of, in Foucauldian 
terms, as the intensive "formalization of the individual 
within power relations" (Discipline 190) and the networks 
of petty disciplinarians that radiated through various 
levels and sectors of society during the nineteenth 
century.7
The "race" and morality that pervade Stein's story, I am
suggesting, might be most productively interpreted as
"disciplinary technologies" through which, as Foucault
argues, disciplinary power
applies itself to immediate everyday life which 
categorizes the individual, marks him by his own 
individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes 
a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which 
others have to recognize in him. It is the form of 
power which makes individuals subjects. ("Power" 212)
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As this passage suggests, the discipline Foucault theorizes 
is not confined merely to operation as a corrective or 
formative device in the prisons, asylums, schools, and 
clinics which form the heart of his historical inquiries, 
but also "applies itself to immediate everyday life." In 
fact, he hypothesizes the infinite extension of a 
generalized disciplinary power throughout a network or 
continuum of relations that affects every member of society 
and penetrates to the most miniscule levels of 
interpersonal behavior, and it is this prospect of a 
"disciplinary regime" or "disciplinary society" (Discipline 
193, 209) that I find most interesting for my reading of 
Melanctha. Melanctha. and in a similar way the other two 
stories in Three Lives. might be read as an extended 
portrayal of a society characterized by "the universal 
reign of the normative": a social structure in which "the 
judges of normality" and the "mechanisms of discipline" are 
omnipresent and subtly exert their coercive force on "each 
individual, wherever he may find himself" (Discipline 
304).8
In Three Lives. this disciplinary power is represented 
as being transmitted through the capillaries of everyday 
life by every person who has internalized the codes of 
conduct, class, and "race"--by the evaluative and 
judgmental functions of an entire social fabric of 
"supervisors, perpetually supervised" (Discipline 1 7 7 ).9
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Each of the stories depicts a microsociety riddled with 
moral monitoring, chastising, and petty penality. Stein 
focuses on characters, like Melanctha's friend Rose, who 
are not only supervised by the rules of regularity and 
rectitude, but also participate in supervising, managing 
the compliance of both themselves and others. Thus the 
"good" Anna, who "had always a firm old world sense of what 
was the right way for a girl to do" (24), constantly 
monitors the sexual behavior of her young co-worker, 
Sallie, insistently "scolding" her and even resorting to 
surveillance. "Sallie is a good girl but I got to watch 
her all the time," says Anna (20). The "gentle" Lena's 
aunt, Mrs. Haydon, carefully manages Lena's leisure time 
and administrates a proper marriage for her, a marriage 
motivated not by desire but by Mrs. Haydon's conception of 
"decent" identity for a working girl. "I do whatever you 
tell me it's right for me to do," says the compliant Lena 
to her moral supervisor (253). Similarly, in Melanctha. 
Jeff and Rose monitor, categorize, and ultimately censor 
Melanctha for her failures in the "right way to do" and for 
acting like a "common nigger," (86) a classification I take 
to have both a class and a racial dimension. In this 
respect, Three Lives incisively illustrates an almost 
comprehensive supervision of conformity, by which, through 
a "micro-physics of power" (Discipline 26-27), individual 
identities are created, insisted upon, and constrained.
The management of proper conduct, then, represents the 
primary "ritual of truth" and objectification by which 
characters in Stein's story attempt to reduce identity to a 
manageable, individualistic, "fictitious atom" attached to 
human self-experience--it is the basic instrument by which 
"discipline 'makes' individuals" in Melanctha.10 Through 
the strict application of a moral code--often, but not 
always, a code of sexual morality--to observed behavior, 
characters like Rose and Jeff seek to define each person's 
individuality, to evaluate hierarchically the individuals 
so created, and in so doing to enforce normativity and 
conformity.H  Melanctha's friend Rose exemplifies this 
dynamic of the moral code in the opening pages of the 
story: she is described as "promiscuous, " but as 
maintaining her place--and her secure identity--in the 
social order by being properly engaged to each of the men 
she "keeps company" with, "for Rose had strong the sense of 
proper conduct" (88). While Rose's maneuver might seem to 
make a mockery of sexual morality, it is clear that, within 
the code of conduct and identity that obtains in this 
society, she is on solid ground: she is able to avoid being 
categorized as a "common nigger" (88) and, because she has 
observed the rules of social propriety, she is able to 
advance to the next stage of decency and conformity, 
deciding to become "regularly married" (88). Indeed, we 
might be tempted to assess this merely as hypocrisy on
Rose's part, and as her clever ability to slip through the 
code of proper conduct, were it not for the fact that the 
text has already tagged Melanctha's social shortcoming in 
precisely this respect and, hence, her social identity: her 
distinguishing feature in terms of the code of proper 
conduct is that she "had not yet been really married" (85, 
86), a tag that will be reiterated throughout the story. 
Rose may indeed be immoral by a strictly religious 
standard, but she is operating within the framework of her 
society's regulations about decency and conformity. 
Indeed, she is herself one of the arbiters of the code of 
conduct, evaluating Melanctha's position in relationship to 
the code (she is "not a common nigger either") and serving 
as a counselor to Melanctha, in these opening pages, on 
"what was the right way for her to do" (88).
The recurrence of the "right way to do" as a refrain 
that governs both the behavior and the self-images of the 
characters in each of the stories of Three Lives 
accentuates its importance to Stein's conception of the 
oppression of the working-class lives she represents. I 
have suggested, in defining "race" in chapter 1, that one 
of the vehicles of the microsocial extension of the 
disciplines is their linguistic circulation: the
racialization of society sustains, extends and applies 
itself to its subjects effectively because it is a 
discurs ive discipline. It is always transmitted,
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elaborated, and rehearsed by the linguistic acts and
concepts that become the vocabulary and self-concepts that
organize the subjectivities that communicate with the given
linguistic circuit. David Theo Goldberg describes the
operation of social normativity and morality in similar
terms, concisely summarizing the identity management that
such codes entail as well:
The social formation of the subject involves, in large 
part, thinking (of) oneself in terms of--literally as-- 
the image projected in prevailing concepts of the 
discursive order. These concepts incorporate norms of 
behavior, rules of interaction, and principles of social 
organization. The values inherent in these norms, 
rules, and principles exercise themselves upon 
individual and social being as they are assumed, molded, 
indeed sometimes transformed in their individual and 
social articulation. ("Modernity" 193)
Following Goldberg's analysis, "the right way to do" serves
as the key example in Melanctha of a discursive
encapsulation of social norms that, in turn, provides the
basis for "the social formation of the subject." The
phrase "right way to do" literally becomes a linguistically
communicated self-image that particular subjects attempt to
conform to or, at the risk of considerable anxiety and
social censure, as we shall see, resist. This reductive
and normative discursive structuring of the subject, as
Jayne Walker suggests in her insightful reading of Stein,
supplies much of the tragic undertone of the "three lives":
the "repetition of the same judgmental words" about
morality and character are the key feature in Stein's
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creation of what amounts to a "story of victimization by 
language and the social conventions it enforces" (Walker 
26, 27).
In what follows, I want to extend Walker's intriguing
emphasis on the reductive function of compartmentalized
social discourse in Melanctha--the inadequacy of Jeff's
"rigid set of moral labels" for describing either
experience or personality, for example (Walker 33)--to an
engagement with the distinctly racial language that forms a
part of this discourse but that, like many commentators,
Walker ignores. Like Rose, Jeff has thoroughly
internalized the "norm" that governs social behavior in the
"black," working-class culture Stein depicts, and he is an
ardent and vocal supporter of the "regularity" and "quiet"
living it dictates. For Jeff, this behavioral code is
explicitly referenced to his racial identity, and
conformity to it is a crucial component in his program for
improving the life of "the colored people":
"I am a colored man and I ain't sorry, and I want to see 
the colored people like what is good and what I want 
them to have, and that's to live regular and work hard 
and understand things, and that's enough to keep any 
decent man excited"....It was the life he wanted that he 
spoke to, and the way he wanted things to be with the 
colored people. (117, emphasis mine)
According to this reductive linguistic grid, Jeff initially
defines Melanctha as a type. That type is clearly "bad,"
for we learn that "he did not like Melanctha's ways and he
did not think that she would ever come to any good" (112,
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emphasis mine). We might conceptualize the two lovers' 
subsequent interaction in terms of Jeff's continuing 
efforts to secure not only the semantic and moral, but also 
the racial integrity of his terminology of "good" and 
"bad," and, simultaneously, to position Melanctha's 
identity within his linguistic grid and his code of 
"decent" behavior for "colored people." The wild 
vicissitudes of Jeff's frustrated, repetitive involvement 
with Melanctha, then, correspond to his movements between 
brief periods of sharing in the semantic, experiential, 
psychological and sexual "wandering" that Melanctha 
represents, and renewed efforts to restore semantic, 
psychological, and moral "regularity," where "regularity" 
is defined within a socially dominant conception of 
"blackness." (I will return below to the complex influence 
of "white" ideas of "blackness" on that conception.)
Which is the wav that is vou really?
Above all, Jeff manipulates the linguistic units and 
self-images circulating through the codes of "regularity" 
and "good" in order to secure and define subjectivity, an 
insistence on essentialized individuality most prominently 
thematized by his enduring rhetoric of "really knowing" 
both his and Melanctha's identities. Melanctha, in simply 
struggling for a social and psychological existence that 
respects the various emotional and intellectual impulses
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she feels, is unconsciously struggling against a 
"government of individualization" that ever pulls her 
toward a unified, static, and describable individuality. 
Her tendency to "wander" away from the socially constructed 
identities available to her--like the social positions 
reverenced by her friend Rose--is, indeed, what initially 
seems to attract Jeff, the young, upstanding doctor, but he 
is eventually repulsed by the threat such "freedom" entails 
and moves violently back toward a reassertion of the moral 
code and, significantly, a strict doctrine of 
individualism.
Throughout Jeff's repetitive cycle from strict "decency" 
to brief dalliances with wandering and back to a sense of 
rigid individualism, a romantic journey that consumes the 
central 100 pages of the 150-page narrative, Melanctha and 
Jeff link their contrasting concerns with identity 
management to a specifically linguistic sense of self­
constitution and to their differing epistemological 
orientations--their different ways of knowing the world. 
When Melanctha meets the young "mulatto" (108) doctor at 
her mother's deathbed, he is a man with a rigid, simply 
defined self-conception committed to an austere lifestyle 
(no "excitements") and a carefully defined existence. He 
is given to long, elaborate sessions of "thinking" things 
through and talking things out. He believes in always 
learning to know his world through careful thought, and, as
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Melanctha puts it later, in "always wanting to have it all 
clear out in words always" (171).
In contrast to this existence based on definition and 
rigid security, Melanctha has a "complex, desiring" (87) 
identity, "always full with mystery and subtle movements 
and denials and vague distrusts and complicated 
disillusions" (89) . Her complexity and vagueness 
counterpoint, but also counteract, Jeff's propensity for 
clarity and definition. Melanctha has little use for 
talking and thinking; her mode of interacting with the 
world and with other people is both material and affective. 
"Melanctha always had strong the sense for real experience. 
Melanctha Herbert did not think much of [Jeff's] way of 
coming to real wisdom" (116) . Early on in their 
relationship, she condemns Jeff's narrow and quiet approach 
to life as an avoidance of "really feeling things way down 
in you" (123), stressing the characterological dichotomy 
between Melanctha's sensibility of feeling and Jeff's 
sensibility of thinking.12
The "thinking" and "feeling" types represented by Jeff 
and Melanctha, respectively, resemble the poles of a 
dichotomy of human nature that long occupied Stein's 
attention, beginning perhaps with the research article she 
published as a psychology student at Harvard, "Cultivated 
Motor A u t o m a t i s m . " 13 of more direct relevance to my 
argument here, however, is the connection Lisa Ruddick
convincingly shows between Stein's representation of these 
personality types and the work of her college psychology 
mentor, William James. Numerous critics have explored the 
influence of Jamesian psychology on Stein's writing, most 
notably in terms of her efforts to render in fictional form 
the Jamesian concept of a "stream of consciousness." 
Ruddick, by contrast, delineates how James's discussion in 
Principles of Psychology of what he called "habits of 
attention" may have provided the conceptual basis for 
Stein's personality types in Melanctha. Ruddick's focus is 
particularly useful here because it elucidates how the 
"feeling" and "thinking" types might be related to another 
apparent theme in the story: how the words and concepts 
available to us limit our interactions with the 
experiential world.14 That is, the concept of "habits of 
attention" may have been the model that Stein herself was 
working with in creating characters whose language, as 
Walker puts it, "controls--and impedes--their perceptions 
and judgments" (37).
Briefly, James believed that each of us makes sense of, 
and limits, the multeity of sensory experience by selecting 
what we will actually "pay attention" to according to 
distinctive "habits of attention." These modes of 
selective attention, he reasoned, are predominantly 
linguistic and conceptual in nature. Adults, James 
theorized, would be quite fixed in their habit of
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attention, able to shut out the plethora of incoming 
impressions and limit their actual perceptions to data 
relevant to a limited set of permanent interests, needs, 
and familiar words and concepts. Children, on the other 
hand, might be more capable of simply "wandering" in the 
sensory continuum from one item of immediate excitement to 
another, making fewer "selections" based on acquired 
concepts and personal use v a l u e .  -̂5 stein's emphasis on the 
vague descriptor "wandering" to describe a broad range of 
Melanctha's experiential activities (including, but not 
only, sexual experiences), suggests that we might read the 
personality types in Melanctha as an opposition between the 
two extremes of the character range suggested by James's 
framework. At one extreme is Melanctha*s "childlike" 
"wandering attention," with little concern for practicality 
and little limitation by received concepts; at the other is 
Jeff's more "adult"--or, to use a phrase more amenable to 
the cultural framework of this discussion, more socialized- 
-tendency toward practical perceptual selectivity and the 
linguistic encapsulation of experience.
Reformulating the thinking/feeling typology in terms of 
the Jamesian habits of attention which Stein may have been 
adapting, then, clarifies her thematization of the 
linguistic dimensions of perception and personality. As 
James suggests, our available repertoire of words and 
concepts not only limits what sensory data we actually
perceive, but how we perceive those data that do filter 
through our attention. Thus, our actual perceptual mode is 
significantly determined by our previously acquired, and 
largely linguistic, consciousness; or, as James put it, 
"whilst part of what we perceive comes through our senses 
from the object before us, another part (and it may be the 
larger part) always comes out of our own m i n d . "16 to be 
obsessed with thinking everything out and "having it clear 
in words," as Jeff is, is to have a relatively rigid and 
selective "habit of attention"; to be more interested in 
what "excites" (119), to "have strong the sense for real 
experience" (116), and to prefer feeling things deeply, as 
does Melanctha, is to have a less conceptually and 
linguistically fixed "habit of attention." These, finally, 
were the key characteristics defining what Stein apparently 
conceived of as two basic "identity" types. As she 
observed later, "habits of attention are reflexes of the 
complete character of the individual."1^ stein's recourse 
to the reductive dualism of such a typology, as I argue 
below, might be taken as one indication of her own attempt 
at this point in her career to manage anxieties about the 
disorder and multiplicity of human behavior and identity.
When Jeff and Melanctha meet, her less fixed habit of 
attention immediately begins to expose the inadequacy of 
his linguistic rigidity. Most significantly, Jeff's 
carefully structured sense of self, literally constructed
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out of a set of stock phrases about behavior and morality, 
begins to deteriorate under Melanctha's destabilizing 
influence. Jeff's self-image is directly cued by his 
community's behavioral norms as they are communicated in 
words like "quiet, " "good, " "regular, " and "avoid 
excitements." Following Goldberg, we might analyze this 
formation of Jeff's "subject" as his "thinking (of) 
[him]self in terms of— literally as--the image projected in 
prevailing concepts of the discursive order" ("Modernity" 
193) . The text itself seems to focus on how Melanctha's 
problematization of the discursive order traumatizes the 
subject as cultural structure. As the two begin to discuss 
morality and conduct (116-135), Melanctha repeatedly forces 
qualifications in the "meaning" of Jeff's statements, 
undercutting both the concepts on which he bases his ideas 
and his confidence in the transparency of semantic 
reference, as when she asserts that "it certainly does seem 
to me you don't know very well yourself, what you mean, 
when you are talking" (118). Repeatedly Melanctha points 
out the shortcomings of Jeff's narrow formulations, finally 
observing that Jeff's ideas of goodness and regularity seem 
to preclude the possibility of "real" love and of "really 
feeling things way down in you," which "certainly ain't 
really to me being very good" (122-23). Jeff tries to 
retrench by more carefully defining "love," forwarding a 
narrow formulation of two possible types of love: good,
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regular "family" love, on the one hand, and "animal" love, 
on the other (124). With a perceptual grid based on such 
narrow concepts, Melanctha observes, Jeff can "talk big" 
but has little capacity for "being really very 
understanding" of the world, and his ethics of "goodness" 
"don't amount to very much" (124).
While Melanctha pursues the relationship despite her 
awareness that Jeff's "good" might not be all "good," 
Jeff's interest seems contingent on his establishment of a 
clearly defined character for Melanctha: he is hesitant to 
proceed in the affair until he has pinned down precisely 
"who" she "is." Originally, Jeff had Melanctha neatly 
categorized as a type and wanted nothing to do with a 
personality "who wandered" and hence "would never come to 
any good" (110). After encountering her "feeling" 
mentality, however, he is beset by by both semantic and 
characterological doubt: "If Jefferson only knew better
just what Melanctha meant by what she said....Now he found 
that really he knew nothing. He did not know the least bit 
about Melanctha" (130). From Melanctha's perspective, of 
course, mere words are inadequate to "what a woman is 
really feeling in her," and she urges Jeff to abandon his 
talking in favor of "really feeling" (135). Jeff admits 
that "[pjerhaps what I call my thinking ain't really so 
very understanding" (135), but there is considerably more 
at stake in this realization than a mere shift from a
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"thinking" to a "feeling" mentality. Rather, his engagement
with Melanctha's mode of "knowing" precipitates a state of
uncertainty characterized by the deterioration of
linguistic integrity and a sense of internal discord:
These months had been an uncertain time for Jeff 
Campbell. He never knew how much he really knew about 
Melanctha. . . .he did not seem to himself to know very 
much about her....He now never thought about all this in 
real words any more. He was always letting it fight 
itself out in him. He was now never taking any part in 
this fighting that was always going on inside him.
(136)
Significantly, Jeff's loss of a coherent sense of self and 
his anxiety that both his and Melanctha's identities may be 
complex and contradictory, is linked to an inability to use 
"words" to encapsulate experience. Alerted by Melanctha to 
the possibilities of an endless series of qualifications 
and nuances that might underlie the surface signification 
of words, and aware that the solidity of his identity was 
built on the solidity of his language, Jeff slips into a 
state of Lacanian alienation, where the contradictions of 
his unconscious and the chain of linguistic signification 
threaten the ego integrity he had previously assumed.
Indeed, a few episodes later this threat of psychic 
disintegration becomes even more explicit, as the wandering 
habit of attention that characterizes his relationship with 
Melanctha begins to threaten the dissolution of both their 
"selves" into an intersubjective fabric of "little pieces 
all different" (158). This disintegration of clear ego
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boundaries is, for Jeff, both a "good big feeling" and a 
source of immense anxiety (158-59), a psychological 
ambivalence that mirrors the moral ambivalence that leads 
to his on-again, off-again involvement in the affair. The 
crisis centers, in either case, around insecurity about the 
definition of Melanctha's identity ("I don't know anything 
real about you Melanctha") and about the disturbance of his 
moral and racial self-conceptions, as is suggested by his 
almost desperate rehearsal in this context of the formulaic 
linguistic units through which he has internalized these 
self-images: "the right way," "live regular," "all the
colored people," "a bad one," "having excitements" (159). 
Representative of what he calls his "old thinking" (156, 
159), these formulae bespeak both the behavioral code and 
the semantic order on which Jeff's sense of a clearly 
bounded identity depend. Without them, and the clear 
definition of Melanctha they enforce, Jeff feels himself to 
be in danger, like Melanctha's "wandering," alcoholic 
friend, Jane, of literally "[going] to pieces" (1 0 8 ).18
Melanctha immediately reads this individualizing dynamic 
in their first disagreement, recognizing that what is 
really at issue in Jeff's semantic doubt is his attempt to 
define her moral identity. Jeff, who has begun to wonder 
if his initial assessment of Melanctha as a "bad" wanderer 
is correct, is attempting to bring her "real" self to the 
surface by making subtle suggestions about the difficulty
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of knowing "what each other is really thinking" and "what
each other means by what we are always saying" (128).
Instead of showing her hand, Melanctha calls his,
recognizing that he is only trying to get her to speak so
that he can judge her according to the terms he already
believes in: "That certainly do mean, by what you say,
that you think I am a bad one, Jeff Campbell" (128).
Jeff dodges the truth in this assertion this time, but
the cat-and-mouse game between them continues. Only by
encouraging Melanctha to speak her thoughts can Jeff
resolve the conundrum that structures their relationship:
is Melanctha "good, " so that he can love her, or is she
"bad," making his involvement with her an infraction of his
code of "regular" conduct for the "colored people." Of
course, Jeff is also flirting with Melanctha's reckless
abandonment of the linguistic and moral code, but
constantly he returns to the need for judging her moral
identity, and it is her ability to appear "good" at some
times and "bad" at others--a fluctuation that is
inconceivable within Jeff's original conceptual framework--
that leads to his ambivalence. Frustrated by a woman who is
too complex to fit within any of his available stock
formulations of human character, he accuses her of
psychological duality:
Sometimes you seem like one kind of a girl to me, and 
sometimes you are like a girl that is all different to 
me, and the two kinds of girls is certainly very
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different to each other, and I can't see any way they
seem to have much to do, to be together in you. (138)
While we should reference this anxiety more to Jeff's moral 
indivualization than to Melanctha's complexity per se. in 
any case the significant issue for Jeff, in the context of 
his newly learned doubts about linguistic clarity and his 
experimention with Melanctha's mode of "feeling," is a 
potential failure of identity management. Melanctha 
refuses to resolve herself into the unified, static 
individuality that his conceptual framework can make sense 
of, and he demands that she clarify her identity by stating 
its truth in language so that it can be recognized by 
others: " . . .1 certainly don't know which is a real
Melanctha Herbert, and I certainly don't feel no longer, I 
ever want to talk to you. Tell me honest, Melanctha, which 
is the way that is you really, when you are alone, and 
real, and all honest" (139). As an unwitting conduit for 
the transmission of "disciplinary individuality" into the 
personal interactions of everyday life, Jeff here demands 
the easy categorization of individuals, insists that the 
name "Melanctha Herbert" denote a unified, totalized 
individuality, and tries to impose a "law of truth" 
(Foucault, "Power" 212) on this identity, at once "honest" 
and "real."
What is transpiring in these scenes is something very 
like Foucault's idea of the "examination," in which the
"normalizing judgment" searches for the confession or 
verbal verification of behavior that will allow moral 
categorization. Jeff, significantly a medical doctor, 
deploys a strategy that Foucault argues evolved out of the 
medical procedure of the "examination" to become a 
widespread technique within the disciplinary regime for 
constituting "the individual as a describable. analysable 
object. . .in order to maintain him in his individual 
features, in his particular evolution, in his own aptitudes 
or abilities, under the gaze of a permanent corpus of 
knowledge" (Discipline 190, emphasis mine). It is Jeff's 
insistent search for the verbal describability of his lover 
that makes his repeated interrogations of her, of what she 
is "really thinking," so comparable to the "examination." 
Moreover, Jeff is not interested in simply talking to 
Melanctha about her past, her tastes, or her behavioral 
patterns; he wants to find out, in what seems to be a very 
rigid and simplistic sense, "who" she is.. That is, the 
describability he demands is intended to denote an 
unchangeable, categorizable "individuality," by which Jeff 
will be enabled to make the evaluation "good" or "bad" and 
thus determine whether to continue his romantic interest. 
It is precisely in this emphasis that the normalizing 
procedures represented in Melanctha are so evocative of 
disciplinarity itself--in the distinction that Jeff is not 
so interested in whether Melanctha has committed a
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particular "immoral" act, as he is in making a "case" and a 
particular type of individual out of her by determining her 
acts. "The case," as Foucault defines it, "is the 
individual as he may be described, judged, measured, 
compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is 
also the individual who has to be trained or corrected, 
classified, normalized, excluded, etc." (Discipline 191).
While Melanctha herself consistently eludes being pinned 
down in any single individuality and avoids giving Jeff the 
verbal evidence he needs to establish this describability, 
at one point in the romance he thinks he has obtained the 
requisite record of her behavior from her old friend Jane 
Harden, who gives Jeff a thorough verbal description of 
Melanctha's past activities that includes hints of various 
illicit sexualities--fornicative, homosexual, and 
interracial:
Jane Harden began to tell how they had wandered. Jane 
began to tell how Melanctha once had loved her, Jane 
Harden. Jane began to tell Jeff of all the bad ways 
Melanctha had used with her. Jane began to tell all she 
knew of the way Melanctha had gone on, after she had 
left her. Jane began to tell all about the different 
men, white ones and blacks, Melanctha never was 
particular about things like that. (143-44)
This oral recounting of Melanctha's historical record
allows Jeff to "see very clearly" what Melanctha "is," and
what he sees strikes him as "very ugly" (144). His sense
of "proper conduct" is aroused, for he now "knew Melanctha
had done many things it was very hard for him to forgive
113
her" (146) . He is willing to give Melanctha a chance to 
explain her way to a moral position that refutes the facts 
he has in hand, however, so he confronts her with the 
evidence--with the record of herself as a moral and racial 
subject:
I know [Jane] was talking truth in everything she said 
about you. I knew you had been free in your ways, 
Melanctha, I knew you liked to get excitement the way I 
always hate to see the colored people take it. I didn't 
know, till I heard Jane Harden say it, you had done 
things so bad, Melanctha. (151)
More to the point, Jeff vociferously asserts his right to
know this information, to constitute a body of knowledge
about Melanctha. He believes that this knowledge
constitutes the "truth" not only of Melanctha's past
behavior, but also the "truth" of her identity: "I had a
good right to know about what vou were and your ways" (152,
emphasis mine).
"The disciplinary apparatuses," in Foucault's
formulation, "hierarchized the 'good' and the 'bad'
subjects in relation to one another.... By assessing acts
with precision, discipline judges individuals 'in truth';
the penality that it implements is integrated into the
cycle of knowledge of individuals" (Discipline 181).
Indeed, Jeff seems obsessed with this verbal record of
identity, asserting that, if he had wanted to, he could
have extorted a confession from Melanctha personally--his
mistake was only how he got the information, not that he
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got it. Melanctha, for her part, absolutely rejects the 
establishment of this corpus of knowledge, telling Jeff 
flatly that she "never would have told you nothing" if he 
had come to her for a confession (152) . Jeff's 
machinations to determine Melanctha's degree of conformity 
to the code of proper conduct, though perhaps more subtle, 
are functionally equivalent to the "good" Anna's 
surveillance of the servant girl Sallie: nonconformists 
must be observed in their nonconformity, described and 
evaluated, and punished.
Jeff's interest in Melanctha continues intermittently 
despite such judgments, both because he holds out hope of 
"reforming" her "character" and because of his own furtive 
desires that are aroused by her "wandering" ways. His 
insistent compliance to the moral code, however, repeatedly 
infuses his involvement with guilt and anxiety. When the 
two lovers seem on the verge of sexual activity, for 
example, Jeff's internal moral pilot suddenly goes into 
overdrive and he convulsively and physically throws 
Melanctha aside in "strong disgust" (155). His agonized 
feelings about this behavior are again expressed in the 
formulaic idioms of the internalized codes of proper racial 
and moral conduct that organize his very sense of self: "he 
only had disgust because he never could know really what it 
was really right to him to be always doing, in the things 
he had before believed in, the things he before had
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believed in for himself and for all the colored people, the 
living regular" (156). Melanctha, more resistant to 
normalization, recognizes that the problem lies precisely 
with the simplistic, rigid linguistic units out of which 
Jeff builds his moral code and, consequently, his unitary 
self-conceptions. Brief formulations like "the right way 
to do," she observes, are of little use as abstractions and 
must be subject to constant qualification and application 
to the particularity of situations: "You ain't got no way
to understand right, how it depends what way somebody goes 
to look for new things, the way it makes it right for them 
to get excited" (167). This statement represents a radical 
refusal of normalization--a radical morality. Melanctha's 
perception of the moral universe, indeed, stands in stark 
opposition to that of Lena, the paragon of the effectively, 
and coercively, normalized individual: "I do whatever you
tell me it's right for me to do" (253).
While Jeff's reasons for ultimately rejecting Melanctha 
are confused and multiplicitous in his own thoughts, hence 
confused and multiplicitous in the narrative itself, then, 
it seems clear that they relate to Melanctha's failure to 
comply with disciplinary individuality and normalization. 
It is significant that he upbraids her, near the end, for 
failure to observe a sort of traditional, stoic 
individualist ethic, in which each individual is "not for 
the other but for ourselves, what we were wanting....Each
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man has got to do it for himself when he is in real
trouble" (178). One of Melanctha's shortcomings, as Jeff
tells her, is her willingness to involve other individuals
in her trouble and suffering instead of bearing them on her
own with courage and fortitude (179). Just as
significantly, in his final tirades against her character
he also scolds her for what amounts to her refusal to
provide the "confession" of her behavior that he has wanted
all along: Melanctha's shortcoming is that she never can
"remember right," at least not in the rational,
discursively coherent, and moral sense that Jeff means the
phrase. Jeff's comments reveal his sense that it is
precisely because she cannot verbalize her moral
subjectivity concretely that Melanctha is without
subjective structure:
...you ain't got down deep loyal feeling, true inside 
you....you ain't ever got any way to remember right what 
you been doing, or anybody else that has been feeling 
with you. You certainly Melanctha, never can remember 
right, when it comes to what you have done and what you 
think happens to you. (180-81, emphasis mine)
"Remembering right," then, is also code for the
presentation of a record of acts committed, which Melanctha
has flatly told Jeff she will never give him. She has
refused to comply with the examination procedure, refused
to allow a corpus of knowledge about her "case" to be
established, hence interfered with Jeff's effort to
identify and evaluate the "truth" of her moral
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subjectivity. Though his moral censure is coded in a 
discourse about relationship issues (like "trust") and 
profoundly confused in his own mind with his abiding desire 
for Melanctha, Jeff imposes the severest punishment 
available to him as a judge at the microsocial level: he 
rejects her as a lover and friend. ^
It is at the juncture of this rejection that the 
narrative returns to where it began, to Melanctha's 
involvement with the even more overt disciplinarian of 
rectitude, Rose Johnson. "Rose never found any way to get 
excited. Rose always was telling Melanctha Herbert the 
right way she should do" (207). Moreover, Rose's 
pronouncements cross-reference the rules of "proper 
conduct" with the racial code that organizes, stratifies, 
and, in fact, moralizes her society. For Rose, it may be 
an infraction of "proper conduct" to pursue sexual 
excitements without the moral endorsement of engagement, 
but it is an even greater infraction to pursue those 
excitements across racial lines. Jeff's morality was 
understatedly "colored": regular living, hard work, and
quiet family life are his dictates for the "colored 
people"; and he is horrified by Melanctha's history of 
illicit sexuality, which includes her "wandering" with both 
"white" and "black" men. Rose is both more clear about 
what the code is and more domineering in providing guidance 
to Melanctha:
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You better just had stick to black men now, Melanctha, 
you hear me what I tell you, just the way you always see 
me do it....1 never do say to you Melanctha, you hadn't 
never ought to be with white men, though it ain't never 
the way I feel it ever real right for a decent colored 
girl to be always doing....Now you hear to me Melanctha, 
what I tell you. (207-8)
Like the "good" Anna with her underlings, Rose sets herself
up as moral supervisor for Melanctha, scolding and advising
on points of conduct throughout the remaining pages of the
story, while Melanctha finds security and safety in being
in contact with Rose's more structured self. Rose, the
text indicates on several occasions, like Jeff, has a
firmly structured moral subjectivity as a result of having
"strong in her" the "sense of proper/decent conduct" (200,
210, 215): she has thoroughly internalized the idioms of
both "the right way to do" and "the best way a colored girl
can have to be acting" (208), providing her self, unlike
the "complex, desiring" Melanctha's, with a set of enduring
parameters.
As Rose's ministrations suggest, members of the 
Bridgepoint "black" community think, like Jeff, in terms of 
"regularity" for "colored people": the code of proper
conduct is referenced to the code of racial strata. This 
racial/moral cross-referencing of identity constructs is in 
evidence, for example, when Melanctha is warned of the 
potential disasters of running with "white" men and taught 
what is "right for a decent colored girl to be always 
doing" (208). The racial category of identity also
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operates at a more subtle, and more pernicious, level, 
however. An accepted part of the community discourse, as 
Stein represents it, is in fact the definition of its 
members in terms of their racial category or, more 
specifically, their skin color or "blood" mix, with an 
equally accepted privileging of lighter skin and "white" 
blood. Thus, Rose repetitively refers to Melanctha's 
father, an extremely dark-skinned man, with a single 
epithet that combines his moral and his racial position: 
"that awful black man" (213). The repetition of this color 
coding, spoken in the context of an all-black community by 
a character who is herself a dark-skinned black woman, 
emphasizes the significance of "race"--but more 
specifically "whiteness"--as a category of identity in the 
"black" community Stein represents. Understanding 
"whiteness" as the norm of "black" racialization also helps 
us to understand Rose's insistent self-justification, "for 
I was raised by white folks" (86, 88, 207, 219). Because 
she does have dark skin, Rose must make it clear that she 
escapes the lower class and racial position of being what 
she calls a "common nigger" (88) not only by dint of 
"proper conduct" but by virtue of her strong association to 
whites. Similarly, the fact that Melanctha "had been half 
made with real white blood," seems to considerably improve 
her chances for achieving the "regularity" of marriage and 
a "right position" (86, 210), and make her failure to do so
120
a source of some puzzlement to Rose, who believes that 
Melanctha "ain't no common nigger either" (86).
Finally, however, Melanctha's failure to conform to the 
model of identity constructed out of these codes of racial, 
moral and class correctness makes her presence a liability 
for the properly conducted and decent Rose. Melanctha's 
continuing failure to become "regularly married" leaves her 
without a "right position" within the code of proper 
conduct for black women of her age and of the class to 
which Rose aspires (210) . Indeed, Rose condemns her 
harshly for a particular behavioral faux pas in this 
matter, when Melanctha's engagement to Jem Richards, the 
gambler, is spoiled by her acting "mad," "foolish," and 
"excited," and bragging to everyone about the engagement 
(219). It is significant that Melanctha's infraction in 
this instance hinges on a thoroughly technical issue of 
misconduct. To act this way when in love would be fine; to 
act so when engaged is a trespass of the microsocial rules 
of proper conduct and "middle class" respectability: she 
has embarassed her beau by being too much in love with him 
(219). Such a misstep is not only sure to jeopardize the 
engagement (as, evidently, it does), but it also identifies 
Melanctha as indecent. "When she is engaged to him Sam, 
she ain't got no right to take on so excited," Rose tells 
her husband. "That ain't no decent kind of a way a girl 
ever should be acting" (219).
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Initially sympathetic, Rose is now building up evidence 
of Melanctha's turpitude, making a "case" out of her and 
compiling a record of her behavior that will allow a 
judgment to be made. The evidence becomes overwhelming 
when Rose, like Jeff before her, receives information from 
secondary sources verifying Melanctha's failure to conduct 
herself properly. With a verbal record of her behavior at 
hand, Rose is ready to define Melanctha's moral condition 
as not "good" and "never does act real right." Rose tells 
her husband,
sometimes I hear awful kind of things she been doing, 
some girls know about her how she does it, and sometimes 
they tell me what kind of ways she has to do it, and Sam 
it certainly do seem to me like more and more I 
certainly am awful afraid Melanctha will never come to 
any good. And then, Sam, sometimes, you hear it, she 
always talk like she kill herself all the time she is so 
blue, and Sam that certainly never is no kind of way any 
decent girl ever had ought to do. (228-29)
Rose confronts Melanctha with her judgment and passes
sentence with the utmost finality: their friendship is
over, and Melanctha is never to set foot in Rose's house
again.
Rose's judgment is the normalizing judgment of a society 
governed by the rules of proper conduct and an allegiance 
to the static individualities that can be determined by 
degree of conformity to those rules. Melanctha's expulsion 
from Rose's house and companionship is, therefore, 
literally an expulsion of a "bad" individual from the 
social order, an individual who has failed to conform, who
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has evaded normalization. Rose's judgment is thus even
more final than Jeff's, and fitly completes the depiction
of a social order pervaded by the disciplines of conduct,
individuality, and the "norm," where everyone has become a
judge and a punisher--a social order in which
the activity of judging has increased precisely to the 
extent that the normalizing power has spread. Borne 
along by the omnipresence of the mechanisms of 
discipline... it has become one of the major functions of 
our society. The judges of normality are present 
everywhere. (Discipline 3 04)
It is as one such judge, combining "the art of rectifying
and the right to punish" (Discipline 303), that Rose makes
her final assessment of Melanctha: "she never no way could
learn, what was the right way she should do" (237) .
Wandering as anti-discipline
Melanctha's nonconformity to the strict racial and moral 
codes deployed by the discourse of her peers— her lack of a 
coherent racial or moral subjectivity--implies a critique 
of the disciplinary systems that insist on such normativity 
and, when normalization fails, produce the kind of 
emotional devastation that seems to be Melanctha's lot at 
the end of her story. Reading the story in this 
"intratextual" dimension, then, presents Melanctha as a 
version of the plural and complex psyche in open struggle 
with socially imposed, unitary, and static constructs of 
identity. Stein clearly depicts her main character as more
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plural and more complex than the other characters in the 
tale--as desiring, mysterious, and complicated--though she 
also reduces this complexity to a crude duality: Melanctha 
is first desiring (87), then repressing (89); first 
"seeking rest and quiet," then only finding "new ways to be 
in trouble" (89); first Jeff's bad girl of cold, hard 
laughter, then his flower of beauty and sunshine (13 8). 
Melanctha's cyclical wavering from habits of "wandering" to 
the patronage of "solid," rigidly moralistic friends, is 
similarly suggestive of the uncertain psychological 
character, what Marianne DeKoven describes as Melanctha's 
"divided self" (31), that Stein tends to represent as a 
merely dual nature.
Melanctha's complexity, of course, lies not merely in an 
open rejection of conformity, but in her uncertain 
relationship to it. At times with Jeff she seems a prophet 
of the possibilities of "wandering" free of any fixed moral 
identity, but she also, we are told, longs for Jeff-like 
"peace and quiet" and for "right" c o n d u c t . 2 0 Apparently 
incapable of shackling the desires and the mysteries of the 
heart within a "strong sense of proper conduct" like Rose 
and Jeff, Melanctha allows them more free play, making her 
more a reveler than a rebel. Ruddick has characterized 
Melanctha's struggle with the more practical and more rigid 
"habit of attention" being imposed upon her by society as a 
struggle with a particularly Jamesian doctrine of "success"
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that had influenced Stein's thinking. In the story, this 
doctrine of "success" is represented by Jeff. There is 
considerable merit to Ruddick's contention that Melanctha's 
relationship to Jeff's conception of successful living is 
uncertain and ambiguous largely because Stein herself was, 
at the time she composed Melanctha. ambivalent about the 
strict Jamesian guidelines for practical and 
individualistic subjectivity, and was, in fact, beginning 
to "strain against James" (Ruddick, Reading 30). Jeff's 
renewed inner strength and Melanctha's demise in the final 
pages might be read as a critique of what James called the 
"exuberant non-egoistic" way of being--the lack of 
selective attention--but it is just as possible, as Ruddick 
puts it, to read Melanctha as "a protest against the entire 
notion of mental success represented by Jeff" (30).
From the latter perspective, Melanctha's wandering has 
the effect of exposing the inadequacy of the simple, 
unified, and constrictive subject positions available to 
her within what I have sketched as a disciplinary society. 
The fact that Jeff can only recognize her as two-girls-in- 
one, or as "too many for him" (175), the extent of 
Melanctha's emotional misery within the system (her "awful 
blue" feeling), and the devastating punishment meted out to 
her at the end for her nonconformity, all suggest a subtle 
critique of disciplinary individuality (as well as Jamesian 
individuality, or "egoism"). In this view, Stein is
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artistically representing complex subjectivity in 
aggravated tug-of-war with the moral subjectification of 
social discourse, perhaps because she had struggled with 
this kind of constrictive normalization herself, 
particularly as imposed by the sexual mores of her "white" 
middle-class upbringing. We might also note, however, that 
her complication of reductive psychic models resorts to 
certain reductive strategies of its own--like the 
distinctly either-or, binaristic models of identity that I 
have alluded to--a "stronger" reading of the text that I 
will turn to in my next section.
The moral subjectification deployed by the characters, 
as I have suggested, is deeply intertwined with the 
discourse of racial subjectification that they also use to 
identify themselves and each other. In this sense, 
Melanctha illustrates the operation of what I have called 
the discursive discipline of race, focusing on the 
psychological devastation it creates. Put simply, 
characters have the option of becoming numb to the 
contradictory intimations of their psyches, fully accepting 
as natural the race/morality constructs available to them, 
or they can resist these formulations at the risk of 
confronting the intimate violence of the disciplinary 
system. Melanctha's "blues" mentality, it should be noted, 
is not merely directed inward: "Sometimes the thought of
how all her world was made, filled the complex, desiring
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Melanctha with despair. She wondered, often, how she could 
go on living when she was so blue" (87, emphasis mine). 
While one might argue that Melanctha's emotional upheaval 
is meant to be merely the result of the abuse inflicted 
upon her as a child (to which the text clearly alludes), 
or, more vaguely, of her simple inability to "fit in," 
there are also indications that Melanctha is tormented by 
what she has seen in the world around her.
There are indications, more to the point, that what she 
has seen has had something to do with the devastating 
racialization of her society and the Jim Crow system that 
surrounds and, I would suggest, structures the black 
community of Bridgepoint. During Melanctha's formative 
adolescent "wanderings after wisdom" (97), part of the 
worldly knowledge she obtains is the repeated telling of a 
story of racist differentiation and hate, with an explicit 
threat of "white" violence toward "blacks" who do not 
conduct themselves properly. A porter at the train yard 
tells Melanctha how he evicted from his train a white man 
"who called him a damned nigger, and who refused to pay 
money for his chair to a nigger" (99). The porter had to 
give up going to that part of the south because the white 
men involved "swore that if he ever came there again they 
would surely kill him" (99).
It is within the dynamics and definitions of such 
violent racialization that "proper conduct" and "quiet
living" did, historically, become the imperatives of black 
communities. In this sense Stein's text illustrates what 
Ralph Ellison, in an essay on Richard Wright's southern 
roots, referred to as the process by which southern, black 
communities "worked out efficient techniques of behavior 
control" as a defense mechanism against "white" violence 
(Shadow 90) . One response to such violence, in other 
words, is to numb oneself to it by living, as does Jeff 
Campbell, within the identity "patterns" it allows. Though 
characters like Jeff counsel her to do the same, Melanctha 
is, in the end, too spirited to do so, and thus she is 
fully awake to the horror of "how all her world was made." 
Sensing that her self does not fit within any of the rigid 
models of identity imposed by the overlapping disciplines 
of race and conduct, Melanctha is forced to confront 
despair and thoughts of self-annihilation, wondering "how 
she could go on living when she was so blue" (87). Between 
the lines of Stein's text, I am suggesting, runs the 
implication that Melanctha is "awful blue" because of a 
world that could combine the conduct, race, and linguistic 
elements of individualization in defining her father as an 
"awful black man" and her friend the porter as an 
improperly conducted "nigger."
Still, Melanctha, having less strongly internalized the 
cultural code and having, therefore, a less fixed sense of 
self, fluctuates for a time between periods of "free
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enjoying" and these periods of "awful blueness." She is 
briefly able to communicate the possibilities of her more 
"feeling" habit of attention to Jeff, forcing him to 
problematize the vocabulary of stock concepts, words, and 
phrases that govern his own hypersocialized subject. 
Jeff's and Melanctha's "free enjoying" at this point, along 
with their translations from it to conventionality and 
social opprobrium, respectively, undermine the normalcy of 
the "government of individualization" represented by "the 
sense of proper conduct." Melanctha leads us a tentative 
step down the road to reimagining "what we could be" as a 
means of subverting "the simultaneous individualization and 
totalization of modern power structures" (Foucault, "Power" 
216) .
From interioritv to exteriority
We have, then, what looks from the "intratextual" point 
of view like a significant critique of the disciplinary and 
individualizing methods of society, and perhaps even of the 
particular racial and moral disciplinarity that occurs in 
certain black communities, and, by extension, of the larger 
racialization of society that causes those effects within 
its racialized subcultures. In other words, Melanctha does 
in important ways resemble what bell hooks refers to as a 
"radical black subjectivity" struggling against the 
"conservative policing forces" of her black community (20).
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In short, the story's basic structure of plot and character 
suggests a sympathetic "white" representation of African 
American life.
By looking more closely now at the exceptionally 
racialized textual surface of Melanctha, however, I want to 
suggest how its potential subvers ion of disciplinary 
selfhood is itself subverted by Stein's reproduction of 
racial disciplinarity in the very language she deploys to 
construct the narrative. The racialized elements of 
Stein' s discourse, that is, instance the linguistic 
discipline of race as I have described it in chapter 1. To 
reformulate this point within the Jamesian psychological 
framework with which Stein herself may have been working: 
if Melanctha can be read as a personality with an 
undisciplined, wandering attention, refusing to shape what 
she experiences with reductive words, phrases, and concepts 
(undermining the disciplinarity of the self) , that 
representation is ironically counterpointed by the way the 
text itself exhibits a rigidly selective habit of 
attention, insistently forcing its representations to 
conform to a set of stock words, phrases, and concepts 
(producing a disciplinarity of the text) . When we take 
this aspect of Melanctha properly into account, we must 
add, to the radical signification I have outlined so far, a 
second, more regressive dimension of the story. From this 
second perspective, the story might be more accurately
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characterized as an early example of the "white avante- 
garde" attempting to "appropriate and usurp radical efforts 
to subvert static notions of black identity" for the 
purposes of its own self-definition (hooks 21) . Like the 
contemporary avante-garde critics hooks is describing in 
this phrase, Stein used what she thought she saw in African 
American culture as the starting point for mulling ideas 
about her own, "white" identity.
It is precisely by turning critical attention to the 
surface of the prose, to the text as representation, that 
one also turns critical attention from the "black" subject 
matter of the story to the "white" subject position that 
created it. In other words, by looking at the surface 
effects of Stein's style, and in this case the racial 
surface effects, we perform the project which Toni Morrison 
has referred to as the aversion of the "critical gaze from 
the racial object to the racial subject" (Plavina 90). The 
approach I am proposing has been aptly described by Edward 
Said as the shift from an analysis of "what lies hidden in" 
the racist text to an "analysis rather of the text's 
surface, its exteriority to what it describes" (Orientalism 
20). As Said suggests, the "exteriority" thus analyzed is 
both that of the "style, figures of speech, setting, 
narrative devices, historical and social circumstances" and 
that of the writer herself to the supposed object of 
representation. By looking at the style, figures of
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speech, and narrative devices of Melanctha. then, I want to 
explore how Stein clarifies herself as a presence 
thoroughly "exterior" to African American life, precisely 
by manipulating a received set of discursive agreements and 
linguistic units like those that make up what Morrison 
calls "Africanism. " In her artistic effort to evoke 
alienation, we might say, Stein grants herself the 
privilege of translating the mystery and strangeness of a 
racial other, but it is precisely the constricted 
vocabulary of that translation that reveals a second 
referent: not any "real" African American presence, but the 
"white" self and its constitutive network of Africanist 
d i s c o u r s e .  2 1  When we look at the textual surface of 
Melanctha. finally, we see a generalized and thoroughly 
disciplinary evocation of "blackness" that dilutes the 
radical impulse to represent human couplexity.
As Eric Lott argues, new discourses of "race" evolved 
during the middle of the nineteenth century as a sort of 
social symbolic, encoding and resolving crises of 
subjectivity produced by the intensive "culture of moral 
reform" that accompanied the economic stratification of 
U.S. society (69-70). While Lott is most interested in how 
blackface minstrelsy functions as one such discourse, I 
want to suggest that Stein's representation of "blackness" 
in Melanctha can be read as a similar response to the 
intensively moralized air of her nineteenth-century middle
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class background (a representation itself influenced by the 
discourse of minstrelsy) . It is crucial, that is, that 
Stein does not represent the moral normalization that 
preoccupies Three Lives in the context of the "white" 
middle class milieu she would have been most familiar with 
(and that did become the context of her concern with 
conformity in later texts like The Making of Americans) , 
but rather in the context of the working class, in the 
first and last of the Three Lives stories, and of the 
"black" community, in Melanctha. Like the blackface 
participants that Lott describes as "immersing themselves 
in 'blackness' to indulge their felt sense of difference" 
from the new bourgeois sensibility (51), Stein was using 
"race" to stage subjective conflicts precipitated by her 
class position, with its strict edicts about morality, 
gender roles, and, most significantly for Stein's emerging 
sense of a lesbian sexuality, sexual orientation. The 
issues insistently rehearsed in Three Lives. I am 
suggesting, pointedly support Lott's assessment that, 
"Working-class women (white and black) and black men in 
bourgeois cultural fantasy are figures for a thrilling and 
repellent sexual anarchy" (122). As much as she is an 
emancipatory figure of radical "black" subjectivity, 
Melanctha is Stein's racialized projection of otherness 
itself.
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That Stein, in representing the "government of 
individualization" in Melanctha. intermingles the social 
codes of "race" and morality is significant, then, not only 
because different disciplinary technologies were always 
interactive, overlapping, and mutually supportive,22 kut 
also in the context of Goldberg's thesis that modern 
moralism is productive of race as a differentiating 
ideology. As Goldberg notes, the discourses of race and 
morality have been deeply symbiotic since the inception of 
racialized thinking in the sixteenth century: "Historically 
dominant pictures of moral nature have been keys in forming 
both social self-conception and the figure of the Other: 
what each agent at a given conjuncture could be, expect, 
and achieve" ("Modernity" 198). The project of carefully 
defining one's own identity in moral terms— one's moral 
subjectivity--Goldberg implies, has consistently entailed 
the formulation of racial subjectivities as well, so that 
racial exclusions "have been legitimated and may 
disturbingly be justified in terms of the historically 
prevailing conception of moral subjectivity" ("Modernity" 
198). Enlightenment philosophers defining their own moral 
subjectivity in terms of rationality, for example, at one 
and the same time defined their own racial subjectivity, 
and that of the "Other, " by defining that rationality in 
opposition to a "manifestly" irrational "Other" (savage, 
African, American Indian, etc.). In this sense Melanctha
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reenacts a fundamental dynamic of modern thought, though, 
as Lott argues of the minstrel show and as my 
multidimensional analysis of Melanctha is meant to suggest, 
this moralization of the subject through the racialization 
of an "other" is deeply ambivalent, encompassing both 
distancing and desire.
The common phrases relating to negroes
Indeed, Stein's remarks and attitudes about people of 
color as recorded in other contexts are suggestive of this 
ambivalence, articulating in some instances the kind of 
cross-racial fascination that George Fredrickson 
characterizes as "romantic racialism" and in others more 
overt versions of the projection of amorality I have 
described. Stein's early familiarity with and reiteration 
of overly romanticized and traditionally stereotypical 
images of southern "blackness" is suggested by the 
description, taken from her undergraduate Radcliffe themes, 
of "Baltimore, sunny Baltimore, where no one is in a hurry 
and the voices of the negroes singing... lull you into 
drowsy reveries" (Bridgman, Pieces 23) . Such a remark 
about the city on which the "Bridgepoint" of Melanctha is 
ostensibly based might be taken as the precursor to the 
narrative descriptions in the story of how "the colored 
people came out into the sunshine....And they shone in the 
streets and in the fields with their warm joy, and they
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glistened in their black heat, and they flung themselves 
free in their wide abandonment of shouting laughter" (208- 
9) . Claude McKay was certainly correct in finding in 
Melanctha a reproduction of "the common phrases relating to 
Negroes," a view that we must set in counterbalance to 
Richard Wright's eventual claim that Stein's rendering of 
the colloquial language of African Americans made him "hear 
the speech of [his] grandmother, who spoke a deep, pure 
Negro dialect."23
Stein's recorded remarks do suggest that her thoughts 
about African Americans were often mediated through the 
hackneyed, brief, discrete units of the traditional body of 
discursive agreements about them--the "common phrases 
relating to Negroes." Aldon Lynn Nielsen has provided a 
useful synopsis of her seemingly dismissive statements 
about African and African-American culture, arguing that 
Stein seems to have believed that blacks were incapable of 
art, originality, and of historical tradition (Nielsen 21- 
27) . Nielsen cites, for example, Stein's simple but 
sweeping pronouncement in The Autobiography of Alice B. 
Toklas that "Gertrude Stein concluded that negroes were not 
suffering from persecution, they were suffering from 
nothingness. She always contends that the african is not 
primitive, he has a very ancient but a very narrow culture 
and there it remains. Consequently nothing does or can 
happen" (Selected Writings 224). Aside from the simplicity
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and essentialism of the analysis suggested here, we might 
note both the social ignorance of the assumption that the 
blacks of her time were not suffering from persecution and 
the new light that the imputation of an essentialized 
"nothingness" to blacks places on the vagaries of both 
speech and behavior in the Jeff and Melanctha relationship.
The view that the social position of American blacks was 
attributable not to racism but to a metaphysical black 
character is of course one of the most traditional and 
stereotypical of all rationalizations for society's 
continuing racialization. In fact, Stein's remark fosters 
two of the leading stereotypes that justified the dismissal 
of race issues as a problem for social attention: first, 
that darker-skinned peoples are somehow suffering from 
intellectual and cultural "nothingness" as an essential 
character trait; and second, that (because of their 
essential character) the condition of the race was simply 
fated to be a tragic one, a status that could not be 
changed by any manner of social treatment.24
Additional instances of stereotyped images and idiomatic 
expressions about "blacks" surface in Stein's later 
writing, particularly as she evolved a compositional 
technique that allowed her surroundings and the sometimes 
whimsical movements of her consciousness to be incorporated 
into the fabric of the text. The phrase "needless are 
niggers" appears in the midst of the associative discourse
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of Tender Buttons (494), while the "stories" in As Fine As 
Melanctha incorporate instances of the repeating phrases of 
a culture's discourse about the other like "eeney meeney 
miney mo catch a nigger by the toe" (275) . Moreover, Stein 
was not above applying such idiomatic representations of 
"blackness" to herself. As Lisa Ruddick reports, in the 
notebooks for The Making of Americans Stein referred to her 
own less rational side as her "Rabelaisian, nigger 
abandonment, Vollard, daddy s i d e .  " 2 5  iphe reference again 
suggests an easy familiarity with the discursively 
circulating stereotypes about blacks, but also indicates a 
tendency to project the sensuous aspects of her self in 
racial terms.
I am not suggesting that by finding such examples in 
Stein's writing we can "catch her out" and expose her for 
the racist she really is; on the contrary, such examples 
instance a romanticization of racial difference that can be 
both sympathetic and derogatory. What I am suggesting is 
that the recurrence of such formulaic units of Africanist 
language in the written record of Stein's consciousness are 
indicative of precisely that operation of "race" as a 
construct of culture--as a microsocially penetrating, 
discursive discipline--to which I have alluded. My 
interest, in other words, is not in the degree to which 
Stein was or was not a racist, but the extent to which she 
lived in a racialized cultural milieu, and the effects that
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racialization had on her very habits of being. Stein's own 
“habit of attention" was, in part, a racialized habit: as 
these examples suggest, one of the clusters of "stock 
words, concepts and labels" that shaped her everyday 
perception of reality was that of the Africanist discursive 
agreements— the "common phrases relating to Negroes."
Neoro sunshine
The comprehensive reiteration of such phrases about 
"black" Americans in the narrative of Melanctha has been 
well noted. The "exteriority" of the text and the 
characterizations it presents fairly drip with the most 
deeply stereotyped, strongly cliched, and exotically 
romanticized elements of the discursive field that 
constituted Africanism in Stein's day, many of them 
distilled into the same type of formulaic, easily 
repeatable linguistic units that I have alluded to 
elsewhere in Stein's discourse. One of the most insistent 
of these formulas reproduces Stein's image of "nigger 
abandonment," connecting it both to the stereotype of 
spontaneous "black" laughter and to images that 
"naturalize" or biologize "blacks," making them part of the 
physical world itself: the text repeatedly describes its 
"black" characters in terms of "the wide abandoned laughter 
that gives the broad glow to negro sunshine" (92, 111).
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This rhetorical figure is representative of the texture 
of racial references that organizes the prose and the 
characterizations in Melanctha. To begin to understand the 
scope and significance of this veneer of racial language, 
it is necessary to understand how what appears to be a 
veneer is actually rooted in the very interior of the text, 
being manipulated by the characters themselves. I have 
already noted how Rose and Jeff deploy a "norm" against 
which individuals in their community can be evaluated and 
distributed along a continuum of normalcy. The norm they 
apply is, moreover, at times moral--involving evaluations 
of conduct--and at times racial--involving notations of 
skin color. More accurately, it is a norm in which these 
two categories overlap to produce precise clarifications of 
individuality: Jeff applies it in his pursuit of "knowing" 
the "real" Melanctha, and Rose applies it in her 
determination that Melanctha's father can be identified as 
"that awful black man." It is precisely this disciplinary 
management of the race/conduct norm that is transferred 
from these internal operations of the characters to the 
"exterior" features of the text--its style, figures of 
speech, setting, narrative devices-~creating a seamless 
fabric of individualizing techniques that are obsessed with 
the raciality of moral behavior, and the morality of skin 
color. As Rose chatters along in her efforts to clarify 
her racial identity in terms of her proper conduct, the
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text itself is just as busily clarifying her moral identity 
in terms of her skin color.
The connection I am suggesting between the "interior" 
and the "exterior" of Melanctha is initially evident in the 
fact, noted by other Stein readers, that the norms, values, 
and behavioral mandates forwarded by both Jeff and Rose are 
neither their own nor those of a particularly "black" 
community. Rather, Jeff's ideas of regular living are the 
stuff of a thoroughly middle-class "white" conventionality, 
"the voice of the white bourgeoisie coming through a black 
manikin," as Milton Cohen has put it (121). Moreover, his 
ideal of hard working, restrained, docile, quiet living 
"colored people" closely mimics a typical "white" ideal of 
what "properly conducted" black people should be, leading 
Cohen to suggest the "Uncle Tom" quality of Jeff's values 
(121). Similarly, Nielsen argues that "Campbell is given 
the role of 'race man' in this book and is constantly 
expounding moral observations of the type put forward by 
Booker T. Washington" (25). This dynamic becomes all the 
more evident when we realize that the characters who 
possess the strongest sense of "proper conduct" in 
Melanctha have derived their norms and values from 
"whites": both Jeff and Rose are remarkable for their close 
contact with "white" communities. Jeff's father and mother 
worked for a wealthy "white" family which, we are told, 
"had been very good to [Jeff] and had helped him on with
141
his ambition" (111) and education, while Rose has been 
raised and financially assisted by another "white" family 
(86, 88). Rose herself makes it very clear how this white 
training improves her measurement against the story's 
race/conduct norm: despite very black skin, she is able to 
assert, "No, I ain't no common nigger, for I was raised by 
white folks" (86).
Thus, instead of problematizing the normalizing 
disciplinarity of the "white" discursive order, Melanctha 
reiterates it, first portraying characters who are its 
conduits, then deploying narrative strategies which make 
the "exteriority" of the text a disciplinary mechanism in 
its own right. If for example, Rose thinks she has 
identified herself as decent according to the code of 
"proper conduct," the narrative voice has other ideas, 
assessing her conduct in terms of her white training, but 
assigning her a moral identity based on the color of her 
skin: "Her white training had only made for habits, not for
nature. Rose had the simple, promiscuous unmorality of the 
black people" (86). Three significant assumptions of the 
racial code entwined in the text are established with this 
statement: 1) people can be individualized according to
essential racial and moral "natures"; 2) black skin denotes 
essential identity traits like uninhibited sexuality and 
unmorality; and 3) though you can curb and shape the actual 
behavior of someone with black skin, you cannot alter that
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essential "nature"--the racial/moral individuality is both 
definable and static. This racialization -of morality, 
indicative of a common set of racist assumptions of the 
1890s, begins to suggest the linkage between moral 
discourse and racial discourse posited by both Lott and 
Goldberg. As Golberg observes, "the imperatives of race 
are inadvertently lent the authority of the moral domain" 
("Modernity" 224).26
The assessment of "black" "unmorality" in the story's 
first pages quickly flowers into a bizarre, systematic 
fetishization of skin color that pervades the entire text, 
creating what Milton Cohen has summarized as the "racial 
hierarchy" of Melanctha (120). As Cohen points out, this 
categorization of character types by skin color might be 
taken as a racialized version of the project which 
fascinated Stein throughout the decade 1900-1910, her 
effort to categorize individuals according to a relatively 
small number of types, or "bottom natures." I have already 
noted the resemblance of the Melanctha/Jeff dyad to one of 
those schemas--the "thinking"/"feeling" dichotomy-- 
suggesting one level on which Stein is expressing anxieties 
about managing the plurality of identity. The almost 
feverish effort to assign behavioral characteristics and 
emotional tendencies to the signifiers of skin color and/or 
racial heredity, however, reveals that anxiety working at a 
different, and more politically impacted level.
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The essence of Stein's racial descriptions of the 
characters, charted in detail by Cohen, follows a simple 
principle: the blacker the skin and the less white blood, 
the less civilized, less intelligent, less moral, and more 
closely linked to "nature" and the body; the lighter the 
skin and the more white blood, the more civilized, more 
intelligent, more capable of moral discretion, and less 
closely linked to the physical. Thus, the "real black" 
(86) Rose is identified by a cascade of traditional racist 
stereotypes, including laziness and hypersexuality: "Rose
Johnson was careless and was lazy....Rose had the simple, 
promiscuous unmorality of the black people.... this coarse, 
decent, sullen, ordinary, black childish... unmoral, 
promiscuous, shiftless Rose" (86); "this lazy, stupid, 
ordinary, selfish black girl" (200). By contrast,
Melanctha, who "had been half made with real white blood" 
(86), is a "subtle, intelligent, attractive, half white 
girl [with] wisdom" (200). (While Rose is also described
as having "wisdom," it is crucial that Rose has the wisdom
of "common sense," while Melanctha has the wisdom of
learning, subtlety, and, presumably, rationality.) 
Similarly, Jane Harden, the story's whitest character, "so 
white that hardly anyone could guess" her black blood 
(103), is also capable of advanced learning (two years of 
college), has a "good mind," and "had much white blood and 
that made her see clear" (104).
The color coding applied to the men in the story is 
equally telling. Melanctha's father, James, is described 
with various strings of adjectives, but those strings 
always include the tag "black." As a black-skinned man, he 
takes on all the stereotypical features of the "white" 
community's most feared vision of the "black" other: the 
mean, angry, violent, oversized, oversexed male brute. 
James is described as "coarse... big black virile...brutal 
and rough...powerful, loose built, hard handed, black, 
angry... fierce and serious...black and evil" (90-92), and 
he is capable of erupting into violent rages at Melanctha, 
and at John, the coachman, for showing too much interest in 
his daughter. By contrast, John, a "light brown" 
"mulatto," is "pleasant (and] good natured" (94), and he 
shows extraordinary kindness and friendliness toward 
Melanctha. So too, Jeff Campbell, whose racial 
identification is "mulatto," is, as we have noted, highly 
intellectualized, having a doctor's education and a taste 
for reading and ratiocination. He is also kind, thoughtful 
towards others, interested in the advancement of his race 
rather than the brute pursuit of bodily pleasures, "good 
and sympathetic," "earnest and joyous" (111). The text 
uses "whiteness" (both blood and skin) as a "norm" 
according to which its characters can be distributed along 
a continuum of both racial and moral subjectivity.
Moreover, it might be observed that the "black" end of 
the masculine continuum bifurcates its caricatures into the 
dual stereotype of "blackness" so prominent in the "white" 
imagination throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, most prominently in the minstrel show. 
According to such Africanist representations, there was the 
"black" male that was to be feared because he was violent, 
large, brutish, evil, and given to uncontrollable sexuality 
(like James), and the "black" male that was harmless 
because he was so childlike, stupid, lazy, fearful, eye- 
rolling, and given to uncontrollable laughter (the cheerful 
and docile "darkie"). Melanctha's acquaintances at the 
train and ship yards fulfill the latter role. The men at 
the train yard are portrayed as superstitious story­
tellers, coded by an exaggerated greasy "blackness": "their 
round, black, shining faces would grow solemn, and their 
color would go grey beneath the greasy black, and their 
eyes would roll white in the fear and wonder of the things 
they could scare themselves by telling" (99) . At the 
shipping docks, we meet more minstrel caricatures: "she
would listen with full feeling to the yowling of the free 
swinging negroes, as they ran, with their powerful loose 
jointed bodies and their childish savage yelling" (101). 
There are some inconsistencies in Stein's characterizations 
by skin color, probably, as Cohen notes, in relation to her 
conceptions of the "bottom natures," but a basic
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fetishization of color is rigidly observed. "Black" 
characters are persistently tagged as "black." whereas 
"yellow" or "light-brown" characters are usually only 
identified by color once, or only vaguely. Most pointedly, 
intellectuality is reserved for only those characters at 
the lighter end of the scale, and simplicity and 
childishness is reserved for only those at the "black" end.
These caricatures, as Nielsen observes, reiterate the 
stereotypical "image structures of white discourse" about 
the nonwhite that were already in circulation in American 
culture. Images of the childlike, libidinous, cultureless, 
stupid, lazy, and unmoral "black" abound in the popular, 
scientific, and academic writing by "whites" that is 
chronicled in histories of such discourse like Gossett's 
Race: The History of an Idea in America and Fredrickson's 
The Black Image in the White Mind. Even Stein's 
representation of Melanctha's complexity is largely 
stereotypical, further undercutting the sense that 
Melanctha's multiplicity suggests the humanity of blacks or 
critiques the individualizing impulse. Melanctha's 
statedly "complex," but ultimately dual character, first of 
all, seems to be based on the conventional racist 
misconception that the mixture of "white" and "black" blood 
would produce a psyche torn between the refined callings of 
its "white" elements and the sensuous strivings of its 
"black" elements. Within the dynamics of the story itself,
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then, we can understand how Jeff--also a mulatto--is 
threatened by his licentious side but manages to overcome 
it, having thoroughly internalized the civilizing 
guidelines of his "white" training. Jeff feels the pull of 
his "black" blood but manages to clarify his identity as 
fully moral by virtue of "white" blood and "white" social 
influence. Melanctha, on the other hand, without the 
advantage of "whiteness" by association, is projected as 
half-and-half by a strict blood-to-nature equation: we know 
within the text's racial code that her libidinous impulse 
for "wandering" and "trouble" must be the tendency of her 
"black" blood, and we can assume that her urges for peace, 
quiet, and regularity are the tendency of her "white" side. 
We might say, then, that the text's internal fetishization 
of racial bloodlines dooms Melanctha to complexity and 
contradiction, but in this respect her representation also 
follows the assumptions already in circulation in U.S. 
literature. Stein's stereotypes of black "laughter," on the 
one hand, but mu la 11 o intellectual sensitivity and 
melancholy, on the other, derive from a long fictional 
tradition of what Fredrickson terms "romantic racialism" 
(110),27
In addition to the racial or skin-color hierarchy which 
governs the characterizations in Melanctha. there is a 
fully developed narrative strategy of Africanism, creating 
what Sonia Saldivar-Hull calls the "racist frame" of the
story (193). As with the racial individualization of the 
characters, this setting and background reiterates a 
remarkably formulaic set of cliches and stereotypes about 
the nature of "blackness," an idea often signified in the 
text by the phrase "negro fashion." The text cyclically 
repeats the association of blacks with abandonment, 
laughter, nature, and sunshine, usually by replicating some 
form of its most idiomatic representation of "blackness": 
"the wide, abandoned laughter that makes the warm broad 
glow of negro [southern] sunshine" (86, 92, 111, 137, 161, 
195, 209). In addition to these traditional associations 
of blacks with moral abandonment, with "wide-mouthed 
shouting laughter" (209), and with the heat of the tropical 
sunshine, "negro fashion" is referenced to a series of 
other stereotypical behaviors: black-on-black violence
(94), pious church-going (87), and parental and maternal 
negligence. In a particularly pernicious instance of this 
re-production of white discursive assumptions and formulae, 
we are told that Rose Johnson simply forgets about her 
newborn baby, but that neither Rose nor her husband mind 
the loss for long because, after all, "these things came so 
often in the negro world" (85, 225). This occurence and 
its presentation continue a stereotype that helped to 
impute bestiality to blacks, rationalized the destruction 
of black families during slavery, and extends, as Nielsen
149
points out, all the way back to Thomas Jefferson's 
descriptions of the "black" character (Nielsen 25) .
In the textual background of Melanctha. indeed, 
"negroes" are so connected to nature and its bestial 
kingdom that they virtually blend into not only the 
sunshine but the natural cycles and structures of the 
earth's ecosystem: in spring, "the buds and the long
earthworms, and the negroes, and all the kinds of children, 
were coming out every minute farther into the new spring, 
watery, southern sunshine, " and in summer, we are told, 
"colored people never get sick so much" (195). Stein's 
evocation of an atmosphere of "blackness" depends, then, on 
the rhythmic repetition of certain linguistic units--the 
nouns "sunshine," "laughter," "abandon," and the adjectives 
"docile, " "simple, " "lazy, 1 "indolent, " "cowardly, " 
"childish/selfish," and the idioms noted above. By 
connecting and recombining these elements of the received 
discursive structure about "blackness," she creates a 
fabric on which is limned the same representation of the 
"black" subject that had been in circulation since the 
earliest pages of American history: the simple, bestial, 
heat-loving, childlike, and unmoral "darky." That Rose has 
the "simple, promiscuous unmorality of the black people" 
(86) and the maternal instincts of a "simple beast" (85), 
finally, is an appropriate distillation of the "black- 
subject-as-structure" that the text not so much creates as
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transmits. As the peculiarly racialized language of 
Mel anc tha suggests, the discipline of racial 
individualization is carried out through the circulation of 
repeatable discursive formations.
"White" anxiety and the racial mirror stage
It is in the two significant deaths in Melanctha. those 
of Rose's child and the main character, that the cultural 
dynamic I am suggesting--the ongoing production of a 
twisted "black" image to dispel the anxieties of "white" 
identity--becomes most evident. The "white" fantasy- 
nightmare about uncontrolled "black" virility, 
hypersexuality, and proliferation, represented in the text 
both by Melanctha's virile, threatening father and the 
"promiscuous" Rose, was matched at the end of the 
nineteenth century by a second fantasy, that of a black 
race so constitutionally weak that it was doomed to 
extinction. While both of these images have subsided 
somewhat in the cultural imagination at our end of the 
century, during the decade of Stein's college years they 
were feverishly popular, fueled by lynching mania and 
social Darwinist theories of the certain demise of the 
"incompetent" "black" race, theories which led to 
fatalistic attitudes about blacks (Fredrickson 228-55). 
While the text's repeated assumption that high infant death 
rates are endemic to the black community--"but then these
151
things came so often in the negro world" (85)--is 
indicative of the latter fantasy, the image of parental 
negligence is perhaps even more suggestive, since it 
connects with the perception that blacks are too lacking in 
familial sentiment and too beast-like to care for their 
children.
Indeed, this sidelight of the text, taken together with 
its emphasis on "black" immorality and sexual license and 
with Melanctha's despairing melancholy and youthful death 
as a result of consumption, make Melanctha read like a 
fictional rendering of the popular fantasy of how black 
proliferation would be avoided. The political effectivity 
of Stein's story also needs to be read, that is, in the 
context of a U.S. culture of racism that had produced, in 
1896, the year Stein completed her undergraduate education, 
Frederick L. Hoffman's Race Traits and Tendencies of the 
American Necrro. This treatise, which Fredrickson deems 
"the most influential discussion of the race question to 
appear in the late nineteenth century" (249), is fatalistic 
both in forecasting the demise of the black race and in 
assigning it a set of essential, and degenerate, 
characteristics. Hoffman pronounced the physical degeneracy 
of the "negro" to result from "the fact of an immense 
amount of immorality which is a race trait, and of which 
scrofula, syphilis, and even consumption are the inevitable 
consequences" (emphasis mine).28 These factors, combined
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with other innate tendencies like "a lower standard of 
nurture." Hoffman hypothesized, would "in the end cause the 
extinction of the race" (emphasis mine) . I am not 
suggesting that Stein read and agreed with Hoffman; I am 
pointing out that she was telling a story so familiar to 
"white" citizens of the U.S. in the opening years of this 
century as to give sheer mythology the ring of realism.
Like other instances of Africanism ranging from 
pseudoscientific discourse to the songs of the minstrel 
stage, then, the textual surface of Melanctha might be read 
as a projection of discomforts about sexuality, social 
violence, morality, and even death onto a fantasized racial 
other, a fantasy equally invested in the docility, 
harmlessness, and ultimate managability of that projected 
other. As Morrison puts it, Africanism is "a way of 
talking about and a way of policing matters of class, 
sexual license, and repression, formations and exercises of 
power, and meditations on ethics and accountability"
(Plavina 7). Fifty years ago, Ralph Ellison hypothesized 
the existence of a similar psychocultural racial mirror 
stage:
...it is practically impossible for the white American 
to think of sex, of economics, his children or 
womenfolk, or of sweeping socio-political changes, 
without summoning into consciousness fear-flecked images 
of black men. Indeed, it seems that the Negro has become 
identified with those unpleasant aspects of conscience 
and consciousness which it is part of the American's 
character to avoid. Thus when the literary artist 
attempts to tap the charged springs issuing from his
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inner world, up float his misshapen and bloated images
of the Negro. (Shadow 100)
The effect of "the racial situation"--what I have 
elaborated as a mechanics of discourse and discipline--on 
the writer, Ellison argues, is not "sterility" but the 
production of "a deformed progeny" (101). We might take 
the loose-jointed, laughter-shouting, eye-rolling, 
sunshine-oozing, consumptive "blacks" of Melanctha as a 
signal instance of this deformed literary production.
In another essay written a few years later (1953), 
Ellison argues that the understated rhetoric, the technical 
experimentation, and the focus on the personal of 
twentieth-century U.S. writers--especially the modernists 
of the "lost generation"--were artistic maneuvers meant to 
occlude their avoidance of the socially significant issues 
writers like Twain and Melville had grappled with: 
democracy, morality, and race. I do not believe, finally, 
that Stein was engaging in the "evasion" of social 
responsibility that Ellison imputes, for example, to 
Hemingway. I do think, however, that the tortured 
contradictions of the different social dimensions of her 
text can be productively read in terms of what Ellison 
identifies, in the work of the "lost generation" artists, 
as the working out of massive personal problems through a 
tormented use of stereotyping, of technical 
experimentation, and of ritualistic enactments of defeat
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and agony. His critique provides an insightful formula for
the personal dimension of the racial mirror stage as we see
it functioning in Stein's inflection of Africanism:
the work of art, like the stereotype, is personal; 
psychologically it represents the socialization of some 
profoundly personal problem involving guilt (often 
symbolic murder--parricide, fratricide--incest, 
homosexuality, all problems at the base of personality) 
from which by expressing them along with other 
elements...[the artist] seeks transcendence. Here is 
the literary form by which the personal guilt of the 
pulverized individual of our rugged era is expatiated:
. . .by being gored with a bull, hooked with a fish, 
impaled with a grasshopper on a fishhook; not by 
identifying himself with human heroes, but with those 
who are indeed defeated. (Shadow 38-40)
The cultural myths of "white" discourse, if I am reading
Ellison's complex formulation in this essay correctly,
typically produced the misshapen stereotypes of the
"nigger" as a means of transferring internal
disorganization and "irrationality" to an external locus.
While it might be possible to isolate the historical moment
at which this psychocultural process originated, it is
perhaps more accurate to consider it as a continuing
dimension of the mythic and psychic fortification of
"white" identity. The psychological disturbances of our
society's "pulverized individuals," Ellison argues (using
Hemingway as an example), are symbolically resolved by the
morbid identification of "being gored with a bull." To
Ellison's list of literary identifications with the mauled
and the defeated, I am suggesting, we might add, "by being
worked to death with the good Anna, by becoming a social
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outcast with Melanctha, by having the faculty of feeling 
exterminated with the gentle Lena."
Having outlined Stein's reproduction and manipulation of 
a racialized mythology--the stereotype--and discussed it as 
typical of a "white" cultural fantasy, I now want to move 
in the second direction Ellison articulates, by discussing 
Melanctha as a projection of Stein's personal conflicts and 
anxieties. The clues to what those psychological torments 
may have been can be traced in the unique features of 
Stein's evocation of "the stereotype," features which I 
have already analyzed in terms of the disciplinarity that 
pervades culture: namely, those features that inscribe
Stein's persistent anxiety about the clarification of 
identity and her dissatisfaction with the way her society 
managed "decency"--most particularly, for her, sexual 
"identity" and sexual "decency." We may find in Stein's 
work of art and in her stereotypes, to paraphrase Ellison, 
the externalization of profoundly personal problems that 
were causing feelings of guilt and internal pulverization: 
disturbances, particularly those linked to homosexuality 
and incest, that lay at the base of her negotiation of 
personality (Shadow 39).
I have given Stein's obsession with classifying 
psychological types, a project that held her interest 
throughout the decade 1900-1910, only ancillary mention 
thus far, but it is certainly important to read Melanctha
156
in the context of Stein's continuing efforts to develop a
systematic characterology of human nature. In his
psychobiographical study, Gertrude Stein in Pieces.
Bridgman describes a young Stein, from at least early
adolescence until around the time she met Alice Toklas in
1907, beset by feelings of internal duality, dissolution
and confusion. Stein expressed the anxieties caused by this
self-conception, Bridgman points out, by repeatedly using
her early college themes to write stories about internally
divided and confused young women and even by identifying
with the story of "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde."29 Behind this
fundamental anxiety, what Stein referred to as her "really
anxious being" (Bridgman, Pieces 13), Bridgman finds
lurking a recurrent concern with forbidden sexuality and
with aggressive male behavior, especially of a sexual
n a t u r e . 30 Bridgman's contention is that Stein's writing--at
least until she was well into The Making of Americans--can
be read as the efforts of someone who "commenced writing in
a state of manifest tumult"--a tumult significantly sexual
in nature--to "purg[e] her psyche of old ghosts" (78-79).
Indeed, Bridgman insightfully connects this concern of
Stein's youth to her later artistic concerns and
specifically to her eventual technical experimentations:
Throughout her life Gertrude Stein puzzled in her 
writing over the phenomenon of a multiple self. 
Sometimes identity seemed to her bewilderingly unstable, 
likely at any moment to fall to pieces.... She found it 
difficult and yet imperative to reconcile the sundered
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parts. A good portion of her stylistic experimentation 
can be traced to this effort. The problem was basic.
(Pieces 26-27, emphasis mine)
The disintegration anxiety thematized in Jeff's concern 
with the "fighting that was always going on inside him" and 
the "little pieces all different" that Melanctha awakens 
is, in one sense, the author's (136, 158). Melanctha's own 
crude duality is perhaps the most obvious example in the 
text of an attempt by Stein to externalize her discord by 
projecting it onto a figuration of otherness, but other, 
more coded references to self-fragmentation in the story 
tell us even more about the psychology of this projection.
The extremely general level of most of the description 
of Melanctha's life should instruct us to take note of 
those rare moments when we are suddenly given odd, 
incidental detail. I have suggested that one such telling 
detail is the story about "white" racism in the south, but 
at least two others are indicative of disintegration 
anxiety, the "ill-defined" yet intense awareness of basic 
structural deficits of the self (Kohut, Restoration 103-5). 
First, in a context that amalgamates images of Melanctha's 
forbidden sexual flirtations with intimations of her 
father's surveillance, sexual control, and violence, 
Melanctha suffers a broken arm, which sparks one of her 
father's disciplinary and controlling rages. The scene 
provides both a physical symbolization of Melanctha's 
broken self and a suggestion of the psychosexual history of
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that fracture: her father's control and physical abuse
(there are strong hints that it is also sexual abuse), and 
Melanctha's compensatory obsession with forbidden 
sexuality.
As a psychoanalytic approach--including Kohut's 
psychology of the self--might suggest, the mutilation, 
fracture, and/or dismemberment of the body is a common 
symbolization of the loss of integrity of the psyche. The 
threat of complete bodily disintegration, in fact, is 
articulated at the crucial point of Melanctha's wandering 
through the work sites of forbidden sexuality, when the 
flirtatious workmen taunt her, "Heh, Sis, look out or that 
rock will fall on you and smash you all up into little 
pieces" (102). The psychosocial dynamics of the situation 
are clear: Melanctha may discard the security of the social 
laws imposed and monitored by her father, allowing herself 
to be "held" in the illicit sexual embrace of the workmen, 
but only at the risk of having her sense of identity-- 
written in the terms of those same laws--smashed to pieces. 
If we follow Ellison's eloquent reading here, the 
threatened pulverization of Melanctha evokes the racialized 
attempt of a "pulverized individual" to identify with, yet 
distance herself from, the pulverized.31
Stein's artistic enterprises of the decade 1900-1910 are 
not only suggestive of this feeling of self-disintegration; 
they are consumed by the depth of the anxieties it caused
her. Like Jefferson Campbell, a derivative of a character 
in an earlier story who was, in turn, quite 
autobiographically based on Stein herself, Stein literally 
felt the meaning of thought and the meaning of life 
slipping away with the potential subversion of the 
concrete, unified self.32 This anxiety led to a somewhat 
desperate attempt, lasting at least until she was nearly 
finished with The Making of Americans, to shore up the 
boundaries. Jayne Walker has examined, by reading passages 
from A Long Gav Book and The Making of Americans. Stein's 
next two enterprises after completing Three Lives. how 
Stein connected a broken sense of self to deep 
epistemological and ontological anxieties, feelings that 
led directly to her efforts to develop a "totalizing system 
of classification" of human character (Walker 70). As 
Walker argues, Stein sought to clarify identity and restore 
her sense of its synchronic continuity through a sort of 
"complete" knowledge and definition of all the "types" of 
human character--in a project that amounted to the complete 
and definite "individualization" of everyone. The impetus 
of The Making of Americans, thus, was the quest for the 
certainty of a "completely completed feeling" that was 
available through defining everyone as a type: "I have not 
so much an afraid feeling in being living now when I am 
certain, and I am knowing them, that there are a number of 
kinds in men and women" (Making 581). Like Jeff Campbell,
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Stein was demanding that all identities resolve themselves 
into singular, definable, categorizable individuals, so 
that she could secure the boundaries of her own 
individuality, and with them, her sense of meaning in life.
While Stein's obsessive effort to categorize 
psychological types may have peaked as she worked on The 
Making of Americans. inspired by the schematic 
characterological theories of Otto Weininger (as both 
Walker and Leon Katz argue) , it was not limited to this 
time period. Bridgman notes the numerous instances of 
Stein's tendency to characterize and classify people by 
"bottom nature," beginning in her college days, including 
her psychological experiments at Harvard, and extending 
through her portraits of 1912. Katz, similarly, contends 
that "the concept of the completed individual...became in 
fact the unifying locus of her thought from the beginning 
to the end of her writing" (146) . As Katz observes, 
Stein's passion for Weininger's "science of the individual" 
was inspired both by her own discomfiting intimations of 
dissociation and by contemporary theories of identity as a 
bundle "of 'factors' and causative patterns" which 
undermined one's sense of unified individuality (Katz 146).
It would be imprudent to be too reductive about Stein's 
quest to reassert some satisfactory conception of identity 
as unified, whole, and complete. Walker has argued 
convincingly that, in the later stages of The Making of
161
Americans. Stein discarded her emphasis on subjective 
wholeness and unity in favor of an appreciation of the 
fragments and difference that actually constitute 
experience.33 However, even if we acknowledge that Stein 
abandoned the search for a satisfactory characterological 
system, and that the techniques of Tender Buttons and the 
portraits that followed evoke an evolving comfort with 
fragmentation, it is clear that her thinking and her 
writing between 1900 and 1910 revolved around the 
disintegration/wholeness axis and the anxieties it caused 
her. "Stein freely confesses her fears" that the 
definition of types will fail, Walker notes, "her 
increasingly desperate need for an orderly system to unify 
the disconnected 'pieces' of her experience" (54). 
Certainly, at the time Stein created Melanctha she was 
still deeply concerned to find a totalizing system of 
classification that would define identities as unified and 
categorical, as was evidenced by her passionate response to 
reading Weininger two years later. We should read the 
system of racial classification, the comprehensive 
stereotyping, and the theme of the fragmented self in 
Melanctha, I am suggesting, as a gloss on Stein's own 
tortured encounter with unmanageable identity. We should, 
in other words, politicize Bridgman's contention that Stein 
was "externalizing psychological dilemmas that laughter 
could not dissolve" (Pieces 14) by restating it in terms of
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the racial dynamic that Ellison describes: Stein was
externalizing conflicts at the very base of her 
personality, and she was using a misshapen Africanist 
presence to do it. In this instance, she ascribed the 
multiplicity of identity, and the laughter, to the "bloated 
images of the Negro" that floated up from the depths of her 
unconscious.
We can trace much of this anxiety about psychic disorder 
and plurality to the disciplinary class context I have 
earlier alluded to, a perspective that more clearly reveals 
how Stein uses Melanetha to assign what she experienced as 
the immoralities of her "identity" to that "black" other as 
well. Just as we can read in Melanctha Stein's consuming 
struggle with the axis of psychological 
fragmentation/wholeness--now sensing the impingement of the 
former, now reasserting the security of the latter--we can 
read there her struggle with the related axis of normative 
conformity/unique "individuality" (using the latter in a 
very different sense than heretofore). Related because, as 
Stein realized, the parameters of the self are written in 
the discourse of social norms and assumptions. During the 
years 1900 to 1910, as she used her fiction to work out a 
satisfactory relationship of "pieces" to unity, she was 
simultaneously straining for a satisfactory combination of 
the moral conventionality that structured identity, on the 
one hand, and the ability to be, as she put it in The
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Making of Americans, "free inside" and "singular," on the 
other.
Stein indicates in the latter text that she felt herself
to be an eccentric, one of those "queer" or "singular"
individuals who is both deeply attracted to and unhappily
constrained by what she alludes to as a massive cultural
system of homogenizing, indoctrinating normalization. This
"machine" of middle-class moral conformity, she understood,
offered security of identity:
...there must be in a kind of ordinary way always there 
inside us the sense of decent enough ways of living for 
us. . . .1 believe in simple middle class monotonous 
tradition...middle class is sordid material unillusioned 
unaspiring and always monotonous. (38)
But within this tradition of middle-class "decency"
individual uniqueness risked effacement by the cultural and
familial enforcement of a monotonous sameness, which
becomes
our only way of thinking, our way of educating, our way 
of learning, all always the same way of doing, all the 
way down as far as there is any way down inside to .us. 
We are all the same all through us, we never have it to 
be free inside us. No brother singulars, it is sad here 
for us, there is no place in an adolescent world for 
anything eccentric like us, machine making does not turn 
out queer things like us. (47)
Describing the machine of cultural normalization in terms
suggestive of Foucault's disciplinary regime, with its
universal reign of the norm, Stein alternately poses
herself as a product of normalization and as the
"eccentric" in conflict with U.S. middle-class conformity.
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We might read Melanctha. too, in terms of Stein's 
contradictory feelings about the machine of middle-class 
decency--its appeal for her reflected in Jeff's pose of 
regularity, and her sense of its constraint reflected in 
Melanctha‘s wrenching collision with the machine. It is 
impossible to do so, however, without taking note of the 
earlier story which was eventually to evolve into 
Mel anc tha . Things As They Are. In this story, 
autobiographically based on Stein's brief and frustrated 
1903 love affair with a Baltimore woman named May 
Bookstaver, the pull of conventionality is reflected in the 
internalized bourgeois decency of Adele, an almost 
autobiographical stand-in for Stein who struggles with the 
indecent passions illicited in her by the eccentric and 
convention-flouting Helen. The moralism of Adele is 
clearly Stein's own, and would become that of Jeff Campbell 
when the story was rewritten a few years later as 
Melanctha.34 jn that rewriting process, indeed, Adele's 
phrase "the middle-class ideal" is directly translated into 
Jeff's "living regular." While Things As They Are 
ostensibly concerns itself with Adele/Stein1s morality and 
regularity in conflict with more passionate, "excited" 
modes of experiencing, the fact that the novel's plot 
revolves around a lesbian romance points to the heart of 
that conflict for Stein: the clash between the lesbian
sexuality to which she increasingly felt drawn and the
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compulsory heterosexuality of the Victorian bourgeois 
cultural dictates that informed her identity as social 
subject.
Indeed, the initiation of the conventionality- 
eccentricity (or conformity-"singularity") struggle in this 
early novel based on Stein's first protracted lesbian 
involvement suggests that what was really at stake in most 
of the first decade of Stein's writing was her effort to 
reconcile her internalized sense of middle-class "decency" 
with the lesbianism which it categorically censured.^ 
Catherine Stimpson has presented an extensive discussion, 
for example, of the methods of "encoding" through which 
Stein managed to write about her forbidden lesbian 
tendencies and relationships throughout what Stimpson 
refers to as Stein's "decade of choice" (495). While it is 
not my purpose to extend this reading into Stein's career 
after that decade, I do want to suggest that Stein's still- 
conflicted feelings about her lesbian inclinations at the 
time she wrote Melanctha are as crucial to understanding 
its deployment of Africanism as are her anxieties about the 
unity of identity. It was not, according to Bridgman, 
until she was nearly finished with The Making of Americans 
that Stein felt distanced enough from her early sense of 
morality to "[announce] that she had become reconciled to 
the nature of her affections" (Pieces 105). By then, of 
course, Stein had realigned her sexuality around her
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relationship with Alice Toklas, initiating what would 
become a permanent redefinition of her code of sexual 
"normalcy. "
When she wrote Melanc tha. however, Stein was still 
struggling to bring what she felt to be the illicit sexual 
impulses of her psyche into line with the normative codes 
of her society, and an elaborate metaphor of race provided 
her a medium for both encoding and proi ectinct the 
forbidden. Here, Lott's understanding of the minstrel show 
as social symbolic is perhaps the most pertinent analogy, 
suggesting a masculine precedent in nineteenth-century 
bohemianism for Stein's maneuver of lesbian "class 
abdication" through "cross-racial immersion" in twentieth- 
century expatriacy (Lott 51). Like the antebellum minstrel 
performers Lott describes, Stein evokes the personally and 
politically liberatory possibilities of sexuality by making 
"blackness" sexuality's "virtual condition--that 
fascinating imaginary space of fun and license outside (but 
structured by) Victorian bourgeois norms" (51). As Jeff 
Campbell's "living regular" takes the place of Adele's 
"middle-class ideal" taking the place of Stein's own 
youthful moral imperative, then, and as Melanctha takes the 
place of Helen taking the place of May Bookstaver and 
Stein's "queer" eccentricity, Stein replaces a profoundly 
personal story of forbidden, lesbian romance with an oddly 
distanced, highly artificed story of "black"
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heterosexuality. In the transformation from Things As They 
Are to Melanctha. Stein literally mapped a narrative of 
lesbian desire with a "white" cast of characters onto a 
contrived metaphor of racial existence, refiguring the 
sexual dynamic that Lott descries on the blackface stage, 
where homosexual interests were engaged but were "deflected 
or remained unacknowledged" by virtue of their being 
visually mapped onto a spectral show of heterosexual 
" black" desire (54, 166) . In Me lane tha. in short,
"problematic passion among whites is transferred to blacks, 
as if they might embody that which the dominant culture 
feared" (Stimpson 501).
Indeed, it is in the enormity of this transformation of 
lesbianism into racialism that we can glimpse both the 
psychocultural function of "race" as ideology, and the 
larger significance of every discrete, idiomatic inflection 
of the discursive network of "race." When Stein refers in 
a notebook entry to her unconventional, uncivilized, bodily 
tendencies as the "Rabelaisian, nigger abandonment" side of 
herself, she is not simply using the common phrases of her 
culture to communicate; she is defining her moral 
subjectivity in terms of the racial subjectivity of someone 
else, a maneuver of self-fortification that is as old as 
Hume, Kant, and Hegel (Goldberg, "Modernity") . In the 
process of fortifying her own identity as "moral, " Stein 
uses the middle-class definition of morality to both
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legitimate and justify the racialization and 
"immoralization" of that other. As Lisa Ruddick has
commented,
That she associates her bodily gusto, or everything 
Rabelaisian in herself, with something she calls "nigger 
abandonment" suggests that the extreme racism she 
expresses in "Melanctha"... served (among other things) 
her own need to distance a part of herself about which 
she was ambivalent. She had her own sensuous side, 
which she projected in racial terms. (33)
In working out her attitudes toward her own lesbianism,
Stein may have been moving toward a new, less disciplinary
conception of moral identity for the "white" subject, but
in doing so she was extending the discursive disciplinarity
that constrained the possibilities of moral identity for
the "black." Like the themes of many of the blackface
songs Lott analyzes, the plot of Melanctha "is to be sure,
antibourgeois, but it is again black people, black women.
who are the world's body" (Lott 146).
The background of word-system
Within the framework of such a discursive 
disciplinarity, the focus of a racially politicized 
criticism shifts from Stein's personal morality to the 
extensive racialization of the culture which shaped her 
consciousness. It is precisely as an illustration of how 
that culture transmits racialist assumptions through a set 
of discursive agreements, and how those assumptions then 
shape the consciousness and the perceptions of those in
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communication with the linguistic circuit, that Melanctha 
takes on its greatest value for my analysis. That value as 
an illustration of the mechanisms of racial subjectivity 
and racialist language is accentuated by the fact that 
Stein's aesthetic strategy--her intention in composing the 
work--apparently was, as Jayne Walker has convincingly 
argued, not to represent "reality" but to "realize" her 
object as she perceived it. allowing the elements already 
present in her own consciousness to become a manifest part 
of what she "perceived," rather than imposing a veneer of 
"realism. So attuned was Stein to the mediating
features of language between any empirical "reality" and 
the linguistic representation of it, she. elected to forego 
the epistemologically naive project of illusionistic 
realism and allow the material surface of her medium--the 
very letters, words, phrases, and other discrete linguistic 
units which constituted the "palette" of her discursive 
art--to manifest itself as a legitimate part of the 
conposition.
Although William James's psychological theory of how 
acquired perceptions shape present visual sensation into 
knowable objects was surely an influence, Stein's most 
important model for this compositional method was the art 
of Paul Cezanne. Discarding the illusionary techniques of 
traditional realism and dramatically modifying early 
impressionist experiments with registering only direct
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visual sensation, Cezanne instead embarked on a project of, 
as. he called it, "realizing one's sensations" (quoted in 
Walker 3). Rather than attempting to represent some "real" 
object, that is, Cezanne was interested in representing the 
discrete "signs" that bring such objects to the eye--points 
of light and shadings of color, for example--along with the 
actual material elements of his medium that were the 
instruments of that representation--the one-dimensional 
surface, spots of color, brush strokes, interacting planes 
and so on. While illusionary painting had attempted to 
disguise or obscure these "materials" of the artist's 
craft, that is, Cezanne made them a distinct and "visible" 
part of the represented object, much as, in James's 
formulation, each perceived object is necessarily a conplex 
of acquired mental contents and immediate visual 
impressions. Thus, in Cezanne's "Chocquet Seated," as 
Meyer Schapiro describes it, "The texture of the pigment is 
more pronounced than the texture of the represented 
objects, and the painted pattern is clearer than the 
structure of things," so that "through the texture of the 
painting, the latter has become almost as distinct an 
object as any of the things it represents" (62) . Or, as 
Walker summarizes, "because of the intensity of his 
commitment to 'realizing' his sensations, Cezanne was aware 
that seeing was 'reading,' through a grid determined by the 
concrete resources of his medium" (11).
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This artistic analogue is instructive, not least because 
Stein, a passionate Cezanne enthusiast between 1903 and 
1905, later claimed that his "Portrait of Madame Cezanne" 
was the model for Three Lives. Stein self-consciously 
adapted Cezanne's painting methodology to the writing of 
fiction, creating "a new mode of realism that inheres in 
the material patterning of the composition, not merely re­
presenting the objects of completed conception but modeling 
the processes of perception and cognition" (Walker 13, 
emphasis mine). As Stein herself retrospectively 
articulated this principle, "It was not solely the realism 
of the characters but the realism of the composition which 
was the important thing, the realism of the composition of 
my thoughts."37 for Cezanne, representing the "realism
of the composition of [her] thoughts" meant for Stein 
focusing on the acquired "grid" through which she 
necessarily "read" the represented object and on the 
material elements of her medium--in this case, the elements 
of her linguistic system. Crucially, then, as Stein 
herself described the specific instance of Melanctha. her 
interest in the composition itself took the form of an 
interest in what she called "this background of word- 
svstem. which had come to me from this reading I had done.
I was obsessed by this idea of composition, and the Negro 
story was the quintessence of it" (emphasis mine).
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Stein's conception of a "background of word-system" that 
informed the composition of her story about U.S. "Negroes" 
draws direct attention to what I have outlined in chapter 1 
as a system or field of racial discourse made up of the 
culturally circulating terms, idioms, images, tropes, and 
linguistic "agreements" about "blackness." In composing 
her story, it seems, Stein subordinated theme, realistic 
portrayal, plot, and other traditional artistic concerns to 
the racial discursive structure that she had internalized 
and that organized, shaped, and, indeed, limited her 
thoughts about her object, the southern "black" community. 
She was not trying to represent the southern "black" 
community, we could say, she was trying to represent the 
southern "black" community as it intersected with the 
acquired grid of concepts in her mind.
Having observed that this discursive structure, and by 
extension the "black" community of the "composition of 
[Stein's] thoughts," was present in the form of a set of 
repeatable, discrete linguistic units--the metaphors, 
phrases, idioms, images, and words in circulation in U.S. 
culture about "blackness"--it is important to note that 
part of this "background of word-system" overlaps with the 
cultural discourse of a "real" African American community 
that Stein was representing. Specifically, Stein 
apparently culled at least some of the linguistic fragments 
that inform the narrative texture of Melanctha from the
songs of an African American musical tradition that she 
experienced first-hand while living in Baltimore from 1897 
to 1902. As Carla Peterson argues, Stein lived in close 
proximity to African American neighborhoods, not the German 
or middle-class communities, and became familiar with an 
active black music scene that included the performance and 
development of black minstrel and vaudeville shows, 
ragtime, and blues. According to Peterson, the lyrics that 
Stein heard in blues tunes and in the "coon" songs of the 
minstrel and ragtime traditions, often derived in part from 
the "white" minstrel stage and infused with negative 
stereotypes and racial perjoratives reinflected by black 
entertainers, were an important influence on the textual 
elements of Melanctha. If Peterson is indeed correct, we 
might read the rhythmic repetitions of "verses" and 
"phrases" and some of the thcematic elements of Stein's 
story in the context of the form and content of such music: 
blues songs that often featured strong, sexualized female 
figures wandering outside male control, and "coon" songs 
like the popular one featuring "coal black Rose" (Lott 117- 
18) .
As Peterson's research suggests, the linguistic units 
that make up the "background of word-system" can be loaded 
with political ambivalence and interracial heritage, making 
Stein's artistic manipulation of them almost indecipherably 
equivocal. What is less equivocal is the discursive
disciplinarity of the culture of racialism itself, which, 
as Stein's method makes eminently clear, makes it 
impossible to "see" the "racial" object without "reading" 
it through the grid of those internalized discursive 
fragments. The intermittent recurrence of phrases like 
"the wide broad laughter of negro sunshine" and "the simple 
unmorality of the black people," then, suggest Stein's 
foregrounding of the material elements of her linguistic 
medium--her inclusion of the grid that shapes her 
perceptions in the representation itself. This "realism of 
the composition of [her] thoughts" was an enduring 
principle for.Stein, and continued to demonstrate a certain 
racial significance. In the stories of As Fine As 
Melanctha. which feature an even more radical style that 
allows unstructured phrases circulating in the writer's 
mind to be incorporated into the composition, the 
inpingement of the racial discursive structure is similarly 
clear: "eeney meeney miney mo catch a nigger by the toe"
(275); "Nigger, nigger never die black face and china eye" 
(268).
Cezanne emphasized the set of basic shapes, colors, and 
brush techniques that he was working with, giving up 
traditional realism in order to allow those material 
elements of the medium to become visible components of his 
artistic compositions, literally making "the texture of the 
painting... almost as distinct an object as any of the
things it represents" (Schapiro 62). Similarly, Melanctha 
repetitively and rhythmically reproduces linguistic units 
like those above as a means of accurately recording how 
"blackness" appeared to Stein's consciousness. No one in 
Stein's racial, socioeconomic, and intellectual position 
could see an African American without certain associations 
being amalgamated into the perception: "nigger
abandonment," "childlike" "eeney meeney miney mo..." etc. 
When we read of the "wide broad laughter of negro 
sunshine," we are seeing Stein's brushstrokes. Melanctha 
is not so much an illustration of Stein's romantic 
racialism, though it is in part that, as it is an 
illustration of "race" as a discursive discipline, 
demonstrating its active penetration to the minutest 
corners of society and of the individual psyche, and its 
creation there of "habits of attention" that literally 
shape and constrain perception. In formulating a 
Cezannesque approach to written composition for her "Negro 
story" by refusing to suppress the material surface of the 
linguistic medium itself, Stein stripped the racialized 
discursive network--the "background of word-system" which 
she had internalized--of its guise of realism. It is as 
profound an illustration of Africanism as we have.
In drawing on "blackness"--including the themes of a 
genuine African American blues culture--to express her own 
felt sense of difference, as Peterson notes, Stein found a
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way to represent radical femininity that did not exist in 
middle-class culture and a means to simultaneously distance 
that radicalness as alien. Stein's use of "blackness" as 
an "idiom of class dissent," to borrow Lott's phrase for 
one aspect of the minstrel show, including, as it does, a 
genuine instance of the "cross-racial identification" that 
he finds there (84), must finally be read as profoundly 
contradictory, achieving its liberatory moments by way of 
oppressive racial caricature. It is, perhaps, a 
contradictoriness held in play by Stein's more or less 
conscious representation of the process of racial 
representation itself. The racialism of the discursive 
system, however, which Stein in part--and ambivalently-- 
manipulates to resolve her own sense of class-disciplined 
"pulverization," becomes the very force of psychic 
pulverization for the "blacks" that it, in turn, culturally 
disciplines. It is to Ralph Ellison's own figurations of 
this disintegration anxiety that I now want to turn.
Notes
1. As reported in Brinnin 120-21. Wright's comments, part 
of a review of Stein's "Wars I Have Seen," appeared in PM 
Magazine. March 11, 1945.
2. See, for example, Stimpson 489-506, and Ruddick, 
Reading. Stimpson notes the presence of racial stereotypes 
but demurs on their ramifications for the interpretation of 
the story, either hers or anyone else's . Moreover, she 
rather unanalytically presents Wright's words of praise as 
a counterbalance to the possibility of Stein's racism.
3 . Morrison herself hints at the need for just such an 
approach to Three Lives (Playing 14).
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4. Peterson's unpublished remarks are taken from her talk 
"The Making of Black Americans. Gertrude Stein's Melanctha 
and African-American Musical Traditions," delivered at the 
conference "The Question of Race in the Americas," 
University of Pennsylvania, October 1, 1994. Although the 
author has agreed to furnish me with a copy of the paper 
resulting from that talk (personal correspondence, March 6, 
1995), which will also be published in the forthcoming 
volume, Criticism on the Color Line. I was unable to obtain 
the paper in time to include it in my preparation of this
chapter. Hence, my references to her approach to Stein
will draw on informal notes from her talk. Although this 
circumstance requires my usage of her ideas to be less
specific than I would like, the inclusion of her
perspective seemed vital to my argument.
5. Lott provides an excellent and penetrating discussion of 
the complex, "mulatto" cultural background of minstrelsy 
itself (38-49, 94). On the political ambiguities of 
minstrelsy's reappropriation as a "black" cultural form see 
Lott 103-4, and Ellison's essay "Change the Joke and Slip 
the Yoke" in Shadow and Act.
6. Lott's description of how members of a nascent working 
class worked out the psychological constrictions of the new 
industrial morality through blackface performance provides 
an accurate gloss to my argument about Stein: "The 
blackface body figured the traditional, 'preindustrial' 
joys that social and economic pressures had begun to 
marginalize. . . .The tortured and racist form of this 
pleasure indicates the ambivalent attitude toward enjoyment 
itself that industrial morality encouraged" (148). Stein's 
representation of "blackness" can be read in part, I would 
suggest, as a similar effort to manage the anxieties 
produced by middle-class morality.
7 . Foucault locates an increasing emphasis on and 
proliferation of disciplinary mechanisms in Western 
societies toward the end of the eighteenth and the 
beginning of the nineteenth centuries. The extension of 
individualization through conformity and penality is 
particularly related to the evolution of the "panoptic" and 
carceral sciences, and the birth of the modern prison. 
Foucault cites dates circa 1840-1850 as the key milestones 
in the emergence of the fully developed, society-wide 
"carceral" system (Discipline 293-97). The key discussions 
of the "pyramidal" distribution of surveillance, penality, 
and normalization which inform the following analysis can
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be found in "The means of correct training" (Discipline 
170-194).
8 . Foucault suggested that there are two "images" of 
discipline: "the enclosed institution," like the prison, 
and "the discipline-mechanism," which might be extended 
generally throughout society. The Benthamite plan for the 
"panopticon," for example, provided the structural layout 
for the prison, but it was also the basis for "a network of 
mechanisms that would be everywhere and always alert, 
running through society without interruption in space or in 
time" (Discipline 209) . In this instance, the movement 
"from a schema of exceptional discipline to one of a 
generalized surveillance, rests on a historical 
transformation: the gradual extension of the mechanisms of 
discipline throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, their spread throughout the whole social body, 
the formation of what might be called in general the 
disciplinary society" (209).
9. According to Foucault, the development of "continuous" 
surveillance and supervision was crucial to the extension 
of disciplinary power as an integrated social "system" or 
"network": "this network 'holds' the whole together and
traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that 
derive from one another: supervisors, perpetually
supervised....And, although it is true that its pyramidal 
organization gives it a 'head', it is the apparatus as a 
whole that produces 'power' and distributes individuals in 
this permanent and continuous field" (Discipline 176-77).
10. "The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an 
'ideological' representation of society; but he is also a 
reality fabricated by this specific technology of power 
that I have called 'discipline' . . . [PJower produces; it 
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and 
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that 
may be gained of him belong to this production" (Foucault, 
Discipline 194).
11. As Foucault argued, one of the most specific methods of 
discipline is to control an axis of conformity and 
normality: "What is specific to the disciplinary penality 
is non-observance, that which does not measure up to the 
rule, that departs from it. The whole indefinite domain of 
the non-conforming is punishable" (Discipline 178-79).
12 The contrary mental make-up of the two lovers has been 
well noted. See, for example, Bridgman, Pieces 53-56, 
Ruddick, Reading 19-20, and Weinstein 19.
179
13. In the article, published in the Psychological Review. 
Stein "broke her subjects down into two basic types. Type 
One were 'nervous, high-strung, very imaginative.' She 
found them 'easily aroused and intensely interested. ' . . . 
Type Two were blonde, pale, phlegmatic with weak powers of 
attention and concentration" (Bridgman, Pieces 33).
14. As Ruddick notes, "Melanctha" is "so close, in its 
characterizations, to James's theory of the mind as to 
approach psychological allegory" (15). Others who have 
commented on elements of Jamesian psychology in Stein's 
work include Bridgman (20-22, 75, 133-34), Weinstein (12-
14. 104-105), Donald Sutherland (6-8), and Walker (14-15).
15. See Ruddick 16-22. Ruddick bases her summary on 
James's Psychology: The Briefer Course, ed. Gordon Allport 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1961) . For the heart of the 
"habits of attention" discussion, see pp. 37-90.
16. Quoted in Ruddick, p. 19. See James, Psychology: The 
Briefer Course 196. As Ruddick summarizes, "words and 
stock concepts, besides determining what objects we will 
select for notice, distort our perceptions of those objects 
that we do observe" (19).
17. A comment that Ruddick also notes in connection with 
her discussion of James and Stein. See "The Gradual Making 
of The Making of Americans, " in Lectures in America, p. 
138.
18. Modifying Lacan slightly, we might say that the massive 
disparity between the fiction of ego unity (taking the 
specific form, here, of a socially formed "moral subject"), 
on the one hand, and the intimations of the desiring, 
multiplicitous, linguistic "unconscious," on the other, 
produce an anxiety of the fragmentation of the subject.
19. That the person who serves this function in the text is 
a doctor bears significance beyond its reference to the 
facts that Stein herself once studied to become one and 
that Jeff, to some extent, serves as a surrogate for Stein 
in the story. As Foucault observes, originally, "the 
supervision of normality was firmly encased in a medicine
or a psychiatry that provided it with a sort of
'scientificity'" and this supervision quickly 
“proliferated" outside the prison, the school, the specific 
institution, spreading through a vast network of
apparatuses, services, and "agents" (Discipline 296). Of
course, it might also be argued that Stein's extensive
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training in psychology, medicine, and psychiatry left her 
with an unusual familiarity and expertise with the 
procedures and methodologies of the very human sciences 
that, Foucault argues, were intimately linked to the spread 
of disciplinary individuality. Whatever Stein's 
"intentions" in making Jeff a doctor, the fact that he is 
one adds considerable depth to the reading of Melanctha as 
a text about discipline.
20. The depiction of a dual personality in terms of that 
personality's relationship to "proper conduct" is 
strikingly similar to a historical instance used by 
Foucault as an illustration of the operation of one of the 
earliest disciplinary mechanisms: the institution of the 
asylum and the disciplinary constitution of "madness." In 
Madness and Civilization. Foucault refers to the treatment 
of a "young girl" who was deemed mentally ill because she 
was "torn between 'the inclinations of her heart and the 
severe principles of her conduct.'" The asylum sought a 
cure for such "madness" by creating for the girl a "domain 
of pure morality, of ethical uniformity" (Reader 148). In 
terms of her society's similar obsession with ethical 
uniformity, Melanctha's dual inclinations are also so 
perplexing as to place her on the edge of what that society 
would define as "madness."
21. Said describes this dynamic for Orientalist discourse:
"[the Westerner] could penetrate, he could wrestle with, he 
could give shape and meaning to the great Asiatic 
mystery.. . .Yet what has, I think, been previously 
overlooked is the constricted vocabulary of such a 
privilege, and the comparative limitations of such a 
vision" (Orientalism 44).
22. See Foucault, Discipline 26 and 138, for descriptions 
of the "multiform instrumentation" of the "political 
technology of the body" and the "micro-physics of power" 
(26) .
23. McKay 248. I am indebted to Nielsen for locating and 
reporting this quote (21) . Wright's remark is from his 
review of Stein's "Wars I Have Seen," PM Magazine. March 
11, 1945, as quoted in Stein, Selected Writings 338.
24. For the tradition of stereotypes about "black" 
"nothingness," see Gossett 42-65. For the tradition of 
rationalization of African Americans' social position by 
way of the fatalist argument see Nielsen 23, Gossett 282- 
86, and Fredrickson 228-55. As Fredrickson makes clear, 
the period during which Stein was growing to intellectual
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maturity was a period of unprecedented formalization of the 
doctrine that the American black was fated to inferiority 
and eventual extinction: "...the 1890's saw an unparalleled 
outburst of racist speculation on the impending 
disappearance of the American Negro. From the most 
reputable sources came confident predictions of black 
extinction through natural processes, and few who thus 
consigned an entire race to oblivion could conceal their 
satisfaction" (246-47).
25. Ruddick, Reading 33. Ruddick cites notebook DB, p. 47 
of Leon Katz 1s transcriptions.
26. Stein's conception of the "unmorality of the black 
people" has deep roots in the tradition of Euro-white 
theorizations of moral subjectivity. Kant reasoned his way 
to a causal relationship between black skin and immorality 
and stupidity, as Goldberg argues ("Modernity" 212), while 
Nielsen has referenced Stein's remarks with Hegel's 
formulation: "it is manifest that want of self-control 
distinguishes the character of Negroes. This condition is 
capable of no development or culture" (Quoted in Nielsen 
28) .
27. The classic instance of this tradition is, of course, 
Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin. with its articulate, 
dissatisfied and resourceful "mixed race" characters and 
its simple, docile, and unrelentingly cheerful "blacks." 
Similar examples are to be found in Metta V. Victor's 
antislavery novel Maum Guinea. and Her Plantation 
"Children" (1862) which, as Fredrickson notes, "contains a 
similar cast of docile blacks and restive browns," and in 
William Dean Howells An Imperative Duty (1892), a text 
Stein probably read, which also ponders the confused and 
melancholic disposition of a woman of "mixed race."
28. The material reproduced here and following from Hoffman 
is quoted in Fredrickson 250-51.
29. Bridgman 27. For Bridgman's assessment of Stein's 
anxieties about self, especially as they are thematized in 
her Radcliffe essays, see 5-27.
30. See especially chapters 1 and 2. As Bridgman remarks 
in assessing Stein's Radcliffe themes, the college-aged 
Stein "sought relief from her inner torment by dramatizing 
it in her college prose" (24). The first of these themes, 
"In The Red Deeps," includes intimations of sado-masochism, 
multiple identity, and a "tumultuous sexual motif, 
involving both father and brother" (25).
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31. The intensity of the image might be read in- its 
endurance in Stein's consciousness. As late as 1943, in 
the whimsical play "Look and Long," Stein was rewriting the 
struggle to concretize identity and the body. In the play, 
which thematizes bodily splitting and shifting identity, 
one of the characters attempts to piece his body together 
with sticking plaster and string: "Oh oh, I am in two oh in 
two in two. It is only the string holds me together." 
Stein, "Look and Long," in Gertrude Stein First Reader and 
Three Plavs 79. For commentary on the continuingly related 
themes of twinning, multiple or lost identity, bodily 
injury, and illicit sexuality in Stein's work during the 
1930s, see Bridgman 301-8.
32 . For an account of the autobiographical aspects of 
Things As They Are. originally titled Quod Erat 
Demonstrandum. see Bridgman 40-45, and Stimpson, 495-500. 
Bridgman, Ruddick, and Stimpson all provide useful 
descriptions of the connections between Things As They Are 
and Melanctha (Bridgman 52-55, Ruddick 15, 18-30, Stimpson 
499-502) .
33. Stein's view that the wholeness of a personality was 
built out of a series of fragments was, in fact, explicit 
in The Making of Americans: "Sometime then each one I am 
ever knowing comes to be to me a completed being, and then 
always they are always repeating always the whole of 
them....it has to be told as it has been learned by me very 
slowly, each one only slowly can know it, each one must 
wait for little pieces of it, always there will be coming 
more and more of it...always I am telling pieces of it" 
(305, 350).
34. As Bridgman argues (Pieces 44).
35. Indeed, it is difficult not to read many of Stein's 
comments about the struggle between "singularity" and 
middle-class conventionality, between "eccentricity" and 
the homogenizing "machine," in The Making of Americans, as 
being more specifically about her culture's denigration of 
lesbianism: "Or you like something that is a dirty thing 
and no one can really like that thing" (485); "It takes 
time to make queer people....Brother Singulars, we are 
misplaced in a generation that knows not Joseph. We flee 
before the disapproval of our cousins, the courageous 
condescension of our friends who gallantly sometimes agree 
to walk the streets with us, from all them who never any 
way can understand why such ways and not the others are so
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dear to us, we fly to the kindly comfort of an older world 
accustomed to take all manner of strange forms into its 
bosom" (21).
36. See Walker's "Preface" and chapter 1. Walker 
insightfully applies Cezanne's painting aesthetic to 
Stein's fictional approach. Norman Weinstein has made 
similar observations about Stein's approach to the 
linguistic medium, though with a less detailed analysis of 
the Cezannesque aesthetic on which it may have been based 
(44-45, 60-61).
37. I am indebted to Walker for locating and pointing out 
the significance of this and the following Stein comments, 
which are taken from "A Transatlantic Interview 1946" and 
quoted in Walker 13.
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Discipline, Disintegration, and Freedom of the 
"Black" Self in Ellison's Invisible Man
In chapter 2 I outlined how a newly expatriated Gertrude 
Stein manipulated a "discourse" of cultural assumptions 
about "blacks" to artistically secure the boundaries of her 
own subjectivity or, more accurately, to both register the 
psychological impression of discursive "blackness" and 
simultaneously avail herself of that discursive network's 
ego-reinforcing functions. In recapitulating images of the 
"black" as sexually immoral (Rose), physical and carefree 
(the "free abandoned laughter of negro sushine"), child- 
abusing (Rose and James Herbert) and even as well-behaved 
race spokesman (Jeff Canpbell), Stein was managing a range 
of disruptive forces within her own psyche: anxieties about 
illicit sexuality, disintegrating identity, and familial 
and social violence. The artistic reconstruction of such 
images of otherness allowed her to shape the coherence and 
purity of her own self by means of what we might call a 
psychodiscursive racial mirror stage. In effect, Melanctha 
provides a racially politicized psychoanalytic criticism 
with a detailed illustration of how the unified, moralized, 
"white" subject is created and sustained, at both the 
personal and cultural levels, as a highly individualistic 
model for identity.
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The cultural effect of such ritualistic repetitions of 
U.S. culture's imagistic and idiomatic agreements about 
"blackness," however, is not only the fortification of a 
"white" subject but also the articulation of a definitive, 
constrictive, and individualizing "black" subject. The 
racial mirror stage produces not only a narcissism of 
"white" identity, as Frantz Fanon argued in discussing the 
colonial situation, but a "dual narcissism" in which "the 
white man is sealed in his whiteness" and "the black man in 
his blackness" (Fanon 9-10). In the discussion that 
follows, I want to turn to Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man. 
published the same year (1952) as Fanon's Black Skin. White 
Masks. as a text that thematizes how "race" functions both 
as a psychological apparatus for "whites" and as a 
correlative disciplinary apparatus for "blacks"--sealing 
"black" identity in its "blackness." As Ellison's novel 
delineates, the racial mirror stage structured by "white" 
discourse about "blacks" is in no way reciprocal: the
image-system through which "whites" see "blackness" as not- 
self, facilitating the structuring of the "white" subject, 
inevitably destructures the identity schema of the psyche 
objectified by that gaze. The eyes/I's, in the complex 
symbology of Invisible Man. are always stacked against the 
"black" subject: it is invisible as the nexus of a
multidimensional consciousness, hypervisible as a signifier 
of the "non-white," and blinded by the very structure that
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allows the "white" subject to represent it as the latter 
"sees" fit. Moreover, Ellison's novel suggests that the 
real psychological violence -of the "white" image-system 
inheres in its role as an instrument of a disciplinary 
individualization that parallels Fanon's perception of the 
compulsory "narcissism" of race. Ellison's insistent theme 
is not only his protagonist's invisibility, but the network 
of coercive "disciplines" and unitary self-fictions that 
render him so. In his quest for a satisfactory identity, 
Ellison's nameless protagonist repeatedly confronts the 
psychological dilemma structured by every invocation of 
U.S. racial imagery: conform to the "black" image in the 
"white" mind, or experience a progressive fragmentation of 
identity.
Among the myriad symbols that organize Ellison's vision 
of African American life, the iron shackle is perhaps most 
emblematic of the novel's concern with the discipline of 
the "black" self. Incorporating nuances of the 
disciplinary aspects of slavery and chain gangs, of the 
behavioral codes of Reconstruction, of Booker T. Washington 
accommodationism and its educational modes, and even of the 
iron-clad (and ironic) images of blacks emanating from 
"white" culture--like the iron "darky" bank the protagonist 
finds in his room--it has, as Brother Tarp says of the 
specific chain link he gives to IM, "a heap of signifying 
wrapped up in it" (379). As a closed loop of solid iron,
figuring wholeness and unity, the shackle signifies the 
autonomous and rigidly ordered self: invoking the need for 
"discipline," the president of the protagonist's 
accommodationist college raps on his desk with "an old leg 
shackle from slavery" and expels the protagonist for 
exceeding the defined role of the good southern "nigger" 
(137-39). The expelled student thus embarks on what 
critics have commonly viewed as an identity quest, carrying 
with him yet another image of the well-wrought ego, his 
briefcase. Given to him by the "white" leaders of his home 
community, it serves as the container for a growing 
accumulation of written vouchers of identity and, 
eventually, various haphazardly collected icons of the 
"black" self. The subsequent episodes of Invisible Man 
elaborate a series of encounters with constrictive and 
enclosing identity constructs (often symbolized by tokens 
that the main character adds to his briefcase collection 
and carries with him) and with an increasingly widening 
network of discipline. Indeed, it is largely by 
representing this far-reaching network that Ellison effects 
the extension of his critique from the question of "race" 
as a specific apparatus of individualization to the 
question of individualization as a generalized social 
modality. Invisible Man stubbornly refuses to be only 
about racial existence--just as Ellison rejected the 
epithet "protest novel"--insisting instead on registering
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its social critique according to what Kenneth Burke has 
called its "two methods of bookkeeping" (357), one specific 
to black culture, the other referable to all U.S. citizens. 
As the application of the term "discipline" itself is 
extended from the slave shackle to the standards of 
absolute communitarianism in the Brotherhood to a 
comprehensive cultural machinery that evokes the components 
of Foucault's disciplinary regime--the workplace, the 
asylum, the hospital, the school, the military--the full 
scope of Ellison's vision unfolds.
When the iron shackle makes its second appearance in 
Invisible Man. joining its precursor in what Robert Stepto 
has referred to as the text's "museum" of "artifacts" which 
are "prototypes for the self-in-motion" (186), it connotes 
a symbolic resolution of the protagonist's struggles 
against both disciplinary "blackness" and the networks of 
institutional and interpersonal discipline. If the 
protagonist's central quest is for a satisfactory 
conception of his own identity, the leg iron that Brother 
Tarp filed open to escape the chain gang provides a key 
symbol of how such a self might be configured. The chain 
link that Brother Tarp gives the main character--at a 
critical juncture, significantly, in the latter's 
engagement with the "discipline" of the Brotherhood--bears 
a "signifying" difference from the museum piece on Dr. 
Bledsoe's desk: while Bledsoe's shackle was smooth and
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closed, Tarp1s has been violently marked and opened (379). 
The difference between these two pieces I take as 
figurative of the contrast between the ordered, 
disciplined, ego-bound self and a model of the self that 
more flexibly allows for the interpersonal and historical 
contingencies of subjectivity: an externally derived
structure. but one with a critical opening or marginal 
space as the nexus of continuous self-creation, 
intersubjectivity, and possibility. In this sense, "the 
reforming of the shackle is finally the trope before the 
questing narrator for a viable pattern of mobility and a 
viable system of authorial control" over his own life and 
self (Stepto 190).
The opened shackle, I will argue, inscribes Ellison's 
unique vision of "radical black subjectivity" (hooks 26), a 
dynamic, complex, and plural racial identity that becomes a 
persistent emphasis of his nonfiction essays. In his 
crucial assessment of U.S. culture in "The Little Man at 
Chehaw Station," for example, Ellison observed that each of 
us is "representative not only of one but of several 
overlapping and constantly shifting social categories" and 
questioned our tendency to hide that plurality behind the 
security of reductive "symbols of identity" (Going 19-20) . 
His own conception of "radical black subjectivity," 
however, finds its fit liberatory strategy not in simply 
annihilating such symbols, or the racial mechanism that
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idealizes them, but in the individual1s improvisatory 
"transformations" of all such historical and cultural 
determinants of identity (Going 20). If Ellison ultimately 
casts Invisible Man as the poetry of the "blues" self, I 
want to read that poetry as a chronicle of what happens to 
the plural psyche in the crucible of a racializing, 
individualizing society. The plural "blues" self, I argue, 
wrenches the disciplinary force of the iron shackle into an 
opened structure, creating a critical, interstitial space 
for the psychic freedom of continuing change, irreducible 
contradiction, and a plurality of "invisible" 
interconnections with social, historical, and racial 
otherness.
Mirror stage
I have suggested that the process by which the "white" 
subject materializes itself as a coherent, normative, and 
autonomous ego-construct might be formulated as a sort of 
ongoing racial mirror stage. This formulation is based on 
Fanon1s germinal speculations about the formation of 
personal racial identity, but the racial mirror stage also 
has a broader, cultural application. The psychocultural 
"white" fiction of ego unity, as Nielsen elaborates it, is 
not produced positively, through the definition and 
reification of "whiteness" per se. but negatively, through 
an ongoing individual and cultural (largely discursive)
definition and reiteration of "blackness^ In Chapter 2 
of Invisible Man. Ellison develops a subtle but provocative 
parable of the personal moment of this construction of 
"whiteness," capturing both the self-securing, self-knowing 
production of the "white" subject and the fragmentation and 
obscuration of "black" identity that results. Thus, the 
"mirror staging" of racial identification provides the 
predominant metaphor of the fateful car ride that leads to 
the expulsion of the invisible man from his dreamy southern 
black college where everyone's sense of history, mission, 
and proper racial roles are so clearly, yet so evasively, 
defined. While the wealthy "white" banker and scientist, 
Mr. Norton, confidently pontificates about his own destiny 
and identity during the first segment of the ride, the 
narrator focuses suggestively on the white line that splits 
the divided highway he will be driving for the rest of his 
life, stealing furtive glances back through the rear-view 
mirror to gauge Norton's satisfaction and approval. 
Although these visual dynamics in the car of "white" power, 
like the college's "white"-endorsed "up-from-slavery" myth, 
seem pleasant and well-intentioned on the surface, the ride 
into the southern countryside soon exposes the unpleasant, 
repressed underside of both the stories "whites" tell about 
"blacks" and the story the college tells about itself.
In the "powerful" (37) machine of "white" privilege that 
takes the narrator for a ride with the rich college patron,
we are immediately alerted to a play of glances through the 
vehicle's rear-view mirror, during which Norton's knowledge 
of his own identity is emphasized but the narrator becomes 
increasingly muddled precisely as a result of Norton's 
assertions of self-knowledge. As the ride begins, Norton 
instructs the narrator to drive him away from campus, for 
"The campus is part of my life and I know my life rather 
well" (38). Norton's concrete sense of self, however, 
elicits immediate confusion from the young student, who has 
no similar sense of self-knowledge and who then asks 
himself two questions that suggest the meaning of 
subsequent events: "How was the campus part of his life, I 
wondered. And how did one learn his life 'rather well'?" 
(38) . Applying Lacan's mirror stage to the situation 
suggests that the rich "white" man has acquired his 
coherent sense of self precisely by. making the "black" 
college a part of his own life. That is, Norton has 
materialized his own "white" subject position and its 
knowability through a process of projective othering: 
Norton's act of looking at the "black" college enacts the 
process that "projects the formation of the ['white'] 
individual into history" and "manufactures for the 
['white'] subject" a "succession of phantasies" of 
"totality" (Lacan, Ecrits 4). Norton not only directs his 
financial beneficence toward the economic dependence and 
social inferiority of southern blacks, we might say, but he
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also needs their dependence and inferiority as the negative 
terms against which his own wealth, independence, and 
autonomy can be staged. The "white" philanthropist 
literally knows himself "rather well" because the "black" 
campus is a part of his life.
In correspondence with the dialectic of Lacan's mirror 
stage, then, Norton's claim to knowledge of his self 
"symbolizes the mental permanence of [his] X/ at the same 
time as it prefigures its alienating destination" (Ecrits 
2, latter emphasis mine) . That is to say that we may 
interpret Norton's use of "blackness" in this scene as a 
racial reiteration of the "fictional direction" of the 
developmental mirror stage that becomes the perpetual 
fictional direction of the function of the "I" (Ecrits 2): 
the "Ideal-I" the baby derives from its reflection has, of 
course, not been formulated in terms of any interior world, 
but in terms of what is distinctly exterior to itself. 
Indeed, Lacan emphasizes several dimensions of the 
fundamental "otherness" of this projection: the baby has
looked away from its own body, at a reflected image; the 
baby recognizes its "self" negatively, by distinguishing 
its own movements from the surrounding not-self in the 
reflection; the image in the mirror is, moreover, a 
manifold distortion--one-dimensional, oversized, and 
inverted. Thus, the primordial fantasy of unified identity 
has a distorted, oppositional "otherness" implicit in its
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constitution, leading Lacan to observe that the mirror 
stage prefigures the alienation and anxiety of even the 
mature subject's relationships to the images and fantasies 
through which it knows itself. It is this crucial aspect 
of the mirror stage--what it suggests about how otherness 
defines the self--that lends itself to the hypothesis, 
suggested by Fanon, that in a racialized milieu one 
component of identity might be a racial self, constituted 
against a racial other. Norton, indeed, provides a pointed 
fictional illustration of how the mature, socialized 
subject in U.S. society might project its "self" by way of 
an image of racial otherness.
Norton's assertion of "white" self-certainty, Ellison 
suggests, produces complete bewilderment for the "black" 
subject: "How did one learn his life ‘rather well?'"
Clearly, being positioned as the "dependent" "other" by 
someone else's self-constituting gaze scrambles the 
invisible man's attempts to stage and to know his own self. 
While Norton's fiction of ("white") ego unity is so 
achieved that he hardly need do more than gesture at the 
campus to reiterate it, the car episode suggests that the 
narrator's sense of a meaningful self is reduced to so 
archaic a state by Norton's presence as to require the 
constant recapitulation of a literal mirror stage--glancing 
at the actual bodily image of "whiteness" in the rear-view 
mirror--for reinforcement. Hence his repeated peeks at the
"white" man's reflection: "Through the rear-view mirror I
could see him..." (37), "Through the glass I saw him..."
(41), "When I took a quick glance into the mirror..." (44). 
Due to the politics of the psychological mirror staging 
going on in the car, Phillip Brian Harper notes, the 
protagonist can view only the reflected "whiteness" as the 
basis of his self-staging, and hence is "thwarted from 
glimpsing his own image--from experiencing a successful 
mirror phase--and thus from achieving a workable self­
conception" (118). Perhaps the most pointed indication of 
how the "white" mirror stage at work at the college 
obscures "black" identity (and of its economic dimensions, 
as well) are the historical photographs, displayed in the 
college library, that flash through the protagonist's mind 
as Norton begins to speak of the role the black college has 
played in producing the "white" man's "pleasant fate" (39). 
These photographs of the school’s early days depict 
impoverished "black" "people who seemed almost without 
individuality, a black mob" with "blank faces," in stark 
contrast to their "white" benefactors "in smiles, clear of 
features, striking, elegant and confident" (39). Indeed, 
these pictures almost suggest a spectral rendering of the 
contrast between the power of the subject and its 
constitutive imagos, "whose veiled faces," Lacan comments, 
"it is our privilege to see in outline in our daily
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experience and in the penumbra of symbolic efficacity"
( E c r i f s . 3) .
Although the protagonist at first tries to identify 
"with the rich man" in the back seat (39), he is 
immediately stymied by the latter's possession of a 
"pleasant fate," an idea almost unfathomable to a young 
southerner whose grandfather was a slave. But Norton 
proceeds to make the protagonist's attempts at self­
definition even more difficult by directing the "gaze" of 
his ego-reinforcing mechanism at the youth even more 
personally. As Norton repeatedly presses the point that 
"your people" and, more specifically, the protagonist 
himself, are "closely connected to my destiny" (41), the 
protagonist registers only embarrassment at not being able 
to understand the point Norton is making:
"I had a feeling that your people were somehow 
connected with my destiny. That what happened to you 
was connected with what would happen to me."
I slowed the car, trying to understand. Through 
.the glass I saw him gazing at the long ash of his 
cigar...
"Yes, you are my fate, young man. Only you can 
tell me what it really is." (41)
In the race-creating mirror stage through which Norton 
establishes a clear sense of himself as "white," "blacks" 
are intimately connected with his identity, but only in the 
form of a collectivity ("your people") whose supposed 
characteristics serve above all as signifiers of the "non­
white ." To formulate the point in the terms of what I have
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called racial discipline, Norton's identity as a wealthy, 
independent, authoritative "organizer of human life" is 
sustained by and dependent upon his continuing activity as 
an organizer of "black" life (42) . Namely, he assigns 
himself the authority to circumscribe "blacks'" potential 
economic and social roles according to the list of possible 
careers he suggests to the narrator--"a good farmer, a 
chef, a preacher, doctor, singer, mechanic"--and to give 
them the "necessary" helping hand of "white" philanthropy 
(43). Indeed, Norton adds another common "white" 
assumption to his list of probable potentialities for 
"blacks"--the probability of failure--when he concludes, 
"whatever you become, and even if you fail, you are my 
fate" (43). Thus, whether the protagonist becomes a good 
farmer or whether he fails, he will be fulfilling Norton's 
story not about "black" progress, but about Norton himself.
Again, we might apply Lacan's formulations of the 
otherness of the mirror stage to Norton's "you are my fate" 
claim, in which it is the invisible man who is reduced to 
"the automaton in which, in an ambiguous relation, the 
world of [Norton's] own making tends to find completion" 
(Ecrits 3). While Norton's pronouncements leave him deeply 
self-assured, then, "smiling through the mirror" at what he 
has identified as, in effect, "you people" in the 
reflection (43), being on the receiving end of such 
organizational maneuvers continues to cause the narrator
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immense psychic confusion: "My feelings were mixed. Was he 
kidding me? Was he talking to me like someone in a book 
just to see how I would take it?" (43). He stumbles "with 
embarrassment" (44) at Norton's insistence that he can tell 
the older man his fate, then is completely unable to 
verbalize his own hopes, dreams, or identity: "I don't know 
now, sir. This is only my junior year. . . " (44) . The
"white" mirror stage, so effective at producing coherence 
and security for "whites," is profoundly disorienting, 
humiliating, and self-disrupting for the "blacks" it not 
only objectifies but creates as "black." What the narrator 
does vaguely recognize is that in this mirror stage moment, 
as in the broad historical situation starkly outlined in 
the school photographs, his personal identity is 
irrelevant: "But you don't even know my name, I thought,
wondering what it was all about" (45). Norton's identity 
does depend, as he insists, on the narrator, but only 
insomuch as the latter's darker skin signals his membership 
in a "black mob" characterized by a set of generalizable 
economic and social signifiers of "nonwhiteness," in 
opposition to which Norton can stage his own self-image. 
The narrator's notice that the "white" subject needs no 
particular, nameable subjectivities for this process is a 
crucial first reckoning of the alienation that will leave 
him nameless, objectified and scrambling to reconstruct an 
identity throughout the remainder of the novel.
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Ellison's rendering of the full implications of the 
racial mirror stage begins to come clear when Norton 
introduces his own daughter as the real explanation for his 
philanthropy, a gesture that is still more alienating for 
the narrator. As Norton begins to speak of her, the 
narrator realizes that Norton is talking while "no longer 
seeming to see me, but speaking to himself alone" (42). The 
description captures not only the occlusion of "black" 
subjectivity that Norton's "white" self-constitution 
entails, couched in the novel's predominant metaphor of 
invisibility, but also Nielsen's cogent summary of the 
autodiscursive dimension of what he refers to as the U.S.
"racial-mirror stage": "The white subject has spoken to
itself, and in so speaking has created its own racial 
consciousness" (5). More significantly, Norton's 
introduction of his daughter's sanctified image at this 
point provides Ellison's first hint of the crucial 
psychosexual dimensions of the racial mirror stage. While 
Harper is quite right to read the imbalance of self­
certainty in the car as a largely economic and social 
incongruity, through which the privileged Norton's "very 
success at self-definition sets [him] up as an impediment 
to the self-constitutive effohts of those less fortunate" 
(119), Norton's excited emphasis on and desire for his own 
daughter in the same context, reveals the equally important 
sexual and biological dimensions of racial
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subjectification. By stressing Norton's sudden increase in
"intensity" at the moment he begins speaking of the
college's connection to his identity in terms of the
daughter he is memorializing, Ellison suggests that
Norton's focus on the college as an economic device is also
a screen for the secret management of more carnal anxieties
(42). Norton's use of the "black" campus for his own ego
functions begins to resolve itself here into a massive
displacement of a bizarre, hyper-romanticized desire for
his own daughter onto his efforts to improve the economic
and cultural status of "blacks."
The protagonist, on the other hand, attempts to read his
self-disruption and struggle to concretize an acceptable
self in terms of the overt issue of economic identity: "You
have yours, and you got it yourself, and we have to lift
ourselves up the same way" (44). Fanon's speculations on
the "mirror stage" dynamic of the racial situation suggest
how these very different languages of identity are
determined by the "white" and "black" mirror stages:
When one has grasped the mechanism described by Lacan, 
one can have no further doubt that the real Other for 
the white man is and will continue to be the black man. 
And conversely. Only for the white man The Other is 
perceived on the level of the body image, absolutely as 
the not-self--that is, the unidentifiable, the 
unassimilable. For the black man, as we have shown, 
historical and economic realities come into the picture.
(Fanon 161, n.25)
The full extent of Norton's dependence on a corporeal 
"black" imago as his Other, suggested by his presentation
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of the photograph of his "too pure" daughter as the real 
motivation for making "blacks" the key to his "fate," is 
about to explode in the second segment of chapter 2, the 
Trueblood episode. Meanwhile, we have already seen the 
"picture" of historical and economic struggle through which 
the invisible man is forced to conceptualize the obscuring 
of "black" identity and the struggle to constitute it.
Suddenly, as if to shock the invisible man as well as 
his readers, Ellison plunges his narrative from the coded 
surface of polite U.S. racial discourse to the underside of 
ugly and unspeakable realities it represses. As the car of 
"white" privilege takes a hill and is "swept by a wave of 
scorching air" (45), Ellison reveals with one deft maneuver 
the lewd tale of incest beneath the two interlocutors' 
courteous chat about destiny, the "wasteland" of broken 
fountains and raw sewage beneath their image of a sylvan 
campus (36-37), the culture of poverty and folk ways 
repressed by the college's sanitized myth of progress (47), 
the "cripples" and the "asylums" covered over by "white" 
philanthropy (35) , and, above all, the sexual and corporeal 
mirror stage beneath the overt discourse about economic and 
intellectual identities. Although Norton says and thinks 
the "black" Other functions in the fulfillment of his 
destiny (as the great philanthropist) and his construction 
of a memorial (to his daughter), what we discover in the 
countryside is the magnitude of Norton's hidden use of the
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"black" Other in a fundamentally sexual dimension— to quell 
sexual self-revulsion.
As their vehicle passes into this revealed landscape, 
the protagonist and Norton encounter the "disgraced" 
sharecropper Jim Trueblood, who, we learn, has impregnated 
his own daughter. While Trueblood's elaborate narration of 
his incest and its consequences are crucial to the novel's 
vision of "black" self-expression, as Houston Baker, most 
notably, has explained, I want here to focus on Norton's 
reactions to the Trueblood saga, particularly as they 
typify what Fanon called the "biological" cycle of the 
"white" racial mirror stage (165) .2 in Norton's
fascination with Trueblood's "incestuous" relationship with 
his daughter, Matty Lou, we can read a projection of his 
own repressed desires, a projection facilitated by the same 
system of stereotypes about “black" physicality, 
hypersexuality and immorality elaborated in Stein's 
Melanctha.
The protagonist is doubly reluctant to expose Norton to 
Trueblood. The college had always been embarrassed by the 
elements of poverty and the cottonpatch in its backyard, a 
"peasant" life of "earthy harmonies" which do not square 
with its myth of civilizing progress for southern "blacks": 
"We were trying to lift them up and they, like Trueblood, 
did everything it seemed to pull us down" (47). Trueblood's 
sexual indiscretion, according to the protagonist, has
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turned this blunted "contempt'' for his earthiness into open 
"hate" for his apparent depravity (47). But the 
protagonist is unable to deflect the interest piqued in the 
"white" man by the sight of the two pregnant women, mother 
and daughter, at Trueblood's cabin. As the protagonist 
explains that the daughter has no husband, Norton lets slip 
the first indication of his real assumptions about the 
"black" Other, assumptions quite different from the 
pleasant fiction that his gifts to the college can help 
them to become farmers and mechanics: "But that shouldn't
be so strange. I understand that your people--Never mind! 
Is that all?" (49) . Norton is a member of the "white" 
discursive community well-versed in the same stereotypes of 
"black" promiscuity and immorality that pervade Stein's 
text.
But that is, of course, not all. Once the invisible man 
has disclosed the incest behind the pregnancy, Norton is a 
man transformed, expressing shock, horror, pain, but above 
all wanting more--hastily and energetically moving to get 
closer to Trueblood and his story: " 'Get out!' he cried.
'I must talk with him. . . Hurry! ' " (50) . As Norton
listens with a mixture of "envy and indignation" (51), 
Trueblood unravels his long narrative of dire economic 
straits; of fatherly anxiety about potential suitors; of 
his dream of entering the house of "white" wealth and the 
bedroom of "white" sexuality; and of awakening in his
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daughter's arms, with no way to "keep from sinnin'" except 
with a knife (59). Norton's fascination with Trueblood's 
situation seems a direct gloss on his bizarrely 
romanticized relationship with his own daughter, related to 
the invisible man only minutes before the Trueblood 
encounter:
Her beauty was a well-spring of purest water-of-life, 
and to look upon her was to drink and drink and drink 
again....She was too pure for life...too pure and too 
good and too beautiful. We were sailing together, 
touring the world, just she and I, when she became ill 
....Everything I've done since her passing has been a 
monument to her memory. (43)
Reading Norton's reaction to Trueblood as directly
connected to the previous scene, in fact, clarifies
Ellison's continuing representation of the "white" mirror
stage. The analogy here between the similar projects of
self-unification executed in "white" discourse like Stein's
and in Ellison's portrayal of "white" behavior like
Norton's is an apt one. In Melanctha. as I suggested in
chapter 2, Stein transferred internal anxieties and guilts
about class identity and socially proscribed sexual
tendencies onto a hypersexualized "black" stereotype. In
these pages of Invisible Man. the "white" subject is shown
barely able to suppress the sexual tendencies that would
unleash chaos in its sense of self, first displacing them
with a fiction about memorializing the object of desire by
improving the lot of an economically inferior "black"
Other, then feverishly embracing what it takes to be the
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very incarnation of a sexually and morally inferior "black"
Other— one through which Norton can vicariously live out
the exact fantasy he has suppressed.
Hence Norton1s query to Trueblood: "You have looked upon
chaos and are not destroyed!...You feel no inner turmoil,
no need to cast out the offending eye?" (51) . For the
"white" subject, the creation of an orderly fiction of ego
unity, and the creation of a "black" subject through which
it is effected, is precisely about the suppression of inner
chaos and turmoil--a particularly compelling source of
which are forbidden sexual tendencies. As Fanon explained,
this sexualized inner turmoil is suppressed through an
imaginative projection onto "blackness"--or rather, through
a projection that creates "blackness" as the very condition
of inner turmoil (Melanctha) and hypersexuality (Rose).
This projection lies at the foundation of the "biological"
cycle of Fanon's racial mirror stage:
Granted that unconscious tendencies toward incest exist, 
why should these tendencies emerge more particularly 
with respect to the Negro?...The civilized white man 
retains an irrational longing for unusual eras of sexual 
license, of orgiastic scenes, of unpunished rapes, of 
unrepressed incest.... Projecting his own desires onto 
the Negro, the white man behaves ‘as if' the Negro 
really had them. . . . [T]he Negro is fixated at the 
genital; or at any rate he has been fixated there.
(Fanon 165)
Projecting his own incestuous desires onto Trueblood, 
Norton is transfixed by the opportunity to behave as if the 
"black" man really had them. The fact that Trueblood does
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not act on such desires (while he acknowledges Matty Lou's 
womanliness and beauty, his story makes it clear that the 
intercourse was an accident of unconscious dream activity 
facilitated by the conditions of extreme poverty) is of 
little significance to the "white" man's use of the 
situation as a verification of "blackness" and a 
reinforcement of his own civilized, “white" subject.
Ellison connects the two scenes in this chapter, then, 
as two "moments" of Norton's mirror stage--his economic 
positioning next to the college and his sexual/moral 
positioning next to Trueblood--by juxtaposing Norton's 
veiled but discernible desire for his daughter, in the 
first, with Trueblood's openly discussed but actually 
spurious desire for Matty Lou, in the second. Moreover, 
while Norton is focusing on this living signifier of 
"nonwhiteness"--incest personified--all other forms and 
indicators of black subjectivity become invisible to him. 
As in the moment in the car when Norton introduced his own 
daughter's photograph, the main character again "vanishes" 
while the "white" man listens to Trueblood: "he was
listening to Trueblood so intensely he didn't see me" (57). 
When the "white" subject "stages" itself it sees only a 
"black" image--in this case the luridly sexual "black" 
stereotype--which is really a mirror-distortion of a part 
of its own identity. This is the phenomenon, repeated in 
various forms throughout the novel, that informs the
207
central "invisibility" discovery of the invisible man's 
entire experience. As he tells us in his "Prologue," "it 
is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, 
distorting glass. When they approach me they see only my 
surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination- 
-indeed, everything and anything except me" (3).
As Norton finally prepares to leave, and the invisible 
man again notes that "[h]e looked at me with unseeing eyes" 
(68), Ellison plays out the connection between the 
cultural-economic and the sexual-biological phases of 
"white" self-constitution by foregrounding the inevitable 
bioeconomic transaction that structures the racial 
hierarchy. Pulling out his wallet--and with it the 
telltale "platinum-framed miniature" of his daughter (68)—  
Norton compensates Trueblood for so effectively embodying 
the essential corporeality of "blackness"--for effectively 
"symbolizing the biological" (Fanon 167) so that Norton can 
deny it in himself--with a hundred-dollar bill. It is a 
token that refers directly to Norton's more coded use of 
the "black" image, his economic support of the college and 
its young upwardly mobile "blacks," as the protagonist 
signals with considerable chagrin: "You no-good bastard!
You get a hundred-dollar bill!" (69). The money, in other 
words, might have gone to the protagonist instead, had he 
not been, as it were, "out-blacked" by the sharecropper. 
(As the car ride began, the protagonist had hoped for "a
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large tip, or a suit, or a scholarship next year" (3 8) as a 
token of Norton's appreciation.) But whether Norton gets 
his assurances of "nonwhiteness" from the image of the 
well-behaved mechanic-to-be or the image of uninhibited 
sexuality, the effect for him, the text suggests, is 
whitening. When Trueblood has finished his story, Norton's 
face has "drained of color" (68), and as he stumbles back 
into his car the protagonist notes that his face is "still 
chalk white" (69).3
The invisible man's ill-fated car ride illustrates the 
mechanism of a racial mirror stage that fictionalizes a 
coherent "white" identity by positing a "black personality" 
that is equally unitary and what I will call 
"disciplinary." In reality, I am suggesting, this "black 
soul," is an extension or part-object of the "white" 
identity. The "white" subject that "seals" itself, to 
borrow Fanon's term, in intellectuality and moral purity, 
does so by manipulating the symbolic order to "seal" its 
imagined Other within a "black" subject of corporeality and 
immorality. The educated-craftsman-Booker T. Washington 
"black" and the hypersexual "black" that populate Norton's 
mind in this episode of Invisible Man are only two of the 
disciplinary identity configurations which constitute the 
"black soul"; the novel describes several others and the 
main character is knocked on the head by most of them more 
than once.
The image of the sexual "black, " here forced on
Trueblood, is one that the invisible man has been forced to 
take on himself before and will be forced to confront again 
later. The opening "Battle Royal" episode chronicles the 
first in a series of attempts by "whites" to set up the 
"black" image as a pornography of the "white" self, by
forcing "blacks" to act out what is considered to be
illicit sexual behavior.̂  As we have seen in the case of
Norton, reiterating this image sanitizes "white" identity 
of chaotic impulses, while still allowing it to 
voyeuristically consume the pleasure of the forbidden. The 
opening sequence, for example, is a structural inversion of 
the car ride episode, during which we see "whites" imposing 
first the stereotype of hypersexuality then the educated- 
but-knows-his-place image, both to their immense 
gratification. In this scene, ten young African Americans 
are forced to watch a titillating nude dance by a "white" 
woman, while a collection of "white" social leaders view 
their mixture of pleasure, discomfort, and erections. 
After a blindfolded "battle royal" and a mad scramble for 
"tips" from the "whites," a bloodied invisible man crawls 
back into the other, equally "white"-imposed image of 
himself, delivering a speech spiced with the Washingtonian 
rhetoric of social responsibility and "casting down buckets 
where you are." Much later in his career, he encounters 
the "black sexual brute" stereotype when he meets a woman
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at a Brotherhood meeting who envisions him as her personal 
living pornography: Sybil wants to play-act her own rape at 
the hands of a man she can only see as a "big black 
bruiser" (511). Indeed, the Norton and Sybil scenes are 
subtly linked by a joke that both refuses the imposition of 
the "black"-as-rapist image and pointedly identifies the 
real source of such pornographies. Refusing to comply with 
the pleas of the drunken Sybil, the invisible man instead 
scrawls the following message on her stomach in purple 
lipstick: "SYBIL, YOU WERE RAPED / BY / SANTA CLAUS /
SURPRISE" (511); a much younger invisible man had twice 
identified Norton with "St. Nicholas" (37, 105).
All three episodes, then, evoke what Fanon described as 
the intensive biologization, sexualization, and, most 
specifically, aenitalization of the "black" imaao. For 
Fanon, this mechanism, which he formulates as one aspect of 
the racial mirror stage, functions like a blunt instrument 
in the symbolic and psychological oppression of "blacks": 
"Whoever says rape says Negro" (166) . Even more specific 
is Fanon's observation that, in the presence of this imaao. 
"one is no longer aware of the Negro but only of a penis; 
the Negro is eclipsed. He is turned into a penis. He is a 
penis" (170) .5 if for Sybil, as for millions of 
acculturated U.S. "white" women, the word "rape" bears an 
at least connotative relationship to the concept "black 
man," it is equally true that for Norton, as for the men at
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the battle royal, to see a "black mem" is to "see" a penis. 
If this is the most compelling of all "black" stereotypes, 
finally, it is so perhaps, as Fanon's analysis suggests, 
because it is so profoundly linked to the bodily-schema 
psychology of the mirror stage.®
Discipline
When the narrator returns from his carnival ride with 
Norton on the south's racial back roads--a ride that 
includes stops at both Trueblood's "slave quarters" and at 
the combined asylum and tavern known as The Golden Day--he 
faces an iron-fisted retrenchment of the college's more 
"polite" racial myths and identity frameworks, suggesting 
how the college has itself become implicated in an urgent 
project of identity management. While the racial mirror 
stage is anything but reciprocal, it does produce coercive 
definitions and parameters of "blackness" that are as 
reductively unitary and individualistic as the 
configurations of "whiteness" they are meant to support, 
and it is these parameters that the college's president, 
Dr. Bledsoe, invokes as he "disciplines" the narrator upon 
his return. One of the most prominent dehumanizing 
features of the racialized society Ellison represents, 
then, is what a Foucauldian theoretical paradigm might 
refer to as a prevailing culture of disciplinary 
individualism, here centered around what Fanon calls a
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"dual narcissism" of race (9-10). Much of the subsequent 
social critique of Invisible Man is devoted to exposing the 
operations of the various disciplines that seek to fix 
complex subjectivities within clearly defined, socially 
categorized, interpersonally isolated, politically 
manageable identities--to create, combining both meanings 
of the word, sub-iects.
Ellison focuses, it seems to me, on how the racial 
discipline surrounding the "white" mirror stage is at once 
a product of, complicit with, and productive of other 
disciplinary technologies which overlap to form a fabric of 
disciplinary individualism broadly conceived.^ His 
narrative illustrates, for example, how both "whites" and 
"blacks" are seduced by the idea of racial individuality 
(Norton/Bledsoe), how that racial discipline intersects 
with the discipline of capital, workplace and asylum (the 
paint factory and its hospital) , how even opposition to 
capitalism and racism reproduce an ideological (and racial) 
discipline (the Brotherhood), and how even reversal of 
racism reproduces racial (and ideological) discipline 
(Ras) . Ellison places the racial discipline within a 
larger cultural regime in which individualizing disciplines 
reinforce individualizing disciplines. While he suggests 
that "race" originates in the self-constitution of the 
"white" ego (Norton providing a case study) , he also 
suggests that "race" is a particular strategy in a more
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comprehensive pattern of dehumanization. In the following 
section, I want to examine Ellison's representation of how 
"race" is embedded within our culture's pervasive 
"government of individualization" (Foucault, "Power" 211- 
12), of which "race" might be viewed as a particularly 
efficient and effective tool.® Thus, as George E. Kent 
observes, the story of the invisible man's victimization by 
a "cultural machinery that would reduce him to negative 
sign" is inseparable from his story "as an allegory of 
black struggle in American history" (97).
The mythology of the accommodationist college itself 
becomes the first derivative of the race-driven extension 
of individualization targeted by Ellison. Bledsoe's 
reaction to the narrator's "wrong turn" suggests how the 
culture of "white" supremacy evidenced in Norton's mirror 
stage forces a southern "black" college to reproduce the 
system of racial individualization, no matter how 
vigorously the latter resists the "white" representations 
of itself. Hence, though Bledsoe advocates the subversive 
tactic of "lying" to "whites" for economic and social 
advantage ("My God, boy! You're black and living in the 
South--did you forget how to lie?" (136)), the college, in 
its zeal to forward the "black" cause, is almost 
unwittingly complicit in a system of disciplinary power and 
racial individualization. Bledsoe refuses some of the 
culturally imposed identity configurations of "blackness,"
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in other words— like the image of the hypersexual "black"-- 
but he believes in and fosters the "black" subject. Though 
the college fights to keep Norton's unspoken image of the 
hypersexualized "black" suppressed, it assumes as its only 
realistic path to economic survival his expressly endorsed 
image of the educated-craftsman-Booker T. Washington 
"black." This, of course, is precisely the identity 
structure with which the narrator left home, rehearsed in 
his speech on "social responsibility" to the "white" men at 
the smoker.
Just as he was aggressively threatened on that occasion 
for substituting the phrase "social equality" for "social 
responsibility," the invisible man finds that the college 
reinforces with equal discipline its own version of this 
self-image, what I will call the southern-nigger- 
struggling-upward, after the invisible man has endangered 
its coherence and uniformity by exposing Norton to the 
chaotic underside of "black" existence in the south--an 
underside which includes, significantly, the "crazy" vet's 
open questioning of the racial hierarchy (92-94). The 
invisible man himself has already remarked on the 
embarrassment caused to the college and its students by 
elements of African American history and identity that 
contradict the preferred "story" of the educated, 
civilized, and economically viable African American, noting 
the college's "contempt" for the "primitive" culture of
"peasants" like Trueblood, with their "earthy harmonies" 
and "animal sounds," not to mention its contempt for his 
"disgraceful" sexual history (46-47). The invisible man 
worries that his ride with Norton has opened the coherence 
of his very self to the chaos of primitive, sexual, and 
discontented elements at the "quarters" and The Golden Day: 
"Here within this quiet greenness I possessed the only 
identity I had ever known, and I was losing it" (97). To 
reintegrate himself with the college, he considers 
expressing to Norton his total disavowal of these 
unprogressive elements, "to assure him that far from being 
like any of the people we had seen, I hated them, that I 
believed in the principles of the Founder with all my heart 
and soul" (97) . To Norton, of course, no great violence 
has been done to the racial scheme of things, and he is 
quite willing to forgive and excuse the young college 
student. For Bledsoe, however, everything has changed; the 
image of "blackness" he is trying to build has suffered 
"incalculable damage. Instead of uplifting the race, [the 
protagonist has] dragged the entire race into the slime" 
(138) . It is Bledsoe, then, who enforces the iron 
discipline of the college's carefully delimited definition 
of "black" identity, moving swiftly and finally to extrude 
the disorder that the invisible man now represents. As 
Bledsoe promises Norton, "[H]e shall be disciplined, 
severely disciplined" (101).
It is important to note that, while the word
"discipline" has a common enough usage in reference to
punishment, Ellison presents an extensive depiction of the
campus as a militarized camp or manufactory where behavior
is rigidly controlled and identity is rigidly patterned.
Ellison's description of the invisible man's expulsion from
the college is meant as a critique, I would argue, not of
the idea of the southern "black" college per se nor of its
Washingtonian mission of economic development within
segregational constraints, but precisely of the discipline
of the idealized self-constructs fostered by that mission's
particular myths of progress and civilizing acculturation.
Thus, he depicts a college riddled with minor rituals of
discipline and codes of acceptable behavior meant to
carefully orchestrate the struggling-upward model of
"black" identity. Looking back on his experience, a more
"open-eyed" (35) invisible man can see not only the
cesspools of sewage on the idyllic landscape of the campus
(36), but also the almost military disciplining of behavior
that was actually taking place there:
we drilled four-abreast down the smooth asphalt and 
pivoted and entered the chapel on Sundays, our uniforms 
pressed, shoes shined, minds laced up, eyes blind like 
those of robots.... Oh, bugle that called in the morning, 
Oh, drum that marched us militarily at noon. (3 6)
The college's manufacture of blinded mechanical
"individuals" with "laced up" minds is linked, moreover,
not only to the Founder's and Bledsoe's delimitation of a
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certain type of "black identity" but also to a larger 
structure of "white" power which works through them. As 
the students walk to Founder's Day chapel, to hear the 
school's mythic history rehearsed before the "white" 
trustees, they move "with rigid motions, limbs stiff and 
voices now silent, as though on exhibit even in the dark, 
and the moon a white man's bloodshot eye" (108). At the 
chapel, the invisible man walks past the "rows of 
puritanical benches straight and torturous, finding that to 
which [he is] assigned and bending [his] body to its agony" 
(108). The military marching, the puritanical seating 
implements, the rigid control of movement, the "firm and 
formal design" thrust upon them by the sermons they hear, 
and even the sense of omnipresent "white" surveillance all 
are part of a method for churning out carefully patterned 
and defined identities (109).
The identity "demanded" by this design is, of course, 
that of the southern-nigger-struggling-upward, dramatized 
by the "black rite of Horatio Alger" that is performed upon 
the chapel's stage (109). Ellison's description, 
crucially, connects this identity model not only to the 
mythology of "black" economic progress overtly endorsed by 
the "white" trustees, but all the way back to the 
segregatory racial definitions of the "whites" in the main 
character's hometown,
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those who had set me here in this Eden. . .who trailed 
their words to us through blood and violence and 
ridicule and condescension with drawling smiles, and who 
exhorted and threatened, intimidated with innocent words 
as they descibed to us the limitations of our 
lives...and this we must accept...even when those were 
absent, and the men who made the railroads and ships and 
towers of stone, were before our eyes, in the flesh, 
their voices different, unweighted with recognizable 
danger. (109-10)
In the structure of power outlined on these pages, the
school's production of "black" robots is a disciplining of
identity that has a degree of "black" control and
authorization but that is nevertheless governed by the
project of racial discipline begun with the strip tease and
continued by Norton's self-satisfying glances at the campus
and at Trueblood. In each case, "black" identity is
structured by the "white" gaze.
It is within the context of such a campus that Bledsoe
acts to restore order by expelling the invisible man for
allowing the college's carefully composed image of
"blackness" to become disordered. Bledsoe himself
reiterates the dynamics of such a composition when he
personally enacts the "black" mirror stage that is
structured by "white" expectations. Before they enter
Norton's room to assess the damage of the car ride, the
protagonist notices that "as we approached a mirror Dr.
Bledsoe stopped and composed his angry face like a
sculptor, making it a bland mask" (100) . Bledsoe's
miniature mirror stage constructs not so much his idea of
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himself as his idea of the "white" idea of himself; it is 
fraught, as Phillip Brian Harper suggests, with "the 
intervention of the white man. . .in the process of the 
fashioning of the black self" (120) . As with the 
protagonist's frequent glances into the mirror of 
"whiteness" in the earlier car scene, Bledsoe's act 
connotes the repeated need of the alienated "black" subject 
to literally recapitulate a mirror stage that will make 
sense of itself in terms of the "bland mask" the "white" 
observer expects to see.
As we learn from the narrator's descriptions of Bledsoe 
in the following pages, moreover, the identity Bledsoe here 
composes for "white" consumption is a version of the 
Washingtonian accommodationist, organized by a rhetoric of 
progress and of resourcefulness within assigned roles. In 
musing on Bledsoe's "Live-a-Humble" philosophy, the 
narrator recalls, "Hadn't he refused to eat in the dining 
hall with white guests of the school... .Hadn't he always 
taught us to live content in our places?" (103-104) . 
Indeed, Bledsoe espouses covert advantage-taking within a 
framework of acting "black" and stresses the value of 
showing the rich "whites" "what we want them to see" (100) 
and of lying to them as needed to preserve the proper 
"black" image and the influx of economic support (137). The 
"white" intervention in this "black" image, however--and 
the magnitude of Bledsoe's complicity with "white"
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management of the southern "black" population--are revealed 
in his unqualified use of what Nielsen has described as the 
very "organizing principle" (6) of the entire "white" 
racial discursive structure: the term "nigger." He uses 
it, tellingly, both in summarizing his own enactment of the 
college's prevailing identity construct, the southern- 
nigger-struggling-upward ("I had to act the nigger!" 
(141)), and in chastising the invisible man for endangering 
the integrity of that construct:
"Nigger, this isn't the time to lie. I'm no white 
man. Tell me the truth!"
It was as though he'd struck me. I stared across the 
desk thinking, He called me that. (137)
The failing for which Bledsoe is about to expel the
protagonist from the school, it becomes clear in these
pages, is one of not acting "black"--more specifically, of
not acting the southern-nigger-struggling-upward.
It is in this specific moment of discipline, finally,
that the college's disciplinary project most clearly
resolves itself into that of sealing its students within
their "blackness," to borrow Fanon's description of the
"narcissistic" nature of the racializing hierarchy. Not
only is Bledsoe furious with the protagonist for failing to
"act the nigger" appropriately, he is appalled by a
specific occurrence on the Norton field trip that unsettled
the uniform mask of "blackness" he wants Norton to see. As
if the idea threatened to shatter the very identity he had
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earlier composed in the mirror, Bledsoe's "face twitched 
and cracked like the surface of dark water" at the news 
that the "crazy" vet at The Golden Day opened to question 
the proposition that "white is right" (137). More 
seriously, the vet did not act "black" ; he brought both 
racial discontent and a confusion of the racial roles 
endorsed by Norton (and Bledsoe) into the "white" man's 
view, creating a dangerous roiling of the smooth surface of 
"blackness." "He talked like a white man," the protagonist 
reports; "A Negro like that should be under lock and key," 
Bledsoe replies, emphasizing his concern, determined by the 
power of the "white" gaze, with keeping "whiteness" and 
"blackness" clarified and separate as mirror-stage ego- 
ideal s .
It is, then, as an agent of discord in the coherence of 
the accommodationist "black" self that the invisible man is 
sentenced to immediate expulsion: his failure to properly 
act "black," disgusting to Bledsoe in itself, has also 
allowed the elements of "black" sexuality, "black" poverty 
and cultural backwardness, the economics of slavery 
(Bledsoe refers to the entire sharecropper section as "the 
slave quarters"), and "black" social discontent to 
contaminate the college's preferred self-image of the 
educated-but-in-his-place-farmer-craftsman. As he passes 
sentence, Bledsoe wields, with great symbolic significance, 
a token that at once figures both the accommodationist myth
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of racial "progress" and the sealed, unitary, well-ordered 
"black personality" it privileges:
Suddenly he reached for something beneath a pile of 
papers, an old leg shackle from slavery which he proudly 
called a "symbol of our progress."
"You've got to be disciplined, boy," he said. 
"There's no if's and and's about it." (138)
In having Bledsoe reach for the iron-circle of the leg
shackle at the moment he "disciplines" the invisible man,
Ellison suggests both the sealed unity and the unchangeable
rigidity of the "black personality" configuration Bledsoe
mandates. The disciplinary "black" self can give no
quarter to the "if's" of possibility nor the "and's" of
multiple otherness which are fundamental to the
experiential reality of the plural psyche. Bledsoe's iron
shackle stands as Ellison's most salient symbol of the
"black" .subject.. With a good deal of irony, Ellison makes
the shackle both Bledsoe's symbol of what, in his limited
vision, progress away from slavery can be and a symbol of
the fiction of "black" ego boundaries Bledsoe's vision of
progress demands. If Bledsoe responds to being defined by
the "white" mirror stage by initiating a reactionary
"black" mirror stage of his own, the iron shackle is an
appropriate physical figuration of the "armour of an
alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid
structure" the subject that emerges from such a mirror
stage (Lacan, Ecrits 4).
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One of Ellison's many nonfiction allusions to the racial
plurality of personal identity and of U.S. culture itself
serves as an effective gloss on this moment in Invisible
Man. In meditating upon the powerful role of what Kenneth
Burke termed "symbolic action" in the construction of human
identity, Ellison refers to the tendency to repress the
plurality and fluidity of the self beneath symbolically
articulated fictions of self-definition:
We repress an underlying anxiety aroused by the 
awareness that we are representative not only of one but 
of several overlapping and constantly shifting social 
categories; and we stress our affiliation with that 
segment of the corporate culture which has emerged out 
of our parents' past--racial, cultural, religious--and 
which we assume, on the basis of such magical talismans 
as our mother's milk or father's beard, that we "know." 
Grounding our sense of identity in such primary and 
affect-charaed symbols, we seek to avoid the mysteries 
and pathologies of the democratic process.
(Going 19-20, emphasis mine)
If we take Bledsoe's "shackle" to be such a "magical 
talisman," we might read it as not only a figuration of ego 
unity (the completed circle), but also a symbol of the 
particularized racial self which Bledsoe has been shown to 
effect throughout the preceding pages. In Bledsoe's hands 
the "shackle" connotes not only the identificatory racial 
"segment" of the broader culture delimited by the common 
experience of slavery, but the even smaller segment of that 
segment which he intends by associating the iron with the 
college's version of "progress." Clearly, he does not mean 
for the latter segment to include either Trueblood or the
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"crazy" vet. Moreover, in this moment we find him waving 
it talismanically at a veritable force of racial and 
cultural self-image disunity, which is what the protagonist 
has become for the college. In Bledsoe's mirror stage, a 
"knowable" sense of "black" identity is established by 
manipulating "symbolic action" to fend off "anxiety" about 
an uncontrollable plurality of influences on self­
experience. Bledsoe's "shackle," like his removal of the 
protagonist from the school, produce a racial version of 
what Anthony Wilden has called, in his concise summary of 
Lacan's mirror stage, a "vision of harmony by a being in 
discord" (174) .
As Ellison continues, however, the "security" offered by 
such "symbols of identity" is "equivocal" for their user, 
for "an overdependence on them as points of orientation 
leads him to become bemused, gazing backward at a swiftly 
receding--if not quasi-mythical--past" (20) . Since
Bledsoe's rigid control of the school seems to be organized 
around the shackle as a "symbol of our progress" and around 
the quasi-mythical history enunciated in the chapel sermon 
of Homer A. Barbee (the blind historian), we might read in 
his attitude a similar pattern of over-dependence on the 
shackle as a point of orientation. But where Ellison 
locates the force of psychological dehumanization here, I 
would argue, is not in the psychic function of "symbolic 
action," or in any misuse of history, or in the school's
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circumscribed sense of racial "progress," but in the 
unrealistic rigidity and wholeness of Bledsoe's vision of 
"blackness." His use of the shackle here gives away his 
role as, above all, a disciplinarian of the self--a 
producer of the "black subject."
Indeed, Bledsoe's deployment of an individualizing 
"blackness" both resembles, and is determined by, that of 
"white" men like Norton, a relationship that is perhaps 
best elucidated by shifting from a psychoanalytic to a 
Foucauldian v o c a b u l a r y .  ̂ Bledsoe himself admits that the 
"power" he exerts is coextensive with a systemic power that 
resembles Foucault's model of a diffused "network" or 
"pyramidal organization" of "disciplinary power" that 
"distributes individuals in a permanent and continuous 
field" (Discipline 177).10 Bledsoe explicitly admits that 
his role in the application of what I have referred to as a 
racial discipline is enmeshed in such a larger structure: 
"'This is a power set-up, son, and I'm at the controls. 
You think about that. When you buck against me, you're 
bucking against power, rich white folk's power. the 
nation's power--which means government power'" (140, 
emphasis mine). As the statement makes clear, Bledsoe is 
"at the controls" only in the sense of his institutional 
operation of what Foucault called the "microphvsics of 
power" (Discipline 26). The power does not originate with 
him and, despite Bledsoe's belief to the contrary, he is
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actually controlled bv it. and by both the "rich white 
folks" and the larger national-governmental-economic 
complex which looms above him in the hierarchy.H As such, 
Bledsoe's reproduction of racial discipline reflects the 
reproduction of disciplinary power even by those it 
dominates. As Foucault observes, "this power is exercised 
rather than possessed; it is not the 'privilege,' acquired 
or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect 
of its strategic positions--an effect that is manifested 
and sometimes extended by the position of those who are 
dominated" (Discipline 26-27) .
Bledsoe's "shackle" confronts the invisible man 
simultaneously with the rigidly defined identity construct 
of the southern-nigger-struggling-upward and with his 
apparent difference from it. His failure seems to be a 
sort of innocent honesty, his not knowing, as Bledsoe
bluntly puts it, "how to lie" (13 6) . This incongruity
causes the invisible man to feel, as he did in the car with
Norton, a sudden liquidization of his self structure, as 
Ellison suggests by having him vomit upon exiting Bledsoe's 
office--"almost a total disembowelment" (143). It is also
significant, however, that the invisible man is unable to 
see around the individualizing logic of racial discipline; 
he believes that he has only two choices: conform to
Bledsoe's/Norton's vision of "black" identity or succumb to 
a chaos of uncertainty about racial identity in "the world
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of Trueblood and the Golden Day" (145)--a world where race 
"progress" is meaningless, where "white" may not be right, 
and where a "black" man can talk like a "white" man. Still 
seduced by the ego-security offered by the shackle, he 
"convinces" himself that he has erred by "violat[ing] the 
code" of racial existence set forth by Bledsoe (145), that 
he can only construct a self-image within Bledsoe's 
disciplinary code.
When he returns to the president's office the next day 
to accept the "shackle," as it were, Bledsoe's personal 
icon of the unified "black" self is rhetorically passed on 
to the protagonist in the form of the seven letters of 
introduction the president writes to identify the expelled 
student to possible northern employers: "touching the
shackle gently with his index finger" (147), Bledsoe agrees 
to provide these additions to what Robert Stepto has called 
the collection of "cultural signs, mostly written 
'protections' or 'passes'...that supposedly identify" the 
protagonist (173). Like the diploma and scholarship papers 
he has already received, these letters serve as discursive 
elements of what he believes to be a clearly defined 
identity. Despite his continued efforts to use such 
identificatory " signs"--symbols of identity--to achieve 
conformity with society's "code" of identity, however, the 
invisible man repeatedly finds his "honest" self-experience 
to be incommensurate with the systems of discipline that
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surround him. As in the moments with Norton and Bledsoe, 
his confrontations with discipline and unitary self-images 
continue to render his more complex, more multiply 
determined experience invisible: believing in the former, 
he can only experience the disordered tendencies of his 
"honest" self as "disemboweling"; finally refusing one such 
system (Bledsoeist southern niggerism), he stumbles blindly 
toward others (northern workplace capitalism, 
anticapitalist historical materialism).
In thus tracing out the various components of what 
Ellison elsewhere referred to as "that feverish industry 
dedicated to telling Negroes who and what they are, and 
which can usually be counted on to deprive both humanity 
and culture of their complexity" (Shadow xx) , the novel 
takes on a cyclical, intrareferential quality which renders 
virtually impossible anything approaching a "full" reading. 
Indeed, Ellison's subtle development of intricate networks 
of symbols and terminologies that convey the meaning of his 
main character's experiences create a textual 
inexhaustibility suggestive of the psychic inexhaustibility 
which "that feverish industry" aims to reduce: each symbol 
and each episodic experience opens out into a larger system 
to which it adds, and through which it has, significance. 
It is by tracing the repetitive, crossreferential nature of 
the invisible man's narrative, then, that the deeper, 
"disciplinary" structures of his existence become evident,
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yet any reading must necessarily be limited to a selection 
of representative passages. Joseph R. Urgo, for example, 
points out how the thematic and repetitive nature of 
Invisible Man highlights Ellison's concern with 
"discipline" and its imposition of objectifying self-images 
onto what Urgo defines as the multidimensional "anarchic 
self" (xvi).12 From this perspective, it is a set of 
externally imposed disciplinary categories that insistently 
produce the "invisibility" thematized in the novel:
The actual plot of Invisible Man is repetitive; it 
continually "boomerangs" back to the same point, that IM 
is invisible because he refuses categorization. He 
won't sacrifice his undisciplined, creative, and rather 
messy self to the rigidities of any system, whether it 
be the blindfolded boxer, the black college boy, the 
factory assistant, the Brotherhood spokesman, or the 
virile Negro lover. (Urgo 24)
Though none of these self-conceptions have quite the
symbolic terseness of the iron shackle, which I take as
figurative of "the black college boy," the invisible man
encounters a series of these templates for the "black
personality" during the rest of his adventures: to those
listed by Urgo we might add the text's various minstrel
figures, like the musical "nigger-with-rhythm" persona
attached to the invisible man by a drunk at a Brotherhood
cocktail party, and Clifton's dancing Sambo doll; the
grinning, begging "field darky" figured by the iron bank he
finds in his room; and the essentialized African
"blackness" asserted by Ras the Exhorter. Kimberly W.
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Benston has also usefully discussed these templates as a 
series of delimiting "names," among which we might group 
both Norton's farmer-craftsman and Bledsoe's "nigger." As 
Benston argues, "the hero's tale evolves from his very 
inability to decipher such depotentiating naming; seeking 
notability as a stamp of incorporation by authority, he 
becomes the instrument of a long series of authoritarian 
namers" (Benston 159-61). While I will return shortly to 
the "disintegrative" effects produced by the racial 
individualization of such names or unifying self-images, a 
closer look at the expelled student's northern industrial 
phase will suggest Ellison's connection of the disciplinary 
mode of these patterns to other aspects of economic and 
political life.
Like the social discipline articulated by Foucault, the 
"disciplinary regime" in Invisible Man uses surveillance 
and confinement as its implements of application, 
emphasizes the clear definition.and coercive management of 
identity, and aims primarily at increasing the raw economic 
utility or productivity of the individuals so defined. 
What the invisible man discovers, in moving from an 
educational institution to an industrial worksite, is that 
he has really only moved to a different locus in what he 
will gradually recognize as an expanding regime of 
discipline, albeit a locus where the capitalist motivation 
of the entire system is more evident than at his college.
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By transplanting his hero to the northern, urban center of 
industry, Ellison reveals the linkage of the basic 
mechanisms of disciplinary individualization--including 
racial individualization--to the capitalist project; or 
how, citing Foucault, "the two processes— the accumulation 
of men and the accumulation of capital--cannot be 
separated" (Discipline 221). Thus, as Phillip Brian Harper 
observes, Ellison suggests that the college campus is 
literally continuous with "the site at which industrial 
capitalism operates," where a "rationalized mode of 
production" causes the alienation of the subject we see 
expressed primarily as a question of racial identity at the 
college.13
Upon acquiescing to the definitions of the 
Bledsoe/Norton scheme of things and plunging into a search 
for employment structured by Norton's economic power and 
Bledsoe's letters of identification, the invisible man 
immediately feels alienated by a regime of monitoring and 
control in the northern urban world he now inhabits. 
"Armored cars with alert guards" roll past; the streets 
swarm with automatons who seem "directed by some unseen 
control" (161). Moreover, he senses that "blacks" are 
marked as particular subjects of control. Carrying the 
briefcase that "contains" his own identity, including the 
letters that are a rhetorical extension of Bledsoe's leg 
iron, the invisible man worries that the African American
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couriers he sees carrying their own "leather pouches
"like prisoners carrying their leg irons"--are being
monitored by an unseen police force (161-62). Just as life
at the southern college seemed monitored by an omniscient
"white" man's "eye," evidenced by the "white" trustees who
visit to observe the operations of the college and figured
in the moon which looms over the chapel sequence (108),
this new economic world seems riddled with surveillance:
This was Wall Street. Perhaps it was guarded, as I had 
been told post offices were guarded, by men who looked 
down at you through peepholes in the ceiling and walls, 
watching you constantly, silently waiting for a wrong 
move. Perhaps even now an eye had picked me up and 
watched my every movement. (162)
Reformulating his sense that he is being watched as "a
queer feeling that I was playing a part in some scheme"
being orchestrated by Bledsoe and Norton, the protagonist
begins to monitor his own behavior to ensure he commits no
infractions, becoming "inhibited in both speech and
conduct" (167). Surrounded by such specters of
surveillance and control, he strains to conform to the
self-image of the sophisticated, urbanized "black college
boy" through what he literally conceives of as the
disciplinary management of personality: stopping for
breakfast on the way to one of his bogus job interviews, he
deliberately avoids ordering the southern, agrarian
identified "pork chop and grits," noting that it "was an
act of discipline. a sign of the change that was coming
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over me and which would return me to college a more 
experienced man" (175, emphasis mine). "He who is 
subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, " 
Foucault remarked of the disciplinary value of total 
surveillance, "assumes responsibility for the constraints 
of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon 
himself....he becomes the principle of his own subjection" 
(Discipline 202-203).
The invisible man is, of course, totally unsuccessful in 
his quest for work from Bledsoe's contacts, but does manage 
to secure a place in the manufactories of industry thanks 
to a kind gesture by young Emerson, after the latter strips 
him of the illusion that Bledsoe's letters "identify" him 
as the urbanized "black college boy." Ellison, however, 
places his protagonist--now bent on avenging Bledsoe's 
discipline--at Liberty Paints only to ruthlessly 
demonstrate the extension of individualizing discipline 
from Bledsoe's school to Liberty's workshop and, 
subsequently, to a bizarre asylum/hospital where useful 
personalities are manufactured for the industrial machine.
The invisible man, honestly but uncomprehendingly 
pursuing his own agenda, totally disrupts the smooth 
operation of the Liberty Paints factory, usually by 
attempting to think on his own, rather than being the 
totally docile worker--limited to robotlike efficiency and 
the execution of specific orders--that industry would
prefer. Having been expressly ordered not to think (196), 
he uses his own initiative in deciding which of two 
substances he needs to refill a container. In doing so, he 
destroys the perfect "whiteness" of an entire batch of the 
factory's signature product, "Optic White" paint, causing 
it to become "diffused with gray" (201). He is reassigned 
to the basement of Lucius Brockway, the "machine inside the 
machine" of both "race" (the production of "whiteness") and 
industry (212). Here, however, he continuingly fails to 
conform to the clearly defined versions of "blackness" that 
industry can understand. Neither one of the management- 
loyal "black" "scabs" defined by the office boy at the 
beginning of the episode nor one of the rebellious, 
unionizing, ungrateful "young colored fellers" (224) 
excoriated by the management-loyal Brockway, the invisible 
man only manages to serve as a muddler of clear race/labor 
categories: his failure to follow orders or time schedules 
repeatedly gets him into trouble, culminating in a massive 
explosion in this basement of industry. Confounding the 
disciplines of race, labor, and individuality leads, in 
Ellison's allegory, to a critical heightening of the 
systemic pressure in the valve of "white" power. Unable to 
manipulate the "white" valve indicated by Brockway as a 
pressure release quickly enough, the invisible man causes 
the basement of the factory to explode into a "wet blast of 
black emptiness that was somehow a bath of whiteness"
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(225), violently restoring the dynamic by which "whiteness" 
was constituted in Norton's "mirror stage" and in the 
college historical photographs. The "right" kind of 
"blackness" and labor keeps the business of the plant-- 
largely the production of "whiteness“--operating smoothly; 
the "wrong" kind of "blackness" and labor--the 
protagonist's honest but uncategorized, untrained self-- 
causes the industrial process to run amok.
During his brief employment with Brockway, the invisible 
man seems on the verge of tunneling through the 
disciplinary "names" that are throwing constraints around 
his subjectivity. Enraged by the rapid succession of 
moments in which he is unceremoniously defined, tried, and 
condemned without so much as being allowed to speak for 
himself, he begins to vaguely understand that what keeps 
happening in his life is the assignment to him of 
"identity" with blatant disregard for his own ideas about 
who he "is." At the factory, a group of ideologues at a 
union meeting convict him as a "fink" because of his 
"association" with Brockway; aware that "they had made 
their decision without even allowing me to speak for 
myself" (218), the invisible man senses the same 
disembowelment of his meeting with Bledsoe, "feeling as 
though my bowels had been flooded with acid" (219) . After 
Brockway, with equally abrupt judgment, convicts him as a 
labor "trouble-maker" because of his "association" with the
union, the invisible man finally erupts into a diatribe 
that both questions these definitions and foregrounds his 
own self-experience: "I came down here because I was sent. 
I didn't know anything about you or the union either....Are 
you people crazy? Does this paint go to your 
head?. . .What's going on? What have you got against me? 
What did I do?" (222) . He is on the verge of comprehending 
that none of these ideologues recognize him as a unique 
person, but only as a representative of various ideas in 
their own heads, and hence of comprehending a much larger 
machine of ideological individualization in which they are 
merely gears. It is indeed the "paint" that has gone to 
their heads, insomuch as the paint represents textually the 
disciplines of both race ( "whiteness as ideology") and 
economic production. But as if simply becoming aware of the 
disciplinary machine and questioning its categories is 
enough to threaten its destructuration, the explosion 
occurs and the invisible man's realization that he is 
"understanding something fully" (225) slips away. Sensing 
that he has "lost irrevocably an important victory" (225), 
he is bustled off to the factory's asylum/hospital for 
corrective re-individualization.
As the protagonist is moved from the plant basement to 
the factory hospital, the "discipline of the workshop" 
flows almost seamlessly into the disciplinary system's more 
overt function as a "technique for making useful
individuals" (Foucault, Discipline 210, 211). Indeed, we 
might view the disciplinary response to the color-confusion 
the protagonist unleashes in the halls of industry in much 
the same terms as Foucault analyzes the disciplinary 
response to the "plague" at the end of the seventeenth 
century. Like Foucault's "plague," the gray color that the 
protagonist precipitates by evincing an undefined, 
unmanageable version of "blackness" (specifically, in these 
scenes, of "black" labor) represents "mixture," which, as 
"a form, at once real and imaginary, of disorder ha[s] as 
its medical and political correlative discipline" (198,
emphasis mine). In this instance, Foucault describes the 
evolution of discipline as a specific response to the 
"confusion and disorder" (199) of the "plague," a response 
that most prominently includes what he calls 
"individualizing distribution" (198): "the ultimate
determination of the individual, of what characterizes him, 
of what belongs to him...the assignment to each individual 
of his 'true' name, his 'true' place, his 'true' body, his 
'true' disease" (Discipline 197-98). Just as Foucault 
treats the historical techniques of plague management as a 
"conpact model of the disciplinary mechanism" (197), I want 
to present the factory hospital episode as my final 
example--and the most compact model in the text--of the 
government of individualization which is inscribed in scene 
after scene of Invisible Man.
I suggest this connection not only because Foucault 
provides here one of his clearest descriptions of what he 
means by "making individuals" (certainly there are others 
relevant to the correction of personality, particularly in 
Madness and Civilization), but also because of intriguing 
similarities in the details of these respective compact 
models: just as the protagonist is placed into a box-
machine where he can barely move but can be perpetually 
observed while doctors create a corpus of charts and notes 
regarding his case, the disorder of the plague was managed 
through the creation of an "enclosed, segmented space, 
observed at every point, in which the individuals are 
inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements 
are supervised, in which all events are recorded" 
(Discipline 197). Moreover, by placing the protagonist in 
this machine and jolting him with numbing electricity, the 
doctors at the hospital hope to create a "new man" (239), 
one without contradictory desires, feeling, or memories--a 
"complete change of personality" (231). Though eager to 
provide the protagonist with his "true" name, they are 
pleased that (as they are led to believe) he has no 
memories about subversive "black" cultural icons like the 
trickster Buckeye/Brer Rabbit (237) . The process of 
individualization in the industrial machine, in short, is 
intended to destroy the rebellious, ambiguous, confused, 
emotional, tricksterish, and even "criminal" components of
the protagonist's identity--his racial and industrial 
"gray" areas--producing in their place a unified and 
coherent sub j ec t . As the doctor notes, comparing the 
effect of his "treatment" to a prefrontal lobotomy, "'The 
patient will live as he has to live, and with absolute 
integrity. Who could ask more? He'll experience no manor 
conflict of motives, and what is even better, society will 
suffer no traumata on his account'" (231, emphasis mine). 
If one is to live as a "nigger" or as an industrially 
rationalized subject without disrupting the smooth 
operation of U.S. society, the full range of human 
experience must be suppressed. The invisible man has
full command of his physical senses, and full feeling on 
the "surface of This) body. " but can feel nothing 
internally (230) . Ellison is half-comically, half- 
tragically describing racial individualization and the 
industrial rationalization of subjectivity as attempts to 
"lobotomize" full human experience, leaving a creature with 
full functional ability and "absolute integrity" but 
without the affect or the complexity of motivation that 
constitutes full humanity. Such is the intent, Ellison 
suggests, when the psyche is defined according to a surface 
effect of the body; or when, in the interests of 
production, "the body is reduced as a 'political' force at 
the least cost and maximized as a useful force" (Discipline 
221) . Within the context of a prevailing industrial
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capitalism, the "political technologies of the body" have 
evolved as a treatment for the "plague" of "major conflict 
of motives." Thus the hospital Director, representing at 
once psychiatrist and capitalist--Was he doctor, factory 
official, or both?1" the protagonist wonders (241)--tries 
to convince the protagonist that he is "cured" (240). The 
disease: psychic plurality. The new subject: the American 
"black" man.
As the invisible man strongly suspects, he has seen this 
doctor and this machine before. "'Do you know Mr. 
Norton?'" he queries the Director. "'Do you happen to know 
Bled?'" (242). In the machine, with his head "encircled by 
a piece of cold metal like the iron cap worn by the 
occupant of an electric chair" (227) and unable to feel his 
stomach at all, he has boomeranged back to the disciplinary 
moment in Bledsoe's office with its iron shackle and its 
"total disembowelment." Indeed, we may take these two 
scenes, with their associated symbologies, as figurative of 
a continuously repeating experience in his life, perhaps 
the central organizing feature of the entire novel: the
moment of "discipline" when the "honest, contradictory, 
inconsistent self" (Urgo 21) is placed in a "box" that 
removes a fundamental part of its constitution, supposedly 
producing a "new" well-defined identity. These "boxes," 
indeed, may be correlated with the objectifying 
categorizations delineated by Urgo and the "names" referred
to by Benston, distilled, of course, in Bledsoe's 
application of the key name "nigger." Within the cyclical 
structure of Ellison's work, the machine-box of the factory 
hospital is a reiteration of the boxing ring of the battle 
royal, where (electric) "power" was applied to the bodies 
of young "blacks" to produce the kind of well-disciplined 
"black" identities determined by the "white" image 
structure: oversexualized, scrambling for small coinage, 
and "hot" with rhythmic energy (watching the invisible 
man's body dance between the electrical nodes of the 
machine, one of the doctors comments, "They really do have 
rhythm, don't they? Get hot, boy!" (232)). Similarly, in 
the search for the job that will transform him into the 
young-urban-professional black, the invisible mam walks 
through Wall Street's grid of surveillance and steps into 
an elevator that shoots him upward, "creating a sensation 
in my crotch as though an important part of myself had been 
left below" (162). Later, he again passes through an 
elevator on his way to joining the Brotherhood, noting a 
sense that he "had been through it all before" (292). The 
elevator takes him to a party where he is assigned a new 
name and a "new identity" as Brotherhood spokesman. 
Clearly given the job because of his skin color, he is told 
he will be a "new Booker T. Washington" who nevertheless 
represents not "blacks" but "the poor" (300, 298)--an
identity which will be constantly and rigidly managed by
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the ideological constraints of what the Brothers repeatedly 
refer to as "discipline."
The "cure" of the machine, however, never quite takes; 
always there are rough edges, past selves, contradictory 
desires, conflicted motivations, multiple determinations of 
character that make it impossible for the invisible man to 
conform completely to the self-image molded by the "box" or 
by his new "name." Spouting the rhetoric of "social 
responsibility" that the "white" men of his.hometown love, 
he lets slip the antithetical phrase "social equality" 
(31) . Trying to conform to the role of order-following 
factory assistant, he is unable to suppress his own 
spontaneous affective and analytical outbursts. Asked to 
deny his racial culture and his personal history in 
deference to the pure class consciousness of the 
Brotherhood, he is enticed by the powerful racial 
significance of Frederick Douglass and Brother Tarp's chain 
gang leg iron, feels the pull of personal memory (381), and 
finally infuriates the Brotherhood leadership by insisting 
on the reality of racial identity (458). In this "model" 
hospital episode too, what Houston Baker refers to as the 
tricksterish Homo ludens elements of the invisible man's 
personality somehow escape the suppressions of the machine 
(Journey 161). Though he does not at this stage understand 
it himself, the invisible man is aware that his personality 
is connected to "many names...as though I was somehow a
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part of all of them" (235, emphasis mine); aware, too, that
one of his names, one of his past selves, is the trickster
of "black" culture that the hospital officials hope they
have annihilated:
I laughed, deep, deep inside me, giddy with the delight 
of self-discovery and the desire to hide it. Somehow I 
was Buckeye the Rabbit...or had been....Yes, I could not 
bring myself to admit it, it was too ridiculous —  and 
somehow too dangerous. It was annoying that he had hit 
upon an old identity. (236)
What Ellison referred to as "the mysterious, underground
aspect of human personality" survives even the most violent
disciplining of the self, even the most high-tech
production of the subject. "Homo ludens is hidden at the
margins and is yet to be discovered by the technological
'detectives,Baker observes, "The expectation of those
who control society's machinery is characterized by their
refusal to explore the margins" (Journey 161).
Disintegration
Though Invisible Man is riddled with indications that 
the "lobotomization" of racial subjectification fails in 
its attempt to annihilate the "anarchic self" (Urgo xvi), 
it also thematizes a peculiar psychological havoc that is 
wrought by the "discipline" of the machine: at the
hospital, the invisible man's earlier sensations of 
"disembowelment" grow into an increasingly dramatic 
experience of bodily disintegration and an outright crisis
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of the self. Baker is quite right to note that it is a 
"playful, ironic" tricksterish invisible man who walks out 
of the factory hospital (Journev 161), but it is also an 
invisible man utterly disoriented by what he feels to be 
this "alien personality lodged deep within" him (243). The 
immediate effect of the hospital machine on Ellison's anti- 
hero is, more specifically than the internal numbness he 
first describes, a sensation that parts of himself have 
been literally cut away and that, as a result, he must 
struggle to reconstruct a sense of self dependent on his 
bodily schema:
I lay beneath the slab of glass, feeling deflated. All 
my limbs seemed amputated.... I lay experiencing the 
vague processes of my body. I seemed to have lost all 
sense of proportion. Where did my body end and the 
crystal and white world begin?...I was laved with warm 
liquids, felt gentle hands move through the indefinite 
limits of my flesh. (233)
The invisible man's struggle here to reconstruct his sense
of the limits of his own body gives Ellison's obvious use
of a birth motif for the hospital scene an important
additional level of meaning. The birthing of a "new man"
intended by the hospital officials is fused with the
invisible man's reversion to a Lacanian, infantile state of
psychosomatic disorganization, indicated by his groping for
the lost finitude and coherence of his body. Like the
infant of Lacan's mirror stage, the invisible man seeks to
(re)constitute a fiction of ego unity through a complete
integration with the "processes of his body" and the
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"limits" of his physical being. By retracing the form of 
his bodily schema, he hopes to overcome the nightmare 
sensation of quasiphysical "amputation" caused by the 
"prefrontal lobotomy" of the machine and, in doing so, to 
find an answer to the question of "identity" that now 
plagues him (237).
The disillusioning manipulations of Bledsoe's letters, 
of the factory workshops, and of the hospital machine have 
opened the invisible man's eyes to the social disciplines 
that have hitherto forced him to suppress his true feelings 
(243), unleashing the rebellious, trickster self that quips 
sarcastically with the hospital Director and overturns a 
spittoon on the head of a man he believes to be Bledsoe. 
But the protagonist is still consumed with the idea of a 
unified self--disenchanted, perhaps, with some of the 
"names" he has tried but still living out what Benston 
refers to as "the comedy of his vain desire to achieve an 
empowering name" (159). Caught up in the romance of self- 
presence, he is unable, as he leaves the hospital and 
begins a new life on the streets of Harlem, to cope with 
the confusion of identity engendered by his regression to a 
sort of pre-mirror stage condition in which he has become 
aware of the "many names" of which he partakes (235). 
Thus, he can only conceive of these newly released elements 
as parts of an "alien personality lodged deep within" him 
(243, emphasis mine). As the hospital episode ends he is
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still trying to solve the problem of a fragmented, multiple 
self, and still associating this quest with -the 
reintegration of his body: "We, he, him--my mind and I--
were no longer getting around in the same circles. Nor my 
body either" (244). In this remarkably overburdened 
statement of self-fracture, we might read the "I" as the 
perceived center (ego) of invisible man's sense of self, 
linked to the "circular" configuration of Bledsoe's 
"shackle" and to the body imago, but now experiencing an 
internal plurality ("we") based on the "hitherto 
suppressed" (243) emanations from other regions of a 
larger, more complex, more multiply determined "mind."
In the transitional Chapter 12, the invisible man links 
this new condition of fragmented identity directly to his 
loss of the specific illusionary self-constructs which had 
governed his previous life. The self-images of the 
"college boy working to return to school down South," the 
accommodationist, and the well-dressed-black-urban- 
professional are among the "illusions that had just been 
boomeranged out of my head" (250), he notes while observing 
others who are still performing these roles. Moreover, he 
is now capable of a critical reassessment of his 
psychological condition: he has survived within the
parameters of such illusions--parameters laid down and 
self-images imposed by the segregation of society, 
certainly, but also by the disciplines of society, as we
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have seen— only by numbing the parts of himself that exceed
or contradict such boundaries. Though long buried "beneath
the emotion-freezing ice which [his] life had conditioned
his brain to produce" (253), those parts were there all
along. Defining these now thawing portions of his psyche
partly as an emotional/spiritual element heretofore
"frozen," partly as a "new, painful, contradictory voice"
(253), partly as the angry "demands for revengeful action"
which we might associate with Baker's ludic trickster
figure, the invisible man vaguely links their release to
the key moments in his developing awareness of how others
are "defining" his identity--Bledsoe' s use of the term
"nigger," young Emerson's unveiling of Bledsoe's
manipulations, the combined moment of self-realization and
self-explosion at the paint factory:
A remote explosion had occurred somewhere, perhaps back 
at Emerson's or that night in Bledsoe's office, and it 
had caused the ice cap to melt and shift the slightest 
bit....Coming to New York had perhaps been an attempt to 
keep the old freezing unit going, but it hadn't worked; 
hot water had gotten into the coils. (253)
Instead of a liberation, however, the protagonist
experiences the collapse of the self-disciplinary "freezing
unit" and the release of his contradictory, emotional
components as an anxiety-producing loss of coherent
identity. He now suffers from an "obsession with [his]
identity" (253) not unlike the condition analysts of
narcissistic personality disorders have described as
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"identity confusion" (Samuels) or "disintegration anxiety" 
( K o h u t ) ! ^ :  "who was I [?]....If only all the contradictory
voices shouting inside my head would calm down and sing a 
song in unison, whatever it was I wouldn't care as long as 
they sang without dissonance; yes, and avoided the 
uncertain extremes of the scale" (253) . It is, 
significantly, precisely his internalization of the ideal 
of a unified, controlled, and "certain" self that prevents 
the invisible man from either fully expressing his 
resentment of the (racial) "names" he has been called or of 
living comfortably with the "many names" he is beginning to 
realize are implicated in his identity. The producer of 
the "ice cap"--now become the producer of his 
disintegration anxiety--is none other than the discipline 
of the self, or what he calls "'self-control,' that frozen 
virtue, that freezing vice" (253).
In the pages that follow the protagonist struggles 
repeatedly with this anguished borderline condition, caught 
between his newfound sense of the fluidity of his 
"blackness" and the freedom of his self-experience and his 
old, deeply internalized allegiance to one-dimensional 
versions of the self like the accommodating, "progressive" 
"black college boy." Purchasing hot yams from a street 
vendor, the protagonist is overcome with memories of his 
previously repressed southern, agrarian, folkish past and 
experiences "an intense feeling of freedom" (258) at being
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able to enjoy that aspect of his identity openly, with no 
regard for the culture of discipline--"I no longer had to 
worry about who saw me or what was proper" (258, emphasis 
mine). While eating his yam, he meditates further on the 
profoundly unpredictable, contradictory nature of an 
identity filled with "likes" and "dislikes" that have 
nothing whatsoever to do with externally proscribed 
patterns or "accepted attitudes" (260), and proclaims his 
new belief in doing "what you liked": "I am what I am"
(259). Indeed, a few lines later he incorporates both his 
folk roots and (perhaps less intentionally) his plural 
intersubjectivity into his new statement of selfhood, 
announcing "I yam what I am" (260)--I y(ou) am/we are what 
I am. We might read this scene as a fictional rendering of 
a new attitude toward African American folk culture which 
Ellison described in his own life as a "discipline toward 
affirming that which felt desirable to [him]," regardless 
of the extent to which it demonstrated education or 
civilization (Shadow 9). Yet the invisible man is markedly 
unable to integrate this new multidimensional or fluid 
"blackness" with comfort, much like he could only refer to 
the talkative, tricksterish voice of the hospital episode 
as an "alien personality lodged deep within": "now that I
no longer felt ashamed of the things I had always loved, I 
probably could no longer digest very many of them" (260). 
Indeed, the next yam brings him only an "unpleasant taste,"
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as he realizes it is "frostbitten" (261). His internal 
freezing unit is still working, making the experience of 
internal contradiction and manifold desire distasteful, 
rather than empowering.
The narrator is almost uncontrollably fluctuating, at 
this stage in his narrative, between the romance of a 
complete and autonomous identity and the lived experience 
of a plural psyche, mixing memory and desire, which resists 
totalization. On the one hand, he seeks a new "name"/ego- 
construct to replace the Nortonist/Bledsoist one he has 
exploded— and finds one in short order when, pressed by 
economic exigency, he attends the Brotherhood cocktail 
party and receives a literal "new name" as Brotherhood 
spokesman. On the other hand, however, he expresses 
distaste for the Brotherhood's manipulation of his racial 
identity: he recognizes that they are treating his skin 
color as a "natural resource" (296) and elects to model his 
career after the Founder, not as the deraced "Booker T. 
Washington" of the "poor" that Brother Jack prescribes. It 
is indicative of the protagonist's new "I am what I am" 
ethos that, in opposition to the Brotherhood members' race- 
erasing ideology and Brother Jack's preemptive assertion 
that "The brother does not sina!" (304), he wishes at the 
party that there were a way for him to be asked--as a 
"black" man from the south--to sing spirituals (307). But 
the ideology of the Brotherhood, which Jack first refers to
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at this party as "our discipline" (301), demands that the 
invisible man set aside not only such racially determined 
facets of his identity as an appreciation for black music, 
but also his "past," his family (301), and his relationship 
to the folksy landlady, Mary Rambo. "So long as he seeks a 
name as prescribed social role," Benston notes, "the hero 
discovers only the limitation of exogenous delimitation" 
(160). The Brotherhood is really only another box-machine 
in which he will be given an "unconflicted" racial identity 
and "name," at the price of amputating precious parts of 
his contradictory racial identity.
The complex motivations and implications of this self­
disintegration are reiterated in the comedic episode which 
intervenes between the cocktail party and the invisible 
man's first speech as the Brotherhood's token "black" 
spokesman. Returning home after the party, he makes a 
conscious determination that the remedy to his identity 
confusion lies, in part, in re-establishing himself as a 
unified, autonomous ego; he decides, therefore, to separate 
himself from Mary, his past, and their mutual connection to 
a racial, southern identity: "they seldom know where their 
personalities end and yours begins; they usually think in 
terms of 'we' while I have always tended to think in terms 
of 'me'" (309, emphasis mine). (His attraction to the new
identity is, predictably, as much economic as 
psychological: as these thoughts run through his head, his
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pockets are filled with the crisp new bills the Brotherhood 
has paid him for taking on the name they assign.) Upon 
awaking the next morning, Ellison has his anti-hero reenact 
the explosion of the old rigid mold for his self in a 
sequence that tellingly alludes to the versions of the 
"black" self forwarded by Bledsoe, Brockway, and Mary, and 
to the protagonist's rejection of all of these as too 
binding. In a violent outburst against the uncivilized, 
"cottonpatch ways" (312) of tenants beating on the heating 
pipes in Mary's building, IM takes up a "cast-iron figure 
of a very black, red-lipped and wide-mouthed Negro" with 
"white eyes" and an "enormous grin" (311), and retaliates 
by striking the pipe with it until he feels "the iron head 
crumble and fly apart in [his] hand" (312).
A caricature of various exaggerated "Negroid" features, 
perhaps a representation of the combined minstrel and 
"field nigger" figure in the American racial imagination, 
this iron bank is also linked to the "white" version of 
"black" identity transmitted to young "blacks" by Bledsoe 
through the discipline of the iron "shackle" and the 
"white" version of "black" identity which, initially 
imposed upon, unavoidably becomes a genuine part of "black" 
identities through the process of folk acculturation 
represented by the likes of Mary and the Provos. The 
invisible man's description of and reaction to the bank are 
crucial to an understanding of its signification:
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It was a bank, a piece of early Americana, the kind of 
bank which, if a coin is placed in the hand and a lever 
pressed upon the the back, will raise its arm and flip 
the coin into the grinning mouth. ... [I] grabbed it, 
suddenly as enraged by the tolerance or lack of 
discrimination, or whatever, that allowed Mary to keep 
such a self-mocking image around, as by the knocking.
(311)
We might remember here that, upon advising the invisible 
man to leave "pride and dignity" to "white folks" and just 
do his best in his socially assigned role as a "black" man, 
Bledsoe "looked at [him] like a man about to flip a coin" 
(142) and that, in his subsequent rage of "disembowelment" 
the invisible man struggled to "keep from bursting out 
[his] brain" against something. Now, dramatically picking 
up this icon of the "nigger" selves of his past (the 
accommodating Bledsoe nigger, the uncivilized field nigger, 
the leering minstrel nigger), he indeed causes its iron 
head to explode, destroying with great symbolic 
significance its grinning mechanism for gathering small 
change: "The figure had gone to pieces like a grenade,
scattering jagged fragments of painted iron among the 
coins" (313). Connected by literal possession to the down- 
home "blackness" of Mary Rambo, the bank also suggests 
Primus Provo's role as minstrel performer, and its 
"explosion" is of course a reenactment of the explosion in 
Brockway's basement when the constraining definitions of 
the "old-fashioned, slavery-time, mammy-made, handkerchief
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headed" (222) Brockway had caused the invisible man to "fly 
apart" for the first time.
The disintegration of the iron bank is representative of 
the protagonist's conscious decision to put these old 
selves behind him, but Ellison doubly iron-izes his effort 
to forge a new "identity," suggesting how the protagonist's 
own overly narcissistic, "me"-centered paradigm ("No 
respect for the individual," he grumbles at the 
"cottonpatch" tenants banging on the pipes [313]) 
contributes to his continued alienation and psychological 
fragmentation.15 First, he smashes one iron-cast racial 
"identity" only to move immediately into another: the
Brotherhood, too, expects him to act out a particular image 
of "blackness"— playing the part of "black" spokesman for 
the dispossessed but denying the "black" aspects of his 
existence while doing so--for which they are willing to 
compensate him with a patz'onizing income (flipping him more 
coins) but no power or agency in the organization. More 
comically, the invisible man finds that it is impossible to 
dispose of these junked versions of the "black" self. 
Attempting to discard the fragments of the shattered bank 
along Harlem's streets, he is thwarted twice, first by a 
woman who identifies him as a southern "field nigger" and 
demands that he retrieve the package from her trash can, 
then by a man who identifies him as a type of the "young 
New York Negro" con man or drug dealer (322) and who
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helpfully returns the package the invisible man has 
intentionally dropped on the sidewalk. It is
tragicomically difficult, in the psychological world 
depicted by Ellison, to walk away from past versions of the 
self or from distasteful components of one's psychic make­
up; as we have seen in earlier episodes, the cost of a "new 
name" can only be some version of psychological amputation- 
-even when the part-or past-selves derive from the racist 
distortions of the "white" imagination. The invisible man, 
in other words, cannot even "dispossess" himsel f of 
unwanted psychic components. Despite his desire for an 
identity that will "sing a song in unison" (253), he is 
forced to carry the broken image along with him as part of 
the dissonant "psychic" contents of his "ego"-briefcase: 
unwittingly reflecting the couriers with pouches he earlier 
observed on Wall Street, he walks now with his own 
"package" self--a jumble of dissonant elements--at his 
side.
The meaning of the disintegrated iron "darky" bank must 
be read, finally, in the context of three other crucial 
scenes in Invisible Man. To explode the atomistic, 
exogenously imposed, disciplinary "black" self--the "black 
subject"--as a meaningful paradigm for self-experience, is, 
in effect, to reverse the mirror stage by which one 
conceptualizes oneself through the constitution of an image 
of self-unity. Thus, when his consciousness of the
"nigger" identities being imposed upon him reaches critical 
mass at the paint factory, causing him to "explode, " the 
invisible man is left in what I have described as an 
infantile, pre-mirror stage condition of subjective 
disorder, which he schematizes physically as a sense of 
being both "deflated" and fragmented or "amputated" (232) . 
(The "white" hospital workers, of course, try to 
reconstruct the unconflicted "nigger" self, but his 
"contradictory voices" have been permanently unleashed). 
This image of "deflating" the disciplinary "black" ego- 
construct recurs later during his similarly conscious 
flirtation with another more fluid conception of 
"blackness"--the mental state he refers to as the "yam 
level" (261). Rejecting the shame imposed on the eating of 
down-home food by the Bledsoist "progress" version of the 
"black" self, the protagonist imagines humiliating the 
college administrator by publicly accusing him of eating 
chitterlings. With his refined image compromised by the 
charge of "field niggerism, " the protagonist fantasizes, 
"Bledsoe would disintegrate, disinflate" (259) . The 
smashing of the bank, viewed in this context, is also a 
material enactment of this earlier fantasy of 
"disinflating" the Bledsoean "ego." However, just as the 
protagonist's "yam level" reverie of a fluid, self- 
determined identity is interrupted when he literally 
stumbles over the full complexity of the plural psyche--the
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contradictory "jumble" of an evicted couples' possessions 
scattered like junk upon the street (an image of the 
multiplicity of African American identity that he finds 
nauseating)--he finds that, after smashing the signifier of 
all of the past "black" selves (including the "cottonpatch 
field nigger") that do not fit into his new Brotherhood 
identity, he cannot. try as he may, discard them like junk 
along the street. Caught up in the cult of the "me," as 
the protagonist admits he is, and in the quest for an 
"empowering name," as Benston puts it (159), he shuttles 
between the anxiety-ridden (yet liberatory) plurality on 
one side of the racial mirror stage, and the security- 
granting (yet imprisoning) illusion of self-presence on the 
other.
We first saw the characteristic imagery of fragmentation 
of this borderline state, along with the correlative effort 
to reestablish integrity according to the outline of the 
bodily schema, as a prominent part of the invisible man's 
experience in the hospital machine, which, as I have 
argued, stands as a model for a series of box-machine- 
individualizing-naming contraptions that he encounters 
throughout his narrative. The Brotherhood becomes, of 
course, the central example of such a disciplinary 
"machine" in the latter third of Ellison's novel, so it is 
no coincidence that, on the occasion of the invisible man's 
first public appearance as Brotherhood spokesperson, the
fragmented, pre-mirror stage sensations of the hospital-- 
and, by extension, the disembowelment of being named 
"nigger" by Bledsoe— replay before his eyes like an uncanny 
vision. That Ellison intends this scene to evoke the 
alienation that anyone might feel at the prospect of being 
confronted with a "new identity" seems undeniable. Yet 
that he has in mind the particular psychological 
extremities of the racial situation is indicated by the 
invisible man's explicit connection of the occasion of his 
first speech to several of the more overtly racializing 
"boxes" of his career: the "canvas-covered platform" (332) 
of the arena, formerly the site of boxing matches where a 
famous boxer "had lost his sight in the ring" (326), 
recreates the blind battle royal of the young black boys; 
the spotlight surrounds him "like a seamless cage of 
stainless steel" (332), reminiscent of Bledsoe's shackle 
and habit of "making a cage of his fingers" (143); standing 
before the crowd, visible to thousands but unable to see 
them, he feels again the "hard, mechanical isolation of the 
hospital machine" (333). Similarly, according to Fanon, 
the effect of having one's consciousness of self mediated 
through the eyes of others--the effect, as he concisely 
puts it, of the words "Look, a Negro!"--is simultaneously a 
"crushing objecthood" and a feeling of being "burst apart" 
into fragments (Fanon 109).
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The racial psychology of the colonial situation provides
an instructive parallel to the invisible man's experience
as he prepares to "become" his new identity publicly for
the first time. Almost immediately upon entering the
arena, he experiences the effort to conform absolutely to a
new name and a new identity as a literal splintering of
himself as a center of cognition, a dispersal of himself
across multiple subject positions. This sensation is
connected, moreover, to a psychological effect which is
puzzling without the explanatory framework of the mirror
stage: he begins to deliberately observe and operate his
own body and motions as if from another perspective, not
only as if somehow separated from himself, but also as if
trying to reintegrate his sense of identity by carefully
reintegrating the parameters of his physical form:
I bent forward, suddenly conscious of my legs in new 
blue trousers. But how do you know they're your legs? 
What's your name?...For it was as though I were looking 
at my own legs for the first time--independent objects 
that could of their own volition lead me to safety or 
danger... Then it was as though I stood simultaneously at 
opposite ends of a tunnel. I seemed to view myself from 
the distance of the campus while yet sitting there on a 
bench in the old arena. (326-27)
Disoriented by the process of having a new identity
"manufactured" for him by the Brotherhood's disciplinary
"box"/"machine," the protagonist is placed in the position,
as in the car with Norton, of having to literally reiterate
his own mirror stage to reconstitute subjective integrity.
Thus, he becomes unusually conscious--as in the hospital
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machine--of the limits and movements of his own body, 
feeling his disintegration as a dissection of the bodily 
schema, and schematizing his reintegration through an 
unusually deliberate emphasis on the organization and 
manipulation of that bodily schema. The mirror stage, to 
use Lacan's own phrasing of this relatioship, "manufactures 
for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial 
identification, the succession of phantasies that extends 
from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that 
I shall call orthopaedic" (Ecrits 4, emphasis mine).
Similarly, the invisible man conceptualizes his status 
in-between the anxiety of fragmentation and (what he hopes 
will be) the formation of a new, unified identity through 
the trope of looking at a picture or reflection of himself: 
"I seemed aware of it all from a point deep within me, yet 
there was a disturbing vagueness about what I saw, a 
disturbing unformed quality, as when you see yourself in a 
photo exposed during adolescence; the expression empty, the 
grin without character." (327, emphasis mine). The 
description suggests another moment of mirror staging in 
his life, the experience with Norton that made him think of 
a college historical photo, showing "blacks" with blank, 
characterless expressions as if their subjectivity has been 
disrupted/interrupted by the clearly defined "whites" who 
surround them.
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As in that earlier instance, the "photo"
conceptualization represents a sort of mental micro-mirror
stage whose intended outcome is a more "formed" reflection
of the self; the invisible man hopes that the photo will
resolve into his new, unified identity, one without the
internal multiplicity of a split point of consciousness, of
the "contradictory voices," or of the alien, tricksterish
part selves he has been feeling. Indeed, he summarizes
this multiplicity, the disintegration anxiety it illicits,
the discipline of his new, unitary self that must suppress
it, and the overt consciousness of the body engendered by
this whole psychodynamic in a passage I quote at length
because it so concisely emphasizes the racial mirror stage
components of the invisible man's experience:
This was a new phase, I realized, a new beginning, and I 
would have to take that part of myself that looked on 
with remote eyes and keep it always at the distance of 
the campus, the hospital machine, the battle royal--all 
now far behind. Perhaps the part of me that observed 
listlessly but saw all, missing nothing, was still the 
malicious, arguing part; the dissenting voice, my 
grandfather part; the cynical, disbelieving part--the 
traitor self that always threatened internal discord. 
Whatever it was, I knew that I'd have to keep it pressed 
down. . . .No more f Ivina apart at the seams, no more 
remembering forgotten pains....No, I thought, shifting 
mv body, they're the same leas on which I've come so far 
from home. And yet they were somehow new. . . .1 was 
becoming someone else. (327, emphasis mine)
The enticing security of this new sense of self, however,
ironically implies the very splitting that the invisible
man seeks to escape. If the Brotherhood "machine"
"manufactures" for him a new identity, that is--just as
Norton, the college, the factory, the hospital machine 
intended to do--it will do so at the cost of "amputating" 
parts of his psychological experience. Indeed, we can 
trace this irony back to the fact that the anxieties of 
splitting and disintegration are structured by the mirror 
stage of subjectivity in the first place. It is only the 
artificial constitution of a unified self-image, as Lacan 
would have it, that creates the potential for that "ego" to 
splinter back along the chains of signification out of 
which it was tentatively crystallized. In taking on the 
"manufactured name" of "another personality," the invisible 
man admits in the next paragraph, he submits himself to a 
second type of psychological splitting: he must cut away 
all past versions of his self if he is to maintain the 
purity and coherence of the new self. The new orientation 
of being "the focal point of so many concentrating eyes" 
might perhaps "transform" him into an entirely new "someone 
else," he thinks, "But what if someone from the campus 
wandered into the audience? Or someone from Mary's?" (328). 
Because such contacts would threaten his new "personality" 
with disillusion, he realizes, he would have to suppress 
them, pretending not to recognize Mary even if he saw her.
As I have suggested, we might gloss the experience 
Ellison is so richly depicting in these pages with the 
contemporaneous racially politicized psychoanalysis of 
Fanon. So long as the "black" subject lives only "among
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his own," according to Fanon, even though conscious of the
politics of race, there is no problem in maintaining the
integrity of self-experience. The first encounter with the
hierarchization and objectification of the "white" gaze— or
the name "nigger"— however, creates in the "black" psyche a
self-consciousness that has the form of--as for the
invisible man--a "third-person consciousness" of the self.
Fanon describes precisely the sense of vagueness and the
concentration on the bodily schema that the invisible man
experiences in his "machines":
In the white world the man of color encounters 
difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. 
Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity. 
It is a third-person consciousness. The body is 
surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty. I 
know that if I want to smoke, I shall have to reach out 
my right arm...[etc.] And all these movements are made 
not out of habit but out of implicit knowledge. A slow 
composition of my self as a body in the middle of a 
spatial and temporal world--such seems to be the 
schema. (110-11)
Precisely as if, we might say, the addition of an-Other
perspective on the self has so shattered the coherence of
one's self-experience that one must reproduce a mirror-
stage-like understanding of the unity of the bodily schema
in order to reconstitute the fiction of psychic self-unity.
This bodily schema, in Fanon's formulation, is also
insufficient, because the "black" self must also account
for a massive discursive structure of assumptions about
" b l a c k n e s s t h e  white man. . . had woven me out of a
thousand details, anecdotes, stories" (111)--which brings
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to bear another, racial, cultural, historical perspective 
on its identity and which undercuts the "physiological 
self" (111). Taking into account this discursive 
historicity, Fanon says, he had to replace his corporeal 
schema with a "racial epidermal schema"; "whites" looking 
at him not only saw him as objectifiable difference, which 
he had to account for in his sense of' himself, they thought 
him as difference according to an internalized discourse 
about "blackness," which he again, and separately, had to 
account for in his sense of himself. Combining these 
exogenous perspectives with the self-experience the "black" 
person brings with him or her to the situation of racial 
objectification produces what Fanon describes as a 
nauseating, triple existence (112). "What else could it be 
for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that 
spattered my whole body with black blood?" (Fanon 112).
The objectification the invisible man faces at the arena 
is not merely that of a new identity imposed by a new set 
of peers, but clearly also the racial objectification of an 
established network of discursive agreements about the 
emotive "black" orator. (Brother Jack, it might be noted, 
selected him as the new "Booker T. Washington" on the basis 
of a speech which had virtually no substantive content and 
virtually no effect on the mob it was directed to; in other 
words, Brother Jack did not see Invisible Man, he saw only 
the emotive "black" orator). Experiencing a splitting
which is simultaneously a division into multiple points of 
self-consciousness and into present and past versions of 
his self, the invisible man's response is first an 
increased focus on his bodily schema, then a vision of the 
amputation of the "black" self that has been present, 
either explicitly or implicitly, on each previous occasion 
of his being disciplined into "blackness." At the battle 
royal, he was forced to play both the "black" orator and 
the sexual "black"; handed his new briefcase-ego for the 
first time after his speech, he splattered it with blood 
from an injury incurred while boxing blind on a canvas like 
the one he stands on to give his speech here. Disciplined 
by the "bleeder" of "souls" (Bledsoe) for not conforming to 
the image of the "nigger," he vomits. After smashing the 
iron bank incarnation of the "nigger" image, and just 
before making his futile attempt to discard this part of 
himself, he notices a "trickle of blood" from a cut on his 
hand (313). The discipline of racial identity has indeed 
been experienced as "an amputation, an excision, a 
hemorrhage."
The images of corporeal mutilation which haunt the 
invisible man's boomeranging pilgrimage through racial 
society, then, are direct derivatives of the racial mirror 
stage, symptoms of the fundamental psychological function 
of race. When "white" identity defines itself, by 
gesturing visually, verbally, imagistically, financially (a
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la Norton) , or even literarily (a la Stein) toward the 
difference of "blackness" in a self-constituting "white" 
mirror stage, the self-experience of whoever is so defined 
is violently disrupted. Because this disruption has the 
effect of reversing the self-staging mirror processes of 
the self so objectified, or of initiating a scrambled, 
compensatory attempt to reenact them, it precipitates in 
some form of bodily dismemberment imagery. As Fanon 
describes the effect of being defined as "black" for the 
first time, "I am being dissected under white eyes, the 
only real eyes. I am fixed. Having adjusted their 
microtomes, they objectively cut away slices of my 
reality... it is not a new man who has come in, but a new 
kind of man, a new genus. Why, it's a Negro!" (116) . 
Similarly, it is in his moments of jolting awareness of 
being defined by others as "black" that Ellison's 
protagonist feels by turns "disemboweled" (with Bledsoe), 
"amputated" (in the hospital machine), and "torn to shreds" 
(at the arena).
As Fanon's emphasis on the production of a "new kind of 
man" makes clear, "whiteness" and "blackness" do not pre­
exist this psychocultural process as empirical--or 
epidermal--realities; they are produced by it as entities 
of a purely symbolic, or metaphysical order. In their 
derivation from the mirror stage's production of a fiction 
of personal autonomy and ego unity, moreover, these racial
identities tend to encourage narcissistic habits of being, 
"sealing," as Fanon puts it, racial selves into their 
"whiteness" or "blackness" (Fanon 9-10). Given this "dual 
narcissism" (Fanon 10) of racial identity, we might expect 
a similar manifestation of disintegration when the "white" 
mirror stage is disrupted as we see for the invisible man; 
and indeed, Fanon later outlines the disruption of the 
"white" mirror stage as an anxiety fraught with visions of 
"blacks" and of "the liberation of the body image" (162)-- 
the corps morcele. ^  Combining Fanon1s mirror stage 
speculation with an object-relations perspective on 
narcissistic personality disorders, finally, we might read 
the invisible man's disintegration anxieties and "obsession 
with [his] identity" as results not of the complexity of 
his self-experience, as he seems to believe, but of the 
experienced disparity between his hyperindividualistic 
dependence on ego unity and autonomy, on the one hand, and 
the contradictory voices of what Ellison depicts as a 
psyche of complex, multiple determinations, on the other. 
If the invisible man's first instinct in the novel is to 
throw off the shackle of Bledsoe's and Norton's "black 
subject," whose "racial identity certainty" "disembowels" 
the fluidity of his own lived "black" experience, the 
Brotherhood segment shows him trying to conform to the 
shape of an equally narcissistic, equally "certain" 
identity--albeit one he conceives of as significantly
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"deraced." It is the individualistic tendency of his self­
conception in both cases--his belief in a unified and 
"sealed" identity--I am suggesting, that encourages the 
invisible man to "amputate" parts of himself, and that 
keeps him stewing about the plurality of voices, emotions, 
and memories (many--but not all--of them derived from his 
distinctly African American experience) he actually hears 
within.
It is as a "solution" to his experience of this internal 
dissonance that the protagonist turns to the Brotherhood, 
which beckons with the possibility of a new, clear 
identity. One of the fine ironies of this section of the 
novel, however, is the protagonist's failure to recognize 
until much later--when the coded racism of Brother Jack's 
"anti-race" ideology becomes evident--that his efforts to 
conform to his new name constitute a mere repetition of the 
inhuman "disciplines" of previous episodes. Not only does 
the Brotherhood turn out to be yet another institution in 
which African Americans are allowed to be transmitters, but 
not agents, of power, but its "disciplines" of identity and 
politics constitute a denial of the complexities and 
vicissitudes of human experience--precisely the repression 
that IM has been revulsed by in the past. The Brotherhood 
promises the "certainty" of identity he seeks--he calls the 
time before he begins to sense the limitations of his 
Brotherhood identity his "days of certainty" (371)--but
only at the price of suppressing the multiple 
determinations, especially the racial and [processual] 
determinations, of his self-experience. That his new 
certainty of identity is also another discipline of 
identity is most clearly evidenced by the Brotherhood's 
demands that he forget his past, his family, his African 
American culture, and his status as a racially categorized 
human being. Indeed, the invisible man's own formulation 
of the new sense of vitality and identity the organization 
gives him ironically recalls Bledsoe and the hospital 
machine: "The organization had given the world a new shape, 
and me a vital role. We recognized no loose ends, 
everything could be controlled by our science. Life was all 
pattern and discipline; and the beauty of discipline is 
when it works. And it was working very well" (373). The 
beauty of the mirror stage is the pattern and certainty it 
gives to identity; the horror of the mirror stage is its 
suppression of the plural psyche. We are made of loose 
ends. Still, confronted with the dilemma of the 
narcissistic racialization of U.S. society--conform 
"wholely" to one of the "names" for "blackness" which 
together constitute the "black subject" or experience 
identity as persistently fragmented, dissonant, and 
invisible--the invisible man grasps at the concreteness of 
the role offered to him by the Brotherhood as the only 
means he can conceive of for completing his mirror stage
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and preserving self-unity without recourse to the 
objectifying definitions of race. During the night 
following his first speech as Brotherhood spokesman, the 
invisible man sits up in bed, "grasping [his] knees" as if 
gathering to himself the scattered parts of his 
"orthopaedic" fantasy of totality, and decides to accept 
the new role given to him by an audience that "was mixed, 
their claims broader than race....How else could I save 
myself from disintegration?" (345).
Coda; The Opened Shackle and the Freedom of the Self
Within the dynamics I have outlined of an axis of 
disciplinary identity certainty (narcissistic egoism) and 
identity confusion (or fluidity), the identity quest in 
Invisible Man implicitly becomes a search for a 
conceptualization of the self that adequately allows for 
its inherent fluidity. One possible revision of the 
narcissistic individual along more fluid lines is suggested 
by the protean Harlemite B. P. Rinehart, a veritable living 
example of the "exploded" "black" self. As "the man of 
parts who got around" (487), the man who willingly plays a 
whole series of "multiple personalities" (488)--storefront 
preacher, numbers runner, gambler, ladies' man--Rinehart 
figures the absolute fragmentation at the extreme pole from 
the staged unity of self-presence. What is more, he 
manipulates this disintegration for his own ends,
suggesting the potential for reveling in identity 
"confusion," converting it into social power and economic 
profit. Momentarily living the life of Rinehart, the 
invisible man realizes for the first time the possibility 
of a new orientation to the plurality he has been 
experiencing all along, the possibility of recognizing and 
accenting that experience is a "vast seething, hot world of 
fluidity" (487), and making oneself at home in that 
possibility just as "Rine the rascal was at home in it" 
(487). Still, there is a dark side to Rinehart's technique 
for undermining the unifying, "naming" tendencies of 
disciplinary society. His profit-taking is, finally, 
cynically self-promoting and self-interested, a defacement 
of "communal reality" (Benston 162). Moreover, the price 
he pays for the liberated possibility of his existence is 
the sacrifice of any center of consciousness whatever; 
anyone, as the invisible man proves, can take on Rinehart's 
various roles, and the narrative itself reduces him to the 
signifiers he manipulates--the hat and glasses, the 
pamphlets, the words other characters say about him: 
Rinehart himself is never seen. As Kimberly Benston 
observes, Rinehart's strange combination of name-refusing 
agility and asociality "awaken the hero to an 
improvisational freedom but offer no stable theme off which 
a coherent identity could be riffed" (162).
While Benston contrasts the model presented by Rinehart
with the novel's invocation of Frederick Douglass as its
uplifted model of a more positive fluidity of the self, I
want to conclude by focusing on two other textual figures
which might be seen to stand alongside Douglass in
Ellison's pantheon of icons of what Benston calls "self-
creating transformation" (162). Foremost among these is
the chain gang leg iron passed on to the invisible man by
his African American confidante in the Brotherhood, Brother
Tarp--the man who, significantly, also gives the invisible
man a portrait of Douglass in an earlier scene. As he
symbolically hands the protagonist the leg iron he filed
open to escape the chain gang, Tarp associates the piece of
steel both with his quest for "freedom" and with his
precious preservation of the memory of his time in chains.
This token of Tarp's identity thus reinscribes the
ontological messages of the hospital machine, the Provos'
possessions, and the iron bank (you must say no to the
limitations of the mold, but you can't leave it behind
without destroying yourself), while also signifying on the
ahistorical "smoothness" of Bledsoe's "progressive" version
of the "black self":-^
I took it in my hand, a thick dark, oily piece of filed 
steel that had been twisted open and forced partly back 
into place. . . .It was such a link as I had seen on 
Bledsoe's desk, only while that one had been smooth, 
Tarp's bore the marks of haste and violence, looking as 
though it had been attacked and conquered before it 
stubbornly yielded. (379)
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This revision of the novel's shackle image signals what 
Robert Stepto has formulated as a transition from a 
"rhetoric of progress" to a "rhetoric of liberation" (193), 
positing a fluidity of identity (including, but not only, 
"black" identity) that includes both a historically derived 
structure and an "exquisitely rude aperture that 'defiles' 
the otherwise completed (or closed) form of the leg 
iron. . .a void to be filled, not once and for all but 
continually... To fill the space is less to close the form 
than to shape the form; and, to be sure, there can never be 
only one form" (189) . Translating this idea to the 
approach I have outlined, the revision of the shackle 
signals the shift from a rhetoric of individualistic, 
static egoism to a rhetoric of identity f luidi t v . 
precariously balanced between certainty and confusion, 
between the fixity of one "name" and the plurality of many.
Tarp's opened leg iron represents his decision to forge 
an identity that, rather than annihilating its tragic past 
or being simply defined by it, maintains the partial 
structure of his violent history as a fundamental 
component. It would be entirely in the spirit of both 
Ellison's nomenclatural tricksterism and the traditional 
African American "disruption at the level of the signifier" 
(Gates, Monkey 47), to say that Tarp has executed a 
revision within the "trap" of racial identity, transforming 
his trap/shackle by opening it, revising to insert a
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pluralistic form of "to be" (ar [e] ) forcing it back 
together, and bearing it with him into the future as "part" 
of his new identity as T a r p . 1 8 The structure of the past, 
that is, exists in a profound tension with the formlessness 
of individual freedom suggested by Tarp's hard-won opening, 
deforming, and personal marking of the link, just as 
Douglass "seems to exemplify the heroic modulation of form 
and chaos, convention and invention" (Benston 163). In 
this creatively sustained tension between fixed past and 
ongoing renewal, between conventional structure and self- 
expressive riff, Ellison locates the true freedom of the 
plural self (and true "individuality")--a freedom that 
escapes both the order of discipline and the disintegration 
of multiplicity, both the violence of history and the chaos 
of historylessness.̂  c.W.E. Bigsby has remarked, "This
tension between chaos and form, this recognition of a 
profound ambivalence, is a fundamental trope of Ellison's 
work" (174), and Bigsby goes on to read this tension as the 
essence of Ellison's cultural pluralism, African American 
existentialism, and improvisatory jazz aesthetic. Tarp's 
leg iron is only one of numerous thematizations of such a 
tension in Invisible Man. but perhaps the one most 
evocative of its hero's quest for a sense of self that 
neither seals the plural psyche within the closed circle of 
unitary (racial) ego-constructs nor dissipates it across a
275
politically and personally meaningless array of multiple 
determinations.
Though often obscured at the narrative margins and never 
comprehensively apprehended by the protagonist, a series of 
related images of the possibilities located literally in 
the "break" created in the "shackle," located between the 
rigidity of order and the creative potentials of chaos, 
recur: when he momentarily reaches the self-accepting "yam 
level" of existence and announces, "I yam what I am" (260), 
there is a hint of the reality of tensional, pluralistic 
intersubjectivity in the subconscious reading of the line 
as "I you am (we are) what I am"; in the name and seemingly 
contradictory existence of Tod Clifton, another opened 
enclosure (cleft-tun), the theme of Tarp's shackle is 
reiterated; so too, the zoot-suiters whom the invisible man 
sees in the (underground) subway after Clifton's death and 
whom he associates with Clifton, with himself, and with 
Douglass, exist "outside the groove of history" (433). 
"[B]irds of passage who were too obscure for learned 
classification. . . of natures too ambiguous for the most 
ambiguous words" (429), they simultaneously thwart 
reductive identification, yet manage to craft highly 
stylized, distinctive identities for themselves. They do 
not have a conventional, historical, above-ground, visible 
(in the sense of objectifiable) self-presence, that is, 
"yet they are undeniably present. " as Houston Baker
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comments, "in the fastidiousness of their style" (Blues
61) .
Behind all these images lurks the recurrent figure of 
the "blues" (the next thing the invisible man notices, 
after seeing the zoot-suiters, is the sound of blues
music), what Baker has defined as the "blues matrix" of 
Invisible Man (Blues 14). This figure is thematized most 
fully in the sharecropper Jim Trueblood, whose remarkable 
narrative of his own tragedy evidences his bending of the 
"shackle" of the "genitalized" identity imposed upon him by 
"whites" like Norton, inescapable but not paralyzing, to 
his own self-authenticating purposes. As the novel's 
primary example of what Baker calls the "blues singer par 
excellence" (188), Trueblood is perhaps the first
representation the invisible man encounters of a possible
resolution to the problem of identity posed by the racial 
mirror stage. Trueblood represents the recognition-- 
recreated as the thematic of his own story as told to 
Norton--that he can neither live within the constrictive 
notions of "blackness" imposed on him by the social 
structure nor deny their effects on his self structure 
without suffering the psychic equivalent of amputation. At 
his personal moment of truth, the moment of his apparent 
commission of incest, this recognition is translated into 
his realization that if he moves he will commit what the 
social code defines as "sin," but that he is not willing to
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suffer the amputation involved in physically separating 
himself from the situation: "There was only one way I can
figger that I could git out: that was with a knife....you 
know I knowed that that was too much to pay to keep from 
sinnin’" (59). As Trueblood himself understands, this 
situation is figurative of the racial and economic 
conditions of his entire life: "But once a man gits hisself 
in a tight spot like that there ain't much he can do. It 
ain't up to him no longer.... That' s just about been my 
life" (59). Trueblood's recognition that his "tight spot" 
is not only a product of, but a metaphor for, the broader 
context of conditions in the racialized south urges a 
reading of his "tale" as an allegory about economic and 
social identity, a subversive subtext that Norton 
certainly, and invisible man for the most part, does not 
grasp. Within the context of the episode's "white" sexual 
mirror staging, we might say that Trueblood's story 
connotes his decision not to use a "knife" to remove the 
thoroughly "genitalized" identity construct (the 
"erection") being forced upon him by the racial structure, 
nor to compromise his humanity by simply conforming to it. 
Instead, he accepts the effectual realities of the incest, 
the "white" insistence that he is depraved, and the 
conditions of his life, but transforms them to his own 
self-expressive, self-authenticating, and economically 
empowering purposes. In the new life-story passed on in
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his own narrative, this transformation occurs at the moment
of his decision to return home despite the condemnation of
his preacher, his wife, and the nearby black college (which
finds him embarassing and offers him money to move away).
That night, Trueblood's improvisatory conversion of the
acquired form of a "church song" into some blues "ain't
never been sang before" (65-66) signals his epiphany of
self-affirmation: "I makes up my mind that I ain't nobody
but myself and ain't nothin' I can do but let whatever is
gonna happen, happen" (66). As Baker comments,
In translating his tragedy into the vocabulary and 
semantics of the blues and, subsequently, into the 
electrifying expression of his narrative, Trueblood 
realizes that he is not so changed by catastrophe that 
he must condemn, mortify, or redefine his essential 
self. This self. ..is in many ways the obverse of the 
stable, predictable, puritanical, productive, law- 
abiding ideal self of the American industrial-capitalist 
society. (Blues 190)
It is such a version of the self--what might be called,
following Baker's supple explications of the blues motif
here and in other African American literary identities, the
plural blues self--that is always hauntingly present as the
invisible man pursues his struggle for an acceptable
identity. Taking the rejected unitary self-images of its
tragic past along with it into a renewable present as
components of an affirmative, improvisatory identity, the
plural blues self is, like Tarp's opened leg iron, a
disciplinary structure wrenched open, and personally
marked, but not discarded. As Baker suggests, such a self
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is opposed in Invisible Man by a network of racial, 
industrial-capitalist, and ideological disciplines that 
enforce the "ideal self": "stable, predictable,
puritanical, productive, and law-abiding." Though the 
invisible man, still intent on conforming to the "shackles" 
of his society's individualizing disciplines, seems 
oblivious to the blues meanings of Trueblood's story when 
he hears it, he is, by the time he has retreated 
underground with Tarp's leg iron and prepared to write his 
own story, fully cognizant of the value of, as Trueblood 
puts it, "movin1 without movin," of revising the self from 
within rather than leaving old selves behind.
Between the absolute discipline of "white" or "black" 
determined self-images that "Ble(e)d" your "soe(l)" and the 
absolute liberation of self-dispersal that makes your 
innumerable masks ("rind") your only soul ("hart"), then, 
Ellison locates the creative tension of the blues self-- 
that psychoexistential nexus where you take the music that 
has been given to you and make of it your own "True-blood." 
For Ellison the ideal of democratic subjectivity is 
represented by the blues consciousness of Trueblood, who 
recognizes, in his personal moment of truth, that to deny 
the determining conditions and constraints of his life 
would be to amputate, to hemorrhage, a profoundly essential 
part of his self. Indeed, it is an experienced and blues- 
wise invisible man who, in his "Prologue," is capable of
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combining Trueblood's blues with Tarp's opened shackle in 
the single, radiant image of Louis Armstrong's trumpet. 
Armstrong, he tells us, "bends" the discipline of a 
"military instrument into a beam of lyrical sound," making 
"a poetry out of being invisible" (8) . True freedom for 
the self, Ellison suggests, can only be won through bending 
the "military instrument" of cultural individualization 
into a structure with an opening or gap. Such an aperture 
might serve not only as the free space of continued 
restyling of the self, but also as the crucial interstice 
where "underground," "invisible" interconnections with 
social, historical, and racial otherness might obtain-- 
shattering, among other destructive dualisms, the "dual 
narcissism" of race (Fanon 10).
As Homi Bhabha argues, "Private and public, past and 
present, the psyche and the social develop an interstitial 
intimacy... that questions binary divisions through which 
such spheres of social experience are often spatially 
opposed" (Culture 13). Anticipating Bhabha's postcolonial 
critique, Invisible Man similarly formulates a subject that 
imports "a hybridity, a difference 'within', a subject that 
inhabits the rim of an 'in-between' reality" (Culture 13). 
To become conscious of this interstitial relationship 
between psyche and social, past and present, is to 
decolonize--and de-individualize--the racial self, turning 
its inherent fissuring and fragmentation to positive
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political and ontological effect. Thus, the invisible man 
begins to truly hear Louis Armstrong's blues only when he 
recognizes the off-beat, nodular, and "invisible" quality 
of his experience, reaching that state where "Instead of 
the swift and imperceptible flowing of time, you are aware 
of its nodes....And you slip into the breaks and look 
around" (8). Similarly, the "breaks" in the subject, the 
"interstices" where the psyche and the social communicate, 
inform the contradiction and internal division that the 
invisible man, in his epilogue, recognizes as the 
inevitable reality of self-experience: "Now I know men are 
different and that all life is divided and that only in 
division is there true health" (563). It is the sickness 
of a society characterized by "an increasing passion to 
make men conform to a pattern," he notes, that has finally 
forced his complex, unpatternable existence underground. 
Though the novel ends ambivalently with this "patterning" 
passion still in force as the prevailing "trend of the 
times" (563), Ellison is profoundly clear about the path to 
both psychological and social health: "[D]iversity is the
word. Let man keep his many parts and you'll have no 
tyrant states" (563).
Notes
1. See chapter 1, 60-70; Nielsen 5-11; and Fanon 160-65.
2. For Baker's interpretation of the economic and 
performative dimensions of the Trueblood episode,
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especially as they relate to his conception of an African 
American "blues" identity, see pp. 172-199 in Blues. 
Ideology, and Afro-American Literature.
3. It might also be noted that Norton is shaken, drained 
and weak because he is, so to speak, sexually "spent." One 
of the hilarious jokes of this episode is the veiled 
metaphor of sexual satisfaction that Ellison is applying to 
what I have framed as Norton's self-constitution. To 
understand the blues motif which informs the chapter (the 
blues is also the mode of self-sustaining and self-creating 
affirmation at the heart of Trueblood's story) is to 
understand that Norton is "getting off" by having his ego 
stroked by "blacks." With classic blues subversion and 
indirection, Ellison riffs on the sexual components of 
Norton's need for "blacks" by placing the narrator in the 
situation of being a "driver" for the "white" man, "gazing 
at the long ash of his cigar" (41) as he "smokes." We 
might gloss this image, for example, with the sexual 
metaphors in the following set of blues lyrics from, 
respectively, Bo Carter and Memphis Minnie:
I come over here, sweet baby, just to get my ashes 
hauled...Won't you draw on my cigaret, smoke it there all 
night long, / Just draw on my cigaret, baby, until you 
make my good ashes come.
Won't you be my chauffeur, won't you be my chauffeur? / I 
want someone to drive me, I want someone to drive me 
downtown.
For these and other blues sexual metaphors, see Levine 242- 
43 .
4. My phrasing is indebted to George P. Rawick's discussion 
of the historical formation of "whiteness." As Roediger 
summarizes, "Rawick‘s argument that the typical early 
bourgeois racist constructed whiteness by imagining ' a 
pornography of his former life' and projecting it onto 
Blacks might be expanded in order to consider the racism of 
working class Irish-American Catholics who at times created 
a pornography of their present lives and at other times of 
their past" (153). I am suggesting a similar expansion to 
consider the racial postures of twentieth-century bourgeois 
subjects like Stein and (in Ellison's fictional portrayal) 
Norton. See Rawick 132-33. Similarly, Joseph R. Urgo 
describes these scenes in Invisible Man as a "white, staged 
pornography" (29) .
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5. Fanon's entire discussion of this "genitalization" (160- 
180) is relevant to the scenes elaborated in Invisible Man. 
encompassing both the "Sybil" fantasy (17 8) and the 
Norton/Stein projection: "For the majority of white men the 
Negro represents the sexual instinct (in its raw state). 
The Negro is the incarnation of a genital potency beyond 
all moralities and prohibitions" (177).
6. "[T]he Negro, because of his body, impedes the closing 
of the postural schema of the white man--at the point, 
naturally, at which the black man makes his entry into the 
phenomenal world of the white man" (Fanon 160) .
7. As in chapter 2, I am using the terms "disciplinary 
technology" and "individual" in the particular senses 
elaborated by Foucault in, for example, Discipline and 
Punish and The History of Sexuality: Volume One: "The
individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an 
'ideological' representation of society; but he is also a 
reality fabricated by this specific technology of power 
that I have called ' discipline'....The individual and the 
knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production [of power]" (Discipline 194) .
8. Thus, as Kenneth Burke has observed, Invisible Man 
illustrates how "technology," including the "technology" of 
"symbolic action," supersedes "race" as the object of 
Ellison's social critique: "Technology transcends race, not 
in the sense that it solves the problem of racial 
discrimination, but in the sense that technology itself is. 
the problem. . . .With the current terrific flowering of 
technology the problem of self-control takes on a possibly 
fatal, and certainly ironic, dimension. We must all 
conspire together, in a truly universal siblinghood, to 
help us all help one another to get enough control over our 
invented technologic servants to keep them from controlling 
us" (Burke 3 58) . I want to examine here, with specific 
attention to Foucault's "disciplinary technologies" that 
manage and organize life itself, how Invisible Man 
illustrates the extent and the effects of a pervasive 
flowering of methods of controlling and atomizing human 
identity.
9. Bledsoe's role as an enforcer of the "black subject" is 
linked to Norton's by several metaphors in the novel, the 
most telling of which may be the cross-referencing of 
spiritual and physical mutilation images. That Bledsoe's
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name suggests "bleeder" of "souls" connects him directly to 
the crazy vet's description of Norton as a "lyncher of 
souls" (92).
10. Through the technique of surveillance, Foucault argues, 
"disciplinary power became an 'integrated' system, linked 
from the inside to the economy and to the aims of the 
mechanism in which it was practised. It was also organized 
as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power; for although 
surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that 
of a network of relations from top to bottom" (Discipline 
176-77) . Power, according to Foucault, "cannot be 
localized in a particular type of institution or 
apparatus," though they operate what he refers to as the 
"microphysics of power" (26).
11. As Harper comments, Bledsoe's insistence on his own 
"power" in the same speech that alludes to its real source 
is "beautifully self-consuming" (120).
12. See also Urgo's "Introduction" to Novel Frames for a 
concise but useful summary of the "postmodern" 
understanding of identity which he uses as a basis for 
reading Ellison's critique of the objectified, "individual" 
self. Citing theorists such as Paul Smith and Clifford 
Geertz, who critique the "integral, autonomous self" as a 
vestige of "a defunct ideological system" (xiii), Urgo 
argues for a reading of Ellison's novel as a "literary 
attempt to interrogate the idea of an autonomous self" 
(xvi). Although, as my own approach to individualization 
is meant to suggest, that ideological system is anything 
but "defunct," Urgo's presentation of the issues of self 
and racial objectification in Invisible Man is the best I 
have seen.
13. Harper 121-22. While Harper draws his framework here 
from the Marxist perspective of Lukacs, the Foucauldian 
approach which is so useful for unraveling the politics of 
identity control allows, I think, for a similar connection 
between subjectification and capitalism: "At a less general 
level, the technological mutations of the apparatus of 
production, the division of labour and the elaboration of 
the disciplinary techniques sustained an ensemble of very 
close relations.... Each makes the other possible and 
necessary; each provides a model for the other" (Discipline 
221) .
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14. The invisible man's self-recognized "obsession with 
[his] identity" (253) might thus be viewed in terms of what 
Kohut identified as the distinguishing anxiety of cases of 
"narcissistic personality disorder": a "dysfunctional
hypervigilance" (Sussman 66) concerning the multiple 
manifestations of the self. See Sussman 66; and Kohut, 
Analysis 19-20, and Restoration 102-105. According to 
Kohut, "The core of disintegration anxiety is the 
anticipation of the breakup of the self, not the fear of 
the [oedipal] drive" (Restoration 104). The invisible man 
thus experiences a predictable "dread of the loss of his 
self--the fragmentation of and the estrangement from his 
body and mind in space, the breakup of the sense of his 
continuity in time" (Restoration 105).
15. That the invisible man remarks upon his sense of utter 
loneliness and isolation as he walks the streets of Harlem 
trying to rid himself of the pieces of "blackness" that are 
unacceptable to his new self (321), indeed, evokes the 
"alienated individualism" that bell hooks associates with 
"internalized racism" (39). The dehumanizing practices of 
a "colonized" society, hooks argues, encourage African 
Americans--even as they reject overt racism--to internalize 
an individualistic ethic that restricts the liberatory 
possibilities of "radical black subjectivity" and "black 
community."
16. "This is what is clinically called heautophany or 
heautoscopy," images of internal organs removed from the 
body (Fanon 162).
17. Recall here that, entrapped in the hospital machine 
which sought to convert him into the "unconflicted" black 
subject, IM realized that to destroy the machine in an 
escape effort would be futile, for it would destroy 
himself: "I wanted freedom, not destruction... .There was no
getting around it. I could no more escape than I could 
think of my identity. Perhaps, I thought, the two things 
are involved with each other. When I discover who I am,
I '11 be free" (237) .
18. That the tropological revision of the shackle from its 
first appearance in the novel to its second, along with its 
apparent status as a trope for the revision of Tarp's 
identity and his name, refers to the tradition of 
"signifying" seems overtly signaled by Tarp's remark to IM 
that the leg iron has "a heap of signifying wrapped up in 
it" (379) . Henry Louis Gates's definition of 
"Signifyin(g)" as a revision or critique of the "nature of
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the sign itself" is the basis of my reading of Tarp1s name 
( Monkey 45-47) . As Gates comments, "Signifyin(g)" is not 
only a rhetorical but an ontological "guerrilla action" 
(46), an "act of self-definition, implicit in a (re)naming 
ritual, [undertaken] within the process of signification 
that the English language had inscribed for itself" (47).
19. As Stepto observes, this tension also informs Ellison's 
understanding of the appropriate relation between the 
artist and tradition, a thematic that overlaps, of course, 
with the invisible man's quest for a workable schema of 
identity. In Tarp's opened leg iron we have, indeed, 
something like a master trope for Ellison's visions of the 
dynamic interactions of self and other(s), self and 
developmental past, African American culture and slavery, 
"black" and "white," "individual" and society, form and 
chaos.
Chapter Four 
Things Are Going to Pieces: The Psychology of
Blackface in Berryman's Dream Songs
During his thirteen years of work on the poetic sequence
that would eventually be published as The Dream Soncrs. John
Berryman frequently telephoned his long-time acquaintance
Ralph Ellison for consultation, concerning the blackface
minstrel devices that Berryman was incorporating in his
poems. These long-distance colloquies evoke a confused
jumble of United States cultural hybridization: a mid-
twentieth-century white man, intent on articulating the
racialized other within his own identity, turning to a
contemporary African American as an authority on what was
originally a mid-nineteenth-century whi te cultural
representation of "black" cultural forms. Ellison later
recalled these conversations:
During the period he was writing Dream Sonas I grew to 
expect his drunken (sometimes) telephone calls. Usually 
he wanted my reaction to his uses of dialect. My 
preference is for idiomatic rendering, but I wasn't 
about to let the poetry of what he was saying be 
interrupted by the dictates of my ear for Afro-American 
speech. Besides, watching him transform elements of the 
minstrel show into poetry was too fascinating.
(Mariani, Life 3 87)
Far from clarifying the situation, Ellison's recollection 
increases the number of intriguing questions swirling 
around the cultural dynamic in play here. Ellison was 
certainly a significant authority on the minstrel show, 
particularly in its later manifestation as a reappropriated
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performance of blackface by blacks, but what might be the 
relevance of any actual "Afro-American speech" to the 
distorted, exaggerated version of black verbal styles 
represented in minstrelsy? Was it Berryman's rather 
puzzling intention to use certain devices from blackface, 
but to make the linguistic style authentically "Afro- 
American, " rather than authentically blackface? Moreover, 
what would authentic "Afro-American speech" be, in the 
context of both geographical and historical variability, 
and what are the politics of a white poet turning to an 
African American intellectual to provide verification of 
how uneducated "blacks" really sound? Finally, if we 
consider that Berryman may have been most interested in 
Ellison's erudite input on his use in several of the poems 
of genuine twentieth-century blues voices and culture--both 
influenced, it is true, through an almost untangleable 
process of cultural miscegenation, by the minstrel show 
itself--we are confronted with Ellison's statement that he 
elected not to hold Berryman's poems to the standard of 
"idiomatic rendering," and that he did not, in fact, so 
that the poet could freely utilize elements of the minstrel 
show. Was Berryman simply uncritically equating, as most 
nineteenth-century Americans certainly did, "blackface" 
with "black"? More implausibly, in his comment, was 
Ellison?
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Such questions, and the complexities of U.S. racial 
subjectivity evoked by Berryman's effort to represent a 
racialized component of white identity, finally, become 
even more intriguing in the light of Ellison's further 
comment about those (sometimes) drunken telephone calls: 
"Fascinating too, and amusing, was my suspicion that 
Berryman was casting me as a long-distant Mister 
Interlocutor— or was it Mister Tambo?--whose ad lib role 
was that of responding critically to his Mister Bones and 
Huffy Henry" (Mariani, Life 387). The "lower frequencies" 
on which Ellison's nameless African American, in the 
haunting closing line of Invisible Man. purported to "speak 
for"--and out of--the consciousness of his (white?) reader 
in this instance appear to have been the frequencies of the 
telephone line.
While Ellison's remark is amusing in the light of 
Berryman's decision to leave his protagonist's interlocutor 
nameless, not to mention his delight at the whimsically 
expressed idea that "some assistant professor will become 
an associate professor by learning the name of Henry's 
friend" (Plotz 3), it is also of striking critical interest 
as an illustration of the cultural dynamics of racial 
subjectivity that are crucial to The Dream Songs. The 
tangle of representational issues evoked by those phone 
calls--the ambivalence, the contradictions that seem to be 
strung on Ellison's synopsis of the situation--speak
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volumes about the presence of a "black" other within the 
white subject that Berryman was straining to articulate. 
If, in the personal terms of a unique literary 
relationship, Berryman posed Ralph Ellison himself as his 
internal "black" voice, we might further conceptualize that 
other as, in general terms, the sound and style of 
"blackness," or, in cultural terms, as the minstrel show.
The ambivalence and strangeness flavoring Ellison's own 
comments about Berryman's artistic method are magnified in 
The Dream Soncrs themselves, where it is notoriously 
difficult to decipher precisely how the minstrel show 
device and the black(face) voices are being employed. If 
on certain occasions the poems bemoan the failures of civil 
rights and social equality for African Americans, on others 
they utilize the suffering of racial persecution as a crude 
metaphor for Henry's metaphysical struggle with a cruel and 
dominating God; if in some poems the coon show device is 
used to counterpoint, as Ellison's comment suggests, the 
self-absorption of a traditional hero with internal 
dialogue and self-criticism, in others it is used to 
articulate little more than a rampant and self-disgusting 
sexuality. Critical assessments of the blackface elements 
in the Songs, incomplete and marginal in any case, have 
reflected this ambiguity. William Wasserstrom's early 
laudatory assessment was that the poems sympathetically 
"recreate" the "downs and ups" of "mutilated men, American
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Negroes" (172)--that the poems even self-consciously 
reproduce the coded linguistic subversions of various black 
cultural modes and ironize the original white version of 
minstrelsy (a view that would at least begin to make sense 
of Ellison's apparently supportive interest in the 
project). But Wasserstrom's opinion is balanced by views, 
like those of Joel Conarroe, which have taken into account 
the obviously racist impulses of white minstrelsy in 
categorizing Berryman's reproduction as naive, ignorant of 
the black experience, and exploitative (Conarroe 104). 
Perhaps the poet Michael Harper's indignant verse rejoinder 
best illustrates the potential for insult in Berryman's 
extensive use of a degenerative "black" voice: "[Y]ou wrote 
in that needful black idiom / offending me, for only your 
inner voices / spoke such tongues . . ./ That slave in you
was white blood forced to derision."1
My own contention is that the most productive approach 
to Berryman's minstrel technique lies somewhere between 
these two extremes of response, taking into account not 
only the strength of the poet's genuinely sympathetic 
identification with victims of racism, not only the 
exploitation inherent in his assumption that he could adopt 
"blackness" as the fit expression for his own sense of 
alienation, but also the irresolvably ambivalent and 
contradictory impulses of the minstrel show itself. Indeed, 
Eric Lott has recently used an astute blend of historicist
methodology and cultural theory to show that the minstrel 
show was always a cultural phenomenon riven with unclear 
racial antecedents, flatly contradictory motivations, 
equivocal subject matter, and;ambiguous political effects. 
The most popular--and hence most powerful--entertainment 
mode of the nineteenth century in the U.S., blackface 
minstrelsy was capable of projecting anti-slavery 
sentimentalism and anti-abolitionist derision, liberatory 
cross-racial identification and oppressive racial 
distancing, from the same stage, effecting, for example, an 
ambivalently "derisive celebration of the power of 
blackness" (Lott 29) . It is thus insufficient, Lott 
argues, "merely to read off racial oppression from 
minstrelsy's inauthenticity" (100-101), both because 
blackface was a culturally creolized form with an 
undeniable, if unquantifiable, measure of "black" 
involvement and because the racist tendencies of blackface 
production were rooted in a thoroughly "contradictory 
structure" of racial feeling in society, a structure also 
capable of evoking cross-racial solidarity and affection on 
the same stage (29) .2 a  century later, Berryman's 
reproduction of blackface performance was fraught with many 
of the same contradictions, and it is this slipperiness— of 
both psychological motivation and representational 
"authenticity"--that is registered in Ellison's
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noncommittal description of those remarkable telephone 
calls.
Lott's explanations of the ambivalent nature of 
minstrelsy ..are particularly valuable because of his 
attention to not only the political, but also the 
psychological contradictions that were at play in its 
production, and it is on the latter that I want to focus in 
approaching The Dream Soncrs. The condensed and displaced 
themes of the blackface act, Lott suggests, functioned as a 
sort of "theatrical dream work" of both the social (13 5) 
and the personal (147), working to symbolically resolve a 
whole range of anxiety-ridden economic, sexual, moral, and 
identity conflicts. Berryman's rather derivative minstrel 
effects, as I will show, are orchestrated to analogous 
symbolic ends, forming a critical dimension of what he 
explicitly conceptualized as a contemporary social and 
psychic "dream work." The representation of race, in 
Berryman's dream version of the coon show as much as in its 
prototype, is above all a way of playing with intimations 
of disorder, sexuality, and corporeality--enacting a 
subversion of the "white" social subject that is at once 
desired and feared--by identifying with a "blackness" that 
can be simultaneously distanced, ridiculed, and controlled. 
By slipping into and out of the blackface mask at will, 
momentarily impersonating the hell-raising "black" and then 
just as quickly returning to the security of "whiteness,"
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Berryman engages in precisely what Lott refers to as the 
"disappearing act in which blackface made 'blackness' 
flicker on and off so as simultaneously to produce and 
disintegrate the body" (117).3
In what follows, I read the seeming ambivalence of 
Berryman's own simultaneous identification with and 
degradation of "blackness," every bit as consumed with the 
body and its transgressive libidinality as was his 
nineteenth-century model, yet often gesturing toward a 
rhetoric of social anti-racism, in terms of what I view as 
Berryman's profound crisis of the subject. The precise 
emotional configuration of this crisis might be formulated 
psychopathologically in terms of the narcissistic 
personality disorders, and even borderline conditions, 
outlined in Kohut's "self psychology" and various object- 
relations approaches to subjectivity. Indeed, the 
persistent symbolization of orality, threatening authority 
figures, and states of physical disintegration in Henry's 
"dream-work" is suggestive of the dream content Kohut 
associates with such disorders. The theme of the contrast 
between coherent identity and extreme identity loss, 
however, becomes so pervasive in The Dream Songs as to 
become implicated in the much broader, less clinical 
concerns which can be and have been read as central to 
Berryman's work: the proliferation of voices, a proto­
postmodern attention to the self as a construct, his
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donning of Yeatsian "masks" to mediate between self and 
nonself, and his overriding concern with the very nature of 
the poet, defined--in a fashion indebted to both Whitman 
and Keats--as a mere vessel for transmitting other 
identities.4 What I want to suggest here, specifically, is 
the way in which Berryman resolves the anxieties associated 
with fragmented identity precisely through poetry--through 
the manipulation of various poetic masks that include 
minstrelsy.
The minstrel show device itself, that is, becomes one of 
Berryman's most ingenious methods for inflecting his text 
with masks, voices, and personae, condensing as it does 
into a single form his own aesthetic and personal needs and 
the most politically overburdened signifier of the racial 
construction of the subject in his culture. Ultimately, I 
propose, we might read The Dream Sonas as Berryman's effort 
to depict in verse a basic structure of subjectivity: the 
constant tension or, in the case of the extremities of 
narcissistic disorder, alternation between an autonomous, 
egoistic--and well-disciplined--self, on the one hand, and 
its dispersal into a fragmented, intersubjective--and 
transgressive--plurality of connections, pieces, or masks, 
on the other. One of these masks, and one of Berryman's 
names for the slippage of the subject they imply, was 
blackface minstrelsy, a discourse that, like the (racial)
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mirror stage itself, inescapably casts the body as the 
template for the unity and disintegration of the self.
A case of disintegration anxiety
Berryman links the crisis of the subject at the core of 
his long poem to a complex set of causative factors, 
outlining it as a product of his protagonist Henry's 
personal, psychological, narcissistic injuries and of the 
perceived loss of structure in the social environment of 
the late twentieth century. As even Kohut would agree, 
personal and social factors in the pathogenesis of 
narcissistic disorders can never be entirely untangled: 
reading ego crisis in a different, but instructively 
parallel, literary example, he notes that "Hamlet's psyche 
is 'out of joint' because it has to confront the fact that 
the world in which he had believed has become 'out of 
joint'" (Analysis 236). Similarly, Berryman's Henry is 
"the poor man" who "is coming to pieces joint by joint" not 
only because of a catastrophic childhood paternal loss but 
also because of economic, moral, and political 
"c o n d i t i o n s & the faceless monsters of the Soviet 
Unions" (Song 140). Thus, the death by suicide of Henry's 
father during Henry's childhood and the equally devastating 
"death" or absence of the heavenly Father (the loss that 
causes Henry's consuming preoccupation with his dicey 
metaphysical status) blend almost seamlessly into the
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deaths of critical social values--love, compassion, 
equality, honesty— that characterize the nuclear, cold war, 
hyperindustrialized age in which Henry finds himself.
Elsewhere, I have examined in more detail Berryman's 
extended development of Henry as a case of what Kohut calls 
"disintegration anxiety," focusing on poems like Song 137, 
where Henry glibly observes that "things are going to 
pieces," and Song 311, where the function of 
Henry1s/Berryman1s poetry in the symbolic resolution of 
that anxiety is suggested by the line, "The pieces sat up & 
wrote." Here, I want to refer briefly to those causative 
factors in Henry's disintegration complex that might be 
conceptualized in terms of the increasing disciplinarity of 
twentieth-century culture, eventually relating those 
disciplinary forces to the Kohutian model of self 
pathology. While Henry is unnerved by the threats of a 
militarized, nuclear, and ecologically deteriorating age, 
his dream-work also reflects a sort of grim unease 
precipitated by the more insidious forces of alienation in 
society. ̂  There is, for example, the pervasive 
disciplinarity evidenced by Henry's frequent paranoia about 
a carceral network in which he is always at risk of being 
criminalized— caught, tried, imprisoned, executed--and a 
surveillance network in which there is always the threat of 
being watched, often by the police. What Henry feels as 
the pressures of an intense effort to control the modern
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subject, I would argue, are manifested in distorted dream 
form in poems like Song 12, which weaves together 
intimations of surveillance, illegality, and execution; 
Song 101, a dream in which a vague police presence combines 
with a vision of universal insanity and incarceration to 
evoke a sense of "total LOSS" and of the "absolute 
disappearance of continuity and love"; and Song 95, where 
such themes converge in the shape of a single police 
officer whose surly gaze reduces Henry to a Kafkaesque 
insect and provokes his most psychotic criminal fantasies.
The atmosphere of disciplinary order and morality is 
perhaps only a function of the culture of commodification 
and technologization that persistently threatens to reduce 
full human identity and erode spirituality. Henry is 
particularly irked by his complete subjection, even as a 
poet, to the labor, wage, and production-driven economic 
system. He articulates the threat of what Marxist theory 
might call the modern rationalization of the subject--and 
what Kohut noted as the effects of "industrialization" 
(Restoration 270)--with images like the "pinched chest" and 
the "thinky death" of Song 10, the implied "rat race" and 
the hypertechnical social science that reduces human beings 
to machines in Song 13, and the strange forces of 
mechanization that threaten spirituality when they invade 
the "Temples" of Songs 73 and 99. So too, the intensive 
labors and economic imperatives of a rampant capitalism
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leave Henry sweating throughout the book to earn enough 
money, pay bills, consume goods, and shell out taxes; 
noncommodifiable matters of the "fathomless heart" (10) 
like the writing of poetry, for which he is paid nothing 
(67), must take a back seat to the pecuniary exigency of 
teaching: he "taught & taught & taught / ...to mollify one 
creditor / or another... // [mostly]...the grindstone & the 
nose / had it, & him..." (211).
Though the profound racialization of U.S. society is 
not, finally, a central concern of the poems, it recurs 
often enough to be considered an important feature of the 
social "conditions" that are putting Henry out of joint. 
The "race bigotry" (24), segregationism (60 and 68), and 
ultimate commodification of humanity of which they are a 
legacy (273), decried in several Songs, are, indeed, 
closely tied to the tendencies toward criminalization and 
economic rationalization mentioned above. Of course, as I 
suggested in chapter 1, the tendencies of a disciplinary 
society to criminalize and to commodify the bodies of (to 
convert into pure labor) certain segments of the population 
probably played a critical historical role in the 
racialization of the U.S. population, but Henry tends to 
reproduce this channel for the production of "race" rather 
than subvert it, frequently adopting a mask of "blackness" 
for his own sense of himself as a moral transgressor and as 
a purely economic subject. It is precisely this ambivalent
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relation to "race" that I want to examine in greater 
detail— along with the Songs that critique bigotry— below. 
In any case, this sense of racialization is only a 
particularly violent— and visible— component of the social 
context of alienation underlying what we might think of as 
Henry's narcissistic personality disorder. For Henry, as 
for "tragic man"--Kohut's iconic modern sufferer of the 
narcissistic disorder--a comprehensive environment of 
empathic and relational disjunctures is experienced as an 
outright fragmentation of the self and results in a 
desperate, compensatory need to "perform" one's own self­
presence . 6
At the core of the narcissistically damaged 
configuration that includes Henry's well-remarked rage, 
paranoia, hypochondria and compulsive oral and phallic 
preoccupations, I am suggesting, is a basic structural 
deficiency of the self. Eventually, I want to read Henry's 
condition, and his minstrelsy, in terms of Kohut's 
formulation of the fragmentation of the self as a 
"splitting off" of fundamental libidinal and narcissistic 
sectors of the self from the "central" personality 
(Analysis 183-85). I want to begin, however, by focusing 
on his condition as an instance of the comprehensive 
disorganization and "precariousness" of self-experience 
that Kohut also describes (Restoration 103-5), a total loss 
of the self that can result in the former splitting
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tendency as a defensive mechanism. Henry, with his
recurrent dreams that "things are going to pieces" (Song
137), suffers from what Kohut terms "disintegration
anxiety": "the dread of the loss of his self--the
fragmentation of and estrangement from his body and mind in
space, the breakup of the sense of his continuity in time"
(Restoration 105).
Henry's tendency to "come to pieces joint by joint,"
already noted in Song 140, first manifests itself in Song
8, which describes a similar progressive fragmentation of
the self and the body. Here, as with the analytical social
science of Song 13, which reduces Henry to a machine
(which, appropriately, falls apart), an indeterminate
"they" destroy the spiritual levels of experience and
reduce identity solely to its bodily manifestation:
They blew out his loves, his interests. 'Underneath,' 
(they called in iron voices) 'understand, 
is nothing. So there.'
...They lifted off 
his covers till he showed, and cringed &. pled 
to see himself less.
They installed mirrors till he flowed...
The sense of extreme objectification registered here is 
linked to a literal disintegration of the body, for not 
only does Henry "flow" when surrounded by the mirrors which 
force him to objectify himself, but the "they" also engage 
in a progressive removal of Henry's teeth, hair, eyes, and 
"crotch." While the "iron" voices certainly evoke forces
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of technologization, most signifiers in Berryman's "dream-
work" are overdetermined and, within the context of the
book as a whole, I would read the cryptic "they" in Song 8
as a figure of authority in general; it encompasses not
only the enforcement of the industrialized body-as-subject
and the threat of total surveillance, but also, to place
such social forces within Kohut's post-Freudian paradigm,
the interpellative power of the superego. Indeed, in a
discussion of how both workplace and parental denials of
the "total self" can destroy one's sense of self-cohesion,
Kohut suggests a direct link between the fragmentation of
the self and the kind of threatening but indistinct
"voices" of authority that Berryman evokes here:
The cold voices...which the paranoiac often reports as 
commenting on aspects of his behavior, details of his 
looks, etc., are perhaps to be understood not only as 
the criticism of a projected superego but also as the 
projected expression of a feeling of fragmentation which 
arose as a result of the patient's insufficiently 
developed or declining psychic capacity to maintain a 
solid cathexis of the self. (Analysis 121-22)
Henry's own crisis of subjectivity, as we shall see, is
consistently played out within a disciplinary context set
by such projected voices of authority.
Throughout The Dream Songs. Henry seems inordinately
obsessed with damage to his bodily integrity. In Songs 42
and 65 the focus of this anxiety is a damaged ankle, while
Songs 163-7 0 bemoan a broken arm in particular and a
breaking body in general. Elsewhere, Henry has nightmare
visions of being pursued and bitten by the dentist's drill 
(Song 185) and of having his left leg "sawed off / at the 
knee, " leaving him to continue life as a "peg-leg" (Song 
319). Many of these references conflate bodily mutilation 
as a concrete "verbalization" for an otherwise 
indescribable state of identity anxiety (Restoration 103) 
with the more specific anxiety of bodily deterioration 
leading toward death, as in the Opus Posthumous Songs of 
Book 4, where Henry actually imagines himself to be dead 
and buried. In the first of these, there is "something 
bizarre about Henry": portions of his "subject body" (a 
phrase that correlates well with Kohut's references to what 
we experience as a "body-self") are being "slowly sheared / 
off" as he becomes "smaller & smaller": "Henry's parts were 
fleeing" (Song 78). In Song 81, "they" are again at work, 
removing various pieces of Henry's now buried body. 
Finally, imagining the worms of the grave to be at hand, 
Henry alludes to a perceived failure or lack which lies at 
the heart of his fragmentation: "I am--I should be held
together by-- / but I am breaking up" (Song 85).
In these and similar references to the absence of some 
outside agent as a structuring device, the role of personal 
and developmental narcissistic injuries in the etiology of 
Henry's disintegration anxiety become more evident, taking 
their place alongside the social factors I have focused on 
so far. At the foundation of Kohutian self psychology is
the theory that the development of a balanced and 
realistically structured sense of self is dependent on the 
presence of-properly empathic "self-objects" which serve 
both as approving mirrors for the self's inherent 
narcissism and as idealized images of identity which the 
self can internalize as the basis for its own structure. 
If these self-objects— particularly in the case of parental 
self-objects during the crucial developmental years--are 
unempathic, unrealistically admiring, or absent altogether, 
and the mirroring and idealizing functions are thus 
disrupted, there is a tendency for the self to split or 
fragment resulting in narcissistic disorders like 
disintegration anxiety. This framework has considerable 
explanatory value for The Dream Songs. in which Henry's 
representations of both his maternal and paternal imagos 
are deeply troubled. Much of his anxiety clearly revolves 
around a single traumatic failure of paternity: the suicide 
of his father, who, when he "shot his heart out in a 
Florida dawn" (Song 384), "wiped out [Henry's] childhood" 
(Song 143). This abandonment is Henry's most insistent 
complaint, and is often directly associated, as when he 
links the broken ankle of Song 42 directly to the memory of 
his father's corpse, with his anxiety about a decaying 
bodily structure. And though, in one instance, Henry makes 
a somewhat forced effort to idealize the image of his 
mother (Song 100), even then the homage is confusedly and
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tellingly interfused with the orality of his alcoholism; in 
its other appearances the maternal imago is at best 
ambivalent, at worst extremely threatening--she is "the 
armed mother" of the night, "with her knives" (212) .
The identity crisis precipitated by both modern 
conditions and "self-object failures" (Kohut, Restoration 
190) is represented in The Dream Sonas as a tension between 
grandiose assertions of autonomy and self-presence-- 
captured in Henry's repeated recourse to rhetorical 
constructions beginning with an emphatic "I am"--and 
anxiety-ridden meditations on the fragmentation of that 
" I"--literalized in his recurrent idiom of "going to 
pieces." In song 195 Henry evokes the psychological 
paradigm I have outlined in connecting his disintegration 
directly to his father's critical absence: "I stalk my
mirror down this corridor / my pieces litter. Oklahoma, 
sore / from my great loss leaves me." Shattered by the 
loss of his father (who lived and was buried in Oklahoma), 
Henry seeks the mirror--the self-object--that might keep 
his tenuous self-structure from "breaking up." The poem 
concludes, however, with a desperate effort to deny the 
reality of his father's suicide and a hopeful vision of the 
reconstruction of the self and the body: "All my pieces
kneel and we all scream: / History's Two-legs [the father's 
corpse] was a heartless dream." Instead, Henry imagines, 
"reality is [feasts] // & reskinned knuckles & forgiveness
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& toys / unbreakable. . . " and "the growing again of the 
right arm / ... & the popping back in of eyes."^ This
poetic symbolization of a reconstituted self is crucial 
because, as I want to show, it is precisely through poetry, 
and through manipulation of the various poetic masks that 
include minstrelsy, that Henry quiets his screaming pieces 
by making them sing: the songs themselves become the
"dreams," the mirror--a sort of artistic self-object— that 
symbolically resolve the horror of identity fragmentation. 
In these lines, where Henry dreams himself whole, we see 
literalized the process by which Henry the poet--long noted 
as an autobiographical simulacrum of Berryman the poet-- 
experiences through representation the solace of moving 
from "I am in pieces" to "I am."8
Indeed, Henry's ability to work toward such symbolic 
reconstitutions of his "I" suggests a modicum of 
psychological health; the condition represented in The 
Dream Songs. even if we consider Henry's alcoholism, is 
perhaps not so uncontrolled or debilitating as to be 
categorized as "diseased" along the lines of some of the 
more serious cases discussed by Kohut. In this regard, it 
is important to note that Kohut views the continuum between 
a narcissistic cathexis of the self (Henry's "I am"), on 
the one hand, and a tendency to experience fragments 
(drives, sectors, imagos of others, archaic versions) of 
the self in isolation (Henry's "going to pieces"), on the
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other, not only as a clinical paradigm for 
psychother ̂ ipeutic analysis but also as the fundamental 
structure cf everyday psychological life (Sussman 66). 
While Berryman's poems gesture toward a restoration of 
wholeness through creative, narcissistic performances of 
the self, then, it is nevertheless Berryman's evocation of 
a fragmenting self in a fragmenting world that is perhaps 
his most lasting contribution to modern poetry. In Song 
137, in the midst of a horrific sequence of songs (134-45) 
that evoke oral and anal obsession, environmental disaster, 
bodily disintegration, violent rage, massive failures of 
paternal and divine nurturing, and--repeatedly--the suicide 
of his father, Henry sounds the definitive lament of 
"tragic man": "I don't understand this dream...why, /
things are going to pieces." Henry in pieces is Henry at 
his most representative of the modern condition and at his 
most poetic, but I am most interested in the fact that 
Henry in pieces is also Henry at his most "black." Having 
outlined a Kohutian model for Berryman's crisis of the 
subject, I now want to examine exactly how the 
representation of "blackness" functions as one of the 
strategies, with profoundly contradictory results, in 
Henry's/Berryman's symbolic resolution of the conflicts 
inherent in that crisis.
308
"I am the blackt-out man1
We can begin to see the psychic function of Berryman's
minstrel mask by examining Dream Song 22, which seems to
depict in particularly explicit fashion what Kohut referred
to as the "crucial psychological oscillations between the
cohesive and the fragmented self" (Restoration 77):
I am the little man who smokes & smokes.
I am the girl who does know better but.
I am the king of the pool.
I am so wise I had my mouth sewn shut.
I am a government official & a goddamned fool.
I am a lady who takes jokes.
I am the enemy of the mind.
I am the auto salesman and love you.
I am a teenage cancer, with a plan.
I am the blackt-out man.
I am the woman powerful as a zoo.
I am two eyes screwed to my set, whose blind—
It is the Fourth of July.
Collect: while the dying man, 
forgone by you creator, who forgives, 
is gasping 'Thomas Jefferson still lives' 
in vain, in vain, in vain.
I am Henry Pussy-cat! My whiskers fly.
There are several possibilities for making sense of what is
going on in this typically wry and cryptic Dream Song.
Following Denis Donoghue's emphasis, in one of the earliest
critical approaches to The Dream Songs, on Berryman's
technique of breaking the "egotistical sublimity" of his
poet's voice into various "voices" or "fragments," we might
think of the first twelve lines of the poem as the voices
of the others, especially "victims," for whom Henry is so
fond of speaking (Donoghue 24). Donoghue also noted the
similarity of this "voicing" to the Yeatsian "mask," and 
Jerome Mazzaro has more schematically outlined Berryman's 
use of such "masks" as a means for defining the self 
negatively, by assuming versions of the nonself. As 
Mazzaro suggests, in a Lacanian, relational world these 
various masks and roles literally constitute, though 
tenuously, the "I." From this perspective, we might 
formulate Song 22 as a construction, through the assumption 
of a series of "masks" or "identifications with or 
oppositions to another," of a "never fully realized" "image 
of the self" (Mazzaro 131): "I am Henry Pussy-cat!" By
virtue of its very otherness, this "I am" already contains 
the grounds of its own disintegration: "My whiskers fly."9
Similarly, Song 22 illustrates Paul Mariani's description 
of the thoroughly Whitmanian "I" of The Dream Sonas: the
"I" as a conduit that fills up and then pours out, singing 
with "the range of voices we have come to identify with 
Henry" (Mariani, "Lost" 223) . In this view, the opening 
lines of the song evoke a modernized, foreshortened, 
Berrymanesque version of a Whitmanian catalogue, a listing 
of what Berryman, in his own insightful essay on "Song of 
Myself," called the poetic "'I's' identifications outward"
(Freedom 231) .
While this identificatory poetics is a crucial component 
of Berryman's assumption of "blackness," I want to approach 
that dynamic by first reading Song 22 in terms of the more
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psychoanalytic structure of subjectivity that I have 
outlined above. From the viewpoint of Henry's 
disintegration anxiety, the poem reads as a literal 
representation--in Henry's typical dream idiom--of the 
oscillation between his regressive sense of nonidentity, or 
at least splintered identity, on the one hand, and his 
hypernarcissistic assertion of complete identity 
(poetically, a sort of egotistical sublime), on the other. 
Within the limits of this single poem, that is, the poetic 
persona modulates from an undifferentiated series of self- 
images or assumed personae to the single, emphatic 
declaration of self-presence and autonomy of "I am Henry 
Pussy-cat!", and back again to the bodily fragmentation of 
the closing image.
Song 22, we might say, is indicative of the dramatic 
oscillations Kohut ascribes to the narcissistically 
disordered self: such personalities fluctuate between
grandiosity, overexcited exhibitionism, and 
overidentification with an idealized imago, on the one hand 
(the posturing of "I am Henry Pussycat!", the 
identification with "the king of the pool," the invocation 
of the nation's idealized founding "fathers"), and a 
depressive, ashamed, hypochondriacal preoccupation with the 
disintegration and "deadness" of the self and with its 
isolated fragments, on the other (the "flying" off of body 
parts, the interest in the powerlessness stressed by the
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deaths of Jefferson and Adams on the same day, the 
preoccupation with orality).10 With the authority of an 
absent, unforgiving God looming in the background; the 
persona incorporates a series of disconnected images of 
"self" from the external environment ("objects") to prop up 
or stand for its own faltering psychic structure. These 
imagos, moreover, tellingly reemphasize the narcissistic 
damage: they are, by turns, obsessively oral, grandiose, 
powerless, ruthlessly manipulative, and helplessly 
manipulated. Indeed, the series of voices that seem to 
speak through Henry's voice in the first twelve lines of 
Song 22 themselves bespeak the very oscillations of 
narcissistic disorder: if the first sounds helplessly
addictive and oral incorporative, the fourth pretends to a 
self-sufficiency so total as to deny even the possibility 
of incorporation or the disruption of the bodily schema by 
closing off the oral orifice altogether; if the "king of 
the pool" is positively regal in his sense of grandiosity, 
the "woman powerful as a zoo" seems ironically disempowered 
and caged; if "the enemy of the mind" and the disingenuous 
auto salesman suggest ruthless refusal to recognize the 
full humanity of others, the disembodied eyes of line 12 
seem helplessly manipulated by the unilateral power of a 
television set that cannot acknowledge even the presence, 
much less the humanity, of those it interpellates.
Following such a reading, we might well interpret "the 
blackt-out man" of line 10 as a heavy drinker lapsed into 
an alcoholic dead zone, an instance of the drunken memory 
"blackout" noted elsewhere in The Dream Soncrs by critics, 
like Lewis Hyde and George F. Wedge, who have written on 
the significance of alcoholism in the book.H An equally 
compelling reading within the context of the themes 
developed throughout the book, however, is to view this as 
a reference to blackface and, thereby, to the "man" whose 
full humanity has been most comprehensively "blackt-out" in 
the U.S., the "man" with "black" skin. In fact, a careful 
analysis of the role played by the "blacked up." man 
throughout The Dream Sonas suggests that these two readings 
are not contradictory: my analysis of Berryman's deployment 
of "race" suggests precisely the complementarity of the 
alcoholic "blackt-out man" and the minstrel "blackt-out 
man" in his poetry, and it is on the psychology and 
politics of this identification that the balance of my 
study will focus.
Dream Song 22 provides a condensed figuration, then, of 
one of the important structuring devices of the entire 
book: Henry's dual tendencies toward an overly unified, 
autonomous, and grandiose identity and toward a looseness 
of identity that allows him to indulge the libidinality of 
the body, play multiple roles, don various masks, and 
identify with others whom he views as damaged or
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dispossessed. One of Henry's "roles" is assuredly the 
manic substance abuser; one of his masks, blackface; one of 
his imagined identifications, the racially oppressed. All 
of these are encapsulated in "the blackt-out man" of line 
10, but his placement within an undifferentiated series of 
such self-images helps us to understand how Henry's 
"minstrelsy" fits within what I have referred to as the 
poem's larger crisis of the subject--how it relates, that 
is, to the "I am Henry Pussy-cat!" of line 18. Blackface 
is Henry's favorite mask for the "disintegration products" 
of a fragmenting self (Kohut, Restoration 119): autoerotic 
drive fixations, a preoccupation with the mutilation and 
deterioration of the body, and exhibitionistic 
"performances" of self-presence.
The phrase "I am Henry Pussy-cat!", which I am relating 
to the grandiose pole of the narcissistically damaged self, 
is one in a series of "I am" refrains enunciated by Henry. 
John Haffenden has identified this construction as a major, 
recurrent structuring device in the sequence as a whole, 
relating it to Henry's desire for a self-sufficiency as 
complete as that expressed by the "I am that I am" of the 
Old Testament God of the Jews, and opposing it to Henry's 
fears of psychic and bodily disintegration (Haffenden 96- 
97). If, in Song 141, for example, Henry declares--in 
admitted emulation of Yahweh--that a self-interested "I am" 
shall be his credo, we might view it as a direct response
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to the intense disintegration anxiety expressed in Song 
140, where, the reader will remember, Henry was "coming to 
pieces joint by joint."
The frequency of Berryman's references to this crisis of 
the subject in his long sequence is perhaps obscured by his 
oneiric method, which employs a sort of dream symbolism for 
its elements: as often as Henry declares "I am" or dreams 
of withdrawal to the stability of the confines of a tree 
(9, 10), tower (140), citadel (372), house (163, 357, 376), 
temple (73, 102), cathedral (161), monastery (370),
"centre" (221, 368), or body, he imagines his self swarming 
with "others" or falling from the tree (9, 57), leaving the 
house (376), flowing (8, 137), leaking (10), spilling (43), 
pouring out (131, 221), excreting (134), bleeding (176),
radioactively decaying (51), or--in a plethora of 
nightmarish ways--disintegrating. The dream imagery of 
Song 137 is thus typical in its representation of a 
subject--symbolized by "heroes' bodies" and a temple--in 
crisis: the bodies are collapsing, the temple is knocked 
apart, Henry's "honey" is "flowing off," and "things are 
going to pieces" generally. Indeed, almost everything that 
makes The Dream Sonas so famously difficult, from the 
plurality of voices to the fractured syntax to the 
interruptions of minstrel dialogue itself, can be referred 
to this disruption of the subject, to Berryman's stated 
sense of himself as "a strange man, not unitary like other
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people." Yet, in the same journal entry, Berryman goes on 
to declare, "I am really Henry Pussycat."12 Song 22, we 
might say, versifies this crisis as a tension between the 
powerful, heroic stand of "I am Henry Pussy-cat!" and the 
"pieces" of its first twelve lines.
It is through poetry, in short, that both Berryman and 
his surrogate, Henry, allay the anxieties associated with 
their consciousness of impending disintegration. Song 311 
is explicit, for example about the relationships among 
Henry's libidinal drive fixations, his disintegration, and 
his art:
Hunger was constitutional with him, 
women, cigarettes, liquor, need need need 
until he went to pieces.
The pieces sat up & wrote. They did not heed 
their piecedom but kept very quietly on 
among the chaos.
While Denis Donoghue is quite right to find in these lines
an "ingenious" poetic technique in which the poet, "living
in various degrees of chaos, dissociates himself; allowing
to each fragment its corresponding voice" (27), I believe
that only a psychoanalytic model like Kohut's can explain
the strange association here of Henry's object hungers with
that poetic technique. For Kohut, the intensification of
narcissistic and autoerotic drives (orality, sexuality,
aggression, exhibitionism, etc.) is a "disintegration
product" released when broader configurations of experience
are destroyed (Restoration 119) . Both the hypercathexis of
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fragments of the self and the exaggeration of assertiveness 
through creative expression, in this view, are compensatory 
modes through which a disintegrating self desperately 
attempts to experience itself as whole.
We cannot fully comprehend how the use of blackface fits 
into this psychopoetic dynamic, however, without taking 
into account the moralizing and normalizing valuations that 
are attached to such subjective states by the dictates of 
the social order. The ambivalent moral, sexual, and 
corporeal conflicts that are tied up in Henry's 
oscillations between "I am" and "I am in pieces" are 
nowhere in greater evidence than Song 43, where the 
oscillation is figured as a polarity between the 
interpellative imperative to "Be... consist" and his 
libidinal, fragmenting tendencies. In the song, an intense 
sense of transgression and criminality is attached to the 
fragmentation of subjectivity when Henry imagines himself 
to be on trial not only for his uncontrolled adultery, 
smoking, and drinking, but also, literally, for his failure 
to maintain proper masculine unity:
Be.
I warned him, of a summer night: consist, 
consist. Ex-wives roar.
Further, the Crown holds that they spilt himself, 
splitting his manward chances, to his shame, 
my lords, & our horror.
Behind, oh worst lean backward them who bring 
un-charges: hundreds & one, children, 
the pillars & the sot.
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A phalanx of social authority figures (banks, cops, 
lawyers, "the Crown," lords), reinscribing the earlier 
projected "iron" voices of the superego, bring charges here 
against Henry for spilling or splitting his "manward" ego, 
a dispersal of self doubly significative as his masking and 
roleplaying (he is guilty of being both "hundreds & one," 
of the pronominal confusion of "they spilt himself") and as 
his spilling his seed illicitly, spawning various 
illegitimate children (a concern of Henry's expressed on 
several occasions, including in the song that immediately 
follows this one) . His other transgressions of the 
moralized, unified, economically functional subject are, of 
course, his libidinal indulgences of cigarettes ("the 
pillars") and booze ("the sot"). At the end of the poem 
Henry admits his guilt and finds uncertain solace in using 
his dissipation as the occasion for making poetry.
We might say that Henry's "crisis," then, is not 
reducible to a simple effort to secure the boundaries of 
the "I" and its bodily structure against the threat of 
disruption: clearly, he finds both a conflicted pleasure 
and an ambivalent use in the disruptions of the subject. 
The pleasure lies in finding release from and/or 
manipulating the strictures of an imposed social subject 
position, and has much to do with the sexual and oral 
preoccupations--feasting, smoking, drinking--that surface 
in these poems; the use is nothing less than poetry itself,
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through which, similarly, Henry gains both a symbolic power 
over and a release from the static s u b j e c t . 13 Indeed, the 
voices of authority and the sense of transgression they 
bring to the fragmented moment of Henry's subjectivity 
suggest we should read the odd confluence of themes located 
there--excessive indulgence of bodily appetites, 
disintegration, mask wearing, the slipping in and out of 
various identities--not only in terms of the mischanneled 
narcissism of self-fragmentation, but also in terms of what 
cultural critics Peter Stallybrass and Allon White have 
outlined as the carnivalized transgression or subversion of 
the socially disciplined subject. Stallybrass and White 
posit a historical repression of the "'grotesque body' of 
carnival by the emergent middle and professional classes 
from the Renaissance onwards"; thus, "a fundamental ritual 
order of western culture came under attack--its feasting, 
violence, drinking, processions, fairs, wakes, rowdy 
spectacle and outrageous clamour were subject to 
surveillance and repressive control" (176). The outcome of 
this social repression, they argue, was a dramatic return 
in the discourse and psychology of the individual of a 
wide-ranging "thematics of carnival pleasure" (182): not 
only the feasting, drinking, and "grotesque aspects of the 
body" (183), but also clownism, nursery behavior, sexual 
scenes, pantomiming (175), and masking (183).
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I would argue that a crucial--and much neglected--
component of Berryman's dream-work is a similar neurotic or
hysteric return of those carn(iv)al elements repressed from
the "manward" subject of the twentieth century by the
forces of social authority and surveillance who bring their
charges of dissipation against Henry in Song 43.15 Henry's
incessant concerns with the body, its fluids and orifices,
and with slipping in and out of a series of poetic
identities--the "wide cast of characters" mentioned by
Berryman in his 1968 prefatory note--are thus not only
products of anxiety but also represent a earn(iv)alized
transgression of the well-disciplined subject. Henry's
half-comic, half-guilty revelries of fragmentation share
the function, and many of the features, of the carnival
impulse theorized by Stallybrass and White:
It attacks the authority of the ego (by rituals of 
degradation and by the use of masks and costume) and 
flaunts the material body as a pleasurable 
grotesquerie....it denies with a laugh the ludicrous 
pose of autonomy adopted by the subject...at the same 
moment as it re-opens the body-boundary, the closed 
orifices of which normally guarantee the repressive 
mechanism itself. (183-84)
The rationalized, "wise" character of Song 22 may sew its
mouth shut to maintain the integrity of its body-boundary,
but the sheer number of masks that the "I am" is capable of
wearing--including the smoker and the alcoholic "blackt-out
man"--subverts the pose of egoistic self-sufficiency.
Centrally involved in the pleasures, the terrors, and 
the symbolic resolutions of Henry's experiences of self­
fragmentation, then, is none other than "the blackt-out 
man." As a racially oppressed Other in Song 22, he fits in 
among Henry's series of Whitmanian identifications, located 
in the gaps or disruptions of the subject; as an alcoholic 
"blackt-out" in drunken revelry, he figures the 
carnivalized obliteration of the ego through the total 
opening of its body-boundary to pleasurable intake; and, as 
Henry in blackface, he encompasses both the masking through 
which Henry can be both "hundreds & one" and the pantomimic 
acting out through which Henry can safely indulge the 
pleasures of the body. The "minstrel" of Song 231, for 
example, seems directly connected to the smoking, drinking, 
self-splitting transgressor and poet of Song 43, since he 
is again on trial, about to be punished by "them," both, it 
seems, for doing "bad" and for his poetic activity. In 
this later song, closely connected to Song 43--they were 
written just weeks apart--Henry worries that, if punished 
for his transgressions, "He'll lose his minstrelsy
I am suggesting that "blacking up" has a crucial 
function in the larger crisis of the subject that pervades 
these poems: it is one of Henry's codes for the
fragmentation of the cohesive self, in Kohutian terms, or 
the subversion of the bourgeois subject, to apply the 
social approach of Stallybrass and White. Berryman's use
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of blackface thus parallels what the latter theorists 
describe as a
reconstruction of the idea of carnival as the culture of 
the Other. This act of disavowal on the part of the 
emergent bourgeoisie, with its sentimentalism and 
disgust, made carnival into the festival of the Other. 
It encoded all that which the proper bourgeois must 
strive not to be in order to preserve a stable and 
'correct' sense of self. (178)
Minstrel performance in its original form, as Lott's
analysis shows, was precisely a production of the
discipline-subverting pantomimic carnivalesque in the form
of such a "reconstruction of the idea of carnival as the
culture of the Other." Berryman simply resurrects this
politically overdetermined, racializing cultural mode as
the characteristic pose of his twentieth-century "tragic
man." That is, whether Henry is pleasurably transgressing
the parameters of his acceptable identity--white, adult,
law-abiding, economically sound, family man— or agonizing
the possibility of its complete collapse, and whether he
does so through the libidinal pursuits of sexuality and
substance consumption, or through the self-representations
and masked roleplaying of the poet, he has a distinct
tendency to do so in blackface.
"Find out about the Mr. Bones business”
In his crucial 1958 essay "Change the Joke and Slip the 
Yoke," Ralph Ellison described precisely such a disavowal 
of the negative and chaotic side of the "white folk mind"
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and a correlative transference of the carnival to the
"black" Other as the cultural mechanism at the heart of
blackface performance in the United States:
Because these things are bound up with their notion of 
chaos it is almost impossible for many whites to 
consider questions of sex, women, economic opportunity, 
the national identity, historic change, social justice—  
even the "criminality" implicit in the broadening of 
freedom itself--without summoning malignant images of 
black men into consciousness....the Negro is reduced to 
a negative sign that usually appears in a comedy of the 
grotesque and the unacceptable. As Constance Rourke has 
made us aware, the action of the early minstrel show-- 
with its Negro-deprived choreography, its ringing of 
banjos and rattling of bones, its voices cackling jokes 
in pseudo-Negro dialect, with its nonsense songs, its 
bright costumes and sweating performers--constituted a 
ritual of exorcism. (Shadow 48)
This theory of a ritualistic comedy might be directly
applied to the rampant sexuality and drinking of the
sweating, grotesque body; the wild dancing, music and
costuming; the "pseudo-Negro" dialect; and the insinuations
of economic and social transgression that tend to
characterize Henry's moments of blacking up, but before
examining this aspect of Berryman's work more closely I
want to place it within the context of an important
qualifying observation. What I find most interesting about
the possible relevance of this passage to The Dream Songs
is that Berryman, during the earliest phase of their
composition, almost certainly must have read it.
Ellison's comments on minstrelsy, written in response to
Stanley Edgar Hyman's assertion of the African American
folkloric background of minstrel performance, appeared in
the spring 1958 edition of Partisan Review, one of the 
central publishing organs in Berryman's literary and 
intellectual career. Berryman's own publishing
relationship with Partisan Review was long and involved, 
including the 1953 debut of his long poem Homage to 
Mistress Bradstreet in its pages and the publication of 
several of his critical essays on modern poetry. The 
poetry editor of the review from 193 9 to 1953 was Delmore 
Schwartz, perhaps Berryman's closest friend and the man 
whose death is elegized in almost messianic terms by the 
"solid block of agony" (Song 157) of Dream Songs 146-159. 
Most importantly, Berryman's own poem "American Lights, 
Seen Off From Abroad" appeared in the same spring 1958 
issue that contained Ellison's essay. Berryman was both a 
regular reader of Partisan Review and, we can guess, a 
particularly interested reader of this issue, which 
contained not only his own work but the essay by Ellison, 
the long-time literary acquaintance whom he later called 
"one of the best writers in the country" (Plotz 9).
My hunch that Berryman read "Change the Joke and Slip 
the Yoke" when it appeared and found it to be of 
significant interest for his own current creative project 
seems to gain support from the fact that there is no record 
of minstrelsy being a part of Berryman's evolving plans for 
his long poem from 1955, when the first Dream Song was 
written, until late in 1958, just a few months after the
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discussion of minstrelsy in the Partisan Review appeared. 
During the final months of 1958, John Haffenden's study of 
Berryman's notes suggests, the first poems employing 
conversations between Henry and a murky "interlocutor" 
figure who calls Henry "Mr. Bones" were composed; they 
would eventually become Dream Songs 26, 67, 75, 76, 77, and 
217 (Haffenden 45-46, 158). Indeed, despite a voluminous 
archive of the poet's manuscripts, notes, and later 
remarks, all of which document the remarkably complex 
process of shifting conceptualizations and strueturalizing 
devices for the sequence that characterized these early 
years of composition, we have no record that Berryman 
considered a minstrel show effect as such a structural 
device until January. 195 9. "a date from which it may be 
inferred that Mr. Bones and his friend, the interlocutor, 
had not before figured very consciously in his plan" 
(Haffenden 46). Berryman's note to himself that month is 
suggestive of the newness of the minstrel idea--"Find out 
about the Mr. Bones business"--as is the next reference 
recorded by Haffenden: "where does 'Bones' stuff begin?"
(Haffenden 46-47).
This is not to deny the significance of other sources 
and precursors which have been suggested as critical 
influences on Berryman's minstrel impulse. Arpin has 
convincingly connected Berryman's deployment of "black" 
voices to his knowledge of the French Symbolists: for the
325
revitalizing effect of infusing poetry with a racialized 
"low" diction Berryman had the model of Rimbaud's "nigger" 
persona and Corbiere's penchant for "talking negro" (Arpin 
7, 75-77) . Much closer to the time and spirit of
Berryman's own work is Conrad Aiken's Ushant. which, as 
Davis has suggested in her intriguing reading of Berryman's 
copy of the work (and the notations he made in it in 1955), 
contains a possible seed for the idea of using the minstrel 
show as a representational format for the contrapuntal 
"dance, dialogue or dialectic" of consciousness ("Ushant" 
290-91). And of course, Berryman's definite--though 
apparently not very extensive--reliance on Carl Wittke's 
Tambo and Bones for information about the history and 
format of minstrelsy has been well-noted. ^  Whatever the 
relative weight of such influences, however, only Ellison's 
theory of blackface as "negative sign" could have stressed 
to Berryman the actual historical psychological role of 
blackface imagery in U.S. "white" consciousness--"a 
symbolic role basic," as Ellison put it, "to the underlying 
drama of American society" (Shadow 47) . Berryman's new 
sense of this basic symbolic role may have been the 
immediate spark to a decision, late in 1958, to develop the 
minstrel theme as a way of staging the internal otherness-- 
but especially carn(iv)al Otherness--within the identity of 
what he intended to be a representative "white" American-- 
and to revise even poems written before that decision to
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evoke the new carnivalizing, exorcizing, masking Other 
"bound up with [Henry's] notion of chaos": that lurked at 
Henry's fragmented pole: line 10 of Dream Song 22,
originally penned on July 4, 1958, as "I am the shuddering
man," would only later become "I am the blackt-out man"
(Haffenden 89).
If Berryman was indeed familiar with the ideas in
"Change the Joke and Slip the Yoke," it certainly affects 
how we assess his own subsequent creation of a sort of 
derivative minstrel show and possibly clarifies Ellison's 
recollections of the strange phone calls with which I began 
this chapter. It is hard to imagine a cultural scholar of 
Berryman's thoroughness reading Ellison's essay and almost 
immediately proceeding to unselfconsciously write poems 
that trifle with the chaotic, sexual, carnivalesque, and 
marginally criminal borders of "white" middle-class 
identity yet disavow them by, in part, "summoning malignant 
images of black men into consciousness" (Ellison, Shadow 
48) . If Berryman knew the essay, that is, it is also 
possible that he intended his manipulation of minstrel 
devices as a representation of minstrelsy, and how (he knew 
Ellison, had said) it functioned in white culture, not, in 
mere reenactment of the original minstrel show, as a naive 
and racializing representation of "blackness." Similarly, 
it seems unlikely that Berryman would have called Ellison 
with the presumptuous intention of verifying that the
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styles he was incorporating sounded like "black" voices, 
but rather more likely that he now conceptualized Ellison 
as an authority on the "pseudo-Negro dialect" of minstrel 
performance that Ellison mentions in the essay. If this 
indeed was the tenor of the phone calls about "dialect," 
then Ellison's description of those conversations may 
reflect what both conversants acknowledged as the ambiguous 
status of a recorded cultural language--"pseudo-Negro" 
blackface--rather than the outright contradiction that his 
shifting references to "dialect," "Afro-American speech," 
and "minstrelsy" seems at first to suggest.
The actual political effects of Berryman's minstrel 
device will, I hope, be better judged by looking at the 
examples I discuss below, but I am suggesting that the 
"blackt-out man" and the "pseudo-Negro dialect" that erupt 
within the fragmented consciousness of Berryman's typical 
white U.S. citizen should not be viewed simply as instances 
of naive racialism, romantic or otherwise. At worst they 
reflect what was, from the moment of their composition, the 
racial ambivalence borne of a conscious questioning of the 
meaning of the "black" image in the "white" mind. 
Berryman's various, and ostensibly contradictory, uses of 
racial content in The Dream Songs are more productively 
viewed in terms of the ambivalent identifications of 
Berryman's racial milieu and of Henry's crisis of the 
subject.
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"The blackt-out man," most indicatively, is not simply a
racialized figure of carnival but the voice of one of
Henry's sympathetic identifications as well: the racially
oppressed. As I noted above, several Dream Songs use
"black" voices to develop a social critique of racist
practices and segregationist policies. In Song 60, for
example, Henry convinces his unnamed friend that, despite
the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education ruling, racial denial
of equal access remains the de facto law of the land. The
poem also illustrates the typical format and diction of
Henry's blackface dialogues with his interlocutor:
After eight years, be less dan eight percent, 
distinguish' friend, of coloured wif de whites 
in de School, in de Souf.
--Is coloured gobs, is coloured officers,
Mr Bones. Dat's nuffin? --Uncle Tom, 
sweep shut yo mouf,
is million blocking from de proper job, 
de fairest houses & de churches eben.
Although this dialect "bears only a tangential
relationship" to any actual spoken black English (Davis,
Honey 33) and is not an accurate reproduction of even the
language of minstrelsy--not even as it is reported in
Berryman's ostensible source for such particulars, Wittke's
Tambo and Bones--one can see immediately from the content
here why early commentators like William Wasserstrom and J.
M. Linebarger suggested that the Songs bespeak "the lives
of mutilated men, American Negroes" (Wasserstrom 172) and
suspected that they partake of political subversion and
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even anti-racist .satire .• Wasserstrom went too far when he 
assumed, however, on the basis of a few grammatical 
irregularities and slurred diphthongs, that Berryman had 
somehow reproduced America's "black" voice and its 
suffering and its linguistic subversions, for a "straight" 
reading of this pseudo-dialect as "black, " as Aldon Lynn 
Nielsen has noted, surely evinces more of demeaning racial 
insult than of eiqpathetic interracial solidarity (141).
A reading that can begin to make sense of the ambiguous 
political positioning of this poetic voice, however--and 
here it is surely significant that sentimental 
identification with black suffering and anti-oppressive 
symbolism were integral parts of the linguistic distortions 
of the historical coon show (see Lott, Ch. l)--is one that 
takes into account Berryman's possible acknowledgement-- 
vis-a-vis the Ellison essay--of minstrelsy as a white 
representation of "blackness" and even of "race" as a 
discourse. Berryman "is not attempting to represent black 
speech," as Nielsen goes on to argue in distinguishing 
Berryman's use of such language from that of the many other 
modernist poets Nielsen critiques; rather, "this dialect is 
an enactment of the white mind playing at blackness within 
its system of stereotypes" (Nielsen 141). This perspective 
allows, I think, the content of Song 60, which bears an 
explicit critique of social oppression, to stand in 
consonance with its degenerative style, which bears
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(potentially) an implicit critique of the very discursive 
racialization that makes such oppression possible. If this 
was part of Berryman's approach, then Arpin is making a 
defensible claim when he asserts that the epigraph of 
Wittke's nostalgic Tambo and Bones. "'Go in brack man, de 
day's yo' own,'" is ironized in its reappearance as one of 
the epigraphs to The Dream Soncrs. His description 
captures, nonetheless--and perhaps unintentionally-- 
precisely the confused ambivalence that characterizes this 
nexus of Berryman's understanding of minstrelsy, his 
expropriation of "blackness," and his racial sympathies: 
"Wittke enjoyed this painful grotesque [Jim Crow] and all 
the white men who imitated him in fun; Henry identifies 
with him, and sees the desperate irony in the comedy, for 
to jump Jim Crow is to sing under torture" (Arpin 75).
In 1968 Berryman tried to summarize his use of the 
blackface device as a function of just such an 
identification with victims of racism. Asked why he chose 
to employ "the Negro dialect" in his sequence, Berryman 
clarified neither the definition of the dialect nor his 
understanding of minstrelsy, but explained his inflection 
of "blackness" as an extension of his effort, in his 1945 
short story "The Imaginary Jew," to undermine the structure 
of racial bigotry by recognizing his own status as 
"imaginary Jew." Tellingly, his example of the 
inescapability of racial categorization for those it
331
victimizes was none other than his ostensible source for
blackface credibility, Ralph Ellison:
...the Negro business--the blackface--is related to 
that. That is, I feel extremely lucky to be white, let 
me put it that way, so that I don't have that problem. 
Friends of mine--Ralph Ellison, for example, in my 
opinion one of the best writers in the country--he has 
the problem. He's black, and he and Fanny, wherever they 
go, they are black. (Plotz 9)
There is no reason to doubt either the sincerity or the
political value of Berryman's social engagement here, yet
his words also evoke all over again the ambiguity of
Ellison's descriptions of the telephone calls--an ambiguity
reiterated in many of the critical comments on the dialect-
-as to where "Negro" ends and "blackface" begins: does the
inserted term "blackface" supply a correction of "Negro,"
an alternative phrasing, or a notation of his (self-
conscious) "white" performance of "Negro"?18 j am not
suggesting that we can definitively answer this question,
but that Berryman was on some level problematizing the
materiality or authenticity of "race" such questions
assume, both by recognizing the very discursivity of
"blackness" and by using "Mr. Bones" to gesture toward its
emergence from his own construction of himself as "white."
This problematization provides much of the moral impetus of
that earlier story, where we might substitute "black" for
"Jew" to better grasp the meaning of "Mr. Bones" in
Berryman's mind: "The imaginary [black] I was was as real
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as the imaginary [black] hunted down, on other nights and 
days, in a real [black]" (Freedom 366).
Song 68 returns to Henry's identification with blacks 
who are victimized by a racist social order. In this poem, 
however, the minstrel format is gone and Henry has taken up 
the role of black blues artist, imagining that he is 
literally performing on stage with blues great Bessie 
Smith. Here the idiom is more understated and the 
evocation of a "blues" atmosphere is convincing, especially 
when the rowdy tenor of the "performance" gives way to the 
mournful blues lament of the final stanza, which recalls 
that Smith died when denied admittance to a whites-only 
emergency room after an auto accident. In the closing 
lines, Berryman ironically juxtaposes the rhetoric of love 
specific to the Christmas season--when he wrote the poem-- 
with the prevailing segregation by "color" that led to 
Smith's death: "they all come hangin Christmas on some tree 
/ after trees thrown out--sick-house's white birds' / black 
to the birds instead." In this instance, at least, it 
seems entirely possible that Berryman did depend on Ellison 
for verification of the blues voice and sensibility: 
Mariani reports that Berryman called Ellison about this 
poem and, when he sent Ellison a copy of 77 Dream Soncrs. 
inscribed it "Affectionally & with thanks for help on 68."
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"Or keep so-called black & raise new hell"
Still, the social critique articulated in these lines is 
an extremely limited theme in The Dream Songs. broached in 
no more than five or six of the 385 songs (the blues theme 
is even more rare), and a closer look at the situation of 
Song 68--as it relates to other instances of "blacking up" 
that do not end in the same kind of political indignation-- 
reveals a regressive, oppressive countervalence to what 
initially comes across as a politically progressive 
identification with "blackness." The ambience of Henry's 
performance as a "blues artist" evokes "strange horns," 
shouts, nightlife, and the excitement of a hot blues 
session: "the house is givin hell / to Yellow Doct. I blowin 
like it too / and Bessie always do..." The stimulating 
musical scene, that is, has the distinct flavor of a 
carnivalesque atmosphere that banishes the usual stresses 
and anxieties of work, life and death: "I feelin fair
mysef, taxes & things / seem to be back in line, like 
everybody should / and nobody in the snow on call..." Not 
only is it unusual for the complaining Henry to be feeling 
"fair," but here two of his most frequent gripes--taxes and 
the deaths of friends--are in abeyance. (Based on 
Berryman's development of the theme of winter, I take "in 
the snow" to be a reference to death.) The significant 
point here is not that a night in a blues house would not 
or should not have such associations, for both the blacks
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and whites who might enjoy them, but that Henrv needs the 
blues atmosphere and its "blackness" to achieve them.
His "masked" participation in the blues performance thus 
hints at a tendency that is less benign in other Dream 
Songs, the tendency to make "carnival into the festival of 
the Other" (Stallybrass and White 178). Here, musical 
"blackness" "encode[s] all that which the proper bourgeois 
[tax-paying, reserved, hard-working] must strive not to be 
[loud, revelrous, free of social responsibilities] in order 
to preserve a stable and 'correct' sense of self" 
(Stallybrass and White 178). By assuming imaginary 
"blackness," Henry transgresses the usual parameters of 
white subjectivity and achieves imaginative resolution of 
the anxieties normally associated with those (disciplinary) 
parameters--without really endangering his sense of self. 
The complement of this carnivalization of the Other is of 
course the anxiety-ridden encroachment of musical 
"blackness" on the "white" subject, which both Stallybrass 
and White and Toni Morrison have illustrated by referring 
to a single incident involving a similar "black" musical 
"form of the modern carnivalesque scene" (Stallybrass and 
White 181) in Marie Cardinal's autobiographical novel Les 
Mots pour le Dire (1976) . In the passage they cite, the 
first hysteria attack of Cardinal's extended psychological 
crisis is precipitated by a Louis Armstrong jazz concert 
which Cardinal perceives as so musically frenzied, so
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uncontrolled, so intersubjectively physical as to cause the 
young French woman to be overcome with panic and a fear of 
death. As Morrison suggests Cardinal is using musical 
"blackness" for the literary "shorthand, the taken-for- 
granted assumptions" (Plaving x) that make it figurative of 
the structure of her own subjective crisis: rushing from 
the concert in terror, she finds an objective correlative 
for her internal disintegration in a vision of a white 
camellia "svelte in appearance but torn apart inside" 
(quoted in Morrison, Plavincr vii) . Like Henry, she is 
superficially unified, svelte and "white," but internally 
torn apart--and carnivalized, musical "blackness" is the 
signifier of her chaos.19
While Berryman's sympathetic use of a "blues" metaphor 
in Song 68 may have been inoffensive to Ellison, then, we 
must attend to the fact that the same musicality, dancing, 
physicality, and revelry obtain in numerous songs where the 
performance is explicitly minstrel in nature. This is to 
say that, despite Berryman's best intentions of both cross- 
racial identification and/or self-conscious inflection of 
the "sign" of minstrelsy within "white" U.S. identity, the 
overall effect of his representations slips into a 
carnivalization of the Other that reinforces racial 
difference. As Nielsen puts it, "It is difficult to speak 
in this dialect to a white audience without activating the 
entire racial image structure of our language" (142-43).
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The psychology and politics of Henry's carnivalized
transgression of his "white" subject through minstrelsy are
perhaps most obvious in Dream Song 2, the premiere
performance of blackface in the sequence and possibly the
only song that draws specifically on the Wittke text. In
the poem, titled "Big Buttons, Cornets: the advance,"
Henry, in blackface, is trying to resist the temptations of
sexuality and alcohol:
The jane is zoned! no nightspot here, no bar 
there, no sweet freeway, and no premises 
for business purposes...
Arrive a time when all coons lose dere grip, 
but is he come? Le1s do a hoedown, gal, 
one blue, one shuffle,
if them is all you seem to require. Strip, 
ol banger, skip us we, sugar; so hang on 
one chaste evenin.
— Sir Bones, or Galahad: astonishin 
yo legal & yo good. Is you feel well?
Honey dusk do sprawl.
— Hit's hard. Kinged or thinged, though, fling & wing. 
Poll-cats are coming, hurrah, hurray.
I votes in my hole.
This is slippery poetic terrain to traverse, not least
because there are several layers of reference structured
into the content. The first level is Henry's present time,
a holiday in November (1962, when Berryman was writing the
poem) on which Henry mulls the legal closure of drinking
establishments. Davis and Haffenden have suggested it is
Thanksgiving (Davis, Honey 40), but the references to polls
and voting in the final two lines strongly indicate
Election Day, when bars are closed in reverence for that
crucial rite of U.S. civic life. The second level of 
reference is the traditional carnival trappings of the 
minstrel show, as described in Wittke: both the title and 
the holiday atmosphere of the first stanza refer, as Davis 
has shown, to Wittke's description of the traditional 
"parade" and costuming that signaled the "advance" of 
traveling minstrels when they arrived at each new town. 
The third level of reference, more internal to the 
sequence, involves Henry's ongoing struggle to put off the 
temptations of lust and drink in order to remain a "legal" 
and "good" wage-earner, householder, family man, and 
citizen--the dynamic of the socially disciplined subject as 
I have noted it with reference to Song 43. And a fourth, 
narrative level of meaning involves, as Davis again points 
out, Henry's sexual "advance" on a "jane" who, however, is 
"zoned"--off-limits to Henry's attentions and hence causing 
him to "hang on" to his morality and spend a "chaste 
evenin'1 instead. Skipping the "strip" and "ol banger," 
Henry settles for a dance.
There is a remarkable degree of oneiric condensation and 
displacement among these levels of reference, but it is 
precisely by attending to those entanglements that the 
political reading I intend comes clear. The structure of 
social authority which I have noted in other poems is 
almost the reason for this poem's existence, personified 
only by the "poll-cats" ("politicals"? poll monitors? poll
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tax collectors?) who are "coming" in line seventeen, but 
implicit in the enforcement of legality and "zoning" that 
make up the poem's matrix. But condensed here into this 
broader sense of legal and political authority (recall 
Henry on trial in Song 43) are the moral "laws" against 
Henry's abuses of both alcohol and sexuality, the closing 
of bars in deference to governmental processes, the 
foreclosure of the "nightspot" revelry that prevails at 
Henry's blues appearance, the social reserve that the 
minstrels disrupted with their parade revelry, and even the 
"zoning" of the Jim Crow system--especially its two most 
powerful proscriptions, those preventing voting by "blacks" 
and sexual contact between "black" men and "white" "janes." 
The latter idea, of course, imports the obtrusion of yet 
another level of reference, what I have noted as Henry's 
sympathetic identification with the racially oppressed. 
The meaning on this level of social racial relations is, I 
think, fairly clear: if the treed coon falls out of his
tree--enters either the voting booth or the preserve of 
white womanhood--he will be lynched.
It is this intimation that Henry in blackface is Henry 
speaking for oppressed blacks that led Wasserstrom to 
surmise that "Sir Bones speaks from behind his mask a 
satiric language" taken from real black cultural forms like 
rhyming slang, blues, and black minstrelsy, "the kind of 
speech devised in order to hide true meaning from the Man"
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(175) . It is a contention with which other critics 
(Linebarger, Gustavsson) have concurred, though it seems to 
be at odds with the fact that Berryman dedicated the poem 
to T. D. "Daddy" Rice, the original "white" minstrel of the 
183 0s, and I have already noted the troublesome nature of 
identifying this dialect as "blues," "black," or even 
"minstrel." More importantly, to read interracial 
identification in the coon trope and the semantic 
obfuscations of the dialect is to read the metaphor of 
blacking up in only one direction, ignoring its movement 
back in the other direction, a direction that is actually 
far more dominant in The Dream Sonas. Here, that 
regressive movement is present as "white" Henry's recourse 
to blackface, and to the blackface partner of his 
consciousness, the interlocutor, as the format for 
addressing libidinal, carnal desires and his own--not 
blacks 1--subversions of social authority.
In this view, the referential levels involving 
historical minstrels, Mr. Bones and his friend, election 
day bar closures, and Jim Crow degradation are merely the 
code, or the vehicle, for the real "story" being told in 
the poem/dream--the story of identity crisis that I have 
already connected to the recurrent themes of role playing, 
drinking and sex, played out in so many of the songs. The 
interlocutor summarizes the two poles of the 
subjective/moral crisis here: is Henry the transgressive,
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blacked up "Sir Bones" or is he a moral, "white" Sir 
"Galahad"? It is significant that the blackface 
interlocutor is thoroughly complicit in the libidinal 
impulse of Henry's struggle between "legality" and 
transgression; he seems incredulous that Henry remains, for 
the moment, "legal" and "good" and points out that 
indulgence is lavishly available. This contravenes the 
theories presented by various commentators that Henry's 
friend is either a minstrel show interlocutor who remains 
"white" or a critical, ironizing counterbalance to Henry's 
narcissistic extremes, and further connects Berryman's use 
of the minstrel device to Henry's carnivalized subversions 
of both subject and social authorities.
The latter, of course, make their appearance in line 
seventeen as the "poll-cats" who may be enforcing the 
election laws, collecting taxes, or even, to return to the 
foreclosure of Henry's sexuality and move from the social 
to the personal content level, cutting off the pertinent 
horn or head (or bone) . In any case, the subversive, 
hidden meanings of Mr. Bones's blackface discourse give him 
the last word, as he punningly converts these enforcers 
into skunks. When Mr. Bones flaunts U.S. political
authority with his sarcastic "I votes in my hole" (I vote 
by pouring down a shot), he also transgresses the civically 
and socially disciplined (white) subject by, again, 
"deny[ing] with a laugh the ludicrous pose of autonomy
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adopted by the subject" and "re-open[ing] the body- 
boundary> the closed orifices of which normally guarantee 
the repressive mechanism itself" (Stallybrass & White 
1 8 4 ).20 by doing so emphatically in blackface, Henry
engages precisely that ambivalence--managing to elicit the 
critical claims about subversive "black" content mentioned 
above and to attribute the "detested .qualities" of 
experience to "blackness"--with which, as Lott argues, the 
original minstrel mask resonated: "a derisive celebration
of the power of blackness; blacks, for a moment, 
ambiguously, on top" (28-29).
The convergence of the carnivalesque "advance" of the 
minstrels with Henry’s illicit sexual "advance" and his 
desire for an "illegal" drink aptly summarizes the 
significance of Henry's minstrelsy throughout The Dream 
Songs. Henry on the verge of transgressing various social 
and legal proscriptions, of losing his grip and falling 
from the "tree" of respectable identity, is generally Henry 
in the role of Mr. Bones or coon--Henry in the guise of 
"the blackt-out man." A basic Freudian framework makes the 
psychological dynamics of Henry's dream-work clear enough: 
the structure of authority that enforces legality 
corresponds to the superego; Henry in his narrowly defined, 
socially disciplined sense of self is Henry in his tree, or 
"in" his ego; and Henry falling from the tree, or indulging 
his carnal impulses, is Henry under the sway of the id.
But within the Kohutian paradigm of narcissistic 
personality disorders, this macrostructural view of 
psychology already implies a severe fragmentation of the 
self, since Kohut's central adjustment of Freudian theory 
was to posit a healthy "nuclear self" which includes both 
the object-based ideals and limitations of authority 
"imagos" and the self-assertive, narcissistic energies of 
ambition and grandiosity, rather than "splitting" these 
elements off as agencies oppositional to the experiential 
center. In Kohut's view, then, the more regressive forms 
of such narcissistic energies--fixations on sexuality, 
orality, anality, segmented body parts, aggression, etc.-- 
are not "primary biological drives" but what he calls 
"disintegration products," results of damage to the 
organization of the self (Res toration 128) . Such 
tendencies are literally distorted forms, produced by lack 
of empathic response to the "total self," of the normal and 
healthy narcissistic impulse. As a victim of just such 
self-object failure and consequent "splitting" of the self, 
Henry tends to experience his narcissistic energies in the 
form of distorted sexualizations, object hungers, bodily 
obsessions and grandiose pretensions. It is these 
"vertically" split off--alternatively lived, not repressed- 
-narcissistic energies that he so pervasively assigns to 
his "blacked up" self. If Henry's multiple personae 
present a less severe version of the " side-by-side
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existence of cohesive personality attitudes with different 
goal structures, different pleasure aims, different moral 
and aesthetic values" that Kohut finds in certain of the 
narcissistic personality disturbances, I am suggesting, the 
particular manner in which he, "motivated by shame," denies 
the "reality of the split-off sector" is by referring it to 
"blackness" (Analysis 183) . In this case, the "veil of 
ambiguity and indirectness" through which the 
narcissistically disordered personality distortedly 
describes the "perverse fantasies" of its "other self" 
(Analysis 184) is the blackface mask.
Applying Kohut's formulation of what amounts to a 
developmental mirror stage--but for the formation of the 
"nuclear self," not the "ego"--we might think of Henry's 
creation of Mr. Bones in terms of a racialized distortion 
of the process by which "some archaic mental contents that 
had been experienced as belonging to the self become 
obliterated or are assigned to the area of the nonself..." 
(Restoration 1 7 7 ) . 21 For the narcissistically disordered 
Henry, both the excessive exhibitionisms of his 
narcissistic sector and the sense of complete 
disintegration inflicted by the excessively limiting "iron 
voices" (Song 8) are consistently assigned to his 
"nonself," his alter ego, his racialized other.22
Hence, in numerous poems Henry in burnt cork is Mr. 
Bones hot with lust. In the midst of the voyeuristic and
gustatory orgy of Song 4, Henry pauses from his salivations 
long enough to note, "There ought to be a law against 
Henry," and the interlocutor replies, "Mr. Bones: there
is," adding significant context to the "legality" matrix of 
Song 2. Placed within this context, the treed or lynched 
"coon" trope of Songs 9, 10, 57, and 66 becomes much less 
Henry's way of identifying with the potential cruelties and 
degradations of racism and much more his use of "blackness" 
as a metaphor for his own transgressive, shame-ridden 
sexuality: in Song 57, yet another drinking poem, Henry
imagines himself to be "a 'coon treed," but it is again in 
the sense of wanting, but being kept from, sexual contact 
(by his target's refusal) and an alcoholic bender (by 
social rules). The role of the minstrel dialogue format in 
Henry's consciousness is clear enough, finally, in Book V, 
which, after it opens with a recuperative hospital stay, 
concerns itself largely with Henry in his role as husband 
and father and with themes of death and disintegration, and 
almost completely eschews the illicit sex theme. 
Crucially, then, Songs 142 and 143, at the very end of the 
book, reintroduce Henry's lust and bring back the minstrel 
format after an absence of nearly thirty songs. In Song 
142, Henry is musing upon an adulterous "rump session" but 
decides he is glad to keep "chaste." The interlocutor's 
comment on this decision is notably equivocal: "Mr Bones,
you strong on moral these days, hey? / It's good to be
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faithful but it ain't natural..." Song 143 continues the 
dialogue, with the friend suggesting some sexual healing 
for Mr. Bones's despair over marital disputes: "That's
enough of that, Mr Bones. Some lady you make. / Honour the 
burnt cork, be a vaudeville man. . . Again, it is
impossible to distinguish here Berryman's toying with the 
historical use of the minstrel mask in the "white" mind 
from his enjoying the psychological dividends of that use 
himself. Lott aptly captures the contradictions already 
implicit in such representations on the blackface stage:
" . . .in a real sense the minstrel man was the 
penis... invoking the power of 'blackness' while deriding 
it, in an effort of cultural control, through the very 
convention that produced its power--the greasepaint and 
burnt cork of blackface" (25-26). Then too, Berryman may 
have been well aware of Ellison's wry comment in "Change 
the Joke and Slip the Yoke": "The mask was the thing (the
'thing' in more ways than one)" (Shadow 49).
Dream Song 72 deserves note in this regard, since it 
transforms the potential tree-hung lynching rope of Henry's 
"illegal" sexual self into a "twine" on which Henry, in the 
role of respectable father, "is swinging his daughter." 
Under the watchful monitoring of "The Elder Presences," 
which combine gods, Supreme Court justices, and "the high 
statues of the wise," Henry strives toward family 
respectability, but the almost parenthetical middle stanza
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of the poem seems to suggest the sexuality which that 
identity must repress. In the middle of this stanza, as 
the justices threaten, Henry seems to speak to himself as 
"negro" and beg pardon for his behavior. When the 
suppressed, parenthetical middle stanza--what the "gods of 
the garden" will not talk about--dissolves, Henry returns 
to the present moment, with his daughter and the 
respectability she gives him, and notes, "Henry's perhaps 
to break his burnt-cork luck." Henry is negotiating in 
these poems the slippery ground between the "white," adult, 
"good," "legal," subject position toward which he 
repeatedly aspires and the freedoms and transgressions of 
that subject toward which he feels himself continually 
driven. He describes the former, as in Song 163, when the 
"lust-quest seems [briefly] to be over," in terms of 
"knighthood" (Galahad?) and being "respectable, / a 
householder, child & all"; he describes the latter, we 
know, in terms of blacking up and talking to his friend. 
Thus, as Lott claims, "the assumption of dominant codes of 
masculinity in the United States was (and still is) partly 
negotiated through an imaginary black interlocutor" (53). 
Berryman literalizes Lott's conclusion that "white male 
fantasies of black men undergird the subject positions 
white men grow up to occupy."
Henry's blackface moments thus tend to combine the 
adolescently sexual, the infantilely oral, and the poet's
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masking, roleplaying freedom from a fixed subject position 
in a weird combination of what Stallybrass and White have 
referred to as the "carnival" and what Lott adduces, in 
nineteenth-century minstrelsy, as the "widespread 
preoccupation in minstrel acts with oral and genital 
amusement" (Lott 145), a subversion of adult identity that 
highlights the convergence of "blackness" figured as what 
Lott calls the "world's body"--to symbolically resolve 
social and economic indignities--with the corporealizations 
and maskings of carnival--to subvert the suffocating 
autonomy of the ego. Frequently, for example, Henry blacks 
up to get "blackt-out," as it were, or at least to have "a 
drink or three." In Song 232, though Henry is "pigging" 
down food (recall that this too can be read as compensation 
for ego crisis), he is trying to give up smoking and 
"stand...off the sauce." But he seems to become bored with 
the spiritual life of philosophizing with Pascal and 
"waiting upon the Lord." Overwhelmed with the materiality 
of the body, Henry, in a particularly egregious instance of 
using blackface as shorthand for the corporeal, calls for 
both cigarettes and booze: "Negroes, ignite! you have
nothing to use but your brains, / which let bust 
out...//...The decanter, pal! / Pascal, we free & loose." 
Here, it is clear, Henry is not blacking up to call for 
black civil freedom in a gesture of interracial solidarity;
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he is doing so to get "free & loose" of the rationalized 
and moralized subject.
Reference to a series of Dream Songs in which assumed 
"blackness" connotes the "world's body," the carnival 
impulse, the poet's freedom from the "egotistical sublime," 
or some combination of the three, suggests that Berryman 
resorted to the device as a figure for the transgression of 
the subject in general--or what I have earlier refered to 
as both a Kohutian and a poetic crisis of the subject. 
Henry overtly carnivalizes his sexual self in Song 97, 
where "Henry of Donnybrook bred like a pig." The line 
evokes both the carnal pleasures of the great English fairs 
referenced by Stallybrass and White and the central 
oppositional role they ascribe to the "pig" trope in the 
discursive formation of respectable identity (62-66, 147- 
48). Tellingly, then, Henry is forced by his indiscretions 
to convert himself into the subjectified body of labor: 
"how he's sweating to support them." The primary agony of 
the poem is, despite its reveries about Shakespeare and 
death, once again the tension between the adult father as 
responsible social and economic subject, and the 
dissipation or dissolution of that subject through the 
revelries of bodily pleasure. In the third stanza, Henry 
enunciates a paroxysm of release which, predictably, 
involves both brutalizing and blackening himself. We might 
note not only--once again--the open mouth of that release,
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but its focus on the nakedness, sexuality, and materiality 
of the body: "Of brutal revelry gap your mouth to state: / 
Front back & backside go bare! / Cats' blackness. booze, 
blows, grunts, grand groans" (emphasis mine).24
If this poem figures the corporeal disruption of the 
rationalized "white" subject (see Lott 147-49) as a 
pleasurable yet shameful reversion to "blackness," in other 
Dream Songs Henry blacks up to signify his more literally 
internal division, as when his "performances" of the many 
others that traverse his poetic "I" imply the disruption of 
that subject through intersubjectivity. In Song 179, the 
interlocutor again returns after an extended absence (a 
hiatus remarked by Henry) , this time on the occasion of 
Henry's dissolution, in the previous poem, into his poetic 
identifications. There, Henry the poet suggests that 
though critics will look for the "man actual" in his 
dreams/poems, he does not exist; instead, there is only "a 
tumult of seems"--not only, perhaps, an uncontrollable 
cycle of Yeatsian masks, but a pieced-together subjectivity 
riven with disruptions and fractures as well: a
subjectivity therefore in danger of literally coming apart 
at the "seems." (Henry's equation of shaving with dreaming 
in lines three and four, in fact, provides a crucial 
connection to the poetic identifications of Song 22.) In 
the next poem, Henry is on the verge of giving up his art 
(and, possibly, his life), but the interlocutor suddenly
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reappears, urging him to do "more shows" tomorrow, for
which he must "rest & rehearse." Reluctantly, Henry agrees
to go back to the drudgery of "work, work, work"--from
which he takes significant consolation in heading off to
the bar. The incommensurability of the plural psyche to
the bourgeois fantasy of unified, proper identity is, in
both of these poems, too much for Henry to endure except as
spectacle— as blackface stage performance.
The most explicit connection of minstrelsy to the poetic
act, however, occurs in a poem which, by invoking Ellison,
once again casts these possible abuses of the "black" image
in the ambiguous light of Berryman's self-conscious plays
upon the "blackness" inside respectable "white" identity.
Song 119 clarifies, moreover, the significance of shaving
and whiskers in Berryman's dream language. It is the role-
playing, persona-switching poet who wears the beard, but he
is a transgressive presence who must shave to return to
white respectability:
Fresh-shaven, past months & a picture in New York 
of Beard Two, I did have Three took off. Well..
Shadow & act, shadow & act,
Better get white or you' get whacked, 
or keep so-called black 
& raise new hell.
The fluctuation here is clearly between the clean-shaven,
proper, "white" subject and money-earning "scholar" (1.
17), whom Berryman sometimes felt it necessary to become,
and the bearded, blackface poet, the identity in which he
351
would have posed for a picture in New York. As the latter, 
he is capable of "raising [political?, personal?] hell" but 
also at risk of punishment by social authorities for his 
transgressions.
The remarkable allusion of the lines, however, is to 
Ellison's collection of nonfiction, Shadow and Act, which 
included both "Change the Joke and Slip the Yoke" and a 
much older (1949) essay on cinematic and literary 
representations of blacks, entitled "The Shadow and the 
Act." Indeed, we can establish a fairly direct 
chronological relationship between Dream Song 119, which 
Berryman wrote in October, 1964, and Shadow and Act, which 
had appeared earlier that year. The allusive presence of 
Ellisonian cultural theory within this poem puts a deeply 
ambivalent but racially politicized spin on the personal 
identity crisis the lines ostensibly reference: if the
ambiguously positioned, plural identity of the performing 
poet is mere shadow to a kind of social "whiteness, " 
"whiteness"--as Ellison's essay on "The Shadow and the Act" 
of U.S. cultural identity formation suggests--is also an 
act. The fluctuation, that is, as in Ellison's stunning 
ironization of cultural "blackness," is not between unified 
identity and a hellish chaos, but between what is already 
nothing but an act, and the shadow of that act which makes 
the "act" (whiteness) appear to be reality or self­
presence. Berryman acknowledges by allusion the
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oppositional, "hellish” role which "black" plays in the
constitution of properly behaved "whiteness," and by direct
statement both the imaginary nature of "race"--it is, after
all, "so-called black"--and the use he makes of it in his
own moral identity.
In the final stanza of the poem that moral role becomes
more explicit, though it remains inextricably entangled
with the poetic function:
No tremor, no perspire: Heaven is here 
now, in Minneapolis.
It's easier to vomit than it was, 
beardless.
There's always the cruelty of scholarship.
I once was a slip.
Henry, always in danger of being "whacked" by wives,
police, respectable friends, doctors and so on for his
dissipative, unproductive, alcoholic indiscretions, has
here passed to the momentary "heaven" of sobriety--where
the beard is gone and, with it, the identity-shifting role
of the poet. As in Dream Song 2, where the minstrel format
first appeared, the possible racial meanings of the poem
dissolve into the single enduring refrain of Henry's
drinking problem and his crisis of the subject: better get
sober or you get whacked. The enigmatic final line of Song
119, then, might be placed exactly at the conjunction of
two earlier, similarly disconnected parting shots. If "I
votes in my hole" (2) articulated a sarcastic, revelrous
rebuttal to the dictates of the social order, and "My
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whiskers fly" (22) was an initial instance of the poet 
recoiling from his maskwearing to the unity of "I am"--the 
poet getting straight— I take this signature to mean ("I 
may have shaved now but") "I once was a slip." To slip 
from identity to identity, to slip from the tree of unified 
morality by drinking until you wretch, to raise social and 
intersubjective hell: such are the possibilities of
Berryman's blackface coon.
"What I am looking for (I am)..."
While John Berryman's minstrel stage does allow him to 
cast the "black" image in the role of what Eric Lott calls 
the "world's body," I have suggested, it also must be read 
in the context of his conscious effort to deconstruct the 
racial "mirror stage" by tunneling through the imaginary 
nature of "race," as in the closing lines of "The Imaginary 
Jew." These lines and the interview remarks I have cited, 
however, constitute virtually the entirety of his recorded 
views on "race," aside from the wholly unanalytical and 
almost obligatory liberal anti-racism of the postwar 
intellectual that shows up in some of his occasional 
remarks (a perfect example is Berryman's statement to the 
effect that he would never take a job in the South, because 
that is where "racism" is practiced) and poetry, including 
The Dream Sonas. What we have seen in the latter as the 
occasional surfacing of vague arguments for equal rights
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and of indications of solidarity with black protest are
representative of both the tenor and the extent of the
"race" content in much of Berryman's earlier and later
poetry, as well.
Taken together, this material is simply not extensive
enough or developed enough to constitute an achieved
political poetry of the "race" problem in the United States
or a "theory" of the effects, causes, manifestations or
psychology of "race" as a cultural discourse. Then too,
the minstrel device came somewhat secondarily to the
compositional process that produced The Dream Sonas and
figures in only some eighty or eighty-five of them. Race
issues seem to have been at best a marginal concern of
Berryman's philosophy and art. Still, there are consistent
gestures in his life and poetry--early, middle, and late--
to a kind of interracial identification that demand we take
seriously his efforts to represent the "black" voices
within twentieth-century U.S. "white" identity. An example
from Love & Fame (197 0) captures an instance of this
tendency from both the later poetry and the earlier life.
In the poem "Nowhere" Berryman articulates both his love of
blues culture and some intriguing experiences from his
Columbia University days:
More comfortable at the Apollo among blacks 
than in Hartley Hall where I hung out.
A one named Brooks Johnson, with it in for Negroes,
I told one noon I'd some coon blood myself
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and he spread the word wide while the canpus laughed.
Magical mourning blues,
Victoria, Bessie. Teagarden. Pine-top Smith
the sightless passionate constructor.(Collected 180-81)
Indeed, such gestures have the feel of what Lott has 
referred to as the "utopian or emancipatory moment" in the 
bohemian romance with "blackness," which played no small 
part in the evolution of the original minstrel show (Lott 
51) . Yet they also evince a kind of exoticization of 
"black" culture which aims at "class abdication through 
gendered cross-racial immersion" (Lott 51), a tradition, as 
Lott notes, that persists even today. It is precisely this 
persistence, I have argued, that is registered in the 
combination of Dream Song 68, with its bluesy but rowdy 
identification with black suffering, and Dream Song 2, with 
its blackface abdication of white, middle-class citizenship 
through sexual and libational dalliance.25 Here too, we 
find perhaps the most accurate way of assessing Berryman's 
strange and drunken nocturnal phone calls to the black man 
he knew best--and of assessing Ellison's strange and 
equivocal recollection of them. The moment of cultural 
interchange through which those earlier bohemians secured 
the authenticity of their art had a tendency to involve not 
mere observation or distant mimicry, but "a white man and a 
black man becoming, [as one of them] put it, 'brothers for 
the time being' ... .it shows up often enough to be a 
defining interest of these 'white Negroes,' and we might
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pause over its enabling role in cultural theft" (Lott 52). 
These passing nineteenth-century artistic friendships find 
a ghostly resurrection in the strange literary 
collaboration through which, on the lower frequencies, as 
it were, Ralph Ellison became the "blackness"--and perhaps 
the interlocutor--within Henry the modern "white Negro." A 
degree of sincerity on both sides of the collaboration 
seems probable, yet in Ellison's contradictory mixture of 
"fascination," "amusement," and abdication of authenticity 
(Mariani, Life 3 87) are captured both the emancipatory and 
the expropriative impulses of Berryman's black(face) art.
Empathic identification and self-serving exploitation; 
appreciative immersion in a liberating cultural style and 
degrading representation of a biologized Other: as both the 
original minstrel show and The Dream Sonas suggest, the two 
strands are inextricable in American representations of 
"blackness." Though Berryman exploited blackface as the 
designated mask for the ego-transgressing, carnal, and 
split-off elements of Henry's conflicted, "tragic," white 
self, he also exploited the gaps in the "white subject," 
showing how its class, racial, and moral parameters reveal 
its very constructedness--reveal it to be literally in 
pieces because constituted out of various "others" whose 
voices traverse its frequencies. As Berryman elsewhere put 
his definitive concern with the autonomy and alienation of 
subjectivity, "What I am looking for (I am) may be /
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Happening in the gaps of what I know." In the U.S., it was 
his singular but wrenchingly conflicted poetic insight to 
recognize, the "white" "I am" could only be glimpsed, 
though never known, by peering into the shadows of its own 
act.
Notes
1. Qtd. in Nielsen, p. 123. From Michael S. Harper, Images 
of Kin: New and Selected Poems (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 
1977) .
2. As Lott notes, the questions of an "authentic" "black" 
culture or cultural element or of an "accurate" or 
"derivative" blackface imitation are hopelessly muddled, 
reminding one of nothing so much as Ellison's idea of the 
"mulatto" character of American culture. According to 
Lott, "The researches of Hans Nathan, Robert Toll, and 
others suggest that the minstrel show's humor, songs, and 
dances were so culturally mixed as, in effect, to make 
their 'racial' origins quite undecidable....The creolized 
character of black forms themselves, of course, not to 
mention their casual and undocumentable influence on white 
ones, muddies this whole question considerably and makes 
all cultural labeling a provisional matter" (94).
3 . Thus Lott reads the sheer irrationality of the 
linguistic, musical, corporeal, sexual, racial, and 
infantile revelries common to the minstrel stage as the 
regressive "dream" formations of an ever tenuous process of 
self-staging by the rationalized white ego, a return of the 
Other and a subversion of the subject both pleasurable and 
revolting. His description of the contradictory tendencies 
of minstrelsy for a working class facing an increasing 
industrial discipline of the subject provide one example: 
"Ascribing [corporeal excess] to the 'degraded' blackface 
Other, and indulging it--by imagining, incorporating, or 
impersonating the Other--workingmen confronting the demand 
to be 'respectable' might at once take their enjoyment and 
disavow it....All the standard elements in the repertoire 
of inversion--filth, scatology, racial marking itself-- 
returned here to assault the white subject whose self- 
possession had been constituted by their disavowal" (148). 
The ambivalence of this "dream-work" of the body is thus an 
identification so powerful that it requires racism as its 
counterbalance: see also p. 260, n. 13.
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4. On Berryman's use of voices, see Donoghue; for 
Berryman's own remarks on the importance of the "ambiguous" 
"I" of the poet in his work, see his "One Answer to a 
Question: Changes" in The Freedom of the Poet: on his
understanding of the self as a construct see Davis, "The 
Li(v)es of the Poet" and "The Freedom of John Berryman"; on 
his use of Yeatsian masks, see Mazzaro; for Berryman's 
explication of the Whitmanian and Keatsian conception of 
the poet as a vessel, and its intersection with the 
manipulation of voices and identity, see his "'Song of 
Myself': Intention and Substance" in The Freedom of the
Poet.
5. In Song 23, Henry ridicules a U.S. political scene 
dominated by Dwight Eisenhower--vacuous, unintellectual, 
and a representative of both industrial-military hegemony 
and spreading McCarthyism, whose minions destroy one of the 
country's most valuable scientists when they "bile 
Oppenheimer out of use." Song 162 criticizes the cynicism 
and inhumanity of the Vietnam "war," instrument of a 
disguised foreign policy that "kept us unaware / that we 
were killing Asiatics, daily." And in Song 197, the only 
imaginable response to the "bloody fucking news" and the 
"nuclear devices H & A" that converge "on miserable Henry" 
is to hide from them.
6 . The argument I am making here is analogous to that 
forwarded by Gary Q. Arpin, who finds that Berryman, 
beginning with his earlier work, demonstrates how "the 
disruptions of the outer world produce their analogues in 
the inner landscape" (25) . Just as, in Berryman's 1945 
short story "The Imaginary Jew," the protagonist realizes 
he personally bears "our general guilt" for bigotry when he 
himself is mistaken for a Jew, in The Dream Soncrs various 
modes of cultural violence become the violence of psychic 
fragmentation--a dynamic nowhere more clear than when Henry 
experiences interracial fracture as internal fracture 
through his assumption of the role of "imaginary Negro" 
(Arpin 75). On "tragic man," see Kohut, Restoration 206- 
207, and Reflections 36-37.
7. Following John Haffenden's note on Berryman's manuscript 
for Song 19 5, I have noted what seems to be the very 
plausible restoration of the word "feasts," which is 
omitted from the published version, to line 12. See 
Haffenden, p. 111.
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8. For a more complete presentation of my understanding of 
the psychological aspects of'Henry's' fragmentation, see my 
"Things Are Going to Pieces: Disintegration Anxiety in The 
Dream Songs" in Kelly and Lathrop 189-201.
9. Kathe Davis's assumption that Berryman treated the self 
as an almost Derridean construct, always "under erasure" 
even in the moment of the discursive act it makes possible, 
also seems relevant here. See, especially, her comments on 
the uncollected Dream Song in which Henry admits that 
"Henry under construction was Henry indeed" ("Li(v)es" 50).
10. See Kohut, Analysis 9.
11. See the series of essays in Recovering Berrvman on 
"Berryman and Alcoholism," especially Hyde, p. 217.
12. Haffenden records this statement from one of Berryman's 
journals, and Mariani dates it to spring, 1957. It 
continues, "...and I am also a bastard, and I am hopeful 
and good-natured, and I am a man insulted and injured" 
(Haffenden 50, Mariani, Life 314). Later comments suggest 
that Berryman came to view disunity less as abnormal and 
more as the inevitable condition of personality. In 1965, 
as "a man nearing fifty," he wrote, "I am less impressed 
than I used to be by the universal notion of a continuity 
of individual personality" (Freedom 323).
13. Kohut, for example, discusses not only psychological 
maneuvers intended to compensate for a faltering self 
structure, but also those which provide pleasure by giving 
the subject power over or the ability to "play" with the 
loss of self: symbolization of the mutilation and
reconstruction of the self in both artistic and dream 
material provide this outlet, as does the infantile "little 
piggy" game Kohut describes in which the child takes 
thrilling joy in the "removal" of its toes and fingers, 
knowing that the "terror" of mutilation will be banished 
when the game ends with the warmth and wholeness of a 
parental hug (Analysis 118-19) .
14. Stallybrass and White borrow the term and the concept 
"grotesque body" from Bakhtin's discussion of the 
carnivalesque.
15. It is certainly plausible, though not fundamental to my 
argument, that Berryman's text seems exemplary of what 
Stallybrass and White call modern "transgressive 
literature" because of a more direct link than the cultural
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context they describe. That link would be Freud's "Studies 
of hysteria, " which'provide the spark for Stallybrass and 
White’s theory of the return of the carnival repressed and 
which Berryman, a careful reader of Freud, no doubt knew 
well. Freud's descriptions of the "clownism," "imitation 
of animals and circus scenes," "nursery games and sexual 
scenes," pantomimic fantasy, and the fragmented, 
disconnected presentation of such elements in the discourse 
of his hysterics might have been a significant influence on 
the form and content of The Dream Sonas. In any case, 
little has been written on the fair and carnival theme that 
is developed in The Dream Sonas not only through Henry's 
feasting and drinking but also through the regular 
appearance of "holiday" poems and such references as "Henry 
of Donnybrook bred like a pig" (97) and the "little fair" 
of Song 109.
16. The chronological relationship between these poems is 
suggested by John Haffenden's incomplete but invaluable 
dating of many of The Dream Songs according to notations on 
Berryman's original manuscripts. According to Haffenden, 
Songs 231 and 43 were written on August 15 and November 1, 
1961, respectively, despite their extreme separation in the 
sequence of the book and in time of publication (Haffenden 
158) .
17. William Wasserstrom was perhaps the first to note, in 
1968, that one of the initial epigraphs to The Dream Sonas 
was also the epigraph to Wittke's book: "'Go in, brack man, 
de day's yo' own'" (Wasserstrom 169). See also Arpin (75), 
Haffenden (48, 51, and 82), and Gustavsson (80-82) . Kathe 
Davis's reading of Berryman's own copy of Wittke, and his 
marginal notes, is particularly interesting but, if 
anything, suggests how little Berryman actually drew on the 
1930 history of minstrelsy: outside of his striking use of 
one passage as the basis for Song 2 (to be noted below), 
"Berryman's own copy of the book is only lightly marked and 
annotated" and the noted references do not seem to be 
directly developed in The Dream Sonas (Davis, "Honey" 39).
18. Wasserstrom and Linebarger, to cite two egregious 
examples, shift seamlessly back and forth between the idea 
that Berryman is performing a "minstrel" show and the idea 
that he is doing something "Negro." See Wasserstrom 172- 
80, and Linebarger 85-87.
19. As Stallybrass and White argue, the spectacle of the 
carnival in its modern, "subjective articulation" can be 
experienced as both a threat to the disciplined subject, as
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for Cardinal, and as a pleasurable release from it, as for 
Henry: "these carnivalesgue fragments formed unstable
discursive compounds, sometimes disruptive, sometimes 
therapeutic, within the very constitution of bourgeois 
subjectivity" (182). As Lott points out in describing the 
function of the minstrel show, of course, the "phobia and 
fascination" (Stallybrass and White 182) of the 
carnivalized Other are often inseparable.
20. My connection of the concept of carnival, which I have 
borrowed from Stallybrass and White, to the minstrel 
performances Berryman here commemorates is thoroughly 
pertinent to Berryman's own source for the latter. On the 
page immediately following his description of the minstrel 
parade with its "gold cornet band" and "big brass buttons," 
Wittke notes, "The minstrel parade is another example of 
the close relationship between the circus and minstrel 
shows. It was borrowed directly from the circus parade, and 
became an established part of every minstrel outfit in 
America" (145-46).
21. Kohut defines the "nuclear self" as "the basis for our 
sense of being an independent center of initiative and 
perception" (Restoration 177). I have drawn the terms of 
this discussion from The Restoration of the Self, pp. 177- 
91; from The Analysis of the Self, pp. 114-25, where Kohut 
was still using the overtly post-Freudian terminology 
"narcissistic libido" and "reality ego"; and from the 
diagrams which appear on Restoration 213 and Analysis 185.
22. It is precisely in the assessment of this dynamic, I 
want to argue, that Wasserstrom's argument for a solely 
sympathetic reading of the racial content of Berryman's 
sequence most clearly undercuts itself. Analyzing the 
minstrel device in terms of a Freudian "dramatis personae 
of the inner life," but reading the metaphor only in its 
liberatory direction, he notes, "Instead of Henry, read 
ego. In place of id, visualize Bones, end man of minstrel 
shows, unruly in the beat of tambourine and rattle of 
bones.... Sometimes, like id, that olio of vulgar and 
irrepressible want, Bones 1s black need bursts his own and 
even, beyond disentangling, Berryman's bounds" (179-80).
23. We can further sense how Berryman was manipulating the 
blackface material by noting that these two poems are 
radically removed from their sequence of composition. 
Written much later than the poems that immediately precede 
them in Book V, written even after the majority of poems 
that make up Books VI and VII, they were among the final
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Dream Songs written before publication of the second volume 
but were inserted here when Berryman ordered the Songs for 
publication, as if he sensed the need to reinvoke Henry's 
sexual temptations--and his minstrelsy--before ending a 
book in which Henry struggles toward respectable family-man 
status (see Haffenden 164). The blackface device allows 
Berryman to direct a stage on which these figures of bodily 
fun suddenly stand and speak, and just as abruptly sit down 
as rationalized "whiteness" returns, reproducing the 
"disappearing act in which blackface made "blackness" 
flicker on and off so as simultaneously to produce and 
disintegrate the body" (Lott 117).
24. For additional nuances of these meanings of the "burnt 
cork" in Henry's life, see Songs 25, 194, 205, and 228.
25. Lott's description of the "bohemian" artisans who 
created the minstrel phenomenon is an instructive gloss on 
Berryman's resurrection of their art and his Columbia 
memories: "Marginalized by temperament, by habit (often 
alcoholism), by ethnicity, even by sexual orientation, 
these artists immersed themselves in blackface to indulge 
their felt sense of difference....if for men sexuality is 
where freedom and play meet, "blackness" was for antebellum 
bohemians its virtual condition--that fascinating imaginary 
space of fun and license outside (but structured by) 
Victorian bourgeois norms" (51).
Chapter Five 
Crying Because She Has No Self:
The Psychology of Slavery in Morrison's Beloved
In the preceding chapters, I have posited the presence 
of two different mechanisms in the social order of the 
United States that inhibit the abilities of people to 
conceptualize their own psychic wholeness and that foster 
profound anxieties of self-disintegration. Taking Gertrude 
Stein's literary response to middle-class conventionality 
and Ralph Ellison's literary evocation of racial 
personality models as my starting points, I outlined the 
effects of cultural disciplines of the self that deny 
aspects of psychic experience. In chapter 4, I then 
suggested how failures of self-object empathy during 
development might lead to deep, structural deficits of 
identity such as those represented in John Berryman's 
poetry. We might characterize the first of these dynamics 
as cultural, with psychological effects, and the second as 
psychological, with cultural effects. Thus the racial 
disciplinarity outlined by Ellison, which precipitates a 
sense of non-identity that reads as nameless invisibility, 
finds its counterpart in the anxieties of psychic disorder 
that Berryman in part resolves by participating in the 




Moreover, the Kohutian formulation that I found useful 
for explaining the personal, developmental mechanism in 
Berryman's case also rather aptly describes the 
experiential effect of the sociocultural disciplines of the 
self: if a child's need for empathic response from its
self-objects is not met, Kohut comments, "then the broader 
psychological configuration--the joyful experience of being 
a whole, appropriately responded-to self--disintegrates and 
the child retreats to a fragment of the larger experiential 
unit" (Restoration 81). I am suggesting--and here we can 
speak of the ongoing identity formation processes of 
adults, as well as children--that if the empathic needs of 
some parts of the broader psychological configuration are 
denied by various cultural strategies of individualization, 
we can similarly expect the joyful, "whole" self to 
disintegrate and the person to retreat to a fragment of his 
or her possible experience.
I want now to articulate a more intimate relationship 
between these two mechanisms of fragmentation by suggesting 
that they constitute different moments of a single process 
of distorted identity formation, and proposing that each is 
productive of the other in a sort of cyclical symbiosis of 
psychocultural pathology. Neither precedes or bears a 
strictly causal relationship to the other, but, 
intertwining in the conduit of psychocultural transmission 
through which narcissistically damaged psyches cause the
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development of narcissistic damage in the psyches that must 
relate to them, the two become almost inextricable 
components of a vicious circle of psychic discontent. 
Anxieties about the unity of the self are produced and 
enhanced by a complex combination of both childhood 
rejections, especially through the self-object dynamic 
elucidated by Kohut, and cultural subjections, especially 
in the sense explored in historical contexts by Foucault. 
But it is crucial to see as well how psyches so damaged 
communicate their damage to others, both by becoming 
parenting self-objects incapable of responding wholly to 
their children and by turning for salvation from their 
internal discord to the very cultural systems that enforce 
such fragmented existences: disciplines of race, gender, 
sexuality, health, productivity, and so on.
Within the problematic of racial discipline that I have 
examined, perhaps Stein's Three Lives most suggestively 
collapses these concerns into a single text. It refers, 
seemingly autobiographically, to both child abuse and 
disciplinary identity management as causative factors in 
psychic pulverization, encoding such concerns in a text 
that reproduces wholesale a set of culturally circulating 
racial personality models. Forced to retreat to "a 
fragment of the larger experiential unit" by both parental 
mistreatment and cultural subjectification, I am 
suggesting, Stein responds by thematizing the psychological
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transmission of psychic damage from parent to child in a 
text that enacts the cultural transmission of disciplinary 
forms of racial identity. In turn, as Ellison's novel 
shows, the latter forms encourage similar retreats by 
(racialized) others to fragments of their broader self- 
experience.
Toni Morrison's Beloved provides a fit conclusion to 
this study of the meanings of disintegration within the 
problematic of racial identity, since it traverses an 
imaginatively historiographical recreation of the terrain 
of United States slavery and racism to explore precisely 
how the two mechanisms of fragmentation alluded to here 
work together. Examining the personal and developmental 
ramifications of a social and economic system based on 
white supremacy, Morrison focuses on the very instance of 
disciplinary propagation: the parent-child relationship and 
its formative significance for emergent consciousness. For 
Morrison it is in the family structure itself that the two 
mechanisms of identity disfiguration, which I have 
described as operating coproductively or in tandem, fuse 
with and enhance one another: individuals crippled by
disciplines of racial identity are both materially--because 
of the brutal rupturing of family relationships in slavery- 
-and psychologically--because of the brutal rupturing of 
internal relationships among psychic components--unable to 
provide the models of psychic wholeness and strength in
367
relation to which healthy subjectivities might develop. 
That is, the process that Kohut calls "transmuting 
internalization," through which healthy selves develop in 
relationship to a "self-object's highly developed psychic 
organization" (Restoration 86), is inhibited by either the 
self-object's own lack of healthy structures or by its 
absence altogether.
This is the cruel cycle of relational failures and 
psychic retreats that characterizes the family at the 
center of Beloved. even years after the end of economic 
slavery and the achievement of material freedom. Indeed, 
it is precisely in her exploration of this cycle and its 
transmission from generation to generation that Morrison 
develops what numerous critics have noted as her unique 
emphasis on the cataclysmic psychological impact of 
slavery, particularly in its extension into an indefinite 
future after the Emancipation Proclamation, and on the 
therapeutic value--for both the characters she represents 
and for the U.S. as a social group--of revising the way we 
remember that horrifically damaged past as a means to re­
membering our selves (Henderson).1
I want to continue the work that has been started on 
this psychological aspect of Beloved, particularly in the 
directions articulated by critics like Jennifer FitzGerald, 
who notes that "psychoanalysis, vigorously modified by 
objects relations theory, can be explored as one of the set
of meanings which can be read into, or onto, Beloved" 
(685). The derivative version of object relations theory 
Kohut calls self psychology, specifically, allows us to 
apply the Kohutian concepts of self-object empathy and the 
relational self to an analysis of the kinds of severe 
narcissistic personality damage, especially disintegration 
anxiety, depicted in Morrison's novel. Morrison creates 
characters whose intensive hungers, withdrawals, 
dependencies, and fears of fragmentation suggestively evoke 
the psychopathological considerations of self psychology. 
Foremost among these characters are Denver, the daughter 
delivered during an escape from slavery, and Beloved, who 
is the incarnate ghost of not only the daughter Sethe 
killed to save from re-enslavement, but also of the 
empathically deprived child-selves of almost every African 
American character in the novel. In her figurations of 
wounded selfhood, Morrison suggests that the salient effect 
of the violence of slavery on "black" identity was the 
formation of what we might read as the disintegration 
anxieties and stunted, archaic self-object relationships 
characteristic of narcissistic personality disorder.
The U.S. historical epoch of institutionalized slavery, 
as Morrison rewrites it, wreaks its havoc on the "black" 
self in two interrelated and mutually reinforcing ways, 
imaging the two mechanisms of self-disintegration I alluded 
to above: its material practices fragmented the larger
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experiential unit of the family, initiating a cycle of 
isolation and dysfunction; and its imaginative practices-- 
the symbolic violence of discourses of "whiteness" and 
"blackness"--fragmented the larger experiential unit of the 
psyche. Kohut's self psychological perspective allows us 
to view that psychic unit precisely as a function of the 
kinds of empathic relationships made available in 
structures like the family, and thus to better grasp the 
insidious reproductive effect of such practices to which 
Morrison calls attention: the self which develops in the 
relational context of such diminished structures can only 
reproduce the mutilation of its environment, retreating to 
a fragment of the full psychological configuration.
The ghost of slavery past; Beloved
The most marked case of such stunted emotional 
development in the novel is, of course, the "ghost" Beloved 
herself. This is of far-reaching significance, for Beloved 
represents the general psychological condition of "blacks" 
under and after slavery as much as she incarnates the 
particular sense of injury and abandonment of the infant 
daughter killed by Morrison's maternal protagonist, Sethe. 
Beloved embodies not only the "haint" that spitefully 
terrorizes 124 Bluestone Road as the novel opens, but also 
the primal African American experience of the middle 
passage and the injured past selves of Paul D, Sethe,
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Halle, and Denver, each damaged by slavery in related ways 
despite differences of age, sex, and historical situation 
(Denver, for example, is the child of another "middle 
passage"--Sethe's escape--and grows up in a state of 
nominal "freedom").
As Deborah Horvitz astutely surmises, Beloved shares the 
spirit of both Sethe's daughter and her mother, who 
survived the middle passage as a child but was apparently 
abandoned when her mother— Sethe's grandmother--jumped into 
the ocean to avoid bondage (Beloved 210-14; Horvitz 157-58, 
163). This historical connection establishes parental 
abandonment, predicated on the inhumanities of slavery, as 
a sort of familial primal scene for the novel and as the 
context of Beloved's emotional state. We must read her 
condition not simply in terms of her enraged infantile 
response to Sethe's act of aggression, that is, but in the 
sense that she represents the common daughter in an 
extended historical succession of such violent disruptions 
of the mother-daughter relationship. Beloved's monologue in 
Part 3 recalls the original African mother's leap into the 
ocean, the abandonment of Sethe's mother (214) . As a 
child, Sethe learns from her nurse Nan how Sethe's mother 
abandoned a series of children who were products of slave- 
rapes (62), and as an adult she eventually pieces together 
the central horror of her own childhood: that this mother 
eventually abandoned her by trying to escape without her
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and being hung for the attempt (203) . Sethe1 s own 
desperate resort to infanticide to put her child out of 
reach of slavery, intelligible to the ghost-baby only as an 
abandonment, is thus literally a product of both a 
psychological legacy of emotional damage and the immediate 
material cruelties of slavery.
But the matrilineal connections that Horvitz so fully 
explicates do not mark the limits of Beloved's symbolic 
import in the novel. In her fragmented recall of the 
experience of the middle passage, she also is a figure for 
the "Sixty Million and more" African people who died in 
transit to the Americas, alluded to in Morrison's epigraph, 
and thus an important past "self" for all African 
Americans. For Sethe, of course, she represents not only 
Sethe's violently traumatized daughter, but also the 
traumatized daughter that Sethe herself once was--the past 
she has repressed and only begins to remember under 
Beloved's influence. In both ways, she is the image--of a 
deeply narcissistically damaged self--Sethe has been 
"dreaming" for years (132). Similarly, she functions as a 
literal projection of the memory that Denver has repressed- 
-the infanticide--a repression readable in Denver's two- 
year period of deaf withdrawal from the world (103) and her 
nightmarish fear of violence at Sethe's hands (103, 206). 
And if Paul D has also retreated from the unimaginable 
parts of his past to a fragment of his self-experience,
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locking away his memories of brutal abuse under slavery "in 
that tobacco tin buried in his chest where a red heart used 
to be" (72-73), Beloved's seductions of him represent his 
own desire to recover full identity: during their
lovemaking he chants "'Red heart. Red heart,' over and over 
again. Softly and then so loud it woke Denver, then Paul D 
himself" (117). Beloved is literally Paul D's dream of his 
repressed, damaged self.
Indeed, at the end of the novel Beloved vanishes along 
with the community members' memories of her, as if she were 
nothing more than their "bad dream" as well: they "began to 
believe that, other than what they themselves were 
thinking, she hadn't said anything at all" (274). Beloved 
is the damaged element of the consciousness of the African 
American community and its novelistic representatives, a 
past "self" long "unspeakable" but suddenly emerging into 
their physical world. Morrison does not settle the 
question of whether the ghost is a real agent in the story 
or a mere figment of each character's psychic damage: she 
is both. As FitzGerald comments, citing Morrison's 1988 
interview with Marsha Jean Darling, "[Beloved] can thus be 
read in two ways, as Morrison herself suggests: both as a 
psychically damaged real-life slavegirl and as a ghost 
(fantasy object for the emotions of others)" (672-73).
Specifically, as her preeminent role as Sethe's 
literally mutilated--almost beheaded--daughter makes clear,
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Beloved is a projection of the narcissistically damaged 
child within all of the victims of slavery, the embodiment 
of their collective retreat from full self-experience in 
the face of slavery's almost total denial of the empathic 
responsiveness and proper self-object relationships 
necessary to the development and sustenance of mature 
identity. "A wounded, enraged baby," Barbara Schapiro 
writes, "is the central figure of the book, both literally, 
in the character of Beloved, and symbolically, as it 
struggles beneath the surface of the other major 
characters" (195). Indeed, numerous commentators have 
noted Morrison's extensive depiction of the psychology of 
Sethe and her family as a condition of undeveloped, 
injured, infantile narcissism. The preoedipal, preverbal, 
or narcissistic state lived out by Sethe and Beloved--and 
by Beloved as a part of Denver and Paul D--has been 
variously characterized in Kleinian (Fitzgerald, Wyatt), 
Winnicottian (Mathieson, Wyatt), Benjaminian (Schapiro), 
Freudian (Mathieson) and Lacanian (Wyatt) terms. Kohut's 
framework for narcissistic damage makes a useful 
contribution to this already productive discussion, 
particularly in the light of his sensitivity to the very 
empirical or, to borrow one of his favorite phrases, 
"experience-near" qualities of empathic relations and the 
intersubjective context of the self. His outlook shares 
many of the interests of the modification of object
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relations theory Jessica Benjamin calls "intersubjective 
theory," but it also presents what we might think of as an 
empathically revised version of the psychoanalytic legacy 
of Freud and L a c a n . 2 if, as Jean Wyatt convincingly 
argues, Morrison revises the Lacanian symbolic model of 
social identity into a vision of healthy subjectivity that 
combines nurturing with intersubjectivity, bodily contact 
with language (Wyatt 475, 484), Kohut1s revision of the
analytic situation (subject relating to subject by way of 
mutual, discursively mediated empathy) provides one 
possible explanatory device for a text that also "teaches 
[us] that caring is 'what language was made for'" (Beloved 
252, Wyatt 475).3
The intense hungers, the extreme dependencies and 
transgressions of self-boundaries, and the general loss of 
selfhood that Morrison thematizes at 124 Bluestone Road, 
then, might all be referred to the archaic self-object 
relationships characteristic of, in Kohut's view, both 
preoedipal childhood and the narcissistic personality 
disorders precipitated by the traumas of early self-object 
failure (Res tora t ion 28) . That is, we can better 
understand how Morrison is depicting the emotional damage 
of the culture of slavery if we treat Sethe and Beloved's 
relationship not simply as a Kleinian or Winnicottian 
preoedipal relationship, though it certainly has those 
qualities, but also as a representation of the
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narcissistically damaged modes of adult identity that can 
arise from childhood self-object trauma. Morrison's 
ingenious device for representing this connection is, of 
course, to make Beloved both the ghost of an infant 
stranded--cut off--at the phase of hungering, 
undifferentiated, preverbal, and preoedipal relationship 
with its mother, and the twenty-year-old, narcissistically 
disordered result of infantile empathic failure; the 
result, that is, of being treated by its mother not as a 
full self (a subject, in Benjamin's parlance), but as a 
mere extension of that mother's own self.
Almost from the moment of her appearance Beloved 
"hungers" for anything that Sethe can give her: stories, 
company, looks, games, sweets, foods. Both metaphorical 
and material, this is the "bottomless" longing that Denver 
immediately notices in Beloved's eyes (58), observing both 
the young woman's lust for sweet foods (55) and "how greedy 
she was to hear Sethe talk" (63) . Both Sethe's 
storytelling and the sweets "became a way to feed her" 
(58). Beloved's reliance on Sethe becomes so constant, 
demanding, and possessive that she gradually maneuvers Paul 
D out of the household so that Sethe's attention will be 
devoted exclusively to her. Ultimately, the two become so 
entwined in what Wyatt describes as a bodily connected, 
"maternal continuity" (477) that both withdraw into the 
house, neglect the outside world, and continue a "feeding"
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relationship so intense that Sethe begins to waste away 
physically while Beloved whines for sweets and grows bigger 
"by the day" (239-43).4
Morrison thus creates a nuanced representation of the 
condition Kohut associates with failures in empathic 
response. In the passage I have earlier used to summarize 
the child's retreat to "a fragment of the larger 
experiential unit," the specific retreat being discussed 
is, in fact, a retreat “to pleasure-seeking oral 
stimulation...or, expressed clinically, to depressive 
eating," potentially resulting in "addiction to food" 
(Restoration 81). Indeed, Beloved's temper tantrums (242) 
and accelerated desire and demandingness (240) during part 
3 of the novel, together with the insistent depiction of 
her explicitly oral, incorporative, and hungering 
relationship to Sethe throughout evokes nothing so much as 
the "unusually great demandingness vis-a-vis the mother," 
"the intensified oral greed," and the "tendency toward 
violent temper tantrums" Kohut observes in certain children 
who have "suffered severe traumatizations in early infancy" 
(Restoration 27-28). If we view Sethe's infanticide both 
as such a severely traumatizing act for the baby that has 
"survived" it (as a ghost) and as indicative of a larger 
inability on her part to respond empathically to her 
children--to treat them as whole and separate selves--we 
can understand Beloved's characteristics as part of what
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Kohut calls a "depressive-disintegrative reaction to the 
unempathic self-object milieu" (Restoration 81).
Beloved's initial "hungry" dependence on Sethe--she 
begins to wait longingly for Sethe to come home from work, 
"as though every afternoon she doubted anew the older 
woman's return" (57)--is only a precursor to the 
"frighteningly boundless narcissism" (Schapiro 203) of 
their withdrawal into the house and of the later pages of 
the novel. As the novel moves on we discover the full 
extent of Beloved's hungers for Sethe's smile, her gaze, 
her face: like the preoedipal infant she was when Sethe
first left her, and like the narcissistically disordered 
adult that might result from such abandonment trauma, 
Beloved has trouble recognizing any boundary between Sethe 
and herself, a "breakdown of the borders between self and 
other...that is bound up with incorporative fantasies" 
(Schapiro 202).
It is in the series of monologues that immediately 
follows the withdrawal of Sethe, Denver, and Beloved from 
the outside world that the boundaries between self and 
other in Beloved's experience are shown to be completely 
soluble--and so, too, are the boundaries between Beloved as 
the "crawling-already?" baby and Beloved as the survivor of 
the middle passage. In Beloved's monologue, she expresses 
the very essence of predifferentiated, infantile 
narcissism, placing both Sethe and a woman on the slave
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ship in the position of mother, yet as part of her own
self: "I am not separate from her there is no place where
I stop her face is my own...Sethe's is the face that left
me Sethe sees me see her and I see the smile her
smiling face is the place for me" (210-13). Beloved's own
identity is utterly dependent on, is literally coextensive
with, Sethe's presence and her smiling, empathically
responsive face. Correlative to Beloved's more and more
complete merger with Sethe is her growing inability to
tolerate any failure in Sethe's responses to her, as we
learn in a passage that again implicitly connects the
smiling--but abandoning— woman of the middle passage to the
smiling--but abandoning--Sethe who sent Beloved ahead
during her escape from Sweet Home:
Beloved accused her of leaving her behind. Of not 
being nice to her, not smiling at her. She said they 
were the same, had the same face, how could she have 
left her? And Sethe cried, saying she never did, or 
meant to--that she had to get them out, away....Beloved 
wasn't interested. She said when she cried there was 
no one. That dead men lay on top of her....Sethe never 
came to her, never said a word to her, never smiled and 
worst of all never waved goodbye or even looked her way 
before running away from her. (241-42)
This remarkable passage conflates no less than three
moments of perceived parental abandonment or
unresponsiveness precipitated by the extremities of
slavery, articulating them from the enraged, narcissistic
viewpoint of the child who experiences them (or from the
viewpoint of the narcissistically damaged adult that child
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will become): the original African mother's leap into the 
sea, Sethe1s (and her mother's) flight from plantation and 
children, and Sethe's desperate act of infanticide. 
Eloquently, and realistically, it also emphasizes the 
preoedipal child's all-important visual dependence on its 
mother and on her face and smile--the "mirroring" through 
which the child sees its own self-worth reflected back to 
it in the face and smile of the self-object, in "the gleam 
in the mother's eye," thus building its own strong sense of 
self (Kohut, Analysis 116-17). These are the "visual 
interactions" that can become--and indeed seem for Beloved 
to have become--"hypercathected" as a result of traumatic 
empathic failures, the "gaze" that can be "the carrier of 
the wish to be held and carried [and suckled] by the 
mother" (Kohut, Analysis 117; see also Restoration 8-9).
Not only does the archaic emotional state pursuant to 
what Kohut calls "self-object failure" (Restoration 190) 
involve a retreat to a fragment of the experiential unit-- 
frequently to an excessive orality like Beloved's--it also 
often eventuates in the conscious experience of that 
fragmentation. "After the self has broken into fragments," 
Kohut observes, there is still a "residual part of the self 
that experiences its own fragmentation" and "attach[es] its 
anxieties and complaints to this or that fragment of the 
body" (Restoration 156-57). When the child-woman Beloved
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loses a tooth, we learn how intensely she feels this
"disintegration anxiety":
Beloved looked at the tooth and thought, This is it. 
Next would be her arm, her hand, a toe. Pieces of her 
would drop maybe one at a time, maybe all at once. Or 
one of those mornings before Denver woke and after 
Sethe left she would fly apart. It is difficult keeping 
her head on her neck, her legs attached to her hips 
when she is by herself. Among the things she could not 
remember was when she first knew that she could wake up 
any day and find herself in pieces. She had two dreams: 
exploding, and being swallowed. (133)
In Kohut's clinical terms, we might read Beloved's
imputation of her condition to her bodily structure as
paralleling the disintegration anxiety "patient's attempt
to give a circumscribed content to a deeper unnamable dread
experienced when a person feels that his self is becoming
seriously enfeebled or is disintegrating," often actualized
with a "clearly hypochondriacal and phobic cast"
(Restoration 105). Like the self psychological framework I
am foregrounding, Morrison emphasizes the absence of self-
objects, when the fabric of relationship that structures
the self is not visibly present, as the situation when this
threat of bodily fragmentation is most acute.5 Thus,
Beloved's feelings evoke both the specific shocking
experience at the core of her fragmentation and a general
condition of archaic overdependence on self-object empathy:
her difficulty "keeping her head on her neck" links her
fragmentation to the crucial incident when violent
aggression came from the expected source of caring empathy,
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and her inability to maintain her sense of self in the 
absence of others bespeaks the lack of mature self­
functioning produced by an environment of developmental 
self-object failure. In this case, that environment is a 
culture of slavery where, as for Sethe and for her mother 
before her, parents are always running away, sold away, or 
too emotionally crippled themselves to be effective models.
As a particularly concretized description of the literal 
fragmentation of identity, I take this evocation of 
disintegration anxiety to be absolutely central to 
Morrison's articulation of the psychology of slavery. 
Beloved is both the preoedipal infant for whom the absence 
of the parent's mirroring gaze precipitates an existential 
crisis and the victim of slave culture for whom adult life 
is a constant, infantlike quest to establish firm grounds 
for an identity. In normal maturation, according to 
Kohut's formulation, "the mother's exultant response to the 
total child (calling him by name as she enjoys his presence 
and activity) supports, at the appropriate phase, the 
development from autoerotism to narcissism--from the stage 
of the fragmented self...to the stage of the cohesive self" 
(Analysis 118). Having experienced the traumatic loss of 
her mother's responsive smile and affirmative naming--on 
several historical levels at once--Beloved is stranded in 
the immature emotional state of disintegration anxiety,
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experiencing only various autoeroticized (oral, sexual, 
tactile) fragments of the self.
When Beloved makes her ghostly visitation to Paul D in 
the cold house, intent on her narcissistic design of 
removing a distraction from Sethe's purview, she is also 
engaging in a furtive, eroticized attempt to fill her eirpty 
sense of self. But what is most revealing is her 
connection of that eroticism to the crucial lack in her 
past--the lack of having her total self acknowledged by 
being called by name by a joyful parent. She tells Paul D, 
"I want you to touch me on the inside part and call me my 
name" (116). Homi Bhabha, indeed, emphasizes this request 
as the crucial moment of "Beloved's naming of her desire 
for identity." That "inward and intimate desire," he adds, 
is the very "'inscape' of the memory of slavery" that 
Morrison is recreating (Bhabha, Culture 16).
Historically, we might trace this destruction of the 
African American self to the violent disorientations, 
deterritorializations, and familial separations of the 
abduction from Africa, as Morrison suggests by making the 
disintegration theme a critical presence in the 
aforementioned monologue section, when Beloved's middle 
passage life is literally contiguous with her "lives" as 
Sethe's baby and as the ghost at Bluestone Road. Beloved's 
fragmented discourse in the monologue, as Wyatt observes, 
"robs the reader of known demarcations, creating a
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linguistic equivalent of the Africans' loss of 
differentiation in an 'oceanic' space that 'unmade' 
cultural identities."^ In a broken, unattached 
recollection that combines geographical displacement, 
maternal abandonment, child sexual abuse, and brutal racial 
persecution into a single, horrific psychology of self­
disruption, Beloved remembers
I watch him eat inside I am crouching to keep from 
falling with the rain I am going to be in pieces he 
hurts where I sleep he puts his finger there I drop 
the food and break into pieces she took my face away 
there is no one to want me to say me my name. (212)
It is unclear whether the sexual abuse "Beloved" recalls 
here (and on 215) occurred on the slave ship (the place of 
"crouching"), after her mother jumped overboard, or after 
enslavement, since the immediately preceding statement that 
"the others are taken I am not taken" may refer to an 
auction. We do know that Sethe's mother--the woman who 
came from the sea--bore several children, the progeny of 
rapes at the hands both of crew members during the Middle 
Passage ("many times") and of later white slavemasters—  
children whom she abandoned (62). What is clear is that 
these lines recount the primal psychic cataclysm when the 
self-experience of Sethe's mother broke into pieces, 
expressing that fragmentation in the crucial infantile 
discourse of hunger for a parent's self-mirroring, self­
naming presence.
Historically generated and generationally descended, 
represented by the child who is a victim of both the Middle 
Passage and Sethe1s desperate act of violence, a product of 
geographical, cultural, physical, and parental violations 
of the total self, this disintegration is fundamental to 
the postslavery African American consciousness, as Morrison 
reemphasizes in the novel's closing pages. Here, Beloved, 
forgotten by the community members whose consciousness 
created her, returns to "the place where long grass opens"- 
-Africa, where the story began--and "erupts into her 
separate parts" (274). Here, Beloved becomes a historical 
version of the wounded "baby" who "struggles beneath the 
surface" of all of the novel's major characters (Schapiro 
195) . Here, Morrison takes us back to their ancestral 
infancy, to the infancy of "African American" identity 
itself. In the archetypical moment when Sethe's mother, 
picking flowers in the "long grass" with her mother, was 
abducted and removed into the galley of a slave ship, 
African American identity was "born, " and born into a 
fragmentation that images the preoedipal fragmentation 
theorized by Klein, Lacan, Kohut, and others.
As the preoedipal, pre-mirror stage, predifferentiated 
child occupies no coherent subject position (and here I am 
using the term "subject" not in a Foucauldian sense but in 
its Benjaminian, intersubjective sense), so the native 
African removed to the galley of the slave ship had her
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subjecthood revoked. Indeed, this systematic displacement 
of a racialized other represents perhaps the most complete 
annihilation of full subjecthood in world history: the
complete "unmaking," as Hortense Spillers has described it, 
of cultural identities in their historical, geographical, 
and relational specificity (72). Like Ralph Ellison's 
hospital machine--perhaps this was its first incarnation-- 
the slave ship was the scene of a violently coercive 
(re)birth, a reduction to racialized objecthood, an 
enforced retreat to a fragment of one's full psychic 
configuration, and--in all these senses— a disintegration 
of the body-self. ”7 Through the single figure of Beloved, 
Morrison accomplishes nothing less than a stunning revision 
of the often racistly deployed concept of ontology- 
recapitulates-phylogeny. In Morrison's revision, however, 
personal ontology recapitulates ethnic phylogeny because of 
the generation-to-generation transmission of narcissistic 
damage that made the culture of slavery so devastating. 
Beloved's "archaic" disintegration anxiety in the novel's 
"present" time recapitulates the disintegration inflicted 
during the most archaic phase of African American 
ethnicity.8
The ghost of slavery future: Denver
By focusing on Sethe's less ghostly daughter, Denver, we 
can move this discussion of U.S. racial psychopathology to
more material grounds and from the historical epoch of 
preslavery to that of postslavery, for, as Mae Henderson 
writes, "The connection of Sethe's present with her past is 
figuratively embodied in her relationship to Beloved while 
the connection with her future is figuratively embodied in 
her relationship with Denver" (75). For Denver Sethe's act 
of violence against her own flesh and blood is not a 
personally experienced memory of parental aggression but 
only a collection of "certain odd and terrifying feelings 
about her mother" that conglomerate around the horrible 
truth she has blocked from her consciousness (102). Yet 
she suffers from a variation of the same gnawing hunger 
that characterizes Beloved and from the same intense need 
to be responded to as a total self. Her psychological 
journey to that archaic state might be traced through her 
passages from preverbal infancy to a normal, early 
childhood development of a linguistically socialized self, 
characterized by her acquisition of "the little i." at Lady 
Jones’s school, and then to the destructuring moment when 
Nelson Lord enunciates her mother's past to her, bringing 
its violence momentarily to consciousness and putting "the 
little _i and all the rest that those afternoons held out of 
reach forever" (102) . It is at this moment that her 
formative "little i." evaporates and she retreats, first to 
two years of isolated silence and deafness, then to her 
"green bush house" in the woods, an enclosed, withdrawn
387
subjectivity she can rigidly control while she "keeps 
watch" for the only object of desire and relationship she 
feels she can safely allow herself, the ghost-baby (105).
Denver's reaction to Beloved when she appears, then,
indicates that Beloved is that object— or, more accurately,
that self-object: Beloved is not only the self-ob~i ec t
Denver begins to look to for company, empathy, and
mirroring appreciation, she is also the self-ob~iect that is
a projection--as I have suggested in the case of Paul D--of
Denver's own injured past and her desire to restore it to
wholeness. 9 Her own ungovernable need for Beloved thus
mimics Beloved's ungoverned need for Sethe, encompassing
both a similarly intense hunger and a similar desperation
for full empathic response. For Denver the catastrophic
end of the "wonderful little i." brought about what she
thinks of as "the original hunger" (121), an orally and
visually hypercathected desire that only Beloved satisfies:
To go back to the original hunger was impossible. 
Luckily for Denver, looking was food enough to last. 
But to be looked at in turn was beyond appetite; it was 
breaking through her own skin to a place where hunger 
hadn't been discovered.... It was lovely. Not to be 
stared at, not seen, but being pulled into view by the 
interested, uncritical eyes of the other. Having her 
hair examined as a part of her self, not as material or 
a style. Having her lips, nose, chin caressed as they 
might be if she were a moss rose a gardener paused to 
admire. (118)
That is, the disintegration of her fragile "i,"
precipitated by her unnameable fear of her own mother as a
threatening, rather than nurturing presence, has catapulted
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Denver into an archaic mode of self-object relationship, 
characterized by similar hungers, similar infantile merger 
fantasies, and, above all in this passage, a similar need 
to be responded to appreciatively as a full self.^0 Again 
notable here is the hypercathexis of these desires onto the 
"visual interactions" through which, "by looking at the 
mother and by being looked at by her, the child attempts 
not only to obtain the narcissistic gratifications that are 
in tune with the visual sensory modality but also strives 
to substitute for the failures that had occurred in the 
realm of physical (oral and tactile) contact or closeness" 
(Kohut, Analysis 117). Instead of directing it toward her 
mother, however, Denver has displaced this needy, injured, 
infantile self-object relationship onto Beloved--both her 
long-lost sister and a version of that common childhood 
compensatory mechanism, the imaginary friend.
Denver's own version of the "depressive-disintegrative 
reaction to the unempathic self-object milieu" (Kohut, 
Restoration 81), then, like Beloved's, involves a marked 
tendency toward "depressive eating," oral-incorporative 
fantasies, and a vulnerability of the self structure that 
threatens its complete dissolution in the absence of the 
mirroring self-object. The novel's opening chapter, for 
example, emphasizes Denver's weight problem and her eating 
binge in response to Paul D's preemption of Sethe's 
attention (19) . Denver only has a "little i., " we might
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say, in the context of Beloved's gaze and presence; without 
Beloved, Denver literally has no self. When Beloved 
momentarily vanishes one day in the darkened cold house, 
the portrait of Denver, too, as a chronic case of 
disintegration anxiety is completed: without Beloved "she 
does not know where her body stops, which part of her is an 
arm, a foot or a knee. She feels like an ice cake torn 
away from the solid surface of the stream. ... Breakable, 
meltable and cold" (123) . If Paul D's arrival at 124 
Bluestone Road threatened the carefully controlled self she 
had managed to retreat to within the green walls of her 
boxwood "bower" (28), causing Denver to cry "for herself 
really, as the Kohut framework suggests, a fragment of her 
self--Beloved's seeming disappearance is far more 
devastating, erasing Denver's identity altogether: "Now she 
is crying because she has no self" (123, my emphases).H
The fact that Beloved is stranded in an immature psychic 
state of narcissistic personality disorder that borders on 
psychosis can be traced to her dual embodiment of the 
infant itself--which never got a chance to grow out of 
primary narcissism--and of the "adult" who is responding in 
enraged, narcissistically damaged ways to what she 
experienced as childhood abandonment (at Sweet Home) and 
physical violence (at Bluestone Road). Denver's less 
severe case cannot be understood in quite the same way, 
however, since she was born during the escape from Sweet
Home, did not feel the direct violence of her mother's 
handsaw, and seems only subconsciously aware of what Sethe 
did that day, experiencing "odd and terrifying feelings" 
(102) and recurrent nightmares about her mother: "She cut
my head off every night" (206) . Indeed, it is the obscure 
rather than direct presence of Sethe1s particular, isolated 
act in Denver's pathogenesis that allows Morrison to focus 
attention on a broader context of dysfunctional 
intersubjective relations and familial disruptions that are 
precipitated by slavery and its associated racist 
practices. In one of his signal modifications of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, Kohut theorizes that "gross events" in 
childhood memory "often turn out to be no more than 
crystallization points" for the child's experience of "the 
specific pathogenic personality of the parent(s) and 
specific pathogenic features of the atmosphere in which the 
child grows up," a matrix of empathic response failure that 
is actually far more important in the genesis of later 
psychological disturbances than any particular "gross 
events" (Restoration 187, my emphasis). If the shock of 
Sethe's infanticide is such a "gross event" in Denver's 
childhood, Morrison nevertheless creates a vision of 
Denver's disturbance that urges us to view the moment in 
the shed--and/or Nelson Lord's enunciation of it--as a mere 
"crystallization point" for a much more comprehensive
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"atmosphere" of faulty responsiveness that actually leads 
to her damaged state.
Correlatively, it is the portrait of Denver that invites 
us to disregard the seemingly important, but profoundly 
misguided, question of Sethe's maternal competence, 
"morality," "guilt," or "innocence" in her commission of 
this particular act of violence--or rather that permits us 
to avoid falling into the trap of asking that question--and 
to focus our attention instead on an entire culture of 
slavery that has produced both Denver's and Sethe1s psychic 
deficiencies. Denver is damaged, that is, not by the 
memory of her mother's commission of a subhuman murder, 
though even Paul D and other members of the African 
American community in the novel attempt to read Sethe's act 
as such, but by the broader absence of anything but 
"pathogenic personalities" in Denver's and Sethe's 
formative relational matrices. The Kohutian paradigm 
suggests that it is Sethe's "disturbed empathic capacity," 
not her moment of defensive violence, "that, by depriving 
[Denver] of maturation-promoting responses, sets up the 
chain of events leading to psychological illness"
(Restoration 188) . ̂ 2 Even more importantly, the object 
relations approach helps us to position both Sethe's 
infanticide and the "disturbed empathic capacity" of which 
it is a manifestation within a larger cycle of emotional 
damage, for, as Kohut observes, "a mother's faulty empathy
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can rarely be judged in isolation....it has to be evaluated 
as a failure vis-a-vis an unusually difficult task" 
(Restoration 29).
The case of Denver, I am suggesting, redirects our 
attention from the "gross event" that seems to be the 
emotional vortex of the novel to the atmosphere of 
relational failures and pathogenic personalities that was 
the condition of the postslavery African American family. 
This atmosphere, Morrison suggests--the abandonments, 
degradations, and violences that have already, by the 
present time of the novel, wrought their havoc on Sethe's 
own sense of self--make her parental "task" not only 
difficult, but very nearly impossible. If the depiction of 
Beloved connects that "gross event" to the disintegrations 
of the African American past, then, it is in the depiction 
of Denver that Morrison most clearly connects slavery's 
disintegration of the African American self to its 
disintegration of the African American family (and, 
thereby, to the postslavery future) . In the cold house, 
when Beloved vanishes and Denver is overcome with panic 
that she is both psychically and physically disintegrating, 
that she literally has "no self," she immediately connects 
her loss of identity to what she has experienced as an 
extended, familial atmosphere of abandonments: "She won't
put up with another leaving, another trick. Waking up to 
find one brother then another not at the foot of the
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bed..."; then the loss of her grandmother, Baby Suggs, and 
now, Beloved, the "dream-come-true" replacement for two 
losses— her sister and the baby-ghost— "comes true just to 
leave her on a pile of newspaper in the dark" (123). And 
while the brothers, Howard and Buglar, left the family 
ostensibly to escape the ghosts of Sethe's violence, their 
choice of isolated wandering, too, must be read in the 
context of a family network, devastated by the practices of 
slavery, that fails to provide the necessary empathic 
support.
The two gaping holes at the center of that network, of 
course, are Sethe's own damaged, "pathogenic personality" 
and the more absolute absence of the father, Halle, whose 
redemptive return is another of Denver's dreams. Halle not 
only failed to rejoin the family after the escape from 
Sweet Home, he did so because, as Paul D explains to Sethe, 
his witnessing of Sethe's rape at the hands of her youthful 
white masters was the final blow that caused his self 
structure, too, to disintegrate. If, in the Kohutian 
framework, every psyche has two opportunities to develop a 
healthy self structure through empathic relationship to 
first one parent, then the other, Denver has suffered a 
double self-object failure: her father has not been present 
at all and her physically present mother has virtually no 
self to internalize. As Schapiro puts it, less clinically, 
"The 'other‘--whether represented by mother or father--is
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always untrustworthy in Morrison's world, rendered thus by 
the social environment" (205). It is this
untrustworthiness of the crucial familial relations that 
structure the self, enforced by an environment of slavery 
that ruptures both the family and the subject, that 
Morrison pinpoints as the intersubjective mechanism of her 
characters' disintegration.
This emphasis is explicit in the case of Baby Suggs, 
Halle's mother and the family's matriarch, who, before 
Halle buys her into freedom and she recovers enough of an 
identity to begin her career of inspirational preaching, 
records her lack of identity as a sadness "at her center, 
the desolated center where the self that was no self made 
its home" (140). If the rhetoric of this sadness echoes 
Denver's "crying because she has no self," its cause also 
has much in common with the disruption of familial bonds at 
the root of Denver's lack of a self. "White" slaveholders 
separated Baby Suggs from all of her children but Halle: 
"it wasn't worth the trouble to try to learn features you 
would never see change into adulthood anyway. Seven times 
she had done that. . . .All seven were gone or dead. What 
would be the point of looking too hard at that youngest 
one?" (139). This passage dramatically inverts the 
language of Denver's hungering for a maternal "look" to 
notice her in all her physical detail, pointing to the 
critical cycle, the transmission of self-fragmentation from
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generation to generation, which the Kohutian framework 
enables us to understand: Baby Suggs, her own self-
structure eradicated by the continuing destruction of her 
family relationships (she has also lost a husband who, 
given the opportunity, had to make an escape to freedom 
without her), is unable to give the crucial "looks" that 
recognize and affirm the total child; Denver has no self-- 
or at best a fragmented and tenuous self--because she has 
not received the "looks" that were essential to moving from 
the infantile "stage of the fragmented self...to the stage 
of the cohesive self" (Analysis 118) and because she, too, 
has found every one of her crucial relationships to be 
untrustworthy.13
It is Sethe, of course, who "looks" both ways in this 
dynamic, having been separated from the "looks" of, and, as 
she perceived it, abandoned by, her mother, thus developing 
the "pathogenic personality" that is incapable--much like 
Baby Suggs--of giving the appropriate recognition to 
Denver. Indeed, the text emphasizes Sethe1s experience of 
the lack of the smile of her mother, who was both 
physically separated from Sethe and facially deformed from 
being forced to wear a bit on the plantation where Sethe 
grew up (203). The consequent destruction of Sethe's own 
self is written as a profound emptiness of the eyes (9)-- 
signalling also her inability to look at Denver with true 
empathic responsiveness--and as a lack of self-boundaries:
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like Beloved in the role of preoedipal infant, "Sethe 
didn't know where the world stopped and she began" (164). 
Such boundaries can only be developed, according to Kohut, 
in empathic relationship to an appropriately structured 
self-object.
The ghost of slavery present; Schoolteacher
In Beloved. however, this destruction of the self 
through the disruption of familial relations is both a 
direct product of and cofunctionary with the debasements of 
a racist system of oppression, or, as FitzGerald puts it, 
"the responsibility for Sethe's confusion lies in slavery, 
which positioned her as object and denied her the 
experience of bonding with her own mother through which she 
could arrive at a separate subjectivity" (678, my 
emphasis). Significantly, the two strands of the 
destruction of the African American self which FitzGerald 
gestures toward here correspond to the two mechanisms of 
fragmentation with which I began this chapter. In pursuing 
my interest in how the admittedly depoliticized self 
psychological view I have presented can be modified to 
include a consciousness of how racial politics impinge upon 
the (mis)construction of subjectivity, I want to separate 
out the first strand of Fitzgerald's formulation--the 
positioning of slavery's victims as objects— as a component 
of the slavery system Morrison represents that is worthy of
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specific study in its own right. In the case of Paul D, 
for example, Morrison's focus is much less on the severance 
of familial bonds and much more on the dehumanizing effects 
of racist objectification. The lack of empathic 
recognition or responsiveness that causes him to "retreat 
to a fragment of [his] larger experiential unit" (Kohut, 
Restoration 81), we might say, takes the form of his being 
treated as an ob-iect rather than as a subi ect. The 
tortures inflicted on him at Sweet Home, which make him 
feel like even less of a subject than the rooster he must 
look at eye-to-eye (72), and the disciplinary enforcement 
of the identification "nigger" on the chain gang (107-8), 
are the cultural strategies of individualization that deny 
the empathic needs of his "broader psychological 
configuration" (Kohut, Restoration 81), causing his "whole" 
self to disintegrate. More explicitly than any of the 
other characters in Beloved. Paul D has survived the idea 
of "nigger" in his symbolic world, and the literal box in 
the ground that physically enforced it on him, by 
retreating to a fragment of his "larger experiential unit": 
"After [the chain gang] he had shut down a generous portion 
of his head, operating on the part that helped him walk, 
eat, sleep, sing....The box had done what Sweet Home had 
not, what working like an ass and living like a dog had 
not: drove him crazy so he would not lose his mind" (41). 
The subterranean box in which he is forced to sleep on the
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chain gang, I am suggesting, is only the disciplinary 
instrument through which is executed his individualization 
in the symbolic box "nigger"--the sexual, economic, and 
psychological servitude to which he returns each morning at 
the utterance of the words "Hungry, nigger?" (108).
Contemplating another degradation a few pages later, 
Paul D reiterates this retreat to a fragment of experience 
as the enclosure of part of himself within a "tobacco tin 
buried in his chest where a red heart used to be" (72-73). 
The unthinkable memory in question here involves 
Schoolteacher, the slavemaster who replaced the marginally 
more humane Mr. Garner at Sweet Home, and who becomes the 
crucial figure in Morrison's depiction of this second, more 
symbolic strand of slavery's annihilation of the "black" 
self. Forced to wear a bit in his mouth by Schoolteacher, 
Paul D realizes that the barnyard rooster, Mister, is 
allowed more of a self than he is: "wasn't no way I'd ever 
be Paul D again, living or dead. Schoolteacher changed me.
I was something else and that something was less than a 
chicken sitting in the sun" (72) . This recollection 
provides our first glimpse of Morrison's recreation of the 
fact that racism was an integral part of slavery. That is, 
Schoolteacher as a "white" man is after more than just the 
material benefits of physical domination and economic 
exploitation; he has an equal if not greater investment in 
this reduction of Paul D to less than subject status, to
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less than human status--to, in fact, the position of 
object. What we see in this torture session is 
Schoolteacher short-circuiting the intersubjective matrix 
to position himself as "white" and as subject and to 
position Paul D as "black"--as racialized other, and, 
thereby, as object. I am not saying that Schoolteacher 
does this to Paul D because of the power invested in him as 
a "white" man, or because Paul D is "black"; I am saying 
that Schoolteacher here creates himself as "white" by, in 
fact, reducing Paul D to the position of object.
The disciplinary session Paul D remembers in this 
passage is really only a material practice in what is 
actually Schoolteacher's far more extensive systematic, 
discursive, and rationalized methodology of objectifica­
tion. Schoolteacher is a sort of pseudoscientific 
disciplinarian, bent on inscribing the African Americans on 
his farm in a discourse of biologization, biological 
segmentation, and taxonomical differentiation. Arriving 
with a supply of notebooks and papers, his intention is not 
only to work his slaves--to exploit their bodily labor for 
profit--but also to (rationally) study them as bodies, thus 
doubly concretizing his own autonomy as rational, thinking, 
and knowing subject. Engaging a practice of slavery that 
is far more devastating to the self-experiences of the 
Sweet Home residents than the simple denial of freedom they 
were accustomed to under the previous owner, both because
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of its more draconian methods of torture and because of its 
positioning of them as objects of study, Schoolteacher 
begins observing, measuring, quantifying, testing, 
notetaking, and classifying his human chattel. In doing 
so, as Mae Henderson phrases it, "he divides or dismembers 
the indivisibility of the slaves' humanity to reconstruct 
(or perhaps deconstruct) the slave in his text" (70).
It isn't the "measuring string" that he applies to 
Sethe's head, nose, and behind (191) that devastates her 
self so much as it is her textualization as subhuman object 
of study, signified by two particular recollections in her 
gallery of horror. The first, which she relates to Beloved 
as justification for the infanticide, is the day she 
overhears Schoolteacher instructing his pupils on how to 
"do" Sethe as a write-up in their notebooks: "'I told you
to put her human characteristics on the left; her animal 
ones on the right. And don't forget to line them up. '" 
(193) . The, second, which occurs the day of the escape 
attempt, is Schoolteacher's instigation of an "experiment" 
in which Sethe is "milked"/raped by his pupils, "two boys 
with mossy teeth, one sucking on my breast the other 
holding me down, their book-reading teacher watching and 
writing it up" (70) . Inferring that physical death is 
preferable to the psychic death of being reduced to a 
sexualized, biologized, and bestialized object in the
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scientific discourse of another, Sethe swears, "No notebook 
for my babies and no measuring string neither" (198) .
"The dismemberment of Schoolteacher's method," then, as 
Henderson notes, "is the discursive analog to the 
dismemberment of slavery" (70). Indeed, Sethe identifies 
Schoolteacher's manipulation of discursive objectification 
as more destructive than his physical abuses. As she 
describes his effect on another of the Sweet Home slaves, 
"'He commenced to carry round a notebook and write down 
what we said. I still think it was them questions that 
tore Sixo up. Tore him up for all time'" (37). As Sethe's 
rhetoric here suggests, moreover, the psychic death imposed 
by Schoolteacher's objectifying disciplines is indeed an 
exact, discursive analog to the "dismemberments" of 
slavery's material practices: like the disruption of
familial relationships, it imports the complete 
fragmentation of the self. Schoolteacher's notebooks form 
a critical symbolic link in his total system of discipline 
for "the dis-memberina of slaves from their families, their 
labor, their selves" (Henderson 71).
Schoolteacher, no less than the fabricators of literary 
"Africanism," is engaged in the practice of writing "race" 
here, though his methodology, as Barbara Christian 
suggests, is probably meant to evoke that of the legion of 
nineteenth-century "white" "scientists" and ethnographers 
who tried to establish physiological justifications for
race differentiation and for slavery. That is, though he 
aspires to the scholarly objectivity of scientific 
empiricism, studying a "thing" that is already "there," 
Morrison shows him to be actually creating "race" in his 
objects of study as he studies them. His method of inquiry 
is not intersubjective or empathic, to use the terms of my 
psychoanalytic perspective, but is structured, like his 
physical humiliation of Paul D, to confirm his own position 
as knowing, thinking subject, fey. defining others as 
objects. His "study" of "race" thus takes the form, as his 
anatomical segmentation of Sethe suggests, of a creation of 
"race" that constitutes his subjectivity as culture and 
civilization, hers as nature and body; his as human, hers 
as animal. His writing of "race," to borrow Henderson's 
cogent summary, "espouses a concept of difference and 
'otherness' as a form of subhumanity that serves, through a 
process of negative self-identification, to confirm his own 
sense of superiority. It is Sethe' s 'savagery' which 
confirms Schoolteacher's 'civilization,' her 'bestiality' 
which confirms his 'humanity'" (70).
Morrison's fictional portrayal of Schoolteacher thus 
dramatizes her critical assertion, in Plavincr in the Dark, 
about the psychological instrumentality of "black slavery": 
"in that construction of blackness and enslavement could be 
found not only the not-free but also, with the dramatic 
polarity created by skin color, the projection of the not
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me" (38) . From forcing Paul D to wear the bit to 
observing, questioning, and "writing" his slaves, we can 
see Schoolteacher constructing a system of both "race" and 
enslavement that projects his "not-me," allowing him to 
self-legitimatingly clear his own subject of "savagery." 
Morrison thus represents fictionally how it is this 
psychological function— what she calls, in Plaving in the 
Dark, "ego-reinforcement"--that made the practice of racial 
objectification itself--especially the deployment of "race" 
as a discursive discipline--essential to the practice of 
slavery.
This constitution of "blackness" as "savage," "sexual," 
and "bodily" as a means of reinforcing the subjecthood of a 
"white" ego, of course, is what I have been describing 
throughout this study as a racial mirror stage. As I have 
tried to show--as Fanon so poignantly represents his 
response to the epithet "nigger"--being positioned as 
"black" object to the "white" subject in such a 
constitution of subjectivity is inherently fragmenting for 
the "black" self, a fragmentation Morrison captures in the 
images of both Sixo, torn up by the discursive discipline 
of Schoolteacher's notebooks, and Paul D, who shuts down a 
portion of his head to survive the bodily discipline of 
Schoolteacher's bit and collar. The symbolic, imaginative, 
and discursive destruction of the "black" self articulated 
by Schoolteacher's modes of racial individualization, then,
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are the novel's particular instances of a larger, cultural
mirror stage that implements the symbolic violence of
"white" and "black." Indeed, Morrison thematizes this
cultural mechanism in a crucial passage that seems to
forego, for the moment, both narrative voice and the
implied consciousness of her character--Stamp Paid--in
order to engage in a bit of blunt cultural analysis. In
effect, her description of the constitution of "whiteness"
as a process by which "whites" project onto "blackness" a
"jungle" that actually "lived under their own white skin"
(199), provides the interpretation of what she has shown
Schoolteacher doing with his notebooks. Like
Schoolteacher, "whites" at large have created the
"savagery," disorder, and subhumanity that they claim only
to observe or respond to in "blacks":
Whitepeople believed that whatever the manners, under 
every dark skin was a jungle. Swift unnavigable 
waters, swinging screaming baboons, sleeping snakes, 
red gums ready for their sweet white blood....But it 
wasn't the jungle blacks brought with them to this 
place from the other (livable) place. It was the 
jungle whitefolks planted in them. And it grew. It 
spread. (198)
Moreover, Morrison's cultural mirror stage, like that of 
Fanon, is powerful and destructive: those positioned by it 
as "black" object cannot help but engage a desperate, 
disordered effort to regain the position of subject-- 
"human," in the mirror stage's own symbolic code--which is 
a necessity for the experience of total selfhood: "The more
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coloredpeople spent their strength trying to convince them 
how gentle they were, how clever and loving, how human, the 
more they used themselves up to persuade whites of 
something Negroes believed could not be questioned, the 
deeper and more tangled the jungle grew inside" (198).
The inevitable growth of this disordered "jungle" 
corresponds to the profound sense of objectification 
experienced at Schoolteacher's hands by Paul D and Sethe. 
Not only does it mandate a perpetual, and virtually 
impossible, struggle to reconnect with the "human," 
"rational," and "emotional" components of self-experience, 
as Stamp Paid here suggests, but that very struggle also 
implies a segmentation of the total self. We might 
understand the denial of full self experience implicit in 
objectification in terms of Jessica Benjamin's 
intersubjective theory, which argues that the splitting of 
the intersubjective field into subject and object can only 
be experienced as fragmenting for human psyches that are 
inherently relational and intersubjective (63). Or, as I 
have suggested, we might understand Schoolteacher's 
objectifying disciplines as denials of full empathic 
recognition, forcing the paradigmatic "retreat" to a 
fragment of the "broader psychological configuration" 
(Kohut, Restoration 81). Or, as Sethe herself describes 
the objectifying force of the racial mirror stage, "anybody 
white could take your whole self for anything that came to
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mind. Not just work, kill, or maim you, but dirty you. 
Dirty you so bad you forgot who you were and couldn1t think 
it up anymore" (251).
This symbolic strand of slavery's destruction of the 
"black" self, then, reinforces the familial and relational 
destruction of the slave identity. Insomuch as it 
functions as a more insidious symbolic structure within the 
African American psyche, it propagates that destruction 
into the postslavery future correlatively (and 
overlappingly, as I have noted) with the intergenerational 
transmission of self-object damage that Morrison most 
notably thematizes as a sort of matrilineal dysfunction. 
But what I have tried to suggest, in bringing the 
intersubjective and object-relational perspectives to bear 
on the racial mirror stage, is that these two mechanisms of 
slavery's fragmentation of the African American self are 
not only related and similar, but related and similar 
because they are versions of the same process of identity 
formation; more accurately, of the same process of identity 
distortion. From the perspective of an intersubjective 
context in which the experience of a whole, total, or 
integrated self has its being through "mutual recognition" 
with other "subjects" (Benjamin), or in relationship with 
others that are experienced as "self-objects" through the 
mediation of "empathic response" (Kohut), that is, the 
racial mirror stage is understandable as a form of self
object failure. The racial mirror stage, like its Lacanian 
antecedent, relies on a denial of intersubjectivity and its 
empathy, postulates an "I" by violently splitting the 
experiential world into knowing subject and external 
object, and, thereby, closes off the intermediate, 
internalizing position of self-object. When the current 
flowing through empathy flickers off, entire sectors of the 
self disappear, as Paul D discovers when he loses his "red 
heart" and shuts down a portion of his head. Both the 
perpetrators and the victims of the racial mirror stage, 
then, will experience a fragmentation analogous to those 
who, robbed in development of the empathic response and 
internalizability of healthy parental self-objects, are 
stranded in a perpetual quest for a more integrated 
experience of identity. Psyches struggling to survive in 
the absences of "mutual recognition" pursuant to either the 
cultural or the personal process I have outlined here, 
Morrison's novel illustrates, will retreat to fragments of 
their experience. Her "'inscape' of the memory of 
slavery," a product of both processes working together, 
provides a racially politicized analog to Kohut' s 
understanding of the psychic misery of "Tragic Man": "The
deepest horror man can experience is that of feeling that 
he is exposed to circumstances in which he is no longer 
regarded as human by others; i.e., in a milieu that does
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not even respond with faulty or distorted empathy to his 
presence" (Reflections).
The pieces I am. she gather them
When Denver walks out of the boundaried structure of the 
house at 124 Bluestone Road, which has become a site of 
"consuming narcissism" (Schapiro 204) isolated from the 
outside world, she makes a first, tentative step toward 
reinstating mutually supportive, empathically communicative 
relations with a community of self-objects (248-49). In 
response to Denver's attempt at connection, the 
narcissistically disordered structure of her life suddenly 
inverts as her requests for help, her offerings of service, 
and her efforts at conversation are rewarded with food, 
education, and friendship. When Paul D finally overcomes 
the blindness of a white-derived rhetoric that defines 
Sethe as beast, part of his own internalized "jungle," he 
is able to reach out to her with a gesture of affirming, 
bodily, empathic responsiveness, converting his discourse 
about the number of her feet to an offer to rub her feet 
(272) . Both instances point to the possibility that, 
despite the formidable replicative capacity of slavery's 
mutilations of the self, neither its infliction of 
narcissistic damage nor its cultural disciplines of 
objectification are impenetrable.
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Sethe is still, as Paul D offers to bathe her, only able 
to imagine the kind of attention, the kind of looking, that 
segments her as a body--"If he bathes her in sections, will 
the parts hold?"--but it is precisely his offer of close, 
loving attention to her as a total self, almost as a "total 
child, " that initiates the process by which she might 
recover a sense of her own, still tentative, "Me? Me?" 
Though the novel provides no guarantees, that is, we are 
invited to imagine that Paul D's "holding fingers" "holding 
hers," together with his affirming response--"You your best 
thing, Sethe"--could provide the structure--like the 
pathogenically missing mother's smile--for rebuilding her 
self (273). Sethe's closing "Me? Me?" suggests a possible 
revision of not only the narcissistically damaged Sethe, 
who can only think of her children as extensions of her 
self (and the "best" part of her self), but also of the 
racially individualized Sethe, who is accustomed to being 
sectioned, measured, and animalized.
The way out of the fragmentations of slavery, as Paul D 
recalls in this scene while trying to cope with the "too 
many things" he feels: about Sethe (272), is suggested by 
Sixo's relationship to the "Thirty-Mile Woman." An 
empathic friendship of the mind that involves neither 
making the other a part of oneself nor responding to only a 
part of them, neither reducing the other to an object nor 
exalting them as an ideal, this relationship offers a model
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for the reintegration of self-experience. As Sixo 
described it: "She is a friend of my mind. She gather me, 
man. The pieces I am, she gather them and give them back 
to me in all the right order" (272-73). In suggesting that 
we take a lesson about empathic responsiveness from this 
passage, I do not want "empathy" to be construed as 
anything as simple as "caring," "sympathy," or "closeness." 
What I take friendship of the mind to mean is the 
continual, mutual attempt to recognize the full psychic 
configuration of another as if from within it, hence 
enabling each party to sense the important "pieces" of the 
other that they might be constantly reflecting that psychic 
configuration back in "all the right order."
bell hooks has described this passage as "paradigmatic" 
for a "transformed" notion of how black men and women can 
bond (214), and, given our similar need for transformed 
modes of bonding across a multitude of identity modes, I 
would extend that application. hooks is quite right to 
note that the passage evokes the need of black women and 
men for "that space of recognition and understanding, where 
we know one another so well, our histories, that we can 
take the bits and pieces, the fragments of who we are, and 
put them back together, re-member them" (214). But it is 
precisely in the significance of these historical pieces, 
the past versions of the self, the "yesterday" that Paul D 
gestures toward in beginning to think of building his and
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Sethe1s "tomorrow" (273), that Sixo1s paradigm is most 
applicable to additional, broader social dynamics. As Mae 
Henderson argues, Morrison's call for a "re-memberance" of 
the self imports not only Sethe1 s need to "claim and 
surrender the past in order to refigure the future, " but 
also the reader's need to do likewise (82). For culturally 
"white" readers like myself, then, Beloved provides a 
critical first opportunity to become empathically immersed 
in the full psychology of the African American past, that 
we might avert what Henderson refers to as the 
"continuation of a 'national amnesia'" about the "personal 
aspects of the story of slavery" (83).-*-5 in rereading 
Morrison's story of my own historical and racial "others" 
from an empathic perspective, I am most interested in how 
such a friendship of the minds across the cultural and 
psychic boundaries of the U.S. racial mirror stage could 
contribute to an interracial restoration of the self.
Notes
1. The work of reading the psychological implications of 
Beloved has already been initiated in productive, and 
productively different, ways by Schapiro, Henderson, 
Fitzgerald, Wyatt, and Mathieson, among others. As 
Morrison has commented in comparing her fiction to the 
histories of slave life contained in the slave narratives, 
the impulse of her artistic effort was to "find and expose 
a truth about the interior life of people who didn't write 
it" ("Site" 113, emphasis mine).
2. Although Benjamin's focus on the "self who suffers the 
lack of recognition" (19) has much in common with Kohut's 
emphasis on the self damaged by failures of empathic 
response, she explicitly distances her conception of
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intersubjectivity from Kohut's idea of self-object 
relationships, arguing that the latter "fails to 
distinguish between using others as 'selfobjects' and 
recognizing the other as an outside subject, missing the 
key point of the intersubjective view" (251, n.16). While 
this would seem to place Kohut midway between Klein's 
strictly object-relations view and Benjamin's subject- 
subject paradigm, I believe it somewhat mischaracterizes 
self psychology, failing to take into account, for example, 
the recognition of the other as sub-iect that is implicit in 
the deep empathy of the healthy or therapeutic self-object 
relationship.
3. In my reference to Wyatt, as in my discussion of Horvitz 
above, I have somewhat deliberately avoided their emphasis 
on the identity issues in Bel oved as questions of 
specifically maternal, feminine, or African American 
women's identity or recovery. I do so not to deny the 
validity of what critics like Wyatt, Horvitz, and Henderson 
have interpreted as the novel's emphasis on women's 
subjectivity, but to suggest how the validity of their 
observations extends to the novel's concern with racial 
subjectivity, across, for the moment, gender lines. 
Morrison herself has insisted that she writes "without 
gender focus" ("Interview" 54), suggesting a willingness to 
think beyond the mother-daughter identity dynamic that 
manifests itself in at least two textual details: Denver is 
crippled not only by Sethe's inability to provide a healthy 
"maternal" model, but also by Halle's equally significant 
physical absence; and it is Paul D who eventually moves 
into the role most evocative of what Wyatt calls the 
"maternal symbolic," offering a caring, bodily, "mothering" 
relationship to Sethe in the final scene.
4. Rick Moreland finds another useful psychoanalytic model 
for this relationship in Julia Kristeva's descriptions of 
the autoeroticism of the mother-child dyad. Without the 
crucial presence of what Kristeva calls the "Third Party," 
he notes, "Sethe retreats again into this 'inside 
loneliness' with Beloved.... this retreat functions in the 
way Kristeva describes the mother-infant romance that from 
two into an indistinguishable one threatens to collapse 
into abjection and devouring" (519).
5. Beloved's disintegration, FitzGerald suggests, can also 
be read as a version of what Klein called "the feeling that 
the ego is in bits, " a result of infantile ambivalence 
about or splitting of a maternal imago that the infant, 
still preoedipally unseparated from the mother, can only
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perceive as totally nurturing or totally abandoning (674). 
Barbara Mathieson, meanwhile, finds both Freud and the 
object relationalist D. W. Winnicott useful in 
understanding the distinctly narcissistic and preoedipal 
identity (mal)formations of characters in the novel, 
especially Beloved (2-3). The ghost-baby1s fear of 
disintegration, Mathieson notes, can also be referred to 
Winnicott's observation of anxieties of self-disintegration 
in young children as a response to maternal absence 
(Mathieson 17).
6 . Wyatt 480. Wyatt draws her characterization of the 
middle passage from the remarks of Hortense Spillers in her 
essay "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar 
Book."
7. In Invisible Man. the protagonist, his head encircled by 
a piece of iron like the iron collar worn by the smiling 
woman in Beloved's recollection of the Middle Passage, 
experiences the hospital machine not only as a place where 
he "had just begun to live" but also as an amputation of 
his limbs and a dissolution of his bodily boundaries, and 
as a desperate guest to name himself (228, 232-35).
8 . In other words, a psychoanalytic recovery of the past 
that would be therapeutic for victims of racialization like 
Sethe would have to include retelling and repossessing not 
only her personal past, but some recovery of the history of 
slavery as well, like the retelling Morrison herself is 
engaged in here. See Henderson 72-75 and n. 30, especially 
her observations on the concept of ontology's 
recapitulation of phylogeny that Morrison may be revising 
to her own purposes.
9. Rick Moreland has argued, somewhat differently from my 
own formulation, that Beloved serves as a sort of 
Kristevian "Third Party" for Denver, facilitating her 
emergence from an isolated, abject relationship to Sethe 
and enabling her to revise and retell her "story" about 
herself in a way that gives her an interactive, "different 
role than that of either the hero or the powerless victim" 
(514). While I find Moreland's reading of Denver's 
condition in terms of the isolation and polarization forced 
on her by the "romance" discourse of either "heroism" or 
"helplessness" a useful addition to the psychoanalytic 
framework of infantile narcissism (which similarly 
polarizes possession and dependence), I think his view 
idealizes the therapeutic nature of the Denver-Beloved 
relationship in ways the text does not support, neglecting
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what seem to be the distinctly unhealthy, narcissistically 
damaged aspects of their interaction after Denver's 
"retelling" of her story/self: for example, Denver's panic 
of total disintegration (123) and the threesome's later 
withdrawal inside the isolating boundaries of their house.
10. See also Kohut's description of such relationships, in 
an analytical context, as involving "editions of a child's 
demands for attention, approval, and for the confirmatory 
echoing of its presence," and "an admixture of the tyranny 
and overpossessiveness which betrays a heightening of oral- 
sadistic and anal-sadistic drive elements" (Analysis 124- 
25) .
11. The cold house where Denver's disintegration panic 
occurs seems to be an important locus in the novel for the 
associations of the characters' disintegration anxieties. 
It is, of course, where Paul D and Beloved enact their 
eroticized quest for wholeness, but it is also where 
Beloved becomes transfixed by the "sunlit cracks" in the 
ceiling, causing her to curl into a fetal position (124), 
and where Paul D lives among "old newspapers gnawed at the 
edges by mice" and "moonlight seeping through the cracks" 
(263-64). Such images evoke the way Kohut's patients link 
"the dread of the loss of [the] self" to the structural 
integrity of their living quarters: "a negligible crack in 
the plaster in one room might indicate the presence of a 
serious structural defect of the patient's house....or, in 
dreams, the frightening infestation of the living quarters 
with spreading vermin" (Restoration 105).
12. We might include in such a characterization of Sethe 
her hyperprotective refusal to consider Denver as a full, 
separate subject in - her own right (44-45), what Paul D 
refers to as her "too-thick" love (164), and the fact that, 
at the moment of crisis, she can only think of her children 
as "parts" of her own self that she "collects" (163), 
which, indeed, is the mental configuration that enables her 
to think in terms of killing the "crawling-already?" baby 
to protect it from slavery, as FitzGerald points out (678).
13. In a parallel and productive interpretation, Schapiro 
reads the "looking" dynamic I am emphasizing here in terms 
of Benjamin's concept of "recognition," equally critical to 
the development of the self as an experiential whole--the 
subject, in Benjamin's framework. Noting that "empathize" 
is one of the possible "near-synonyms" for what she means 
by "recognize," Benjamin observes, "The idea of mutual
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recognition seems to me an ever more crucial category of 
early experience" (16).
14. Characterizing Schoolteacher as a "disciplinary" 
"ethnographer-as-historian," Henderson claims that Morrison 
uses his portrayal as "an indictment of the kind of 
'scholarly' and 'scientific' discourse and representation 
in which the preconceptions and presuppositions of the 
inquirer subject the results of the inquiry to gross 
distortions" (84, n.18).
15. Citing Morrison's 1989 interview in Time magazine, 
Henderson reports, "Morrison tells us that Beloved is a 
book 'about something that the characters don't want to 
remember, I don't want to remember, black people don't want 
to remember, white people don't want to remember.' The 
author's remarks speak to a public desire to repress the 
personal aspects of the story of slavery." See Morrison, 
"The Pain of Being Black," Time (May 22, 1989): 120.
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